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Some Aspects of the Political Career of Marcus Licinius Crassus
Consul 70 and 55 B.C.
“ An Abstract »
Ch» I A discrepancy exists in the ancient sources between the record of
Crassus * activities and assessments of his importance® Some possible reasons
are considered®
Ch. II Crassus* birth date is placed between late June 115 and very early
114. Absent from Rome between 87 and 82, Crassus entered the senate in about
81® He was praetor in 75 or 74, was prosecuted for incest in 75, and was
therefore a privâtus when given the command against Spartacus® His political
position in the 70s is considered.
Ch. Ill In 70 Crassus was concerned in the restoration of the tribunicia
potestas, as he shows connections with several tribunes of the 70s. His
breach with Pompey may concern the actions of the censors of 70. Crassus
was interested in the reform of the courts, though probably friendly to
Verres®
Ch. IV Crassus may have been hostile to both Lucullus and Pompey in the
early 60s® Cn.Piso prosecuted Manilius in 66/5, and was sent to Spain to
facilitate a change of prosecutor® Catiline was involved against Manilius®
Ch. V In 65 Crassus aimed to enfranchise the Transpadani in order to
increase his power in the comitia. He was also concerned to annexe Egypt.
Frustrated by Catulus, he considered an alliance with Pompey, and began to
cooperate with Caesar.
Ch. VI Catiline's supposed Pompeian ties are unconvincing. Crassus
. supported, Catiline and Antonius® In 63 Cicero allied himself with the
optimates, frustrated Crassus* tribunician programme, and tried to destroy
his political credibility by virtually creating the Catilinarian
"conspiracy".
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Ch. VII Pompey had hoped to return with his army. He then tried to
ally himself with Cato, and dropped several former associates, one of whom, 
P.Clodius, was helped by Crassus. Crassus joined the optimates to ensure 
Pompey’s frustration. The First Triumvirate ensued.
Ch. VIII In April 59 Pompey and Caesar tried to drop Crassus, who managed,
through his association with Clodius, to prevent this. The Vettius affair
may have been genuine. The tribunician elections were held in October.
Ch. IX Having failed to crush Pompey through Clodius, Crassus, with
Caesar’s help, forced him to a crisis from which he himself would emerge the 
strongest. Provincial commands were decided at Luca; the second consulship 
was not.
Ch. X Most of the measures passed’in 55 were not politically - significant.
Crassus, more committed to the alliance, now incurred hostility. Though 
away in 54 he kept in touch, and may have been involved in the electoral
scandal of that year.
Ch. XI Crassus* style belied his great ambitions. The nature of his
power necessitated an approach different from that of Pompey. His strategy 
for securing supreme power is considered. The political realignment 
that followed his death led inevitably to Civil War.
Appendix A Crassus married the widow of a brother who died by 91 - Publius, 
his elder son, married Scipio’s daughter probably in 55» Marcus married 
Caecilia Metella in 70 or 69»
Appendix B Plutarch’s figure for Crassus* total wealth is too low. Pompey 
and Crassus were both very rich. Crassus had interests Îîî the South of 
Italy, and derived his wealth from Spanish silver mines, housing, and slaves.
. Appendix C Cicero’s Sixth Stoic Paradox may have existed before all six were 
published together in 46. Plutarch thought it a speech, and associated it 
with Crassus’ trial for incest in 75»
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Preface
. When this study was undertaken, Crassus seemed to be suffering from 
many years of neglect. The principal works that considered his career as 
a whole were Gelzer’s article in RE, perhaps the standard account, and 
three long, but ultimately unhelpful, articles by Garzetti in Athenaeum. 
Before them had come Delmatel’s obscure De Vita M. Licinii Crassi, and 
after, an interesting but short article by Cadoux in Greece and Rome, and 
a rather slim monograph by Adcock. There was certainly room for an 
investigation into a number of aspects of Crassus* career that had received 
little, or uncritical, treatment. Since this investigation was begun, 
however, two full length works have appeared, one by Marshall and another 
by Ward. . Between them these works go far to establish the previously 
obscured truth that Crassus was a much more formidable and significant 
figure than has often been supposed. Both aclmowledge that he was 
primarily a politician rather than a financier. On many points of detail, 
and on several larger matters, the present study disagrees with the 
conclusions in these recent works. It has not been feasible at all points 
to include references to them, since much of the research for this study 
was completed before either appeared. Where possible, however, notice has 
been taken of views in these works that have seemed to require attention.
The title of the present study, though cumbersome, has been 
deliberately chosen. This does not profess to be a full biography of 
Crassus. There is no treatment of any of his military exploits. Nor 
does it cover, with equal depth of treatment, all phases of Crassus* 
political career. Although a chronological sequence has largely been 
followed, and something of a continuous narrative attempted, this is 
intended rather to connect the more detailed analyses of certain key points.
(viii)
Three topics hard to reconcile with such a consecutive treatment have 
been included in appendices.
It has been necessary to relegate references to modern» writings, and 
some discussions, to notes at the end® To avoid inconvenience, however, 
most references to ancient sources are included in the body of the text, 
as are page numbers for the lists of sources in Broughton’s 
Magistrates of the Roman Republic®
Thanks beyond measure are due to Dr. J.S. Richardson without whose 
patience and long-sustained enthusiastic help this study could never have 
been concluded®
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Chapter I The Problem
Explaining, to one unversed in the history of the late Republic, who 
Licinius Crassus was, almost always necessitates some such expressions 
as "the third member, of- the First Triumvirate, the colleague of Caesar and 
Pompey". He seems thus to exist only by virtue of this appendant 
relationship to his better knoim. contemporaries, unless it be that one can 
jog a somnolent memory by a reference to his proverbial wealth. Even 
then confusion with his apparent near homonym, Croesus, the King of Lydia, 
may be responsible for the flicker of recognition. If Crassus* 
achievements are held up alongside those of his fellow "triumvirs", they 
hardly shine in comparison. As a soldier he was surpassed by such 
obviously lesser men as M.Curio, M.Metellus Pius, the two Luculli, even by 
M.Pupius Piso, twice a triumphator to Crassus* single ovation. Cicero, 
Hortensias, and Galvus in a descending order of political importance were 
all esteemed better orators than Crassus. His only unquestioned 
legislative achievement, the Lex Licinia de Sodaliciis, while useful, 
hardly qualified its author for immortality. He came from a noble family 
and reached the censorship. The actions and events of his career make 
even the prominence generally accorded him by modern scholars hard to 
understand, and seem quite at odds with some of the estimates of his 
power and significance offered by ancient sources. Therein indeed lies 
the problem. In several places Crassus* importance is asserted but this 
assertion never seems vindicated by the surrounding narrative.
Velleius, writing of the formation of the alliance that came to be 
known as the first triumvirate, stated Crassus* motive for joining;
"ut quern principatum solus adsequi non poterat, auctoritate Pompeii, 
viribus teneret Caesaris" (2.44.2). Crassus some ten years earlier was, 
according to Velleius, "rnox rei publicae omnium consensu principem" (2.50.4),
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These are not descriptions of a mere princeps as the word applied to such 
principes as Q.Catulus, or to Q.Metellus Pius, but rather of an 
immoderately ambitious man of immense power. Dio confirms this, 
impression. Assessing the relative strength of the three dynasts-in 60, 
.he writes that Pompey was less strong than he would have wished, that
r  y uCaesar’s power was growing, and that Crassus was (57.56-5).
Dio too set no bounds to Crassus* ambition, which was to surpass all 
rivals, ".TTdiPTOP u (57-56.4). Caesar was aware that the
opposition of either Pompey or Crassus could be disastrous (57-55.1). 
Plutarch, in his life of Pompey, describes Crassus as ~foT€
n r o O f A & 9 0 9  ir/\ovo~jupTctros hwuL oeL^o'rcK'ros sinrsjLÿ 
e^VTOV -r& Tré>fAîr^ i>ov rCAL rovs aXXüvs (Pomp.22.1).
Plutarch elsewhere writes that Crassus made himself a match for both 
Pompey and Caesar in power (Comp.Grass.et Nie.2.5)« Asconius saw Crassus 
as "aemulus potentiae On. Pompeii" (25,C).
The M.Crassus discernible from his recorded actions in no way matches 
these estimates. One is forced either to consider the assessments of his 
power and influence exaggerated, or else to conclude that much of his 
activity has for some reason dropped out of the records of the period.
The first way is unconvincing. If Crassus was merely a fairly
(1)influential and moderate senator, one of the principes civitatis, why
was it essential, as it clearly was, for Pompey, unquestionably the
dominant figure of the period, to ally himself with this man, apparently
against his personal inclinations, not once but three times? It is
precisely this paradox that has helped to perpetuate the myth that Crassus
was necessary to the first triumvirate because of his money. It has been
clearly shown, if not without exaggeration, that Pompey was at that time
(2)certainly no poorer than Crassus. There were other factors than 
wealth to malie Crassus indispensable.
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The remainder o.f this study will he devoted, to the attempt to piece 
together the missing elements. Some attention, however, must first be 
paid to the question of how these elements have come to be .missing. VJhy, 
if Crassus was prominently involved in events, do the sources, omit to 
mention the fact? ‘
.The surviving contemporary sources for the period are few® Far and 
away the most important is Cicero. There can be little doubt that Cicero 
heartily detested Crassus: "0 hominem nequam" (Att.4.15®2). Despite
numerous complimentary references to Crassus in public speeches 
(e.g. Mur. 10;48;Verr®2.5.5;Cael.9;l8;Balb.50)9 he mocked and vilified him 
in conversation and correspondence while he lived (Plut.Cic.25.3-26.1 ; 
8all.Cat.48.9;Cic.Att.4.15.2;cf.Fam.5.8) and defamed his memory after 
Carrhae (Off. 3.73-73;Parad.8t.6;Tusc.5«1l6), most particularly in his 
posthumously published work generally knovm. as the De Consiliis 8uis 
(Plut.Cr„'13.4;Asc.85c) and in the sixth 8toic Paradox. Cicero*s 
political hopes and fears centred for many years on the prepotent figure 
of Pompey, through whom he hoped to realise his own ambitions, and for 
whose alliance, it will be argued, he found himself in competition with 
Crassus. Of Caesar he entertained occasional hopes (Att.2.1 <.6;5.15.3? 
3.18.1;4.19.2), but in Crassus he seems generally to have recognised an 
implacable foe; "sed Crassum tamen metuo" (Fam.l4.2.2;cf.Plut.Cic.30.1; 
55.5;Or®13.5)o It will be argued below that Crassus was very active 
politically in the years 65-63. Cicero seems to have acknowledged this 
fact in his lost "De Consiliis Suis", but, as will be argued, had his ovm. 
excellent reasons for distorting the nature of that involvement. When 
currying favour with Pompey, as for example in his speech De lege Manilio, 
Cicero had no desire to praise Crassus. It is not surprising therefore 
that Crassus gets little credit from Cicero for his success in the
4Servile war or for his part in the reforms of 70. Even where, in 
Cicero's correspondence, Crassus is clearly involved, as in many of the 
reports of dissension among the dynasts in 59, he is rarely named. He is 
not named as the target of the sixth Stoic Paradox, but there is no doubt 
that he is meant (see below, Appendix C)« That he is Gal vus ex Nanneianis 
(Att.1.16.5) is maintained below, and by many scholars. Arguments from 
Cicero's silence are untrustworthy.
Of other contemporary sources, only Caesar and Sallust survive.
Caesar's commentaries do not concern themselves much with domestic politics
until, writing of the very end of the fifties, he seeks to justify his
actions in resorting to arms. Crassus was dead before such concern was
called for. Sallust's Histories are for the most part lost to us, and in
any case seem not to have progressed beyond the early sixties- They were
nevertheless a major source for the decade they did cover, and were
clearly used by Plutarch in his account of the Servile War and the events
(3)of 71/70. Sallust's monograph on the Catilinarian conspiracy is rather 
an essay in style and form of a moralistic reduction of history than a 
piece of genuine historical research. He accepts without much question 
the basic Ciceronian account of the affair, his own contribution being 
largely in the spheres of atmosphere, background, and characterisation.
Thus once the towering figure of the monstrous Catiline has left the 
stage, Sallust sets up a fresh confrontation between the two moral 
exemplars Caesar and Cato. There is simply no room in this grand but 
simplified picture for the actual political background.
By far the earliest narrative account that has come dovai to us is 
that of Velleius. What we have is a highly compressed survey of the 
whole of Roman History down to his own times. He intended however 
subsequently to write a much fuller account of events from the late
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Republic onwards (Veil.2.48.5) and presumably had researched this later 
period more fully. , On both his father's and his mother's sides he was 
descended by two or three generations from praefecti fabrum under
(4) *Pompey. The high estimate he gives of Crassus' importance has already
been noted. He shows easy familiarity with Cicero's works, particularly 
in a rather irrelevant discursioji^concerning M.Caelius Rufus (Veil.2,68). 
Otherwise his two chief sources for the period that concerns us are 
Sallust, already mentioned, and Pollio.
The latter is particularly important in the search for the reasons 
for the Crassan problem. Pollio chose as his starting point the 
consulship of Q.Metellus Celer and L.Afranius in 6o. This was the year 
in which the first triumvirate was formed. Pollio professed to see in 
the alliance of Pompey and Caesar the seeds of their later falling-out and 
the years of chaos and bloodshed that ensued. Pollio is concerned with 
the Civil Wars. When war broke out in 49 the protagonists were Pompey 
and Caesar. They had earlier been allied. The entire preceding decade 
was therefore considered essentially with regard to the deterioration of 
that relationship. That there had originally been a third partner could 
not be allowed to disturb the sweep of the story,- still less the possible 
fact that that third partner was at least originally of greater stature 
than one of the eventual two. This is not to accuse Pollio of deliberate 
distortion in the interests of his plan. He loiew from first hand 
experience how the story ended. In the early he was not a 
participant and will quite naturally have viewed the events of those years 
with hindsight, Pompey and Caesar were the two great powers in the 
state in 50; presumably the same obtained in 6o when they joined 
forces. Pollio's picture may have been a little affected by the 
obvious inferiority of the third member'of the second Triumvirate,
M« Lepidus, This may have conditioned him to think of a triple alliance
as two-and-a-bit. He may not have been so far wrong in that view
regarding 60, except that Caesar may have seemed then a better candidate 
for the bit part, a thought inconceivable later.
Pollio*s structure and emphasis were highly influential® Not only 
historians such as Velleius (2.44) and later Florus (2.13*8ff), but also 
poets such as Horace (Carm.2.1.1ff) and Lucan (Phars.1.84ff) accepted his
(5)choice of 60 as the decisive year. The two combatants at Pharsalus
cast their shadows a long way back, to the inevitable distortion of the
historical balance. Pompey *s importance was not exaggerated, but his
later stance as champion of the senate perhaps diverted attention from the
revolutionary nature of his early career. Caesar's importance prior to
his consulship was however unquestionably greatly inflated.^^ Caesar's
gain has probably been Crassus' loss.
Pollio's emphasis on Pompey and Caesar had its effect. So too,
Sallust's on Caesar and Cato may have been a precursor of the flurry of
biographies that were to pour out in a virtual propaganda war.
Cato Uticensis became the saint of those opposed to Caesar or Caesarians.
Brutus and Cicero both wrote hagiographical biographies, as did
MoPadius Callus and Hunatius Rufus (Cic.Fam.7.24o2;Plut.Cat.Min.37).
Counterblasts, or Anticatos, were delivered by Caesar himself and Hirtius.
There is some doubt about the earliest lives of Caesar. Balbus and
(7)Oppius are both uncertainly credited with such works. It has been 
argued that as in the case of Cato, there are for Caesar two separate 
biographical traditions, one friendly, whose heirs are Velleius and 
Plutarch, and the other culminating in the essentially hostile account of
/ONSuetonius. However this may be, it is certain that the efforts of the 
Caesarian and Catonian propagandists ensured that the slightest action of 
either hero would survive in the historical tradition. Pompey's name
was a less potent rallying cry for. the.later "republicans", but he had 
talcen precautions that an account of his exploits would be transmitted 
to posterity. While he did not write it himself, as did Caesar, he carried 
about with him his tame historian, Theophanes of Mitylene.
His eastern campaigns were also treated by the eminent and 
influential historian, Posidonius. These accounts, coupled with the fact 
that Sallust’s Histories barely reached into the sixties and Pollio*s ' 
commenced in 60, may'explain at least partly why in Dio, to talce one 
example, the narrative of the foreign wars in the sixties occupies twice 
the space of that of the contemporaneous domestic affairs. Clearly much 
of the blame for Crassus’ relative eclipse must lie at his oim door for 
failing either to write his own account, as did Caesar and Sulla, or at 
least to arrange for someone else to do it for him, and finally for dying 
too soon, so that his earlier career was quite useless for propaganda 
purposes in the later struggles.
Even when the struggles were over, the late Republic could be a 
sensitive area for historians. Augustus twitted Livy gently for his 
Pompeianism (Tac.Ann.4.54) and permitted him to question whether Caesar’s 
birth was a blessing or a curse (Sen.N^.5-l8«4)« Virgil was mildly 
critical of Caesar (Aen»6.854f) but thought highly of Cato (8.670).
Caesar the man was somewhat embarrasing to Augustus : Caesar the god,
Diyus Julius, was more useful (Hor.Carm.1.12.47)-^^ Cicero had to be 
handled with care. Unlike Cato and Pompey, safely dead earlier, Cicero 
had been involved with and betrayed by the young Octavian. A separation 
v/as needed, as with Caesar, this time between the literary man and the 
politician^
Crassus had died early enough for such a problem to be avoided, but 
Octavian was confronted a few years after Actium with a potentially
powerful riv^ in prestige in Crassus* homonymous grandson. He seems to 
have taken the threat seriously (see below p^225)« It is not certain 
how long the threat, or M.Crassus cos. 50, lasted after the clash in 27, 
but it may have seemed undesirable that too much emphasis be laid on the 
importance and deeds of this rival's potent forebear. Such conisiderations 
may'Tiave affected Livy's account of the period.
Livy's account, later•treated as the standard version, survives only 
in an. epitome so thin that it is hard to infer directly much about 
inclusions and omissions, but the dependence on it of later writers was 
such that it would seem reasonable to assume that it enshrined and 
confirmed the unbalanced political analysis and the Crassan discrepancy 
found subsequently. Despite their personal differences, it seems likely 
that Livy relied heavily on Pollio for the period in question, talcing the 
formation of the first triumvirate as a crucial moment for the future 
decades. Significant perhaps of his attitude is the fact that the 
epitome describes that alliance as a conspirâtio (Per.105)®
Asconius did not write a consecutive history, but preserves in his 
commentaries on several of Cicero's speeches a quantity of quite unique 
and invaluable information. He seems to have had access to excellent 
sources, including the senatorial acta. It is perhaps not unimportant to 
note that he wrote a life of Sallust, now lost, and was a friend of 
Asinius Callus, Pollio's son (Servius on Eel.4.11). Asconius is most 
valuable in the present discussion for his references to Cicero's 
accusations against Crassus in the De Consiliis Suis and for the 
statement that Caesar and Crassus were open backers of Catiline and 
C.Antonius in 64 (85c).
Since the lack of a biographical tradition for Crassus has already 
been considered and regretted, some attention must be given to the one
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biography that does exist, indeed the only one that is Imown to have
existed, Plutarch's, •
Consideration of thiis life, that of a man certainly not best laiown as
a soldier, produces the surprising fact that seventeen years from yi to 55»
a period embracing two consulships, the censorship, the Catilinarian
conspiracy, the first triumvirate, surely the most politically active
period in his life, are treated in five short chapters out of a total of
thirty-three (Cr. 12-16), His two campaigns take the lion's share. That
against Spartacus, which lasted six months, talces up, with its introductory
account of the war, almost the same space as the seventeen years just
mentioned. The Parthian campaign alone takes up more than half the whole
biography® The account of the Servile war owes much to Sallust as already
noted. That of the Parthian war is thought to have been taken from
QoDellius, whom Plutarch certainly used for Antony's Parthian campaigns
(Ant.59)* Plutarch was clearly not overwhelmed with information about
Crassus. He devotes two chapters to the story of Crassus' Spanish have,
vfhich he found in Fenestella (Cr.4-5)® This is no less than is given to
the entire decade of the sixties (Cr.12-13)*
Plutarch's picture of Crassus, with its conventionally artistic
theme of a basically worthy nature warped by the one overriding flaw of
avarice,has dominated the subsequent histories until very recently.
Even now it is possible for a historian seriously to consider that in 55
the choice of consular province was made difficult for Crassus by his
(11 )uncertainty as to which would prove more profitable, Plutarch's ovm
sources for this picture are not easy to determine. Certainly of great 
importance to the formation of his overall viev/ is his knov/ledge of at 
least some of Cicero's writings and sayings. He refers explicitly to 
the De Consiliis Suis (Cr.13*3)» though he miscalls it a speech
— 10
(cf.Asc.83c)® Another "speech" with which he was familiar is the sixth
Stoic Paradox, which seems to have coloured his whole impression of 
Crassus (see below Appendix C). Various jokes at Crassus* expense were 
probably taken from a collection of such material made by Tiro 
(Plut.Cic.23.3-26.1). Plutarch's estimation of Crassus* standing as an
orator (Cr.3»2) probably derives from Cicero*s judgement (Brut.233)* 
Generally speaking it would seem that much of the less, favourable matter 
derives from Cicero, though it is worth noting that he does not repeat 
Cicero's charges concerning false wills (Off.3*73î73); it seems that
(12)Plutarch did not use that work when composing his life of Crassus.
The sources for the more favourable and domestic material are hard to
determine. The Licinii Crassi merged after a couple of generations with
a branch of the Calpurnii Pisones who survived well into the first century
A.D. It is highly likely that some biographical material may have been
produced and have survived in accessible form. There will certainly have
been tituli imaginis and probably fuller elogia, if not any surviving
laudationes such as those delivered by Caesar for his aunt and wife
(Suet-Iul,6). In view of the poverty of Plutarch's material concerning
Crassus* political career, some of the smaller details he did manage to
accumulate are surprising, unless he was drawing on some collection of
(13)such material or memoir of the man rather than of the statesman.
We have however no Imowledge of any earlier biography.
Of the later narrative histories the most important are Appian and 
Dio. Appian is very thin on the sixties, leaping from a Sallust derived 
account of the first consulship of Pompey and Crassus to a conventional 
version of the second Catilinarian conspiracy, and then to the first 
triumvirate, with virtually no analysis of the progression of these events, 
Dio does try harder. He seems to have had access to some good
11
sources. He claims to have read virtually everything available (53*19*6), 
and indeed cites Livy (67-12.4), Sallust (40.63.4;43.9*2-3)»
Q.Dellius (49*39*2), Pollio.(57*2.5), Crerautius Cordus (57*24.2,4), and 
Plutarch (Fr.40.5»Pr;iQ7*1). His treatment of the late republic is marked
by a distinct hostility towards Cicero, which has been argued to be
(l4)derived from Pollio. , Tliis would need to be.other than through Livy 
who was probably much more favourably inclined towards Cicero, Dio is 
thought to have relied heavily on an early imperial annalist, possibly
(13)Cremutius Cordus. Sometimes his analysis of the political scene is
excellent; his account of the background to the first triumvirate is 
easily the best in any ancient source (37*34-8). On the other hand he is 
hopelessly at sea for 56-5, simply it would seem because he has somehow 
failed to notice the conference of Luca (39*25.1-27*3;39*33*1-4). In
his account of 60 he ascribes great importance to Crassus, and yet fails 
to name him when referring to the censors of 65 and the dispute over the 
Transpadani (37*9*3), an affair of potentially greater moment than he 
realises. As has already been observed, Dio devotes twice as much space 
to overseas wars in the 60s, including two chapters on Caesar's not very 
significant tenure of Farther Spain, as he does to home affairs. One 
reason is presumably the apparent lack of contemporary sources for.the 
60s, between the end of Sallust's narrative and the beginning of Pollio*s.
It has in any case been argued that Sallust cannot be considered a
contemporary source for the 70s, nor Pollio for at least the early 50s^
If Cremutius Cordus was indeed used by Dio for his analysis of the
situation as far back as 60, an interesting point arises. Dio's and 
Velleius' accounts are not dissimilar and both agree in attributing great 
influence and vast ambition to Crassus (Dio 37*56.3-5jVell.2.30*4;2.4^,2). 
Cordus and Velleius both flourished and wrote in the first part of the
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principate of Tiberius. They may.have been connected; they may simply 
have used common sources; but it may be that after Augustus, a change in 
climate under the more republican Tiberius will have encouraged-a more 
realistic appraisal of the forces at work in the late republic
From this brief glance at some of the ancient sources, it can be seen 
that Crassus stood little chance of getting a fair or adequate press. 
Contemporary accounts are lacking, and his absence from the final 
showdown together with his ovm disastrous end will have made it almost - 
impossible for subsequent writers to assign him the significance he 
merited in the scheme of things. It is indeed remarkable that such strong 
assertions are made of his importance and power, when the writers themselves 
were not aware of his role in the affairs they narrated. Clearly a very 
strong tradition of his stature existed, and persisted v/hen the reasons 
for it had been forgotten. It now remains to examine the history of the 
period and to attempt to replace the mysterious figure of M.Crassus in 
its rightful position. The task is not easy now, nor v/as it for the 
ancient v/riters, largely because for the bulk of the most important period 
of his life he held no office. From 69 to 56, except for a brief 
censorship which achieved no concrete results and v/hich escaped notice in 
most narratives, Crassus v/as a privât us in an age and political system 
when the spotlight was on the magistrates of the Republic. VJliat must be 
sought out is the exercise of influence rather than any official acta.
The latter are naturally much easier to determine. For the former, 
speculation is inevitable.
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Chapter II To the First-Consulship
The date of birth is generally accepted to have been of great 
importance to a Roman who wished for a public career, as minimum ages for 
seeking most offices were laid down by law® Crassus. was consul for the 
first time in 70. No source suggests that he \ièCS in any way unqualified 
for that office, and indeed one, contrasting him with his new ally Pompey, 
specifically says that he was qualified (App.BC.1.121).
He was presumably elected in the summer of 71» If this was his 
first and earliest attempt legally possible, then the latest date for his 
birth would be the early summer of 113® Thus at the time of his professio 
he would have reached his forty-third year* If 70 was the first possible 
year then his praetorship must inevitably be dated to 73® It will be 
argued below that this is highly unlikely as he seems to have been 
prosecuted for incest with a vestal virgin during 73» There are in 
addition several other indications that he was not elected consul 
suo anno. Plutarch writes of a meeting between Crassus, on his way to 
his province of Syria, and Deiotarus King of Galatia. Crassus was then 
aged more than sixty : e y K  MCV d'TtJ tTdtpAAAol’T T U ^
(Plut.Cr.17.3)® Crassus had left Rome late in 53 (Cic.Att.4.13-2), 
and the meeting probably took.place around the turn of the year. If 
Plutarch is taken literally and we take Crassus to be at least sixty-one 
at the time of the meeting, this would put his birthdate back to the 
winter of 116/5 at the latest. If Plutarch merely meant that Crassus had 
passed his sixtieth year, the date could move forward a year to the winter 
of 115/4. To beg another year from Plutarch and to take him to mean that 
Crassus had at least entered his sixtieth year would be just possible but 
unlikely. To go any further would be to deny him any veracity at all.
- i4
It can thus be seen that only the very loosest interpretation of Plutarch 
permits the assumption that Crassus was consul suo anno, while the more
natural readings would make him one or two years older.'
Cicero writes that Crassus* age when he left_Rome in 53 was the same 
as that of L.Aemilius Paullus when the latter left for the campaign that 
concluded at I^dna (Cic.Att.4.13»2). Livy makes Paullus more than 
sixty at I^dna in June l68 (44.41.1) while Plutarch makes him about sixty 
when elected in 169 (Aem.Paul.10). He left Pome early in 168
presumably aged at least sixty and possibly more.
Further clues may be furnished by Cicero who often describes two men
as being contemporaries - aequales. This he does particularly often in
( ’1 )the Brutus in v/hich he likes to group orators in this way. It is far
from clear what degree of precision Cicero may have v/ished to convey by
this term. The date of birth of any man in public life is likely to have 
been known to his contemporaries, indicating as it did the earliest possible
year in which he could stand for any office. There could of course be
exceptions to the rules, but these invariably required the official 
sanction, after Sulla at least, of the senate. In his correspondence 
Cicero often refers to possible candidates for various offices, and will 
undoubtedly have known the previous careers of these men and which of them 
held any office suo anno. He himself was inordinately proud of the fact 
that his offices were without exception so won and will have been av/are of 
others* failures to match this.
(2 )It has been suggested that aequalis means "born in the same year"..
An examination of some of the men so described will afford an opportunity 
to check the validity of this assertion. Cicero describes both D-Silanus,
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consul 62, and Ser.Sulpicius Eufus, a consular candidate for, 62, as his own
aequales (Cic.Brut.240;156,cf.150)- The former is Icnown to have been a .
candidate for the, consulships of 64 (Cic.Att.1,1.2). , Rufus’ cursus, in
which he followed Cicero by one year in every office, suggests that his
birthday so fell that he was not qualified until the election for 62.
Thus Cicero was born in the first half of IO6 to enable him to stand for
the consulship in 64. Silanus must similarly have been born not later
than the first half of 10?. Rufus need have been only a few months
younger than Cicero to have had to wait a year for his offices. Thus
Cicero and Rufus may well have been born in the same consular year, but
Cicero and Silanus were certainly not. Given the certainty of Cicero’s
own date of birth (Cic.Brut.l6l;cf.Gell.NAI^.28.3) and his tenure of
offices suQ anno, it becomes clear that aequalis does not mean. It does
not mean "born in the same consular year". It does not mean "becoming
eligible for office in the same year". Cicero does however attach some
technical importance to the term, since he is careful to say that some men
can be described as prope aequales, or aequales propemodum. C-Cotta and
P.Sulpicius Rufus were prope aequales (Be Or 3<*31)j and were annis decern
maiores than Hortensius (Brut.301). Cotta stood for the tribunate in 91
and Rufus was expected to stand in 90 (Be Or 1.23). Hortensius was born
C '3 )in the second half of 1l4. Unless Cicero is being vaguer than usual
in his use of round numbers, it would seem probable that Cotta was born in 
the first half of 124 and Rufus in the second half of that year or the 
first of 123. Had they been born in the same year, however, they would 
surely have qualified as true aequales, since, as has been shown, the 
outside limit, whatever it was, was certainly wider than that. P. Rufus
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was therefore born in the first half of 123* How is a distinction to be 
drawn between this pair of prope aequales and the genuine'pairings of 
Cicero with Silanus and with Ser.Rufus, who seem to,have, similar age 
differences. One answer might be to define aequales as men born within 
a year of one another, and so of the same age if only for a short time. 
Thus a man born, say, on 1 July 19^9 would have as aequales all those born 
between 2 July 1948 and 30 June 1930. Such a definition would seem to 
explain both Cicero’s determined precision in the use of the word and his 
occasional apparent looseness.
Considering now this definition in its application to Crassus’ date
of birth, it will be found that Crassus is described as an aequalis of
Hortensius (Cic.Brut.230,233). Hortensius* date of birth has been fixed 
to 114 after early June. Among Hortensius' other aequales was 
P.Lentulus Clodianus, consul ?2 (Cic.Brut.230). If elections were held 
in July 73» Clodianus must have been born before the middle of July 113*
If the attempted definition of aequalitas is to be upheld, his birth must 
be placed in late June or early July 113» and that of Hortensius anchored 
firmly in late June or early July 1l4. Clodianus would thus seem to 
have been the oldest possible aequalis of Hortensius. Thus the earliest 
of the possible dates derived from Plutarch’s statement is ruled out. 
Crassus cannot have been born by the winter of 116/3 and still have been 
an aequalis of Hortensius. To avoid stretching Plutarch too far, and to 
maintain the comparison with Paullus, it must be concluded that Crassus 
was born between late June 113 and very early 1l4. This would permit us
to consider him to have become eligible to stand for the consulship in 75
or 72.
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Born in 113/4 M.Crassus could possibly have been eligible to hold 
the quaestorship, under the regulations obtaining before Sulla’s, 
legislation, in 88 or 87. If as is likely he first saw military service
under his father in Spain in 98, he would have become' eligible to stand
- / /j \in 86 or 83, having fulfilled his ten years’ stipendium. Even if 
eligible to stand earlier it is highly unlikely that he did so. The 
quaestorship did not then lead automatically to membership of the senate, 
and there was therefore little to be gained by holding.it at the earliest 
opportunity. Plutarch writes that when his father and brother were 
killed, Crassus escaped because he was very young - okVTO^ oe
TTctVTtfTroc o~u (Plut.Cr. 4.1). This would suggest
that he had not yet entered public life.
His subsequent exile is a matter of debate. He emerged from his
romantic cave in Spain on hearing of Cinna’s death in early 84 
(Plut.Cr. 6.1). He had been there for some eight months. Plutarch’s 
account seems to suggest that when Crassus did go into hiding he went 
straight to Spain and to his cave, but his whole narrative is so 
condensed that this cannot be regarded as certain. From his text one 
would suppose that Crassus fled soon, though not immediately, after Ginna 
took power, and yet there might seem to be a gap of two years to fill.
On the other hand Plutarch suggests that Marius, who died early in 86, 
was alive when Crassus reached Spain (Plut.Cr. 4.1;cf.MRR2,33)° It is
also worth noting that Cicero specifically writes, referring to the 
"triennium sine armis", "nam aberant etiam adolescentes M.Crassus et 
Lentuli duo" (Cic.Brut. 308). This triennium covers the missing two 
years and makes it plain that Crassus was not present in Rome during that 
time. Indeed it is highly unlikely that after his father’s and brother's
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deaths he would have stayed to find out if he was safe,'but must.at least 
have taken refuge on estates elsewhere in Italy. In any case 
Plutarch’s eight rapnths will not bear any great weight of argument.
There seems, therefore no question of his having held office between 
87 and 81 when Sullan supporters occupied the magistracies. It is 
almost certain that Crassus will have entered the senate in 8l, probably 
by Sulla’s fiat, though possibly.by holding one of the twenty 
quaestorships now available, as did his aequalis P.Lentulus Sura (Tac. Ann 
11.22>cf.MRR2.76) I n  view of Crassus’ outstanding contribution to 
Sulla’s final victory at the Colline Gate (Plut.Cr. 6,6), the former would 
seem most likely, despite Plutarch’s statement that Sulla was so 
displeased with Crassus for his conduct during the proscriptions that he 
never again employed him, for public affairs (Plut.Cr, 6.7). At most
this must mean that Sulla did not use Crassus again for independent
ise
(9)
military coramand^^^ There is in fact no reason to suppos  Crassus’
progress through the magistracies need have been retarded.
Until his consulship in 70 the several steps in Crassus’ cursus 
honorum are almost equally unattested. It has been suggested that he may 
have held some office in 76. Plutarch tells how Sicinius, tribune in 76, 
who attacked all the other magistrates and popular leaders, excepted 
Crassus from his attacks (Plut.Cr.7.8). This could indicate merely that 
Crassus was then prominent rather than that he held office at the time^ 
but a magistracy is a possibility He will not have held the tribunate
as it still lay under Sulla’s prohibition of further office to its 
holders. The aedileship is possible, a very suitable office in which a 
man of wealth could secure great popularity with a view to his later 
candidacies. It will however be argued that the most commonly accepted 
date for Crassus’ praetorship, 73, is open to doubt and that 74, or even
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73, already shown to. be legally possible,are more likely. This would
-make it hard to date an aedileship in 76 because of the need for a 
biennium between officeçP*^ It would thus seem unlikely that Crassus 
can have held any office in 76- He could have been aedile in 77 and 
•therefore praetor in 74, or else praetor in 75, praetor designatus in 76.
It remains therefore to establish the date of Crassus' praetorship. 
This has been the subject of considerable debate, chiefly because on this 
question rests that of the nature of his command against-Spartacus, and 
also of the political implications of that command. Before considering 
the political background, however, it would be well to examine the legal 
and constitutional factors involved. The excerptor of Livy calls 
Crassus praetor when he was given the command in 72 (Per.96), but since 
he also calls him praetor when dealing with the events of 71 (Per.97), it
(12)is clear that, no precision can be attributed to his use of titles. 
Nevertheless this, combined with Appian's statement that after three years 
of war there were no candidates for the praetorship until Crassus took 
that office and marched against Spartacus (B2 I-II8), has led some to 
assume that Crassus was in fact praetor in 72 and propraetor in 71 »
This could fit with Livy but is not really reconcilable with Appian who 
clearly states that the war had been going on for three years when this 
situation arose. It is apparent from Livy that Crassus took command in 
72 and finished the war in 71-^^^The war lasted six months (App.BG 1.121) 
and clearly ended in 71 since Crassus proceeded straight from it to seek 
the consulship of 70 (ibid). He took over the command from the consuls 
of 72 (Plut.Cr.10.1), and his campaigns straddled a winter (Plut.Cr.10.6). 
If Crassus was praetor in 72 he must have been elected in 75, hardly the 
third year of the war, and was clearly not elected for the purpose of 
conducting the war as that was entrusted to the consuls of 72. This
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last fact furnishes the chief argument against Crassus being praetor or 
even propraetor in ?2. When the war began it was the responsibility of 
a number of the praetors of 73 who., after their several failures, were 
.succeeded in 72 by both the' consuls of that year. The war was thus 
declared consular. After the defeats of the consuls they were in their 
turn recalled and the command entrusted to Crassus. It is hardly likely 
that the senate would have reverted to the appointment of a praetor to 
succeed the consuls. The progression upwards from praetorian to consular 
is hard,to continue, since there would have been strong resistance to the 
appointment of a dictator, the proper and logical step. Memories of 
Sulla may have been fresh enough to surround the office with unwelcome 
associations, while the last appointment of a dictator for purely 
military purposes had been that of M .lunius Pera in 216 (MRR 1.248)^^^^ 
Even in the disturbances of the late 50s such a step, though contemplated, 
was rejected in favour of other expedients. In this case a special 
appointment was clearly required.
As has been shown, Appian’s account is very muddled and apparently 
unhelpful. He may have been misled by the ambiguity in Greek of the word
fi '»CTTpfA-Tt^ yo^  ,referring as it does to a command in general and also to the 
specific office of praetor. This confusion, perhaps originating in a 
Greek translation of Sallust, who seems to be a major source for the
(15)Servile War, has led him to his chronologically impossible account.
His frequently manifested inability to distinguish between election to an 
office and assumption of it may have helped (cf.i^ 1.32). He was aware 
that Crassus did at some stage hold the praetorship (BC 1.121), and that 
this was a necessary requirement, laid down in Sulla’s legislation, for a 
consular candidate (ibid;cf. 1,100). The biennium is not mentioned in 
the context of this law in either passage, and it would be unwise to
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assume t h a t ^ < i / U r e f e r s  to more than the mere fact that
• l >  IICrassus had held the praetorship at some time. ' Nevertheless ccr-fpATq 
used of Crassus in his petitio does indicate by. its tense that the 
praetorship had been held before 71• It has already been argued that 72 
is unlikely, and this unlikelihood is increased by the fact that no 
mention of any irregularity in Crassus* position is ever made. Crassus
is contrasted with Pompey by Appian with a  o && ' construction.
Pompey’s position was notoriously irregular; Crassus*, if praetor in 72, 
less so but unlikely in the circumstances of their alliance to escape 
notice.
The most popular date among modern scholars for this elusive office
seems to be 73, the chief reason being that this would be the latest date
consistent with a legal petitio in 71»*^ ^^  Some with a horror of the idea
of an extraordinary command conferred upon a privâtus would wish to
suggest that Crassus’ command was a regular prorogation, albeit proconsular,
(17)of his praetorian imperium of 73* This is most unlikely. If Crassus' 
imperium was prorogued at the end of 73, what was its sphere of 
competence? There is nothing to suggest that Crassus was already 
involved in the war before his assumption of full command, and much to the 
contrary can be inferred from the total silence on this matter. It is 
inconceivable that he could have had his imperium prorogued and then been 
left for several months without a provincia in which to exercise it 
(Cf.Cic.Prov.Cons.3&)^^^^ If it is accepted that Crassus was given his 
command as a privatus, there remains no reason at all to date his 
praetorship to 73, as his status as praetorius would be the same whether
he was praetor in 73, ?4 or 73»
There are two independent reasons for doubting 73» The first is 
simply that of age. While it was quite understandable and even common
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for a noble not to attain the consulship.sue anno, it would require a 
very good explanation to show why Crassus, even in the 70s very much a 
political force, to be reckoned with (Plut.Cr,. 7»8; 10.1 ;Pomp. 21.3-22.1), 
should have failed to secure one of the eight praetorships available in 
his own year. This, as has been shown, was probably 75 or 74. Those 
who argue that Crassus' career was delayed use the 73 dating of his 
praetorship as their chief evidence. Since however there, is no reason 
for this date other than this presupposition of delay, the argument is 
clearly circular and invalid^"'^^
The second reason for doubting 73 relates to Crassus' involvement in 
the Vestal trials, which took place almost certainly in 73 as Cicero 
refers to 63 as "annus decimus post virginurn absolutionem" (Cic.Cat.3*9)»
The only vestal trials known to have taken place during this period are 
those involving Crassus and Catiline, accused of incest with the Vestals 
Licinia and Fabia respectively. The political implications of these 
trials will be considered below (p.23-28), but two questions are relevant 
to the present discussion. Some have denied that Crassus was actually 
prosecuted, yet Plutarch writes that Crassus aL~ri-«v?
(Cr.1.2 cf.Inim.Util.6), gives a list of accusations denied when Crassus 
was tJdj3v?o5 (Comp.NiCo et Cr.1.2), and concludes di-~rLOiV
ocTroAa>crap.£\?oy ‘viro SucAtrruy? (Cr. 1.2). Plutarch clearly
believed that Crassus had actually been put on trial. He mentions the 
name of Licinia's prosecutor perhaps because he did not know that of 
Crassus' accuser. That the Vestals and their supposed lovers were 
prosecuted separately may be shown by the parallel case of Catiline who 
was accused by P.Clodius (Plut.Cat.19.3,Asc.91C) and acquitted with the 
help of Q.Catulus (Orosius,6.3.1)» M.Pupius Piso defended more than one 
vestal at this time, Fabia and Licinia presumably among them (Cic.Brut.236).
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From the evidence concerning Catiline's case it is clear that he was 
tried; and it would seem that while in each case one prosecutor may 
possibly have assailed both man,and woman, their .trials may have been 
separate and different defenders involved. . It is almost certain that, 
in view of the immunity from prosecution enjoyed by at least the higher 
magistrates, Crassus could not have been prosecuted.during his 
praetorship, nor for that matter while designatus save on a charge of 
ambitus^^^^ It appears nevertheless that Crassus was prosecuted and that 
the year was 73» The conclusion must be that it is highly unlikely that 
he was praetor in 73® Again 73 or 7^ remain, the former perhaps 
indicated by the Sicinius incident." If 74 was the year, it is clear 
from the Vestal prosecution that Crassus* imperium was not prorogued into 
73 and thence into 72. It is therefore certain that his status in 72 was 
that of a privatus cum imperio. This imperium was probably proconsular 
(Eutropius 6.7.2). Had it not been, the status of the war would have 
been downgraded, an impossible step in view of its seriousness.
It is worth considering the possibility that Appian's account of 
elections with no willing candidates may have a foundation in something 
more solid than his muddled imagination. It has been concluded that 
Crassus is likely to have held the praetorship in 75 or 74. Were the 
former date correct he would have been eligible to stand in 73 for the 
consulship of 72. If he did so stand, he was of course defeated by 
Gellius and Clodianus. Despite the paucity of information about many 
parts of Crassus* career, it seems unlikely that such a defeat would have 
passed unnoticed, Plutarch could have missed it, but would not Cicero, 
who clearly hated Crassus, have found occasion to hint at it, if only in 
the Sixth Stoic Paradox which is devoted to Crassus (cf.Appendix C)? If 
Crassus was eligible in 73 it is much more likely that he failed to stand.
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A reason is not hard to find. . The prosecution for incest may have been 
designed expressly to prevent his candidacy. Catiline was similarly 
unable to stand, in 63 because of his trial for extortion, although he had
(21)wished to stand in 66, and Ap, Claudius-instigated the prosecution of
M.Scaurus in 34 to help the candidacy of his brother C.Claudius
(Cic.Scaur.3i-7)» If this was a similar instance, some things may become
clearer about the political alignments of the period. The fact that
M.Piso defended in more than one of the vestal cases heard in 73 could
suggest that the prosecutions may all have come from the same political
quarter, rather than that they were quite unconnected or else the one a
retaliation for the other. Those involved in the two cases must be
considered, as must the general structure of the political scene in the
70s. Catiline and Fabia were assisted in various ways by Q.Catulus,
M.Cato, and M.Piso, and opposed by P.Clodius (Orosius 6.3»1 ;Plut.Cat.19»3Î
Cic.Brut. 236)0 Crassus and Licinia were attacked by one Plotius, or
Plautius, and again helped by M.Piso (Plut.Cr.1.2;Cic.Brut. 236). If
we take the prosecutions to be connected with the consular elections an
interesting pattern may emerge, since both the successful candidates in 73
showed in their consulship and consistently thereafter a marked partiality
(22)for Pompey. Although some enmities inferred for the 70s cannot be 
shown to have existed before Pompey*s usurpation of Lucullus' command, 
Q.Catulus for one can be seen to have opposed Pompey at least since 79®
In that year Pompey, supporting M.Lepidus* consular candidacy, was clearly 
opposed to Catulus (Plut.Pomp.13;Sulla 34). After the crushing of 
Lepidus* revolt, Catulus ordered Pompey to disband his forces, which 
Pompey declined to do as he hoped to have his imperium continued by being 
sent to Spain (Plut.Pomp.17«3)» In the 60s Catulus led the opposition 
to both of Pompey’s commands. P.Clodius seems, until Pompey abandoned
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him over the Bona Pea scandal in 61, to have been a keen Pompeian,
The Metellan brothers, Q,Celer and Q.Nepos, brothers-in-law to, Pompey and
clearly within his orbit, were cousins to the Claudii .and indeed Celer
was married to one of P.ClodiUs* sisters. That.Clodius was also
brother-in-law to L.Lucullus need not conflict with this view, as it seems
likely that relations between Lucullus 'and Pompey may well have been far
closer in the'seventies than is commonly supposed, Lucullus worked
hard to help Pompey and Metellus Pius secure the money and reinforcements
they required (Plut.Luc.3.2-3)* His motive in so acting was
questioned in the light of his later relations with Pompey, but the fact
remains. At some time in the late seventies he must have given his
consent to the marriage between his ward Fausta Sulla and C. Memmius, a
(23)man from a family close both to Pompey and to C,Curio. Curio was
another supporter of the Lex Manilia (Cic.Leg.Man.68). In the mid 60s
C.Memmius showed himself very hostile to the Luculli (Plut.Luc,37.1-2;
Cat.29.3-4). Q.Metellus Pius too was no friend of Pompey by 63 when he
testified against Pompey*s former quaestor C.Cornelius (Asc.ôOC).
Cicero’s defence of Cornelius was accounted an action favourable to Pompey
(Q.Cic.Comm.Pet.31;cf.Asc.61c;Quint.Inst.Or.4.3.1319.2.33), and it is
likely that Pius testified against him out of enmity for Pompey, Earlier 
however their relations seem to have been good. Pius was pleased to ask 
for Pompey’s help in 82 (Plut.Pomp,8), and seems to have needed reiforcing 
in 77 (cf.MRR2.83,86)« He certainly treated Pompey with friendliness and 
respect (Plut.Pomp.l8), cooperating with him to much more than a minimal 
degree (MRR2promag.76-71BC). Pompey’s letter to the senate seems to have 
made its requests on behalf of both commanders (Sail.Hist.2.98M). The 
bill carried by the Pompeian consuls of 72 seems to have given Pius the 
same rights as Pompey to confer the citizenship (Cic.Balb.19,32-3,30?Arch26)
- 26 -
Pius was content to let Pompey deal with the final stages of the war, and 
indeed disbanded his army on crossing the Alps, showing no fear of Pompey's 
undisbanded army. Their triumphs were celebrated without any recorded• 
rivalry^ or ill feeling (MRR2.117,123,124). Thèrq is therefore some
reason to suppose that, in the 70s at least, Pompey may have been 
associated with the Claudii Pulchri, the Luculli, and at least three 
Metelli, Pius, Geler and Nepos.' The break-up of this possible grouping 
may not have come until Pompey usurped Lucullus* command, at least partly 
through the agency of P.Clodius, thereby alienating the Luculli and Pius 
who were closely related to one another through the formers’ mother, 
sister to Numidicus,
In addition to the vestal trials, several prosecutions in the 70s may 
throw some light on the pattern of politics. It has been observed that 
Q.Catulus had little love for Pompey. A number of cases seem to show 
attacks by men with Pompeian connections on men possibly associated with 
Catulus. Two Dolabellae, both Cn., were prosecuted in the 70s. In one 
case the prosecutor was C.Caesar, and the defence was conducted by 
Q.Hortensius, Catulus' brother-in-law and close associate, and C.Cotta 
(Asc.26c; Suet.lul.4;Plut.Caes.4;Cic.Brut.317;Ps.Asc.194St.). In the other
M.Scaurus prosecuted, and Hortensius again defended (Asc.26,74c;Cic.Verr.
1.97;T’s.Asc.194St.). Both prosecutors show strong connections with 
Pompey. Scaurus had briefly been Pompey’s brother-in-law, later served 
under him in the East, and in 54 looked to him to help his consular
(24)candidacy. Caesar certainly supported publicly almost every motion
in Pompey’s favour that came up in the 60s from the laws conferring his 
great commands to the bills honouring him in 63 and 62. The 
Lex Plotia de Reditu Lepidanorum which he supported (Suet.lul.5) also
(25)fits this pattern. It is not surprising therefore to find Scaurus and
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Caesar both opposing in the courts men supported by Hortensius. Two 
other cases help to confirm this picture. Caesar also prosecuted 
C.,Antonius, brother of M.Creticus (Asc. 82C ; Plut .Ant. 1 ). M. Lucullus the
presiding magistrate showed Caesar great favour during the tri^
(Asc.84,88c;Plut.Caes.4). In 70 the censors, who were the Pompeian
consuls of 72 Gellius and Clodianus,' expelled C.Antonius from the senate 
while paying compliments to Caesar (Asc.84c), M.Antonins Creticus was 
married to the daughter of L.Caesar, consul 90 (Plut.Ant.2.19;Cic.Cat.4.15) 
in his turn half-brother of Catulus* father (Cic.Dom.1l4). The second 
case concerned one A.Varro, prosecuted by Ap.Claudius, and defended by 
Hortensius his cousin. Varro was helped by the presiding praetor, 
P.Lentulus Sura (Ps.Asc.195,2l8St;Schol.Gron.5498t.). Sura himself later
married Julia, Creticus' widow, thereby becoming Catulus* adfinis 
(Plut.Ant.2). In all these cases some of the same factors may be
discerned. The prosecutors all show links with Pompey or are helped by 
friends of his. The defendants themselves or those that help them show 
links with Catulus or Hortensius or both. If the Vestal trials are 
compared with these others it will be seen that Catiline's indictment 
certainly seems to fit. He was attacked by P.Clodius and helped by 
Q.Catulus and M.Cato. Crassus* case may or may not fit this pattern.
The identity of Licinia*s prosecutor, Plotius, is uncertain. Two men of 
that name served under Pompey in the 60s: A.Plotius a legate in 67
(MRR2.149), and P.Plautius Hypsaeus, a quaestor and proquaestor (MRR2.153). 
There is also the Plautius,tribune probably in 70,who carried the 
Lex Plotia de Reditu Lepidanorum mentioned above,and possibly also a law
providing land for Pompey*s troops (MRR2.128,130n4;cf.note 24 above).
( 27 )Identification of this tribune with the legate of 67 seems likely.
This composite individual is perhaps the most probable choice for the
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Vestal prosecutor, since he seems to have been active closest to the time‘ /-,Q\and also would seem to conform to the observed pattern.^ Only M.Piso 
might ,seem oddly placed in these cases. A legate of Pompey in the 60s, 
close enough to be the letter's choice for the consulship of 61,.he 
nevertheless followed an independent line, failing to follow Pompey's 
lead in trying to sacrifice P.Clodius (Cic.Att.1.14.6), and singling out 
for the distinction of speaking first in the senate his kinsman C.Pisoj 
consul 67, a bitter enemy of Pompey (Cic.Att.1.13»2). Thus while in 
general remaining loyal to Pompey, at no time did he let himself be 
deterred from his own friendships. It should perhaps be observed that 
defence is not as strong an indication of friendship as prosecution is of 
enmity. Incest was a very grave charge involving notably gruesome 
death-penalties. Embarrassment and the foiling of Crassus' candidacy 
may have been the object of the prosecution, rather than his death.
Catiline's prosecution has a less obvious point, • It may have been 
hoped that some of Catiline's notoriety, and perhaps even genuine guilt, 
might seem to attach itself to Crassus by association. All elements of 
the two prosecutions seem to coincide with the conclusion that they were 
initiated from the same general direction of Pompey and his friends.
That the targets were also connected is less certain. It will be argued 
later that Crassus and Catiline were indeed associated in 64, but that 
that association came about only when it became clear that Catulus and his 
friends were not prepared to support Catiline for the consulship.
Throughout the 70s there does seem to have been a degree of sniping between 
the opposed factions of Catulus and of Pompey, though the latter may not 
so early have been considered its l e a d e r A s  has been seen, numerous 
prosecutions fit this pattern. It would be a mistake however to impose 
a spurious duality upon the politics of this period. In the time of
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Ti.Gracchus' tribunate, the clear opposition between the faction of 
Aemilianus and that of Ap.Pulcher and Gracchus did not polarise all 
political groupings, but indeed left room for Q.Metellus Macédoniens to 
lead a faction equally hostile to both^^^^ Just so in the 70s.attacks 
from Pompey*s quarter on friends of Catulus and on Crassus by no means 
necessarily compel the conclusion that Crassus was one of those friends. 
What the attack may have done was to suggest to Crassus that for the final 
and greatest step, that to the consulship, the support of one or other of 
the powerful groups would be necessary.
As is well known and accepted, in 71 Crassus formed an alliance with 
Pompey to seek the consulship together. In 75 if eligible he seems to
have been thwarted by Pompeians. What of 72? He was certainly 
eligible. It is inconceivable that he can have stood and failed. A ,
defeated consular candidate would hardly be chosen to supplant the 
existing consuls. It is here that Appian's assistance can perhaps be 
invoked. If it is accepted that Appian may have been misled both by the
linguistic confusion already mentioned and by his own imperfect 
understanding of the constitutional implications of his account, a 
reconstruction of the events he is trying to relate may become possible.
In 72 both consuls were occupied in the field against Spartacus with 
conspicuous lack of success, and the elections may well therefore have 
been delayed. Numerous praetors had failed the previous year, and now
the consuls. There may have been a marked and widespread reluctance to
stand for the consulship, an office that would almost certainly involve 
fighting Spartacus and the consequent danger and disgrace of being beaten 
by him. Among the possible candidates were P.Lentulus Sura,
Gn.Aufidius Orestes and M.Crassus. There may have been others, but some 
may have been deterred by the prospect of fighting Spartacus, while others,
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notably Pompey's friends, may have shared somewhat in the loss of prestige 
not only of the consuls but also of C.Gassius Longinus, proconsul of 
Cisalpine Gaul, also defeated by the slaves, and perhaps yet another 
friend of Pompey. He was hostile to Verres in ?0 (Cic.Verr,^2.3-97) » 
and supported the Lex Manilia in 66 (Cic.Leg.Man.68). Neither Sura nor 
Orestes had a record of military ability, nor did they show any interest 
in acquiring one later, Sura was a victim of the censors of 70 who were 
the displaced Pompeian consuls of 72 (Plut.Cic.17*1;cf.Dio 36.31*4).
Their action could be explained if Sura had helped to deprive them of 
their commands. Sura's connections are, like most at this date, hard to
establish. As has been seen, after the death of M.Antonius Creticus in
71 or 72, Sura married his widow Julia, thereby becoming an adfinis of 
Catulus. In his praetorship he had helped A.Varro, Hortensius* cousin. 
His later association with Catiline might well fit with a similar 
position at this time on the fringes of Catulus' faction. Of Orestes 
little is known- He was born an Aurelius Orestes (Cic.Dorn.35), and may 
well have been the father, or at least some relation, of Catiline's wife 
Aurelia Orestilla (Sall.Cat.15*2;cf.33*3>8;App.BC 2.2). If the former, 
the attack by Clodius on Catiline may have been aimed at the latter's
■ father-in-law. Orestes was praetor in 77 and may well have been
intending to stand for the consulship in 73*
It is possible therefore that Appian is conveying in muddled form an 
account of a state of affairs in which no one was willing to stand for 
the consulship, and by implication for the command, until Crassus took 
the command without the consulship. In other words he may have made a 
bargain with two non-Pompeian and possibly Catulan candidates whereby he 
withdrew his ovm candidacy and undertook to help them to consulships that 
would be unembarrassed by military responsibility, in return for their
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support in gaining him the command immediately. This arrangement may 
have been generally welcomed-by a majority of those without strong 
factional ties, as it permitted the clearly ineffective consuls to be 
replaced withqut undue delay. While however this may in fact have been 
in the national interest, it is unlikely to have been proposed, let alone 
accepted, save at the prompting of political rivalry and ambition. It 
is significant that idle in Rome at the time of Crassus* appointment may 
well have been P.Servilius Vatia.Isauricus and C.Curio, both 
triumphators, but both possibly friends of Pompey, Both spoke in favour 
of his Mithridatic command (Cic.Leg.Man.68)»
At all events Crassus obtained the command, and Sura and Orestes the 
consulship. The order of these events is uncertain. At some point 
Clodianus proposed unsuccessfully to collect sums of money remitted by 
Sulla from the purchase of the property of the proscribed (Sail.Hist.4.1M). 
This could of course involve a great many people. Very few leading men 
survived the civil war as anything but Sullani, however they started it, 
and Sulla seems to have been keen to bind the doubtful to his new 
status quo by involving them in the sale of this property (Plut.Cr.2.4). 
Nevertheless proposals such as that of Clodianus were often intended 
ad-hominem. So in different ways Caesar and Clodius later acted, the 
one with his convictions of some Sullan murderers in 64 but not others, 
the other in his move against Cicero in 38. Crassus was notorious for 
having bought up a prodigious amount of proscribed property, and indeed 
for never refusing to do so (Plut.Cr.2.4). At what point in the year 
Clodianus made his attempt is not clear, but it could be an
(31)understandable attempt at revenge for his humiliation at Crassus* hands.
If this reconstruction holds together, a hazy picture emerges of
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Crassus playing very much his.own hand, opposed at this point to Pompey 
and his friends, cooperating at times with possible associates of 
Catulus. It.would be dangerous to suppose him close to Catulus 
however, for there is some reason to believe him involved from an early 
date with the agitation for the restoration of the tribunicia potestas, 
and perhaps for the reform of the law courts. Neither cause was dear to 
Catulus* heart, nor, despite Sallust speaking with hindsight for Macer 
(Hist.3.48.23M), of any interest to Pompey until they became electorally 
useful.
In the 70s there was a succession of tribunes agitating on one or 
both of these issues. In 76 Sicinius, in 73 Opimius, in 74 Quinctius, 
in 73 Macer, and in 7I Palicanus were prominent. Sicinius is the 
subject of an anecdote in Plutarch already mentioned. When Sicinius, who 
was attacking all the magistrates and leading men, was asked why he 
refrained from attacking Crassus, he answered that Crassus had hay on his 
horns. Plutarch explains that this meant that Crassus was dangerous 
(Plut.Cr.7.8). This answer of course proves nothing, least of all that 
this was the true reason. All that is worthy of note is that
(32)contemporaries thought Sicinius* omission itself worthy of note.
L.Quinctius served under Crassus as a legate in command of the cavalry 
(Front.Str.2,3.23). Macer was tried and condemned in 66. Crassus
helped him and was clearly, then at least, his principal patron 
(Plut .'Cic. 9» 1 -2) . Palicanus was a Picene, almost certainly a client of 
Pompey, and may reflect the latter*s late adherence to the cause 
(Sail.Hist.4.43M)^^3)
The evidence is of course entirely that of association, but it is 
nonetheless interesting to note that Crassus had close ties with two of 
the tribunes, while his name was linked with that of a third. Not
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much can.be built on so shaky a foundation, but it is reasonable to 
conjecture that Crassus may have maintained at least a lively interest in 
the work of the tribunes, and was far from .being as opposed to them as, 
for example, Catulus, the Luculli, or .Curio (MRR2.92-3i101 ;
Sall.&ist.3.48.9-11M;cf.Asc.78,79,60c).
In taking on the command against Spartacus, Crassus took a considerable 
gamble. He postponed, perhaps for the second time, his consular 
candidacy. Perhaps he would not have won, but had he been defeated by 
Spartacus, his chances would have been further reduced. On the other 
hand, victory over Spartacus made him much surer of the consulship, and of 
a deal of prestige to go with it.
He defeated Spartacus and advanced towards Rome to seek the 
consulship and the ovation he had earned, Pompey, after mopping up some 
servile fugitives on his way back from Spain, approached the city with 
similar aims.
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Chapter III Consul I 70 B.C.
Plutarch states that Crassus and Pompey in their first'consulship
disagreed on almost every measure and. rendered their consulship barren
politically, with no achievement other than Crassus' great sacrifice and
('])feast in honour of Heracles (Cr.12.2;cf.Suet.lul.19*2). Plutarch here 
makes no mention of the genuine legislative achievements of that year 
which included the restoration of the full tribunicia potestas, the 
revival of the censorship, the reform of the law courts by the 
Lex Aurelia, the Lex Plotia de Reditu Lepidanorum, and probably the 
Lex Plotia Agraria.
Crassus' part in or attitude towards these measures must be considered. 
In his life of Pompey, Plutarch attributes all the credit for the 
legislation concerning the tribunate to Pompey, and goes on to say that 
the law court reform was enacted under his auspices (Pomp.22.3)» It is 
clear however from Cicero, quoted by Asconius, that both consuls were 
directly concerned with the former piece of legislation: "qui
restituèrent earn potestatem" (A5C.76C). Pompey's was clearly the name 
more readily associated with the measure, presumably because of his well 
publicised appearance at Palicanus' contio when consul designate 
(Cic.Verr.1.43;Ps.Asc.22QSt;Sail.Hist.4.43M). That even Cicero
elsewhere attributes the restoration to Pompey alone (Leg.3*22) shows no 
more than Cicero's well established and chronic desire to analyse, 
criticise, and if possible justify every move in that politician's 
devious career, Crassus he simply detested: "0 hominem nequam"
(Cic.Att.4.13.2). ^
Pompey's certain adherence to the cause of the tribunicia potestas 
can be dated no earlier than Palicanus* contio. That Sallust seems to 
attribute to Macer a claim of Pompey*s support in 73 cannot be considered
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conclusive evidence either that Macer did so claim, or that if he did he 
was speaking with knowledge of Pompey's position or with his authority.
He .may have hoped for Pompey*s support at a time when Pompey had given 
little thought to the matter. Indeed Sallust’s words seem to confirm 
this view (Hist.3*48.23M). It has been argued kbove on the other hand 
that there is a surprising continuity of connections of one sort or 
another between Crassus and the several agitating tribunes of the 70s.
At Macer's trial in 66, while Crassus was his staunch supporter, Cicero,
in 66 showing clear Pompeian sympathies, was far from friendly
(Cic.Att.1.4.2;Val,Max.9.12.7;Plut.Cic.9,1-2). Crassus’ connections
with Sicinius and Quinctius have been discussed. Sicinius disappears 
after his tribunate, but L.Quinctius went on to a praetorship in 68 in 
which he.cooperated with Gabinius over the measure to deprive Lucullus of 
Pontus and Eithynia (Plut.Luc.33°5;Hall.Hist.4.71M). In view of his
clash with Lucullus during his tribunate in 74, his conduct in 68 need
not reflect any friendship or alliance with Pompey (Cic.Clu.110-12;
Sail.Hist.3*48.11M;Plut.Luc.3.4;Ps.Asc.1898t.). Similarly it would be
illegitimate to infer from Quinctius’ post under Crassus in 71j that the 
latter was necessarily hostile to Lucullus in 68 or friendly to Pompey.
Crassus is never given sole credit for the restoration of the 
tribunes’ powers as is Pompey (Cic.Leg.3.22;Veil.Pat,2.30.4;Plut.Pomp.22.3) 
but is coupled with his colleague with no indication that he need have 
been more than indifferent to the matter (Asc.76C;Schol.Gron.340 6t;
Ps.Asc,189 St ;Sail.Cat.38.1). Cicero to be sure is quoted by Asconius 
as saying that Crassus, as one of the restorers of the tribunes’ powers 
would naturally wish to help Cornelius, a former tribune, at whose trial 
he was then in 63 a juror (Asc.76c). Cicero may here be being more than 
a little disingenuous. Nevertheless the references to both consuls
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would make it fairly certain that both were officially concerned and that 
the measure was enacted by a Lex Pompeia-Licinia, rather than by a 
Lex Pompeia.simply carried in the consulship of Pompey and Crassus.
Had the latter bean the case, it would seem probable that Crassus would 
not'have received even those mentions he did. Pompey undoubtedly 
possessed a remarkable ability to gather all credit, deserved or 
otherwise, from any matter with which he was even remotely concerned.
The suppression of Lepidus, the conclusion of the Sertorian war, the 
Servile war, and the conquest of Mithridates are all, examples of this 
(Cf.Plut.Pomp.31-7)= This would seem true also in domestic matters; 
he attracted a great part of the praise and blame for Caesar's 
legislation in 59 (Cic.Att.2.l4.1;2.16.2;2.19»3 etc.).
The question of the reform of the law courts is also hard to resolve, 
Plutarch implies that Pompey permitted this reform but did not concern 
himself with it in the same way that he had with the tribunicia potestas^^  ^
He had however referred to it in his speech as consul designate at 
Palicanus' contio (Cic.Verr.1.45;App.BG1.121;Sall.Hist.4.46M). It is 
worth noting that only one source associates Palicanus with the issue of 
the courts and even that source is unsure whether Quinctius might not be 
the man involved with them (Schol.Gron,328-9 St.). Of all the agitating 
tribunes of the 70s it was certainly Quinctius who had shown greatest 
concern with judicial corruption (MRR2.103).
Consideration must be given to the likely political associations of 
L.Cotta, praetor in 70, the actual legislator, and to the men and the 
motives involved in the trial of Verres, before any reconstruction can be 
made of the circumstances surrounding the reform. Further analysis of 
the political scene will also help.
The three Cotta brothers all achieved prominence in the 70s with two
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successive consulships and a praetorship. The eldest, C.Cotta consul 75, 
had, with the cooperation of the tribune Opimius, been responsible for the 
repeal of Sulla's law limiting the further careers of holders of the 
tribunate (MRE2i96,97). In a famous phrase Sallust.described him as 
"ex factions media consul" (Hist.3*48.8M). This has been subjected to 
two chief varieties of interpretation;, (i) "from the centre, party", that 
is to say a moderate, neither optimale nor popular ; (ii) "from the heart 
of the faction", meaning the Sullan oligarchy. The latter would seem 
rather the happier linguistically, but rather presupposes, as does the 
former,a division between the Sullan establishment or optimales and the 
populares, democrats, reformers or what you will^^^ This ignores the 
fact, revealed by numerous politically motivated prosecutions during the 
70s and by the intrigues for the various desirable military commands, 
that what Sulla had sought with some success to restore was the old 
political in-fighting, with its swirling and changing patterns of personal 
and family alliances and alignments, that can be discerned before the
(5)dissensions of the 80s, That two men were both found on Sulla's side
/by the end of the 80s means nothing. Survival demanded it. Pompey
Catulus, M.Lepidus, Metellus Pius, the Luculli, Crassus, Cicero, Catiline 
show few signs of pulling together in one "Sullan" party after Sulla's 
death yet all had ended on his side^^^ Thus it may be that by factio 
Sallust here refers to a particular grouping within the "Sullan oligarchy", 
presumably one of which Macer, or at any rate Sallust,disapproved. The 
word is used in something like this sense in "Cethegi factione in senatu" 
(Ps.Asc.259 St.). Not dissimilarly Cicero used the word boni not just 
to mean those holding sound conservative views but rather as a name for a 
particular grouping, centring first on Catulus and then increasingly on 
M.Cato. It could well be in fact that the two groups, Sallust's factio,
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almost plways a pejorative term, and Cicero's boni,hot unsurprisingly the
reverse, are to some extent coincident. It has already been suggested . . / that in the 70s two large groupings of individuals may be discerned, one
gathered around.^Catulus and his brother-in-law Hortensius, the other
composed of friends and connections of the rising star of Pompey.
C.Cotta helped to defend Cn.Dolabella, consul 81, at his trial in the 70s
prosecuted by Caesar,.' Hortensius also-spoke for the defence (Asc.26C;
Suet.lul.4;Plut.Caes.4;Cic.Brut.317;Ps.Asc.194 St.). C« Cotta is also
on record as having supported the praetorian candidacy of Q.Metellus,
later Creticus (Sail.Hist.2.23*26,43,48-30M). M.Cotta supported the
pirate command of M.Antonius (Ps.Asc.259 St;Vell.Pat.2.31;App.Sic.6),
but opposed the aspirations of L.Lucullus for the command against
Mithridates which he sought himself (Plut.Luc.6). Cooperation with
Hortensius and M.Antonius and opposition to L.Lucullus would seem to
confirm the impression that the Cottae may have been well established at
the heart of the Catulan factio. As has already been observed, too rigid
a duality must not be attributed to the politics of this period, Pompey
clearly aimed to be a power in the state. Catulus and his friends were
opposed to him, and some of these friends were attacked as a result.
Others may have been disinclined to follow the rising star and may or may
not have formed temporary groupings with the Catalans to frustrate
particular Pompeian moves. If a third loose grouping is considered,
friendly at times towards the factio and often hostile towards the
"Pompeians", the picture may become clearer. This group may have
consisted of connections of Catulus who were less opposed to the ideas of
the agitating tribunes than Catulus himself. Thus C,Cotta lifted the
ban on tribunician careers with the support of Opimius. In the following
year however, Opimius was attacked by Hortensius, Catulus and C.Curio
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with the help of the praetor C.Verres (Cic.Verr.2.1.155-7; 
cf.Schol.Gron.34l St). Nevertheless the Cottae show political 
associations with Hortensius, and with Verres* kinsman and protector 
Q.Metellus Creticus. It wopld seem that,disagreement on the subject of
the tribunate was not of sufficient importance to affect general
—  (7)political alignments.
It has been shown that Crassus was probably opposed by Pompeians in 
the 70s. His prosecution for incest seems likely to have come from that 
quarter, and it is likely that the consuls of 72 were no friends of his. 
Catiline, also attacked in 73, was defended by Catulus with the help of 
M.Cato, Other than the similarity of the prosecutions and the common 
factor of M.Piso for the defence, there is little else to show that 
Crassus was directly linked with Catulus. On the other hand Crassus 
like the Cottae may well have been sympathetic to the causes urged by the 
tribunes during the 70s.
Another possible connection is that Dio seems to imply that the 
censors of 64 were opposed by certain tribunes on the same matter that 
had caused their predecessors in 65 to fall out (Dio 37*9.4). The 
censors of 65 were Crassus and Catulus; the subject of disagreement was, 
according to Dio, the question of the enfranchisement of the Transpadani; 
L,Gotta was one of their successors. It is possible that Dio merely 
means that these censors too achieved nothing because they too resigned, 
but " does seem rather more specific. The tribunes vetoed
even the Lectio senatus, fearing their own expulsion. It may be that 
they feared this as retribution for their opposition to the extension of 
the franchise taken up again by the new censors. Dio goes on to record 
the banishment of non-citizens by the Lex Papia, thus concluding what he 
may have intended as one section on one subject, that of the franchise
(Dio 37.9•5-5)» The tribune Papius could well be one of the tribunes
who forced the censors to resign. It would seem likely therefore that 
L.Cotta as censor may have sought to carry on Crassus' policy and this, 
together with the legislation of C.Cotta in 75, of L.Cotta in 7^» and 
C.Cotta’s support for Q.Creticus, who was soon to marry his daughter to 
one of Crassus’ sons, makes it more than likely that the family, though in 
many ways part of the faictio of Catulus, may have been politically 
sympathetic towards Crassus^^^
Other men with Catalan links may have associated with Crassus in the 
70s, He was certainly involved later with Catiline and C.Antonius, 
possibly with P,Sura too, and their connection may well have started much 
earlier. He may have gathered about him a group of the rather less 
conservative members of Catulus’ circle, agreeing with Catulus and the 
more rigid of his friends on personalities, but rather less on policies.
If this analysis of the political situation is pursued, a tentative 
account of the events of 71 and 70 becomes possible, Crassus, associated 
with the Catulan circle, was opposed by the Pompeian consuls of 72, and ■ 
indeed may, as argued above, have been a rival for the consulship of that 
year. His connections, and perhaps a specific bargain, enabled him to 
secure the command against Spartacus at the expense of those same consuls. 
He had however shown already an interest in the causes of the tribunate 
and of the law courts, and may thereby have made himself seem a 
relatively unsafe man for the consulship in the eyes of Catulus and others, 
Pompey, triumphantly returned from Spain, was a formidable opponent,
Crassus therefore approached Pompey and proposed an alliance 
(Plut.Cr,12,1;Pomp.22,1-2), Pompey would swing his considerable voting 
power in support of Crassus and would espouse the popularis causes favoured 
by Crassus, Both men’s popular support would thereby be increased
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removing any element of doubt about their election, Crassus would wield 
his considerable influence in the senate to effect a dispensation for 
Pompey from the requirements of the Lex-annalis (cf.Plut.Pomp.22.2).
He himself.certainly required no such dispensation, nor was there for 
either man any difficulty about standing in absentia as has- sometimes 
been thought. Election in absentia was indeed forbidden (Plut.Mar.12), 
but since the comitia centuriata met outside the pomerium, Pompey and 
Crassus were able to attend the elections while awaiting respectively a 
triumph and an ovation. Professio in absentia however was in these 
circumstances inevitable, but this does not seem to have been made 
illegal until some time between 63, when Rullus proposed his land bill, 
and 60, when Caesar was foiled of his triumph by such a prohibition!^^
Another concession on Crassus’ part may well have been an agreement 
to resurrect the censorship and to help the consuls of ?2 to repair their 
affronted dignity. Consuls were certainly able to exercise some 
discretion in the question of whether or not to hold censorial elections 
(cf.Cic.Att.4.2.6)!^°)
They were elected and perhaps came near to quarrelling while stilly 
designate. The matter for dispute may have been Pompeyfe claim to a share, 
perhaps even a major share, of the credit from the Servile War 
(App.BC.1.121;cf.Plut.Pomp.21,2;Cr.11.7~8;Cic.Leg.Man.30)» On entering 
office however, the consuls may have effected a formal reconciliation, 
and then together sponsored the bill to restore the full tribunicia 
potestas. Thereafter all seems to have soured. The censors were 
elected with or without Crassus* help. They proceeded to expel from the 
senate several men connected with the Junian quaestio, a move most 
acceptable presumably to L.Quinctius and perhaps also to Crassus, They 
also however expelled P.Sura (Plut.Cic.17.1îDio 3 6 . 3 1 C.Antonius
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(Asc,84c), M.Valerius,Messalla Niger (Val.Max,2,9-9)» and Q.Curius
(Ssill.Cat.17»3;App.BC2.3)- ■ Antonius and Sura have already been discussed.
Messalla Niger was probably a close connection of Hortensius (Plut.Sull.
f 11 ^35-4;Val.Max.5-9-2). In vipw of this it.is interesting to find him’ 
serving as an agrarihn commissioner under the Lex lulia of 59 (MPE2.192), 
thereby displaying some political flexibility. Sura, Antonius, and 
Curius were all involved with Catiline in 64/3- It is impossible to tell 
whether they were so involved then simply because they had been expelled, 
or whether they may not have been expelled because they were associates 
of Crassus in 70- In the latter case the censorial power would have 
been used against political enemies who happened to be vulnerable because 
disreputable, a procedure hallowed by usage. The revival of the 
censorship seems in itself to have been a popular policy. Cicero claimed 
that the need for judicial reform led to agitation for the restoration of 
the tribunician power and to a desire for the reinstitution of the 
censorship (Div.Caec.8). This could explain in a general way a number of 
the expulsions. Sura had featured in more than one judicial scandal 
(Cic.Att.1.l6.9;Plut.Cic.17.2-3;cf-MRR2.102). C.Antonius had escaped 
condemnation but the case was given by the censors as one reason for his 
expulsion (Asc.84C;Q.Cic.Comm.Pet.8).
The fact that Crassus may have favoured the reform of the courts and
have been glad to see several Junian jurors assailed does not mean that he
need have been in any way hostile to Sura or Antonius. Caesar as
index quaestionis in 64 sought to bring to book certain Sullan malefactors,
but was not pleased when Catiline was brought before him (MRR2.162;
cf.below, p79&n.5)«Thehe may indeed have been a similar irony intended by
the censors in applying to friends of Crassus the vigorous justice he had
(12)demanded for others. It would seem that these censors at last gave
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full effect to the enfranchisement of the Italians, probably deliberately 
obstructed since the 80s. The voting population was vastly increased 
(MRR2.12%cf.54), and it may-well be that the urgency with, which ambitus 
legislation was brought forward during the next decade could reflect a 
political scene in which old-fashioned personal clientelae were submerged 
by the new voters and bribery was seen as the only alternative!"*^^ The 
debt of gratitude owed to the censors, and to Pompey, who probably 
managed as usual to secure much of the credit, must have augmented 
greatly the latter’s strength in the assemblies. Whether Crassus shared 
in this must remain uncertain.
The suggestion of dissension between the consuls over the exercise 
of the censorship by Pompey's friends is of course not supported by 
direct evidence, but does fit well with accounts of a souring of relations 
and with the apparent delay in implementing the jury reform, which was not 
effected before September (Cic.Verr.2.7.177)> Pompey may have withdrawn 
his backing, although he probably did not move into direct opposition.
Cicero associates the issue of the courts very closely with the
verdict of the Verres case, implying that, should Verres be acquitted,
the demand for drastic changes would be irresistible. It has been
suggested that a change to entirely equestrian juries was indeed sought,
and that those who desired this hoped therefore for Verres* acquittal !"*^ ^
This desire is attributed to Pompey in the face of a considerable body
of opinion supporting the belief that Pompey was prominent in instigating 
(15)the prosecution. Verres was certainly supported by Pompey's enemies.
In 72 Gellius and Clodianus had tried to help Sthenius, Pompey’s client, 
against Verres (Cic.Verr.2.2.95)„ So too did Palicanus in 71 
(Verr.2.2.95~1Q0;cf.Ps.Asc.25O St.)!"*^  ^ Many other Sicilians had sought 
help from Pompey against Verres (Verr.2.3.45,204). Believing however
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that Pompey sought Verres’ acquittal aqd a drastic change in the juries, 
the alternative theory holds that the conviction was wanted by a group of 
"moderates" who hoped for the compromise that was In fact enacted. • This 
group is thought to have included Glabrio, the presiding magistrate, the 
Marcelli, who testified against Verres, and L.Cotta^with Crassus as the
{17)leader; This argument places too much reliance on Cicero’s suggestion, 
not devoid of irony, that it is those who wanted wholly equestrian courts 
that sought Verres’ acquittal. No doubt an acquittal could have 
furnished further ammunition for the extremists, but it is simplistic to 
argue that such considerations affected all or even many of the 
participants in the affair. The question of jury reform may have hung 
over the court as Cicero claims, and may have caused some jurors to 
concentrate rather harder.
In the event they did not have to decide, as Verres anticipated the 
verdict. The compromise measure was enacted. How far this was 
influenced by the result of the trial is impossible to tell, but Cicero 
would be unlikely to play down the connection when he came to prepare his 
speeches for publication.
In the face of such a wide divergence of opinions it is worthwhile 
to isolate the generally accepted points. Verres was supported by 
Hortensius (Verr.1.33^4), by Metellus Creticus his brother-in-law 
(Verr.1.18-19,23,26,29)Î by Creticus' two brothers (Verr.1.21,23,26-31 ; 
Ps.Asc.212-3), and by P.Scipio Nasica (Verr.2.4.79)» Cicero prosecuted
and was received sympathetically by M ’.Acilius Glabrio the praetor in 
charge of the case (Verr.1.4,29,41,31-2). M.Lucullus seems to have been 
hostile to Verres (Verr.2.2.23-4). The attitude of C.Curio seems 
ambiguous. The account of his congratulations offered to Verres after 
the success of Hortensius in securing the consulship for 69 is open to 
more than one interpretation (Verr.1.18-21). He could have been sincere
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in wishing Verres well. He could have intended heavy irony.- The fact 
that he blatantly failed to congratulate Hortensius himself might suggest 
the latter. The often quoted assertion that the Metelli backed Verres 
is not as a general statement supported by the evidence. Creticus and 
his two brothers, sons of Caprarius, did. Verres was an adfinis,
P.Scipio, grandson of Caprarius' sister, did also. No evidence shows 
that Q.Metellus Pius, whose auotoritas was second to none, involved himself 
in any way. His adoption of P.Scipio was testamentary and did not come 
until 63. Celer and Nepos and their cousins the Claudii are also 
conspicuously absent from the ranlcs of Verres' defenders. If Pompey was 
interested in Verres' conviction, it is highly likely that this branch 
of the Metelli should at this date have followed the lead of their 
adfinis. They were very much in his orbit until, his divorce of Mucia 
and his "betrayal" of P.Clodius in 62/1. It was argued above that 
Pompey*s relations with Pius were good in the 70s. Some, however, use 
the supposed homogeneity of the family to show that these relations must 
have deteriorated at least by the time of the t r i a l I t  is much more 
likely that the various branches went their own ways, that Creticus, his 
brothers, and Scipio backed Verres, while Pius may have been unsympathetic, 
only breaking with Pompey after the replacement of Lucullus. As was 
noted, M.Lucullus was hostile to Verres, but both he and Pius showed their 
perhaps new-found antipathy towards Pompey by testifying against Cornelius 
in 63 (Asc.60C).
Pompey's involvement would seem likely. Crassus' position is still 
harder to guess. He may well have been in favour of reforming the 
juries, but it would be dangerous to argue that his supposed involvement 
with the equestrian order would predispose him towards the more radical 
of the possible changes. That involvement is more often cited than
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established, whereas his influence in the senate would seem a more solid 
asset. These factors and his possible connections with Cotta make it 
likely that he was pleased with the final, more moderate, outcome.
Such a position was .by no means incompatible with genuine support 
for Verres rather than the devious motivation sometimes suggested.
Matters of principle rarely stood in the way of necessitudo. Conduct 
such as Cato's in 63 when he supported the prosecution of Murena on a 
matter of rigid principle, ignoring factional advantage, was unusual.
At some time in the following years, Crassus forged ties with both Creticus 
and Scipio, his sons marrying their daughters. The marriage or betrothal 
of the younger M.Crassus to Creticus' daughter may well have taken place 
about this time, in 70 or 69. That of P.Crassus to Cornelia must be 
dated rather later, probably to 39 or 35 (see below, Appendix A), but one 
earlier mention of Scipio shows a link with Crassus. He was one of the 
men who accompanied Crassus when in 63 he brought letters to Cicero 
containing warnings (Plut.Cic.15.1-2). Thus it may be that the marriage 
alliance confirmed an existing association of long standing.'
It would seem therefore probable that Crassus had close ties with 
some of the men who supported Verres. It has also been shown that he 
may have had cause to resent the actions of the censors in 70. In both 
matters he may have been at odds with Pompey. The latter's attitude to 
the question of jury reform may have been the more extreme, despite 
Cicero's protests of his moderation (Verr.1.44)
Whether or not Pompey and Crassus were successfully persuaded at the 
close of their consulship to a public reconciliation is open to question, 
but there is no likelihood of anything of the kind being either sincere 
or lasting. Gellius and Clodianus may well have made that certain.
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Chapter IV The Early 60s
A secure chronology for the political shifts in the three or four
years after' the first consulship of Crassus and Pompey is not easy to
establish. Pompey's involvement in the Verres case is uncertain as is
whether his enmity with Metellus Creticus predated their clash in 67
(MRR2.143). Nor is it clear at what point, between their triumphs in 71
and Metellus Pius’ testimony against Cornelius in 65, Pius became estranged
from Pompey. It would seem likely that in the latter case the major
cause was L.Lucullus* supplanting by Pompey. Ostensibly this did not
happen until 66 with the passing of the Lex Manilia, but it has been
suggested that Pompey was at work much earlier, preparing the ground for
(1 )his eventual appointment. The sequence of events must be considered.
In 70 and 69 Lucullus was riding high on a tide of success. It
seems likely that the commissioners sent to organise Pontus as a province
were elected at this time. A commission that included L.Murena and
M.Lucullus would seem exceptionally favourable to Lucullus. This would
be so whichever Murena is meant, the father or the son (MRR2.129;
(la)cf.131n.6). 70 would seem the most appropriate year for their election,
after the complete occupation of Pontus, and before the invasion of Armenia 
the following year. It has already been argued that no convincing 
evidence can be put forward for predating the hostility of Pompey and 
Lucullus to the 70s, The possibility that these commissioners may have 
been elected during Pompey’s consulship may strengthen that argument.
It would seem to be in 69 that the decision was made to assign the 
province of Asia to a praetor of that year P.Dolabella (MRR2.133,139, 
cf,l42n.9)« L.Quinctius launched an attack on Lucullus in which he 
referred to the battle of Tigranocerta as recent and implied that Lucullus 
still commanded in Asia (Plut.Luc.33-5)» Quinctius’ praetorship is
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clearly, to. be dated in 68. Belief that he was praetor in 67. seems to 
derive from the mistaken view that Lucullus was stripped of all his
(2 ) • 'provinces at once by a Lex Gabinia. It is clear however that Asia was 
assigned.elsewhere in 69 (Dio 36.2.2), Cilicia was given to 
Marcius Rex early enough in 68 for troops preparing to serve under him to 
be encountered by 0.Caesar as he returned from Spain (Suet.Iul.8). This 
must have been before the winter set in as Caesar was back in Rome early 
in 67 when he supported Gabinius* pirate law (Plut.Pomp.23-5).
Bithynia and Pontus were assigned to M ’.Acilius Glabrio by an earlier law 
of Gabinius presumably in December 68 (Sail.Hist.3-15M). In order that 
Quinctius could as praetor have been instrumental in the passage of this 
measure and also have been speaking publicly before Dolabella took over 
in Asia his praetorship must be dated in 68. He spoke probably as 
praetor designate in 69, and supported Gabinius during the three weeks 
they were in office together at the end of 68.
The reallocation of Asia, the first step in the piecemeal dismantling 
of Lucullus’ great command, has been assumed along with the later moves 
to be at least in part the result of the demagogic attacks inspired by 
the publicani who were enraged by Lucullus' reforms in that province!^^
The reforms are probably to be dated to the winter of 71/70 (MRR2.123).
The news of them will have reached Rome in 70, and yet as was argued 
above Lucullus’ stock seems to have been very high in Rome in 70 and 69. 
Any resentment felt by the publicani was slow to manifest itself, as the 
first sign of a demagogue comes at the end of 69 in the person of 
L.Quinctius, The reforms themselves seem to have been left untouched 
(Plut.Luc.20.4;Cic.Acad.2.3). Plutarch says that the demagogues achieved 
their aim, presumably revenge rather than redress, eventually, ' ' o'v 'toi-
(Luc.24.4). It would seem unlikely
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therefore that the transfer of Asia was in any way connected with their 
- . activities, but on the contrary it may have signalled a compliment to
(4)Lucullus just.as had the despatch of the Pontic commissioners. The. 
return of Asia to a praetorian proconsul implied that Lucullus had 
succeeded in bringing peace and order to that province. It was no 
longer necessary for Asia to remain part of his military command. This 
view would seem confirmed by the fact that Asia was not subsequently 
included in the commands of either Glabrio or Pompey.
It is possible to view the transfer of Cilicia by the senate to 
Q.Marcius Rex in 68 in the same light. News of the mutiny of Lucullus* 
troops cannot have reached Rome until late in the year, as the mutiny 
itself did not begin until after the autumn equinox (Plut.Luc.32.1). 
Since therefore all reports were of success, Armenia invaded and Parthia 
soon to follow, it may have seemed desirable for reasons other than 
hostility to appoint another man to Cilicia. It is worth considering 
the fact that Cilicia as a province had two quite different physical and 
military aspects, one as a block of land to the' south of Pontus and 
Armenia, but the other as a pirate infested coast. Q-Metellus Creticus
had been assigned Crete and Achaea so that he might combat the pirates.
It may have been felt that with Lucullus away on his Armenian and 
Parthian campaigns, the second aspect of Cilicia’s military significance 
required the full attention of a senior man. On the other hand, it had 
been the intention from the start that the Mithridatic command should be
split between two men. So Lucullus was originally associated in his
command with M«Cotta. The latter had been assigned Bithynia and 
Lucullus Cilicia, but Cotta's lack of success led Lucullus to take over 
virtually all the land operations (MRR2.101;cf.1l8). Cotta returned to 
Rome in 70, and it could be that Rex’s appointment was viewed in this
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light as a restoration of the divided command. It is possible that 
Cilicia was designated a consular province for 68 before the elections 
of 69 in the manner laid down by the Lex Sempronia. This would not of 
course preclude the possibility of rivalry nor of hostility in some 
quarters towards Lucullus. Rex refused to cooperate with him, and gave 
a post to P.Clodius who had fled from Lucullus after fomenting mutiny 
among his troops (Dio 36.13-1;56.17.2-3)-
The only step in the dispersal of Lucullus’ command that can be 
attributed directly to demagogic activity is the third, and ostensibly 
the last, . The Lex Manilia of 66 did not in theory affect Lucullus at 
all since he had lost all his provinces already. In December 68,
A.Gabinius entered office as tribune and immediately proposed that 
Lucullus' remaining provinces be transferred to Glabrio and that the 
Valerian Legions be discharged (Cic.Leg.Man.26;Sall.Hist.3-15M)
The passage of this measure owed much to the advocacy already mentioned of 
L.Quinctius in his last month as praetor (Sail.Hist .4 -71M ;Plut.Luc.33-4-3)< 
Consideration must be given to the men involved in these moves. It 
was suggested above that little of hostile significance can be attached 
to the removal from Lucullus* command of Asia, which almost certainly was 
entrusted to P.Dolabella. Cilicia was transferred to Q.Rex consul of 68, 
presumably by the senate. If, as is possible, the senate had in 69 
merely declared Cilicia a consular province for 68, Rex might, if the lot 
had been used and had proved unfavourable, have obtained the command only 
on the death early in office of his colleague, L.Metellus (Dio 36.4.1).
The latter*s brother, Creticus, had already been charged with the conduct 
of part of the war against piracy. It could have been intended that 
L.Metellus should complement him in Cilicia, It would be interesting to 
know more of the suffect consul Vatia, who died before entering
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office (ibid). ' If as seems likely he was a Servilius, he may have been 
a brother of P.Vatia Isauricus, consul 79» who had triumphed from Cilicia 
in 74 (MRR2.105)1 This raises the possibility that Vatia could have 
been elected with the Cilician vacancy in mind., .Perhaps P.,Isauricus was 
to have served on his staff as Africanus had on that of his brother 
Lucius Scipio in I90. Apart from Isauricus* military and local , 
experience, it is worth noting an old feud with the Luculli (Plut-Luc«1.1 ; 
Cic.Acad»Pr.2.1;Prov.Cons.22) which may have induced him to support the
/ / "NLex Manilia in 66 (Cic.Leg.Man.68). On the other hand, he had after 
initial hostility shown himself friendly to Pompey much earlier, at the 
time of the letter's first triumph (Front.Strat.4.5-1;Plut.Pomp.14.5).
It is possible therefore that Rex only secured the post as a third 
choice. At all events, as has been stated, he refused to cooperate with 
Lucullus. The two men were married to two of the three Claudian sisters 
(PlutoCic.29.4;Dio 36.17-2;56-15-1;17-2;Sall.Hist.5-l4). After
P.Clodius' treachery Lucullus divorced his wife, then marrying a half- 
sister of M.Cato (Plut.Luc.38.1;Cat.24.3;54.1). Rex on the contrary gave
Clodius a place on his staff. That he did not, on his death in 6l, in 
fact leave Clodius anything in his will is perhaps less significant than
(7)that Clodius had to the end expected something (Cic.Att.1.I6.10).
Rex achieved little in his time in Cilicia but clearly took himself and 
his activities sufficiently seriously to demand a triumph (MRR2.154).
Any association with Pompey is hard to establish, save that his marriage 
with Clodia Tertia may have brought him into the orbit of her brothers 
the Claudii, and her cousins Celer and Nepos, all close to Pompey. It 
was suggested above that this grouping may have included the Luculli and 
even Metellus Pius, and that, if this was so, Clodius' actions may have 
been decisive in effecting a split. The motives for his behaviour are
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harder to establish. He may simply have taken a dislilce to Lucullus.
He may have hoped to benefit Rex, or he may have been working all along 
in the interests of the ultimate beneficiary, Pompey, At approximately 
the time that. Clodius was tampering with the loyalty of .the Valerian 
Legions, Gabinius in Rome was proposing their discharge; This coincidence 
suggests a possibility of collusion. Gabinius may have known what was 
planned by Clodius. Gabinius was a friend of Pompey, ' Cl-f -ruÇ 
Tf'ofAirr^ uo'V cT'uvqôoN? (Plut.Pomp.25.1), and married to one, Lollia,
probably a relation if not a sister of M.Palicanus the Pompeian tribune of 
71 whose consular candidacy Gabinius supported in 67 (8uet.Iul.5O; 
Val.Max.5.8.5). This and Gabinius' pirate law raises the suspicion that 
he may have had Pompey's interests in mind when he assigned Lucullus* 
remaining provinces to G l a b r i o I f  this was the case, however, it is 
not clear why Gabinius should not have proposed Pompey immediately for the 
Mithridatic command. An answer could lie in the fact that the war had 
from the start been assigned to consuls in office, Lucullus and Cotta, and 
then Rex. There was no precedent for entrusting it to a privates, save 
perhaps the unfortunate one of Marius in 88 (MRR2.42). The pirate 
command was slightly different, being by its nature extraordinary and 
also less prestigious!^^ The considerable opposition encountered by 
Gabinius in passing the pirate law, under which no one had to give place 
to Pompey, would have been still greater if the issue had been one of 
exchanging Lucullus for Pompey in an extraordinary fashion. As it was, 
Glabrio, a figure arousing much less hostility, replaced Lucullus, while 
Pompey strengthened his case by his success against the pirates, and 
then hoped perhaps to provoke rather less animosity by taking over from 
Glabrio. Such may have been the intention, but Lucullus himself seems 
to have had little doubt as to the identity of his true supplanter
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(Dio 36.46;Plut.Pomp.31;Luc.36.1,5~'4). Relations between the two men
were permanently embittered thereafter.
Glabrio seems to have been content with his role in this. He 
showed little interest in his command, nor is there any record of his 
resenting his recall or seeking, as did Rex, the consolation of a triumph. 
He too declined to cooperate with Lucullus (Dio 36-17.1) and indeed 
encouraged Lucullus' troops to disobey him (App.Mith.90). There is some 
evidence for supposing him friendly to Pompey, He may have been 
connected with Pompey, Celer and Nepos, through his mother Mucia!^^^
His conduct of the Verres case was markedly sympathetic towards the 
prosecution (Cic.Verr.1.4,29,41,31-2;2.130;2.3.76,163). That Gabinius, 
Pompey's friend, was responsible for his command indicates at least that 
he was not an enemy of Pompey as was his colleague C.Piso. Although 
forced by Sulla to divorce his pregnant wife, Aemilia, Sulla's step­
daughter, so that she could marry Pompey, it is possible that he may not 
have blained Pompey for this or for her almost immediate death 
(Plut.Pomp.9-2;Sul'l.33-5)- Her brother M.Scaurus stayed close to Pompey,
(11 )serving under him in the East.
It is not easy to establish the political stances of all the proposers 
and opponents of these new military dispositions. As has already been 
observed, the first name to be associated with the agitation to recall 
Lucullus is that of L.Quinctius, tribune in 74, a legate under Crassus in 
the Servile War, and now praetor in 68. No great weight can be placed on 
his association with Crassus, as he had ample reason for seeking revenge 
on Lucullus for thwarting him during his tribunate (Cic.Clu.110-2; 
Sall.Hist.3-48.il.M;Plut.Luc.3-4;Ps.Asc.189 St.). On the other hand, 
Crassus could himself have been annoyed by Lucullus' treatment of 
Quinctius, and indeed by M.Lucullus' hostility towards Verres.
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Gabinius* pirate law was initially opposed by. three other tribunes,
L.Trebellius, P.Servilius Globulus and L.Roscius Otho, the last named
suggesting that two men rather than one should be entrusted with the
command ' (MRR2.14$). Little is known of any of these save that Otho was
also the author of the famous, or notorious, law to reserve the fourteen
rows in the theatre for the équités (MRR2.145)- The hand of Crassus has
inevitably been detected in this, since on the.strength of his recorded
involvement in 60 with the Asian publicani, he has been labelled the
perennial champion of the equestrian order. Pursuing this idea it is
even suggested that Roscius intended that the second commander should be 
(12)Crassus. The only faint indication of a possible connection with
Crassus is the presence on his staff in the East of two brothers Roscius 
(Plut.Cr.31-2).
It is certainly not necessary to assume that Crassus was behind the 
opposition to the Lex Gabinia. There were plenty of other powerful 
figures who were not backward in proclaiming their detestation of the 
proposal. Among others, C.Piso, the consul and an inveterate enemy of 
Pompey, Q,Catulus and Hortensius fought vigorously but in vain 
(Cic.Leg.Man.52;Dio 36-24.3;36*51-57;Plut.Pomp.25.4;27.l). Crassus*
attitude is nowhere recorded. That he could have been less than friendly 
towards Lucullus need not mean that he favoured Pompey, Indeed if as is 
likely Pompey and Lucullus were originally allied, Crassus could have 
been keen to see Lucullus recalled from the start. It has been suggested 
that Cilicia may originally have been intended for L.Metellus, brother of 
Crassus* new adfinis Creticus. It is possible that neither Quinctius, 
nor Crassus if he was involved, realised that Glabrio*s command was 
intended to benefit Pompey. They may have been blinded by their wish to 
damage Lucullus, When Pompey turned on Lucullus, it may have come as a
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(13)surprise to enemies and friends alike.
Crassus* attitude towards Pompey at this time can perhaps best be 
examined with relation to the tribunates and trials of C.Cornelius and 
C.Manilius. Cornelius, a colleague of Gabinius, concerned himself, more 
with reforming legislation, proposing measuresi to check loans to 
foreign states; to end senatorial discretion on exemptions from the laws, 
passing this right to the people; to compel praetors to adhere to their 
own edicta perpétua; and greatly to increase the penalties for electoral 
bribery (MRR2.144). He was wholly successful only with the praetors* 
edicts, but managed to carry a compromise measure whereby a quorum of two 
hundred senators were required before the senate could grant an exemption. 
None of these measures was necessarily aimed to benefit Pompey directly, 
though Pompey may have remembered difficulties in obtaining the exemption 
that permitted him to stand for the consulship in 71- It was argued 
above that gaining this may at the time have been the chief attraction of 
an alliance with Crassus. The attempt to tighten up the ambitus 
legislation may have been connected with the enrolment of large numbers of 
new voters by the censors of 70° Pompey*s enemies may have felt it 
necessary to resort to an unprecedented extent of bribery to counteract 
what must have seemed initially a great and unfair advantage for Pompey. 
C.Piso certainly seems to have paid a great deal to secure his consulship. 
It may have been a pleasing irony to force him to propose a law against 
the practice (Dio 36.38-5’-4;cf.Sall.Hist.4.8lM). That Cornelius was 
closely associated with Pompey is indicated by his having served as 
Pompey*s quaestor (Asc.57,6lC), probably in Spain. Cicero's defence of 
Cornelius in 65 was accounted an act favourable to Pompey 
(Q.Cic.ComnuPet.5,51;cf.14-5;Asc.61C). That those testifying against
Cornelius included such enemies of Pompey as Catulus, Hortensius and
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M.Lucullus adds weight to the view that Cornelius w.as prosecuted as much 
for being an associate of Pompey as for anything he had done as tribune 
Cornelius seems to have been working in cooperation with Gabinius since 
the latter carried a law forbidding loans to foreign envoys in Rome
presumably after Cornelius* original measure had failed (Cic.Att.5-21.12; 
6.1.5,2.?)!^^^ Pompey was no mean general, but it would appear that his 
greatest talent, which led to his success in the military sphere was as 
an administrator. Cornelius* programme was popular, popularis, and also 
conducive to more efficient government. It may also have contained 
political factors now virtually undetectable.
Dio reports that Manilius tried to credit Crassus with the authorship 
of his own bill to distribute the freedmen throughout the tribes but was 
disbelieved (Dio 56.42.4), He tried to do this, when, despite the 
successful passage of the bill, it became apparent that it was unpopular - 
in the English sense. Some have taken Dio to be right in saying that
only after this did Manilius turn to Pompey in the hope of enjoying the
same good fortune as Gabinius. This is however unlikely for three 
reasons. The first is that Manilius had in fact taken up the cause at 
the request of Cornelius (Ab c.64c ). The second depends on the probable 
identification of C.Manilius with one Manilius Crispus, attacked by
Cn.Piso with loud threats and denunciations of Pompey (Val.Max.6.2.4).
This incident however it will be argued may belong after the passage of 
the Lex Manilia conferring Pompey*s Mithridatic command. Some hold that 
it must be earlier. If so it shows Manilius Pompeian before Dio's point 
of conversion (see belowp 6l-3)« Thirdly, the good fortune referred to 
is presumably Gabinius' legateship with Pompey. This however was almost 
certainly under the Manilian law, since Cicero states specifically in his 
speech concerning that law that Gabinius was debarred from such an
5?
appointment under his own law, despite Pompey's wish to have him 
(Cic.Leg.Man. 5 7 - 8 ) '
It has been suggested that Crassus was responsible for the 
disturbances at Manilius* first trial in 65, and thpt he was keen to help
Cornelius when his prosecution, abandoned in 66, was renewed in 65!^^^
It is suggested that Crassus, by thus supporting Pompeians, hoped that he 
would gain in popularity at Pompey*s expense. The evidence is 
unconvincing.
Crassus * support for Cornelius is inferred from his involvement in 
the trial as a juror, Cicero, referring to the restoration of the full
powers of the tribunate, observed that of the two authors of that measure,
both of whom would, ipso facto, wish to help Cornelius precisely because 
he was a tribune, one, Pompey, was away, while the other, Crassus, was 
present doing what he could for Cornelius as a juror. It is hard to 
resist the conclusion that Cicero is here not only disingenuous in his 
marvellously flawed reasoning, but in fact wholly tongue-in-cheek. He 
said: "Aiunt vestros animos propter illius tr. pi. temeritatem posse
adduci ut omnino a nomine illius potestatis abalienentur; qui 
restituerunt earn potestatem, alterum nihil unum posse contra multos, 
alterurn longe abesse." Asconius commented: "Manifestum puto vobis
M.Crassum et Cn.Pompeium significari, e quibus Crassus iudex turn sedebat 
in Cornelium, Pompeius in Asia (Asc*76c). Cicero may have been
jibing at the supposed inconsistency of Crassus* action in 70 with his 
present opposition to Cornelius in 65-
The argument concerning Manilius is more complicated and relateé to 
one aspect of the so-called "First Catilinarian Conspiracy". When, 
after Cicero’s strange prevarication in the matter in December 66 
(Dio 56.44.1 ;Plut.Cic.9.4) !"*^\he prosecution of Manilius was resumed in
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65, the court was broken up by violence (Asc.6o,66c).. Cicero refers to
certain "magni homines" who encouraged Msinilius to foment this disruption,
and Asconius guesses that Cn.Piso and Catiline are meant. It has been
objected that this description.is-unlikely to have been used of such men,
(19)particularly the very junior Cn.Piso, then quaestor.
By the end of 66, his year as praetor, Cicero was already thinking 
seriously of his consular candidacy, and seems to .have decided that to 
succeed he would need more help than the absent Pompey could, or perhaps 
would, afford. To this end he began to look around for ways of 
securing support from certain powerful nobles who were hostile to Pompey.
It may well be that he considered defending and then standing with 
Catiline (Cic.Att.1.2.1) because he thought that Catiline would have the 
support of Catulus and his friends.- This desire to ingratiate himself 
with these "optimates" may well have made him reluctant to help Manilius, 
When forced to commit himself, he did, since he could not afford to seem 
to the voting masses to have ceased to support P o m p e y H e  abandoned 
the case as soon as he could, Cornelius, though equally associated with 
Pompey, seems to have been altogether a more respectable figure. In 66 
at his original trial he had been supported by both the consuls of that 
year (Asc.60C). Support for him would be less dangerous for Cicero's 
hopes of wooing new backers. It is worth noting that after the first 
disruption in 65, L.Dornitius Ahenobarbus, an hereditary foe of Pompey and 
the man in whom Cicero reposed his greatest hopes for the consulship 
(Cic.Att.1.l4), gathered a band to meet violence with violence and to 
ensure that the trial's resumption would be undisturbed (Schol.Bob.119 St.) 
The consuls were charged by the senate to see to the protection of the 
trial (Asco60C). Catiline is said to have been concerned with either 
violent behaviour or plans for such on 29 December 66 (Cic.Cat.1,15) 
and on 5 February 65 (Sall.Cat.l8.6-8). It is suggested that both of
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these are connected, with Manilius' trials, in the first case the abortive 
Ciceronian hearing and its sequel in a contio, and in the second the
(21)disrupted resumption in 65. It has been questioned however on what
side either Piso or Catiline would have been demonstrating if they were- 
(22)indeed doing so.
Catiline's.political ties at this date are the subject of some 
debate, A case has been advanced for the view that Catiline was an 
associate of Pompey and that it was as such that he originally stood for 
the consulship. The arguments are essentially five: (i) Catiline is
almost certainly to be identified with the L,Sergius who was a member of 
Cn.Pompeius Strabo's consilium at Asculum during the Social War 
(ILS.8888)!^^^ (ii) Catiline's first wife was a Gratidia. This would 
probably make him an adfinis of Cicero, in his early career at least, 
firmly Pompeian, The remaining three arguments all concern Catiline's 
prosecution in 65 de repetundis. (iii) Cicero considered defending 
Catiline and working with him for the consulship of 65 (Cic.Att.1.2.1).
(iv) P. Clodius the prosecutor, an associate of Pompey, was later accused 
of collusion (Cic.Har.Resp.42,45;In Pis.25;Asc.9C;cf.Cic.Att,1.2.1).
(v) Catiline was defended by the consul, L.Torquatus (Asc,66,92C), whose 
wife came from Picenum (Cic.Sull.25), a region where Pompey had great 
influence, and who had served as a Pompeian legate in 67!^^^ These 
arguments must be considered: (i) The first point, that of Catiline's
service under Strabo need not be denied, but of itself it means little 
dating back as it does some quarter of a century. Since then Catiline 
had been prosecuted for incest by Clodius in 75» on. that occasion 
certainly in earnest, and was then defended by Q,Catulus. Support came
too from M.Cato who threatened Clodius with prosecution (Orosius 6.5.I;
Plut.Cat.19.5)» Later too Catiline appealed to Catulus (Sail.Cat.34.3-55»6)
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(ii) Any connection established with Cicero by Catiline's marriage to 
Gratidia must have been somewhat weakened by his slaughter of her brother 
M.Marius Gratidianus (MRR2.72). This act reinforces the view of 
Catiline's friendship with Catulus, as Gratidianus had been responsible 
for Catulus' father's death (8chol.Bern.on Lucan •2.Î75»P«»62U).
(iii) As has already been argued, Cicero's contemplated defence and 
alliance with Catiline are best seen in the context of Cicero's moves 
towards the Catulan optimates. He was helped in his canvass by 
L.Dornitius Ahenobarbus (Cic.Att.1.1.3) and C.Piso (Att.1.1.2% both enemies 
of Pompey and associates of Catulus and Hortensius. (iv) There is little 
reason to credit Cicero’s charge that Clodius* prosecution was collusive. 
The contemporary reference to the case in a letter to Atticus may only 
show that Clodius was overconfident of the strength of his case and felt 
no need to quibble about the jury : "Indices habemus, quos volumus, summa
(25)accusatoris voluntate" (Att.1.2.1). Cicero himself thought the evidence 
overwhelming (Att.1.1.1). The taunt of "praevaricator Catilinae" was 
flung much later, after the feud between the two men had started, and 
after Clodius had in fact been prominent in the ranks of Cicero's 
unofficial consular bodyguard (Plut.Cic.29»1;cflAsc.50C). There seems 
no suggestion that Clodius' prosecution of Catiline in 73 was other than 
genuine. In the light of Cicero's later assertions of Catiline's 
notoriety, collusion might seem the only explanation for his acquittal in 
65. The support of the consul Torquatus and probably that of Catulus may 
in fact have proved quite enough, with or without the help of some of 
Catiline's African spoils (Cic.Sull.8l;cf.Cael.l4;Asc85-7G)»
(v) L.Torquatus who defended Catiline in 65 had indeed been a Pompeian 
legate in 67, but his case would seem unusual as he was apparently at the 
same time a praetorian proconsul in Asia, His legateship may therefore
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have been a convenient legal arrangement to ensure efficient cooperation 
with Pompey, rather than, as in other cases, a cleeir piece of patronage. 
It is suggested that he may have served as legate before taking oyer his 
province, but the sole evidence for both posts rests on the double title
given him in an inscription from Miletus; 'Trpscr^ enjr^  ^' MuZ ^^6)
which shows, that he held both at the same time. In any case, from the
time he left Rome he must have possessed proconsular imperium. Despite.
his wife's Picene origin, Torquatus was closely associated during his
consulship with Hortensius (Cic.Sull.12). There is little evidence for
his political allegiance, and his defence of Catiline cannot be used to
(27)establish the letter's. In addition to the counter-arguments
marshalled above it should perhaps be noted that in 66 Catiline's petitio
was refused by the consul, L.Volcacius Tullus (Asc,89C), who during that
year appeared in support of the Pompeian Cornelius at his first trial
( A s c . 6 0 C ) I n  64 Catiline was again prosecuted, this time de sicariis
by L.Lucceius, a man generally thought to be a friend of Pompey
Catiline's association, in this matter of Manilius' trial, with
Cn.Piso is of itself enough to cast doubt upon any analysis which would
see him exerting himself on Manillas' behalf. Piso is well attested as
a virulent hater of Pompey (Sail.Gat.19=1-5;Asc.92C)!^^^ It is highly
likely that the passage in Valerius Maximus already once mentioned refers
to him (Val.Max.6.2.4). In this, a certain Cn.Piso prosecuted one
Manilius Crispus who was backed by Pompey. Piso hurled abuse and insults
at Pompey, and when the latter asked why he did not prosecute him, Piso
retorted by asking that Pompey should first guarantee that he would not
start a civil way'". An attempt has been made to date this incident to 
(31 ) ^60, in which case it would be necessary to assume that Piso's son was 
the prosecutor, as Piso was killed in Spain in 65 or 64 (MRR2.159>165)»
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and another Manilius the defendant as the former tribune was condemned 
in 65 (Asc.60C) arid there is no record of any return to public life. The 
younger Piso, consul 23, was almost certainly too young in 60. Another 
attempt to distinguish this incident recorded,by Valerius Maximus from 
the trials of Manilius in 66 and 65 has been'to put it in 69 or 68. The 
reasons given are that, from the passage of the Lex Gabinia onwards, quite 
early in 67, Pompey was both immune from prosecution and also actually 
absent from Pome, and so cannot have then been so threatened. It is 
also argued that Asconius would not have thought Piso likely to be behind 
the disruption of the trial if he was or had been the prosecutor, and that 
in any case the name of the prosecutor is known, one Cn.Minucius 
(8chol.Bob.li9 8t.)!22)
It nevertheless remains highly probable that Valerius Maximus has 
transmitted a somewhat garbled account of the events of 66-3° No other 
Pompeian Manilius is Imowu, and this Manilius is quite unknown before his 
tribunate. The fact that Piso’s attack was on Pompey through Manilius 
suggests that it must follow Manilius* law giving Pompey his Eastern 
command. Valerius does not in fact say that Piso prosecuted Pompey or 
ever intended to do so. He does say that he prosecuted Manilius,
Pompey's part in the reported dialogue could have been played by any of 
the tribunes who questioned Cicero’s behaviour in the matter (Dio 36.44.2), 
A possible reconstruction of events might run as follows: Piso
prosecuted Manilius before Cicero in December 66, perhaps managing while 
doing so to give such offence to Cicero that the latter was more than 
happy later to blacken his reputation posthumously. In 65 he resumed the 
prosecution, Cicero defending, but Manilius’ supporters managed to break 
up the court. At this stage it may be that those who wished to see 
Manilius convicted decided that a change of prosecutor was needed, and
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Minqcius, perhaps less volatile, was asked to take over the case. This . 
could provide an explanation for the conflicting evidence over the charge 
involved,. Cicero's court in 66 was de repetundis (MBR2.132), but 
Minucius is .paid to have prosecuted Manilius de maiestate (Sch0l.B0b.li9 Sti), 
It may be that a new prosecutor could not simply take over another's case.
He had to institute fresh proceedings, the earlier case being dropped.
In these circumstances a fresh charge may have seemed desirable. This 
could explain how Cicero was able to drop out of the affair without 
breaking his publicly given word. He had agreed to defend Manilius on the
(33)charge of extortion. That was as far as his promise went. Piso was 
perhaps compensated for his disappointment by an extraordinary command in 
Spain,
Crassus* role in all this is not clear. His only apparent connection
is revealed by the Sallustian ablative absolute, "Crasso adnitente'.*
(Sall.Cat.i9.l-2), with reference to the senate's decision to send Piso to
Spain. This move has often been regarded as part of Crassus* supposedly
perennial quest for a military base to provide insurance against Pompey*s
(34)eventual return, for a "point d*appui", but may originally have been a
piece of simple horse-trading between two different factions both hostile
to Pompey. If Piso was close to Crassus, the latter may have been keen 
to teach Manilius a lesson for taking his name in vain in the matter of 
the freedmen*s votes. Crassus did not take kindly to being dragged into 
the limelight at times not of his own choosing. Tarquinius found that in 
63 (Sail.Cat.48.3-9). Crassus may nevertheless have been glad to let 
others finish off Manilius, especially now that his ally had gained a
desirable command in Spain, Piso had not expected the post
(Suet.Iul.9)!^5)
That others were involved can be inferred from L.Dornitius* part in
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providing force hostile to Manilius. An hereditary enemy of Pompey, and 
closely connected with Cato, Catulus, and Hortensius, • Domitius* is 
certainly the quarter from which the assault on Manilius might be most 
readily expected, and his is the side on which Catiline should most 
probably be sought in 63. Cicero's thoughts of defending Catiline were 
conveyed to Atticus very shortly after he had told him that Domitius was 
his chief hope.in his consular petition (Cic.Att,1.1.3-4;1.2.1).
Domitius' involvement against Manilius, which came after the disrupted
(37)resumption in early 63 at which Cicero probably spoke, must have been 
quite decisive in inducing Cicero to withdraw from the defence. He had 
declined to appear in a much less important matter for fear of offending 
Domitius (Cic.Att.1.1.3-4).
The matter is confused, and while such a reconstruction is indeed 
hypothetical, it has the merit of fitting all the evidence into a known 
framework without creating new incidents and fresh characters. It has 
one Manilius and one Piso, acting in what would seem a plausible manner, 
and eschews over-ingenious double and triple bluffs!^^^
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Chapter V Censor 65
The disturbances surrounding the prosecution of Manilius may provide 
the basis for at least some of the stories later built up into the myth 
of the "Fj.rst Catilinarian Conspiracy”. Other elements concern the 
displaced consuls designate for 65, P.Autronius Paetus and P.Sulla, and 
various activities of Crassus and C.Caesar in 65.
After the. drama of the second "conspiracy” in 63, in which Autronius
was caught up, the events of 66/5 achieved fresh ramifications, from which
P.Sulla extricated himself with difficulty. , It is now generally agreed
that no schemes were in fact hatched whereby C.Cotta and Torquatus, the
eventual consuls, and/or large sections of the senate\were to be
assassinated, and power seized by various combinations of Catiline, Crassus,
(1)Sulla, Autronius and Caesar. The personalities involved deserve 
consideration. P.Sulla is generally thought to have been Pompey's 
brother-in-law, as C.Memmius, tribune in 5^, probably son of Pompey's 
similarly named quaestor and brother-in-law, was Sulla's step-son 
(Cic.QP.5.5"2). It is sometimes objected that P.Sulla's behaviour in 57, 
when he permitted his house to be used as a base for P.Clodius' activities 
(Cic.Att.4.5.5), and in 54, when, aided by his step-son, he tried to 
prosecute Pompey's adherent Gabinius, might seem to make such a 
relationship unlikely (Cic.QF.3.1.15?3.2.1;3.3.2). In the light of Sulla's
other connections, however, a change in his attitude towards Pompey before 
57 is quite probable. A third C.Memmius was active at this time.
Tribune in 66 he attacked M.Lucullus and opposed L.Lucullus, apparently 
acting in Pompey's interest (Plut.Luc.57°1-2;Cat.29-3~4;cf.Cic.Att.1.18.5). 
In 62 he testified on behalf of P.Sulla (Cic.Sull.55)■ In April 59, at 
a time when, as will be argued, Pompey and Caesar were at odds with 
Crassus and were expressing doubts about the validity of P.Clodius'
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adoption, Memmius, Metellus Nepos, and the younger Curio were all furious 
with them (Cic.Att.2.12.2). In his praetorship in 58 he again showed 
himself hostile to Caes.ar (Suet.lul.23,cf.Schol.Bob. 130,146 St.).. It 
will be argued that by his divorce of Mùcia in 62 and his desertion of 
Clodius over the Bona Pea affair, Pompey alienated not only Mucia's half- 
brothers, Celer and Nepos, and their cousins, the three Claudii, but also 
a number of other important men.
C.Curio, consul 76, had been a supporter of Pompey’s Eastern command 
in 66 (Cic.Leg.Man.68). In 61 he. was closely involved with Clodius, 
defending him at his trial. On subsequent appearances in 39 and after 
both he and his son ranged themselves clearly on Clodius' side in 
opposition to Pompey. Curio was married to Memmia the sister of 
C.Memmius, the praetor of 38 (Sisenna frg.44.HRR1.284)«
Some pattern can be seen to emerge. P.Sulla was closely associated
with Clodius in 37» The Curiones were consistently aligned with 
P.Clodius and were thereby hostile to Pompey in the 30s. One C.Memmius 
was connected with the Curiones and at odds with Pompey until after Luca. 
Another C.Memmius, although Pompey's nephew, was hostile to Gabinius and 
was joined in this by his step-father P.Sulla. Young Curio, Memmius, 
Nepos, and P.Clodius are linked in a group by Cicero in 39 (Att.2.12.2). 
All these men seem to form a closely knit group. All showed hostility to 
Pompey in the 30s. One of the Memmii, and C.Curio pater were friendly 
towards him in 66, P.Clodius may have been working in his interests in
68/7 in the East. If to this is added the possibility that P.Sulla may
have been his brother-in-law, it would seem not unlikely that P.Sulla may 
have been a Pompeian candidate for the consulship in 66, His later 
actions could show him following the lead of his other connections after 
Pompey's volte-face in 62/1, or else he may after his conviction have been
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in any case abandoned by Pompey, . and.have anticipated his friends in 
seeking other directions.
Autronius' connections are not possible to discern. Since it is by 
no means demonstrated that P.Sulla and Autronius were associated in any 
conspiracy in 66/3, it would seem that only the fact that they were both 
elected and unseated in the same year led to the conclusion that they were 
politically associated. It is indeed possible, if unlikely, that they 
could have been opposed to one another and that one prosecution was 
initiated in relatiation for the other. A possible indication of a 
connection is, however, provided by the Marcelli who not only testified 
for Sulla when indicted de vi in 62 (Cic.Sull.20), as did many 
"ornamenta ac lumina rei publicae” (Cic.Sull.3), but also spoke for 
Autronius their kinsman (Cic.Sull. l 8 - 1 9 ) H i s  involvement with Catiline 
after his conviction, cannot be taken as evidence for any previous 
association. He would have looked for help to any who seemed able or 
willing to proffer it.
Just as Cato and Ser.Sulpicius Rufus tried in 63 to unseat L.Murena, 
certainly no enemy of their faction, so the ultimately successful 
candidates of 66 may have had no other reason for attacking Sulla and 
Autronius than that they wanted the consulships of which they felt they 
had been unfairly deprived. These men were L.Torquatus and L.Cotta,
Both have been discussed, and have been found to show more sympathy for 
Cat ulus and his friends than for Pompey- Cotta may have been friendly 
with Crassus. Little more can be said except that Cicero thought highly 
of both men and was on excellent terras with them (Cic.Brut,239;Sull.34;
Dom.84;Leg.3.43;Phil-2.13)- These prosecutions may well have been the
first possible occasion on which the new Lex Calpurnia de ambitu could have 
been invoked. The precedent established may not have been thought
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generally welcome, as no other designate magistrates were subsequently 
condemned. That Sulla and Autronius were furious on this occasion is ■ 
understandable. There may have been noisy scenes and protests as Cotta 
and Torquatus took office. Certainly Autronius had tried to disrupt the 
ambitus proceedings by force (Cic.Sull.13-)» ' Whether either man was
interested in Manilius’ case or in the disturbances that accompanied it 
must be doubtful. The years 66 and 63 show regular attempts to interfere 
violently with the activities of the courts. In 66 Cornelius’ first 
indictment was dropped by the prosecutors after threats to their lives 
(Asc.39“60C). There were noisy demonstrations at Manilius' first 
appearance in court in December 66, and the first attempt to try him in 
63 ended with the court broken up by violence. The tribunates of the two 
men and of Gabinius had been far from peaceful. It has been suggested 
that it was the action of a tribune in vetoing a senatorial investigation 
into this developing nuisance that later enabled Cicero first to hint at 
undisclosed plots, and then boldly to assert them as facts (Dio 36.44.3)^^^ 
During the consulship of Cotta and Torquatus, censors were elected.
As has been observed, consuls seem to have been able to exercise some 
discretion in the question of whether to hold such elections (Cic.Att.4.3.6), 
and presumably had some influence over the results. It is not 
surprising therefore that, with these consuls, Q.Catulus and M.Crassus were 
elected. It is interesting to note a relative absence of recorded 
rivalry in the matter of censorial elections, though there are many 
instances of disagreements between censors in o f f i c e D u r i n g  this last 
half century of the Republic we never hear of defeated candidates. It 
could be argued that in fact such reports are relatively rare in the 
matter of consular elections, and that it is unsurprising to find no 
mention with regard to the censorship, which is in any case so poorly
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noticed that even the names of successful candidates sometimes pass
unrecorded. It remains possible however that in the case of the
censorship, which was perhaps hopefully thought uncontroversial and
honorific, an unwritten convention may have grown up whereby only tv/o
candidates should stand, those two decided by the consensus of the
senatorial principes. Thus any unseemly campaigning might be avoided.
Whether or not this was in fact so, the censorship seems to have been.
considered to be a mark of the general respect felt for its holder
It has been argued that the censorship, even more than the consulship,
(7)tended to be restricted to certain censorial families. The family of 
M.Crassus certainly fitted that requirement, having produced three, and 
possibly four, censors in little over a century: P.Dives in 210,
possibly C.Getha in 108, L.Crassus in 92, and P.Crassus in 89. His 
colleague Q.Catulus came of a family that produced three consuls in the 
third century one of whom attained the censorship. The family had then 
lapsed into obscurity until Catulus* homonymous father restored its 
dignity, albeit with great difficulty, suffering several defeats before 
gaining the consulship of 102 with the aid of C.Marius (Cic.Plane.12).
Q.Catulus was a powerful figure in Roman politics, a leader before 
his death of many of those who resented the growing power and potential 
dominance of Pompey. In the 70s he had tried to insist that Pompey 
disband his troops after the defeat of M.Lepidus and M.Brutus, and was 
presumably opposed to his appointment to Spain (Plut.Pomp.17*1-4). He 
was prominent in opposing the tribunician agitation of Opimius 
(Ps.Asc.255 Gt.) and of Hacer (Sail.Hist.3*48.9-11M). In 67 and 66 he 
took a leading part in opposing the passage of the Leges Gabinia and 
Manilia conferring on Pompey his extraordinary commands against the 
pirates and Mithridates (Veil.Pat.2.32.1-2;Cic.Leg.Man.59-61 ; Dio 36.36a;
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Val.Max.8.15»9;Plut.Pomp.25), and testified against Cornelius in 65
‘(Asc,60,790;cf.Val.Max.8.5-4). That he was a long standing and open 
rival of Pompey is further shown by Caesar's proposal as praetor in 62 
that Catulus should be relieved of his responsibility for the restoration 
of the temple of Capitoline Jove, and that this should be transferred to 
Pompey (Suet.Iul.i5).
His likely relations with Crassus must be considered. It has been 
argued above that Crassus was at the very least sympathetic to the cause 
of the tribunicia potestas in the 70s, and indeed may have been closely 
involved with some of the tribunes. On the other hand, Crassus may have 
had close ties with several of Catulus’ circle. That Catiline, a friend 
of Catulus at least in 73  ^ and Crassus were both attacked in that year by 
men arguably attached to Pompey could suggest some similarity of outlook, 
if only that of opposition to Pompey and his friends. It has been further 
shown that several of those expelled from the senate by the Pompeian 
censors of 70 show ties with Catulus and his group. C.Antonius Hybrida's 
brother was married to the daughter of L.Caesar, half-brother of the 
elder Catulus. P.Sura married her after M.Antonius' death.
M.Messalla Niger was half-brother or cousin to Hortensius, Catulus' 
closest associate. How Crassus was regarded by those nobles hostile to 
Pompey after his alliance and then brealt with him in 71/70 is hard to 
establish. That he will have been distrusted is likely, but it is 
possible that in the mid 60s, just as in 6I/6O in the debates over 
Pompey's Eastern acta and perhaps the issue of land for his troops, and 
indeed later in 56, Crassus may have been welcomed by the Catalan 
optimales as a potent ally against Pompey. It has been suggested that he 
may have had a hand in the original prosecution of Manilius, and was 
certainly associated in 65 with Cn.Piso, a declared enemy of Pompey. It
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seems likely that the marriage,of Crassus* son Marcus to the daughter of 
Q.Metellus Creticus took place in 70 or 69 (see Appendix A), Creticus 
was associated with Hortensius in the defence of Verres and indeed owed 
his provincial command to Hoptensius*. cooperation (Dio 36.1a). , If he 
was not hostile to Pompey at least since Verres* condemnation, he certainly 
became a bitter enemy after their clash in Crete (Plut.Pomp.29«2-3;
Dio 36.I8.I-I9.I). To Catulus and his friends, Pompey was the enemy in 
the middle 60s, and Crassus, who appeared to share that view, must have 
seemed an ally worth recruiting even at the price of the censorship.
They reckoned, perhaps, without his ambition. Plutarch suggests that the 
failure of the censors to agree was a matter for surprise (Cr.I3.I)-
The sources for Crassus* censorship suggest two points on which the 
censors disagreed. Unfortunately, each source mentions only one.
Plutarch says that Catulus objected to Crassus* aim of making Egypt 
tributary (Cr.13.2), Dio says that the censors, whom he does not name, 
were hopelessly at variance over the question of admitting the Transpadani 
£5 'TyjÇ (37 = 9-3)- Both sources say that the censors
resigned on account of their disagreement. The Egyptian question is also 
mentioned by Cicero and Suetonius. Cicero said in 63 when opposing the 
Rullan land bill that those men who had tried openly two years earlier to 
get their hands on Egypt, were now trying to do so indirectly through the 
proposed law (Cic.Leg.Ag.l.1 ;2.41-4). In the fragments of a speech 
probably delivered in 63 he was opposed to a proposal of Crassus to 
annexe Egypt on the strength of the supposed will of a former King 
Ptolemy Alexander (Schol.Bob.Peg.Alex.91-93 St.)l^^ Suetonius writes 
that C.Caesar attempted per partem tribunorum to obtain a commission to 
annexe Egypt. Although Suetonius confused the issue by bringing in 
aspects of the later question of the recognition and subsequent expulsion
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by his subjects of Ptolemy Auletes, he makes it clear that this attempt of 
Caes^ took place during his aedileship, which is certainly to be placed 
in 63 (Guet.Iultll). Caesar is also associated with the Transpadane ; 
cause by Suetonius. ' Returning ante tempus from his quaestorship in 
Spain, Caesar encouraged the Transpadane Latin colonies who were 
”de civitate Romana agitantes”, but was foiled by the fact that the consuls 
had troops in the Cisalpina which they were preparing for Marcius Rex's 
Cilician command (Suet.Iul.8). Later Caesar is said by Suetonius to have 
conspired with Cn.Piso that while Piso secured Spain, Caesar would rouse 
the "Ambrani” and the Transpadane Latins (Suet.Iul.9)- A good 
emendation of "Ambrani” might be Mariani. This coupling with the 
Transpadani could well parallel Plutarch's assertion that in 64 Etruria 
and the greater part of Cisalpine Gaul were ready for revolt (Plut.Cic.10.3; 
cf.l4.1-2). Etruria, a stronghold of Sullan settlers, must necessarily 
have contained many dispossessed Mariani. These latter passages, coupled 
with Dio, would seem to disprove any suggestion that there cannot have 
been a Transpadane question at this date^^^
It is generally assumed that, of Dio, Plutarch, and Suetonius, each 
has hold of part of the truth, and that this truth consists of a 
compilation of all their stories. It is assumed that Crassus and Caesar 
were working together in 63 and that together they tried to effect the 
enfranchisement of the Transpadani and the annexation of Egypt. It is 
worthy of note that Suetonius connects Caesar with both these matters, and 
that no other source relates him to either. Crassus on the other hand is 
connected with the Transpadane question by Dio, and with Egypt by Plutarch 
and Cicero. It is even stranger to observe that Suetonius links Crassiis 
with Caesar in a version of the "First Catilinarian Conspiracy", but 
associates Caesar with the Transpadanes and with Piso's Spanish post in
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another context and with no.mention of CrassusP^^
It would thus seem fairly certain'that there was unrest in
Transpadane Gaul and that the censors were involved in the matter. Dio's : '
failure to mention the censors' names could make this the more probable,
as it rules out the possibility that he derived his account from any
possibly hostile and therefore suspect source such as Tanusius Geminus,
Curio, Bibulus, or Actorius Naso, all cited by Suetonius for Caesar's
involvement (lul.9)  ^^ ^ ^ It remains strictly possible that the roles in
the dispute generally assigned are wrong. It could have been Catulus who
favoured the enfranchisement. This hardly fits with his apparent
character and conservative views. He is unlikely to have been more
popularis than Crassus, or even than Curio who admitted the justice of the
cause but thought it politically inexpedient - "vincat utilitas"
(Cic.Off.3=88). It is true that Cicero later described Crassus as a man
who was very sparing with the franchise (Cic.Balb.3Q), but this could well
have been intended half humorously if it was well known that Crassus had
tried but failed to bring about a massive extension of the franchise.
Crassus' reasons for favouring the Transpadane cause would seem clear.
Cicero wrote in 63, "videtur in suffragiis multum posse Gallia" (Att.1.1.2).
This refers to the voting strength, well worth courting, that lay in Gaul,
which essentially meant the Cispadana, of which all save probably Ravenna
had the citizenship, and one or two fully enfranchised colonies north of
the river. The Transpadani were much the more numerous and therefore a
(12)potentially powerful force in the comitia. It has been suggested that
the successful Lustrum of 70/69, with its doubling of the registered
citizens, had greatly distorted previous voting patterns. Any further
increase was viewed by the optimale nobles with great suspicion, with the
( 13)result that there was not in fact another complete lustrum until 28.
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Crassus may be. seen therefore as making a bold bid to achieve a 
significant boost in his comitial'support, perhaps in an attempt to 
counteract that of Pompey which had been so enhanced in 70/69» He may. 
too have been trying to acquire favpur in a region traditionally connected 
with Pompey whose father was responsible for the law conferring Latin 
rights on the majority of the Transpadane communities (Asc.JC;Pliny NH. 
3.158; M o 37»9»5)» That Pompey did consider himself patron of those 
communities was implied by Cicero in his disquiet expressed over the action 
of M.Marcellus in flogging a Transpadane in 31 (Cic.Att.3°2.3;3«11»2).
Another view is that the aim of Crassus and Caesar was to stir up the 
demand for the citizenship so that the discontent ensuing from its 
inevitable refusal could be used for an insurrection. It is highly 
unlikely that any such insurrection was planned, but in any case the 
accounts of plotting seem to relate to the winter of 66/3® Censors were
(14)usually elected in the spring, thus making it unlikely that any proposals 
put forward by Crassus as censor could have had any connection with those 
planned disturbances. Suetonius is hopelessly vague and makes no attempt 
to relate his garbled accounts of the various plots either causally or 
chronologically. All that can be derived from his evidence is the 
possibility that Caesar may have been involved in some way with Crassus' 
policies in 63.
How Crassus proposed to go about the matter of the Transpadane 
enfranchisement is uncertain. It was not possible for a censor to 
propose a bill on such a matter, but he could have given the weight of his 
censorial authority in support ,of a tribunician measure on the subject. 
Suetonius' mention of a group of tribunes sympathetic to the Egyptian 
matter could suggest this. On the other hand the suggestion that Crassus 
simply tried to enrol the Transpadani without any previous legislation is
_ 75 -
unlikely.• He would have needed some legal pretext or ambiguity to make
this p o s s i b l e S i m i l a r l y  Catulus could not haye vetoed a tribunician
measure, but he-could have made known his intention to refuse to put
into, effect such a bill. ....................  ...........
'Crassus* interest in Egypt might, seem still further removed from the
sphere of censorial, competence. Plutarch's words here might show how
he managed to justify his interest. His policy was ' A l^ tttov
'Trou&u? 'vnXO'Tckfj (Cr. 13-2). A parallel might be sought in
the action of Ti.Gracchus in 133, both accepting the legacy to.the Roman
people of the province of Asia and also assigning the responsibility for
the collection of taxes there to the publicani. Crassus may have argued
that, since by the will of Ptolemy Alexander Egypt was now public land,
as such it was the responsibility of the censors to see to its
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n H e  may even have argued that the Asian system of
collecting taxes should be extended to Egypt. This is not to suggest that
Crassus' interest in Egypt was primarily financial, but rather that this
aspect of the matter, the possible locatio of its vectigalia, may have
(17)served as a pretext for his involvement. Caesar may have supported the 
proposals, but can hardly have hoped for the commission to effect the 
annexatipn. The aedileship was a purely civil office, unlike for example 
the quaestorship which frequently carried military responsibilities. The 
censorship too was far removed from the military sphere, being unique 
among the higher magistracies in lacking imperium. Crassus cannot have 
planned to go himself. Similarly Gracchus had not gone to Asia, but had 
nevertheless been able to exercise influence and patronage over that 
province, and presumably felt that the annexation was a boost to his 
stature both there and in Rome.
It is suggested that Crassus' interests in both Cisalpine Gaul and
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Egypt were in their possible use as military bases against P o m p e y . It
is true that Caesar later found, the Cisalpina an immensely fertile
recruiting ground, but his command,there can hardly Jiave been foreseen in
63. Caesar's occupation of Egypt with an army is said to have been
intended as a counterweight to Pompey. How this could work is hard to
see. Such a force would be hardly likely to march up.into Syria and
there unprovoked do battle with Pompey's veterans, nor would the thought
of a hostile army in Egypt be likely to deter Pompey from returning from
the East in Sullan fashion if he so chose^^^^
Thanks to Catulus' opposition neither of these affairs produced any
result. How long they remained in office before resigning is not easy to
establish. One indication may be provided by an anecdote recorded by
Plutarch concerning an encounter between M.Cato early in his quaestorship
and Catulus who was then censor (Plut.Cat.16.3-6). 64 is the accepted
year for Cato's quaestorship (MRR2.l63n.3 & Supp.49-30), thus suggesting
that Crassus and Catulus were still in office on 3 December 63 when Cato
would have taken up his duties. They had probably been elected in the
spring of 63 and would have entered office i m m e d i a t e l y I f  therefore
the censors did not resign until December at the earliest, it would be
most surprising that they should have failed to carry out any of their
duties, despite both Plutarch's and Dio's assertions to that effect
(Plut.Cr.13.1;Dio 37»9-3)* That the lustrum was not completed is certain,
but that need not mean that nothing was achieved. No lustrum was
completed in 61 but the censors had revised the senatorial lists
(Dio 37*46.4), and had arranged a contract for the Asian taxes (Cic.Att. ;
1.17.9)= The lectio senatus was generally the first of the censor's 
(21 )duties, and might have been accomplished before the disagreements arose 
on other matters. It is likely that Crassus and Catulus would have been
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in general agreement about this, perhaps restoring to the senate some of 
their friends expelled in 70»
After the resignation of Crassus and Catulus,. fresh censors were
elected in 64. . They too resigned and it has been argued above (pp. 39.-40).
that their resignation may have been concerned with the same matter of the
Transpadane franchise. They were opposed by some tribunes who feared
expulsion from the senate. ' One of these new censors was L,Cotta, whose
likely sympathies were also discussed. The other may have been
M'.Acilius GlabriOo An anecdote records a certain tribune M.Lucilius,
who was censured by a censor named Acilius (Fronto Ad.M.Caes.3°4l-2,83N),
No censor of that name is imown. To the suggestion that the consul of 67
could have been censor in 64 the objection is made that there was no
lectio senatus in that year (Dio 37«9.4;MRR2.470), but Dio, the evidence .
for this, states specifically that the lectio was obstructed because the
tribunes feared censure. This coincidence of tribunes threatened with
censorial notae makes it highly likely that 64 is the year for Fronto's
(22)incident, and therefore that Glabrio was censor then. That the censors 
of 64 were in agreement with one another is perhaps suggested by the fact 
that it was necessary for the tribunes to oppose them. As was argued
above Dio may mean that the issue was, as it had been in 63, that of the 
Transpadani.
That Crassus succeeded with neither of his major projects during his
censorship must have been disappointing, but probably not unexpected. He
may have gained credit, even though no votes, amongst the Transpadani.
His possible association with Caesar may be a pointer to his future
policy.
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Chapter VI Catiline
Crassus* possible association with Caesar in the matters of Egypt
and the Transpadane franchise could suggest that it was as à direct
consequence of Catulus* opposition to his ideas that Crassus started to
think once more in terms of an alliance with Pompey, Caesar showed
support for both the Lex Gàbinia and the Lex Manilia (Plut.Pomp.23-4;
Bio 36.43.2-4). In the 70s his prosecutions of Cn.Dolabella and
C.Antonius have been shown to be in all details consistent with a
Pompeian stance. In 65 and 62 he was associated with tribunes in
measures clearly favourable to Pompey. In 63 T.Labienus, together with
T.Arapius Balbus, later a Pompeian consular candidate, was supported by
Caesar in carrying a law permitting Pompey to wear triumphal dress at the
games (Veil.Pat.2.40.4;Bio 37*21.3-4), He was, clearly connected with
Caesar in the trial of Rabirius, and in his measure restoring to the people
( 1 )the right to elect the members of the priestly colleges. Caesar
supported Pompey’s brother-in-law, Q.Metellus Nepos, in 62 in his proposal
to recall Pompey to take command against Catiline (Suet.lul.l6;Cic.Best.62;
Plut.Cat.26-9). Caesar also attacked C.Piso in 63 (Cic.Place.98;
Sail.Cat.49.2), and Q.Catulus in 62 (Dio 36.44.1 ;Suet.lul.13), both
vehement enemies of Pompey, In the latter case he proposed to advantage
Pompey directly at the expense of Catulus. He had already clashed with
Catulus in 63 (Plut.Caes.6.1-4;Suet.Iul.1l). His Pompeian credentials
(2)were impressive. Nevertheless he seems to be found associating with 
Crassus in 63, and again in 64, reportedly backing C.Antonius and Catiline 
for the consulship. Some have seen this as evidence of the insincerity 
of Caesar’s Pompeian professions (Dio 37=22.1,44.3;Plut.Pomp.23.4)P^but it 
is perhaps more likely that Crassus was moving towards Pompey than that 
Caesar was deserting him.
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The evidence for Crassus’ and Caesar’s involvement with Catiline in 
64 has been questioned. The chief source is Asconius who states that 
Antonius and Catiline were allied in their candidacyopposed to Cicero, 
and supported by Crassus and ‘Caesar (Asc.83C)^^^ • He gives this 
information twice, the second time saying that he learned this from 
Cicero’s de Consiliis Suis, and giving the further information, clearly 
from the same source, that Crassus was behind Piso and Catiline in the 
"first conspiracy" in 63- That Cicero was capable of gross distortion 
and libel especially in that work cannot be doubted, but it nevertheless 
remains probable that Crassus and Caesar were open backers of both Catiline 
and Antonius, Caesar almost certainly favoured Catiline in 64 when the 
latter was brought before the quaestio de sicariis of which Caesar was 
index in 64 (MRR2. 1 6 2 ) A n t o n i u s  when consul showed support for several 
of the measures put forward at the instigation of Crassus and Caesar 
(Dio 23-3~4;Plut,Cic.12.2-3)- A certain Q.Hucius Orestinus, tribune in
64, was apparently acting in Catiline’s interests when he vetoed a bribery
law, thereby provoking an attack from Cicero, the Oratio in Toga Candida
(Asc.83,83-6,88c), He may well have been a relation, perhaps a brother,
of Catiline’s wife Aurelia Orestilla, and thereby connected with 
Cn.Aufidius Orestes. He is also likely however to be by adoption a member
of the Mucii Scaevolae, a family earlier observed to have had many close
ties with the Licinii Crassi Antonius’ association with Catiline
is clearly seen in his support for his candidature in 63 (Cic.Mur.49; 
cf.Sail.Cat.26.1)0 It has been shown already that attempts to argue that 
Catiline’s political ties, prior to his "conspiracies", were Pompeian are 
far from convincing.
The "Second Catilinarian Conspiracy", if it existed at all, is now 
generally agreed to have been formed in 63, in the context of Catiline’s
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second candidacy and defeat, rather than in 64 as Sallust claims
(7)(Sail.Cat.17)« It is necessary however to consider the context of his 
first candidacy in 64,■ Crassus had been thwarted during his censorship, 
and may already have come to ^  understanding with Caesar, The second 
pair of censors, perhaps sympathetic to the Tranpadane cause, had also 
failed. These were L,Cotta and.probably M ’.Glabrio. . The letter's 
possible Pompeian sympathies discussed earlier might suggest the first 
fruits of Crassus' new policy of cooperating with Pompeians shown in his 
association with Caesar. Cotta's ties have also been discussed. He is 
unlikely to have been hostile to an alliance of Crassus and Caesar. He 
was a close kinsman of the latter (Suet.Iul.1,2;74,2;Plut.Caes.9.2) and 
probably friendly to Crassus, The weakness of the censorship, even acting 
in combination with tribunes, had been exposed. It must have been 
apparent that the authority of the consulship was needed, together with a 
programme more directly suited to the circumstances of Pompey's return, now 
thought imminent. To this end it would seem likely that Crassus supported 
Catiline and Antonius in the consular elections and at the same time tried 
to ensure that there were friendly tribunes elected. Dio implies that 
at least four tribunes, and indeed perhaps initially the whole college, 
put forward bills in association with Antonius (Dio 37=23.3-4). Cicero 
too indicates that all the tribunes were concerned in the preparation of 
the Rullan land bill (Cic.Leg.Ag.2.11-13)» In addition to that measure, 
Dio includes the proposal of L.Caecilius Rufus to reinstate Autronius and 
Sulla (MRR2.167-8), and two bills whose sponsors are unknown, one to 
restore full rights to the sons of those proscribed by Sulla, another to 
abolish debts. The proposal concerning the sons of the proscribed is 
confirmed by Cicero (Att.3=1=3)=
81 -
Of these measures, clearly the most important3 even discounting 
Cicero's deliberate inflation (Leg.ag.1;2;3 passim), was the agrarian bill 
proposed by P.Servilius Rullus. . An attempt has been made, to identify 
him with a Pompeian prefect, or. legate of 63. mentioned by Plutarch
(8)(Pomp.34.3)1 but this identification is unconvincing. He is otherwise 
unlmown. Detailed analysis of the provisions of the bill is unnecessary. 
Cicero may be exaggerating when he implies that the bill would permit the 
annexation of Egypt (Leg.ag.2.38;cf.1.1;2.44), but it could be that he is 
right. This was not necessarily a nefarious plot. Cicero admits that 
the matter had been proposed quite openly two years earlier. It is clear 
from the fragments of his speech, de rege Alexandrine, that he had then 
opposed it. These taken with his assertion that the same men were 
advocating the present measure, show clearly that Crassus was behind 
Rullus in 63 (Schol.Bob.91-3 St.;cf,Cic.Leg.ag.1.1;2.44). The crux of the 
scholarly debate over the bill would seem to be whether it was, as Cicero 
claimed, aimed against Pompey, or, as its supporters probably claimed, 
designed at least partly to benefit him. They could point to the fact 
that Pompey was expressly exempted from the requirement to hand over all 
gold and silver acquired during his campaigns (Cic,Leg.ag.1.12-13;2.39-60) 
That the measure was not intended simply to benefit Pompey may be 
readily granted, but it does appear well suited to satisfying his likely 
needs. When the "First Triumvirate" was formed in 60, Pompey's 
immediate requirements were two: land for his veterans and the
ratification of his Eastern acta. The proposals of Rullus could have been 
intended to give the commissioners elected under its terms powers to 
grant just those wishes, That the commissioners would have land at their 
disposal is certain, and Cicero inveighs against their power to dispose of 
great tracts of Asia and to unseat Kings (Leg.ag.1.1-2;2,38-46). Indeed
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the scope of the bill does appear to have-been vast, and there can be 
little doubt that its passage would have conferred, immense powers on the 
commissioners. Besides being able to off.er Pompey'what he wanted, at a 
price presumably,•the bill clearly had the aim of settling many of the
urban poor on the land, just as the Gracchan measures had donel^^^ The 
actual powers conferred on the commissioners.together with the popularity 
and increase in personal clientelae that could have been, theirs might well 
have changed the face of Roman politicalHfe.
Cicero's distortions and rhetoric seem to have succeeded in defeating 
the bill. L.Caecilius Rufus was induced to threaten it with his veto 
(Cic.Sull.63), and Antonius may have been bribed into muting his support 
for it by the promise of Cicero's province of Macedonia (Plut.Cic.13*3-4). 
There is some doubt about the dating of Cicero's agreement with Antonius, 
but, whenever it was made official, the promise may well have been made
(11 )early in the year at the time of the Rullan proposals.
It was suggested above that Cicero had, towards the end of his 
praetorship in 66, begun to thinli seriously of trying for the consulship, 
but had not felt wholly confident of his chances if he stood simply as a 
Pompeian candidate. That he had built up the beginnings of a clientele.
(12)of his own is no doubt true, but he must have been aware that to hope 
for the consulship he needed the support of the long-established and much 
more powerful clientelae of the great men in the state. Pompey's support 
may have been uncertain or less than whole-hearted, and Cicero clearly 
decided to explore the possibility of gaining support from Pompey's 
optimale opponents. To this end he solicited the assistance of C.Piso 
and L.Domitius (Cic.Att.1.1.2-4), and contemplated defending and then 
standing with Catiline, probably assuming that the latter's Catalan 
associates would be supporting his canvass. It must have become
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apparent however that, though prepared to defend Catiline's caput,'these 
men, perhaps including such as Catulus, Torquatus and Hortensius, were 
rather less enthusiastic about his consulship. Even if not a known 
blackguard and revolutionary, Catiline's temperament and unrestrained 
speech may have caused many to doubt his soundness. It is also possible 
that he had already begun an association with Crassus, though this is 
more likely to be a consequence of the withdrawal of optimale support 
than its occasion.
Cicero's position in 64 is revealingly illustrated by the 
Commentariolum Petitionis supposedly written by his brother Quintus as a 
memorandum on electioneering, setting put Cicero's advantages and how to 
capitalise on them. The authenticity of the work has been questioned, 
but its avoidance of anachronism in.general is remarkably complete, and 
in one particular, that it does not refer to the "First Catilinarian 
Conspiracy", so much so as to compel acceptance of its contemporaneity.
Any later writer, inevitably relying on Cicero's works published after 
64/3 could not have failed to include that myth when ennumerating Catiline's 
crimes (Q.Cic.Comm.Pet-9-12). It is sometimes asserted that the 
document must be spurious because Cicero cannot possibly have needed such 
advice from his politically less experienced brother. This argument 
takes the work's declared intention too much at face value. Whoever 
v/rote it, probably Quintus, possibly Marcus, and almost certainly in 64, 
the piece seems most likely to have been written as a piece of deliberate 
propaganda intended for a limited circulation amongst possible optimale
i
backers, the purpose being to ensure that they should not support Catiline 
and Antonius, and that they should take Cicero's Pompeian utterances with 
a pinch of salt as being aimed at the gullible mob. The readers would 
know how responsible, respectful, sound and un-popularis Cicero really
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was.(cf.Q.Cic.Comm.Pet.3,51,14-13)*^^^ . ’
Cicero and Antonius were elected and Catiline defeated. It would 
seem to have been after this repulse that Catiline was prosecuted 
de sicariis- by- L.Lucceius Pompey’s friend (Asc.91-2C), almost,certainly 
before Caessir, iudex quaestionis in 64, the year after his aedileship as 
was common^^^^ Cae.sar seems to have connived at Catiline’s acquittal.
In any case Catiline was still.supported, at least in the courts, by 
influential men including a number of consulars (Cic.Sull.8l), Crassus 
perhaps among them.
Crassus and his allies tried to go ahead with their legislative 
programme in 63, but were frustrated at every turn, largely through the 
efforts of Cicero. Before the elections in 63 two other matters arose, 
both involving Caesar and Labienus. Q.Metellus Pius, the Pontifex Maximusy
died and Caesar was elected in his place (MRR2.I71), almost certainly 
after Labienus had passed a measure restoring to the people the right to 
elect the members of the priestly colleges (Dio 37=37=1-2)^^^"^^. Dio 
places this election after the executions which took place in 
December 63, but this is clearly wrong (cf.Sail.Cat.49=2), a date early in
(15)the year being more probable. Caesar’s chief competitors for the
office were Q.Catulus and P.Vatia (Plut.Caes.7=1-2). While personal
rivalry and ambition could well in such a matter transcend normal 
factional ties, it is perhaps significant to note that P.Vatia had shown 
himself a consistent friend of Pompey, supporting his claim to his first 
triumph (Plut.Pomp.l4.3), and in 66 speaking for the Lex Manilia 
(Cic.Leg.Man,68). He may too have sympathised with the prosecution of 
Verres in 70 (Cic.Verr.2.1.36;3=210-11;4.82). He would probably have been 
able to claim the support of many of Pompey’s adherents in the election. 
Catulus' position is clear. Looked to as a leader by a considerable 
faction of interrelated and like minded figures, he was an enemy to
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Pompey. Although it has been suggested that Caesar won as a Pompeian 
candidate, it is unlikely that he can have done more than split the 
Pompeian yote^^^^ Servilius was opposed to Pompey by the 50s> but in 63 
was probably still friendly. It is likely therefore that Caesar, besides 
his own popularity, received powerful support for his candidacy from 
Crassus.
The other issue raised by Caesar and Labienus was the prosecution of 
the elderly senator C,Rabirius for the murder in 100 of the tribune 
L.Saturninus. Labienus was the prosecutor (Cic.Rab.l8), but the 
selection by lot of C.Caesar and his kinsman L,Caesar was certainly not a 
coincidence (Dio 37»26.1-28.4;cf.37°37=2;Suet,Iul.12,Quint.Inst.Or.
(17)5.13=20). Cicero and Hortensius defended (Cic.Rab.l8). The sequence 
of events and the procedures invoked are not clear, but it seems certain 
that the trial was in essence an attack on the view that passage of the 
senatus consultum ultimum suspended the usual legal rights of citizens 
(Cic.Rab.2;Dio 37.26.1-2)$^^^
It might be thought, in view of the fact that this decree was passed 
later in the year, that those involved in the prosecution of Rabirius had 
cause to know that this was likely, and therefore that they were aware of 
plans for disturbances of some sort. It is possible on the other hand 
that Cicero’s belief in the authority of the senate was well known, and 
that he was rightly regarded as likely to invoke the Last Decree if 
presented with any excuse. They may have feared that their tribunician 
programme might be confronted with violent opposition and that this would 
then be used as a pretext for their suppression. It is perhaps not a 
coincidence that C.Macer, whom Crassus supported in 66 in the face of the 
hostile presidency of Cicero (Cic.Att.1.4.2;Val.Max.9.12.7;Plut.Cic.9-1-2), 
had earlier, probably during his tribunate in 73» accused Rabirius of
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sacrilege (Cic.Rab.7;cf.Val.Max*9.12.7). This almost certainly also 
concerned the murder of Saturninus in that the circumstances of the murder 
involved the violation of a holy, place. Macer may have been concerned 
with-the issue of the murder of a sacrosanct tribune, but was probably 
also unhappy with the doctrine of absolute senatorial authority which 
could be invoked In any circumstance the senate itself deemed an 
emergency.
The involvement of L.Caesar, the consul of 64, who was selected along 
with C.Caesar as a duumvir perduellionis to pass sentence on Rabirius 
(Dio 37.27.2), may not have been due to his relationship with C.Caesar.
He was a cousin of Catulus, his father being half-brother to the elder 
Catulus (Cic.De Or; 2.12,44;3.9-10;0ff.1.133»Don».114). His father, consul 
in 90, shared the censorship of 89 with Crassus' father, consul in 97, 
with whom he seems to have enjoyed a close friendship, and who served under 
him as legate in 90 (Cic.Font.43;App.BC.1,4q). That L.Caesar's sister
was married first to M.Antonius Creticus and then to P.Sura might well 
suggest that he may have used his influence in 64 to help the elections of 
C.Antonius, Creticus' brother, to the consulship, and of P.Sura to the 
praetorship (Plut.Ant.2.1 ;Cic.Cat.4.13)» His relationship with C.Caesar
was quite distant, both being descended from a praetor of 208, He may 
well have inherited his father's amicitia with the family of Crassus
Another figure ambiguously connected with this case was the praetor 
Q.Metellus Celer who brought the proceedings to a sudden end by lowering 
the red flag on the Janiculum (Dio 37.27=3). Dio implies that he did 
this to stop the trial because he disapproved of its illegality. It is 
possible on the other hand that Celer was in collusion with Caesar who 
may have had no wish to incur odium by going through with the grisly form 
of execution prescribed. Celer was Pompey's brother-in-law. Caesar
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and Labienus were conspicuously promoting measures in Pompey's favour at 
this time, and Caesar cooperated later in the year and early in 62 with 
Celer's brother Q.Nepos,.who clearly disapproved of Cicero's behaviour 
and his exercise of the 8.C.U., so vehemently indeed that the decree was 
again invoked*,- this time against him ' (MRR2.iy4) . Celer's sympathies are 
therefore more likely to have been with Caesar and Labienus, It is 
perhaps worthy of note that, after Celer's intervention, Labienus did not 
renew the proceedings, which, according to Dio, he was entitled to do 
(Dio 37.28.4)(20)
Caesar concerned himself in this first part of 63 with yet one more 
matter. He prosecuted C.Piso, consul of 67, de repetundis, accusing him 
of the unjust execution of a Transpadane Gaul (Cic.Place.98;Sall.Cat.49.2). 
Such a move served several purposes. It reaffirmed Caesar's and perhaps 
Crassus', identification with the Transpadane cause. It attacked C.Piso, 
a notorious enemy of Pompey in any case, and perhaps specifically so in 
this matter, the Transpadani being, as has been shown, of particular 
concern to Pompey. Lastly, and perhaps most relevantly, it helped to 
bring to public notice the falsity of Cicero's Pompeian and popularis 
professions. He was obliged to defend Piso, Pompey's enemy, since Piso
(21 )had clearly helped him in his consular campaign (Cic.Att,1.1.2).
Antonius had proven at best feeble, and possibly treacherous. None 
of the considerable popularis programme had been realised. The only 
gain was perhaps the unexpected windfall of Caesar's election as 
Pontifex Maximus. Pompey's return was delayed but was still imminent, 
and it was no less desirable to have friends in the consulship for 62, if 
an accommodation and alliance was to be achieved. It has been 
suggested that Crassus and Caesar, even though they may have supported 
Catiline and Antonius in 64, must have withdrawn that support from Catiline
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in 63. This argument is essentially one of a priori probability, resting
entirely on Cicero's assertions that Catiline's revolutionary and
incendiary tendencies had become matters of public Imowledge and concern
(Cic .Mur. 23,26-46,33)  ^ . . ■
It is not easy to see which, if any, of the other candidates,
L.Murena, Ser.Sulpicius Rufus and Dec.Silanus, could have suited Crassus*
(23)purposes, although a case has been argued for each one of them. It is
possible that L.Caecilius Rufus' proposal in favour of P.Sulla and
P.Autronius was intended to enable one or both of them to stand for the
consulship in 63 (cf.Dio 37*23=5)? but it is not certain that he was
concerned in the matter for any reason other than to help P.Sulla who was
his brother-in-law. That he was prepared to veto the Rullan land bill
suggests that he was not closely associated with Crassus, although he may
have hoped for his help in the matter of Sulla and Autronius, and to that
end may have been initially prepared to cooperate over the proposals of
the other tribunes.
Ser,Sulpicius Rufus was supported by Cicero and by Cato (Cic.Mur.3-8),
and it was probably to help him that Cato threatened to prosecute Catiline
at some point before the élections (Cic,Mur.31;cf.Plut.Cic.14.3),
(24)possibly on a charge of ambitus though Cicero does not say,
Silanus was Cato's brother-in-law, and for that reason Cato did not 
prosecute him as he did Murena (Plut.Cat.21.2), Attempts to demonstrate 
Crassan sympathies from his indecision during the debate on 
3 December 63 over the fate of the "conspirators" and from Caesar's 
reputed affaire with his wife are unconvincing- Even Q.Cicero was 
swayed by Caesar's speech (Suet.lul.l4.2), which indirectly warned of the 
consequences of precipitate execution of Roman citizens. Fear, not 
sympathy, caused the wavering in the senate's ranks that day. To argue
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that.Silanus must have been friendly with Caesar simply because they had
been fellow pontiffs for many years is absurd. Such reasoning would
(25)prove th,at Caesar and Q.Catulus loved one another dearly.
_ Murena was closely associated with L.Lucullus under whom he had 
served (Cic.Mur.20), and whose veterans, in Rome in 63 for his triumph, 
supported Murena’s candidacy (Cic.Mur.37-8). Lucullus had, after 
divorcing Clodia, married Cato's niece Servilia, and Cato helped to remove 
the obstacles to his triumph (Plut.Cat.29.3-4). Although Cato, in 
fulfilment of an earlier pledge, assisted Sulpicius in his prosecution of 
Murena de ambitu after the elections (Cic.Mur.3-8;Plut.Cat.20-1), his 
relations with both Lucullus and Murena do not seem to have suffered 
(Plut.Cat.26.1-31.1). The trial may well have been a charade to 
demonstrate Cqto's unswerving rectitude. Perhaps only Sulpicius took it 
seriously.
That Catiline continued to enjoy the support of Caesar and Crassus 
after his defeat in 64 is perhaps shown by Caesar's conduct of his case 
de sicariis and by Antonius' support for him in 63 (Cic.Mur.49). It
would seem probable however that Catiline was concerned to widen the base 
of his popular support, and to that end may have begun to associate with 
Manlius. Contrary to the usual view, that Manlius was Catiline's agent 
and lieutenant in fomenting sedition among the Sullan veterans and other 
discontented elements in Etruria, it has recently been suggested, with 
much ,cogent reasoning, that Manlius had no prior understanding with 
Catiline, but rather, as an independent spokesman for these groups, agreed 
to support Catiline in return for his promise to redress their grievances
if elected(2^)
This more probable account seems partly preserved by Plutarch (Cic.l4), 
where it is clear that Manlius was the leader of a group of Sullan veterans
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who approached-Catiline of their own accord. Catiline no doubt welcomed
such an access .of support, and may have sought to maximise it. That an
armed revolt formed no part of either Manlius' or Catiline's original
plans is shown by the long interval between the elections, when Catiline .
is said to have planned to murder Cicero and the other candidates,
presumably as the first stage of a coup d'etat, and-Manlius' actual rising
in late October. It has been asserted that the elections did not take
place until H8 October, actually after Manlius had taken up arms, but it
(27)is hard to see any justification for such a view. Dio and Plutarch 
both agree that on the day originally fixed for the elections, Cicero 
summoned the senate and questioned Catiline about a speech he had made 
shortly before in a contio (Dio 37.29;Plut.Cic.l4;cf.Cic.Mur.50-1).
Cicero failed to persuade the senate to take any action and was presumably 
obliged to hold the elections forthwith, his only protection being an 
ostentatiously worn breastplate (Dio 37«-29.4;Plut.Cic. . That no 
violence was actually perpetrated at the comitia is clear from "nullo 
tumulto publics coneitato" (Cic.Cat.1.11). Cicero claimed that Catiline 
and Autronius had tried to kill him then and said that he saw Autronius in 
the campus, but admitted that no one else noticed him (Cic.Sull.3i). 
Certainly nothing dramatic was attempted. Murena and Silanus were 
peacefully elected.
Catiline had failed twice in the consular elections, and had been 
taunted and provoked to a degree far beyond the limits even of the 
admittedly abusive norm for Roman political life. Manlius and other 
restless elements were now forced to realise that they had little hope of 
securing a friendly ear in the consulship, and must have begun seriously 
to contemplate more direct action. That such a course was embarked upon 
with reluctance is shown by Manlius' letter to Q.Marcius Rex, protesting,
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even after he had raised his standard, that all he and his followers 
sought was justice and the redress of their grievances, and that were - 
this to be promised they would lay down their arms forthwith (.Sail.Cat. 
33-4). This letter may further demonstrate the unlikelihood of close 
relations between Catiline and Manlius'. The satisfaction of the claims 
of Manlius* followers would hardly help Catiline in his supposed.bid for 
power. The authenticity of the letter has been doubted, and Sallust 
suspected of i n v e n t i o n T h i s  would seem an unlikely direction for 
Sallustian embroidery, casting doubt as it does on Catiline's villainy and 
involvement with Manlius. It is more probable that the letter is genuine 
and that Sallust failed to notice its implications.
Another significant point is that Cicero does not suggest that 
Catiline and his fellows in Rome made their final plans for murder and 
arson until their meeting at the house of M.Porcius Laeca on 3 or 
6 November (Cic.Cat.1.8ff;2.6,12ff;Sulla l8,32f.), over a week after 
Manlius had taken the field on 27 October, a date Cicero insists had been 
long prearranged (Cic.Cat.1.7).
That Cicero was aware of Manlius* activities in Etruria seems likely, 
but it is certain that he had no evidence of any connection between these 
and Catiline or any others in Rome (Sail.Cat.29). If he had, he would 
have produced it. Until it was confirmed that Manlius had taken up arms, 
Cicero experienced great difficulty in persuading the senate that anything 
at all untoward was afoot (Dio 37.31.30* That the senate took any action 
before news of Manlius' rising was due to two events. The first was the 
arrival at night on 18 October at Cicero's house of Crassus, M.Marcellus 
and Q.Metellus Scipio bringing anonymous warnings that had been sent to 
them (Plut.Cic.13*1-2;Dio 37*31*1)^^^^ Despite Plutarch's implication 
that these warnings named Catiline as the author of the proposed massacre,
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this would seem unlikely. Had they done so, Cicero would have had the 
evidence he so .clearly sought. More probable is that they contained 
general warnings and advice to avoid the city. From whom these warnings 
came- is uncertain. Catiline was still in Rome and would not have needed 
to send anonymous letters to Crassus. He could have spoken to him at any 
time. The same is true of others in the city. It is more likely that 
Manlius, who by'this time had decided to act, wished to warn those leading 
men in Rome who had supported Catiline's petitio, and who were therefore 
conceived to be sympathetic to Manlius' cause, that he proposed to march 
on Rome which would therefore be a place to avoid. Another possibility 
is that the letters were sent, either intercepted and then delivered, or 
else simply forged, by Cicero himself. This could have been done in 
order to have evidence produced from another, perhaps more credible source, 
or else in the hope of incriminating Crassus, since if Crassus produced 
the letters he would partake of a degree of guilt by association, and if 
he did not produce them, they could no doubt have been "discovered" with 
still more serious c o n s e q u e n c e s T h i s  view is given some weight by 
Plutarch who says that Cicero in his treatise on his consulship said that 
Crassus came by night with the letter that at last made it clear that 
some conspiracy existed. Because of this, . 'to'V'to " Crassus
always hated Cicero. He cannot have hated him simply for writing of an 
event which, after the meeting of the senate the following day, must have 
been common knowledge, but it could be that Crassus knew that Cicero had 
deliberately placed him on the horns of a dilemma, forcing him to play 
into Cicero's hands.
Whatever their provenance, the letters seem to have produced the 
effect that Cicero would have desired, since the senate decreed a tumultus 
(Dio 37*31.1). When soon after this a letter arrived from Q.Arrius, a
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praetorius, with definite information of Manlius' activities,and apparent
intentions, the S.G.ÏÏ. was at last voted by the senate (Plut.Cic.13;
cf.Dio 37"31«2;Cic.Cat. 1 . 3 - 4 Xrrius was undoubtedly a partisan of
Crassus, probably having served under, him against Spartacus. In 35 he or
his son served in Crassus' Parthian campaign (Catullus 84). Cicero makes
their connection clear; "QiArrius qui fuit M.Crassi quasi secundarium"
(Brut.242-3)■ Arrius was closely involved in the diplomatic manoeuvres
that preceded the formation of the "First Triumvirate" (Cic.Att.I.T/.ll). '
That the praetor of 73 who served under the consuls of 72 against Spartacus
(MRR2.117) and the praetorius of 63 are the same man is disputed on the
ground that the former is said to have died on the way to Sicily to relieve
Verres (Schol.Gron.524 St.). Presumably he was due after his
praetorship to succeed Verres, and the Scholiast., knowing this and also
that Verres was not so succeeded, assumed that he must have died. Since
it is known however that he served in the Servile war under the consul
Gellius in 72, it would seem likely that this alteration in his
propraetorian destination accounts sufficiently for his failure to arrive
in Sicily, and that accounts of his death were almost certainly exaggerated.
It is highly probable that after the recall of the consuls in 72, Arrius
may have continued to serve under Crassus. Their association may well 
(31)have begun.then.
The fact that Caesar at some point also gave information to Cicero 
(Suet.lul.17.2), and; that both Crassus and Caesar were later denounced by 
informers (Sail.Cat.48.3-4;Dio 37*41 ; Suet.lul.17*1), makes it likely that 
Arrius too was concerned to take out some insurance against any future 
attempts to associate Crassus or his friends with the now likely eruption 
in Etruria. In not wholly dissimilar circumstances, friends of Drusus, 
the assassinated tribune of 9I, were persecuted by their enemies through
/
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the Varian quaestio, on the ground that they had encouraged the allies to
revolt. Drusus had sympathised.with the allies* cause and had sought to
( 32 )prevent the Social War by satisfying their demands. That was enough. • 
Crassus must have known that the fact that he had .supported Catiline, who . 
in his turn had championed these potential rebels, could be enough to 
compromise or even ruin him. At all costs it was essential that the 
rising be crushed before it assumed serious proportions. To that end 
Crassus and his "shadow", Arrius, provided between them the date needed to 
make the senate take the threat seriously and to act upon it.
With the S.C.U. behind him, Cicero could have crushed Manlius' rising 
before it had started. It is unlikely that Manlius had more than 2000 
men at the start, of whom less than half were properly armed (Sàll.Cat.
36.1-2;cf.Cic.Cat.2.3). Swift action using all available troops,
including those belonging to generals awaiting triumphs such as Lucullus, 
Metellus Creticus, and Q.Marcius Rex, would undoubtedly have been 
successful. It might be objected that these generals and these troops 
were used. ’ Creticus was sent to guard Apulia and Rex to oppose Manlius 
at Faesulae in Etruria, while Metellus Celer, who was already levying 
troops for his province of Cisalpine Gaul (Cic.Cat.2.3), went to Picenum, 
and another praetor, Q.Pompeius Rufus, to Capua (Sail.Cat.30*3)* These 
dispositions were not, however, made until the news that Manlius had taken 
the field on 27 October reached the senate in a letter from one 
L.Saenius. While it is just possible that there were indications of 
unrest in Apulia, .Picenum and Capua, it may also be that Cicero wished to 
magnify the apparent dimensions of the crisis for his own ends. He may 
indeed have had no wish to catch the lesser fish, Manlius, until he could 
entice the greater, Catiline, into his net.
That Cicero had no knowledge of a detailed conspiracy in Rome at this
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time is shown by his failure in both his speeches against Catiline in 
early November to name any "conspirators" other than Catiline and 
Manlius. He claimed to know what had been discussed and decided at the 
house of Laeca, but does not elaborate (Cic.Cat.1.8ff;2.6,12f). He
cannot have feared that to give names would be to warn the conspirators, 
as he was anyway trying to imply that he knew them. Indeed it was not . 
until the following year, when those named were dead or condemned, that 
Cicero completed his "account" of that night’s- decisions (Cic.Hull.l8,32f.), 
and then he simply lifted wholesale an account he had given in 
December 63 of a set of dispositions supposedly made at quite another 
meeting by P.Sura (Cic.Cat.4.13)-
Cicero asserts again and again that Catiline has tried, either with 
his own hand or through others, to kill him, but has been foiled by 
Cicero’s foresight. No evidence is ever given. Such assertions cost 
nothing and perhaps eventually become accepted through repetition 
(Cic.Cat.1.9,11,13;Sull.18,32;Mur.32).
After the announcement that Manlius had risen, Catiline was indicted 
de vi by L.Aemilius Paullus, son of M.Lepidus, consul 78 (Sail.Cat.31.4;
Dio 37*31*3)« It may be that C.Cethegus was also indicted 
(Schol.Bob.l49 St.). This could well have been seen as the start of a 
witch-hunt of the kind referred to above, associated with the Varian 
quaestio. Catiline offered to go into voluntary custody in the house of 
a prominent senator, suggesting M ’.Lepidus, consul 66, then Cicero himself, 
Metellus Celer, and finally M.Metellus (Cic.Cat. 1 . 1 9 ) This last 
named agreed. Catiline showed by this offer, particularly by suggesting 
Cicero, that he was not unaware of what Cicero was trying to do. It was 
however Catiline whose nerve broke first. At the opening of his first 
speech against Catiline, instead of "Quo usque tandem abutere, Catilina,
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patientia nostra", Cicero should rather have agked how long he himself
would be obliged to go on abusing Catiline's patience before he could
goad him into rash action upon which Cicero could capitalise. Catiline
could deny Cicero's constant assertions., but he could not disprove them.
It is likely that he was at Laeca's house on the night in question with
several of his friends. What was discussed then is uncertain, but
Cicero's careful mixture of fact and fiction must have made all partial
denials sound feeble. Catiline's future must have seemed biealc. After
two electoral failures , a sustained exercise in character assassination by
Cicero, and now the fact that a group of malcontents with whom he had
been publicly associated had resorted to armed insurrection, it is
unlikely that he could have hoped either for Crassus' support for yet
another quest for the consulship,‘or even for much help from any source in
his forthcoming trial de vi. These circumstances would have been
difficult for any man to endure, and Catiline, even if not perhaps the
villain conventionally depicted, must have been a man of reckless and
impetuous energy (Cic.Cael.12-14; of.Sail.Cat.3 * 6-7;Cic.Cat.1.13-16). His
family was patrician and ancient, but had suffered almost total eclipse
since the fourth century. To have been defeated and taunted by a
novus homo must have been galling (Hall.Cat.31.7;35.3 - 4 ) His consular
campaigns even though supported by Crassus must have exhausted his
(35)financial resources. His career, his reputation, and his finances in
ruins, together with the fear that he might well succumb at last to the 
forthcoming prosecution after so many escapes, must have combined to 
convince Catiline that exile or death alone could serve his case. That 
when he left the city, he may indeed have planned to go into exile is 
possible. Cicero clearly feared this, but relied on his reading of 
Catiline's character to reassure himself that Catiline "latrocinantem se
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interfici mallet quam exulem vivere" (Cip.Cat.2.16,cf.l4). Indeed so 
unsure was Cicero of Catiline's intended destination that he was only 
able to have him declared a hostis after it was Imown that he had in fact 
joined Manlius (Sail.Cat.36.2).
It may be that Crassus, in giving information about the planned" 
insurrection, had not expected that Catiline would be goaded into total 
involvement. He may rather have hoped to forestall any such move by 
ensuring that Manlius' cause be doomed from the start, '
There remains to consider the conduct of P.Sura, C.Cethegus and 
others. A case has been made for the view that Sura was not in fact a 
close associate of C a t i l i n e T h i s  is based on two points. The first 
is the apparent conflict between passages in Cicero's Pro Sulla (Sull.32ff) 
and his fourth Catilinarian Oration (Cat.4.13)» In the former certain 
dispositions are made: Cornelius is to murder Cicero, Autronius to raise
Italy, Cassius to start fires, Cethegus to supervise a general massacre.
In the latter, Cassius is again to start fires, and Cethegus is to commit 
murder, this time of Cicero. Italy is to be laid waste by Catiline,
In the first version these arrangements are made at the house of Laeca - 
with Catiline in the chair. In the second Catiline is clearly already 
with Manlius, while Sura gives these orders^ The contradictions 
demonstrated by this argument are interesting but are not enough to 
establish the lack of association between Sura and Catiline, as the 
passage in the Fourth Catilinarian is simply concerned to show that 
Lentulus was involved in plots of this kind and does not necessarily 
purport to refer to a particular meeting.
The second point is much stronger, and rests on the oddity of the 
letter produced as evidence against Sura (Sail.Cat.44;Cic.Cat.3-12),
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It began "Quis sim ex eo. quern ad te misi cognosces" (scies in Cic.).
! .The letter was unsigned and yet bore. Sura's seal (Cic.Cat.3*10,12).
The only possible significance therefore of the opening words is that the
bearer, Volturcius, was to tell Catiline that Sura was the sender, as
Catiline would not recognise the seal. They cannot mean that Catiline ''
would know the writer by recognising the messenger as Volturcius was
(37)unknown to Catiline. The rest of the letter too has a strange ring to 
it, and hardly suggests a trusted lieutenant reporting to his commander.
It exhorts Catiline to observe his situation, to remember that he is a 
man, to consider what the circumstances demand, and to seek help even from 
the very basest. Such a letter would appear much more suitably sent from 
a sympathetic acquaintance a month earlier, at the time when Catiline was 
considering leaving the city. The suggestion to seek help "etiam ab 
infimis" would then imply perhaps that Catiline should in fact go to 
Manlius rather than stay or go into exile. The letter could indeed be 
even earlier and concern Catiline's second petitio in 63. After his 
defeat in 64 Sura could have been urging him to try again and to accept 
the electoral help of Manlius and his followers. It is only the oral 
messages supposedly entrusted to Volturcius that suggest that the 
expression concerning help "etiam ab infimis" really meant "ut servorum 
praesidio uteretur" (Cic.Cat.3.8). Sura's surprise when confronted 
with this letter would be the more easily understood if it had in fact 
been sent some time before and in a different context. Had it been 
entrusted to Volturcius the previous day, Sura would have guessed from the 
presence of Volturcius and of the Allobrogic envoys, and from his own 
arrest, that it must have been seized. Sura acknowledged the letter to 
be his (Cic.Cat.3.12), but it is clear from Cicero's silence on the matter 
that he never confessed to the oral mandata attributed to himu^^^
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The evidence against the city conspirators was thin. That they had
entered into negotiations with the Allobroges was not denied; they
aclmowledged their letters, but these gave no details of the negotiations
(Cic.Cat.3*10). Again these were explained orally, this time by the, . .
envoys, to the effect that the Allobroges were to send cavalry into Italy
as soon as possible to help Catiline (Cic.Cat.3-9)» It is certain that
the Allobroges were in collusion with Cicero with regard to their "arrest"
(Sail.Cat.41,43;App.BC.2.4;Plut.Cic.l8.4)~. It would not be surprising if
Cicero had been able to induce them to say whatever he wished, as indeed
may have been the case with Volturcius. It has been suggested that
Volturcius, who was granted immunity (Plut.Cic.19-2), may have been Cicero's 
(39)man from the start. The case for the guilt of the conspirators
depended therefore on the suspect oral testimony of the Allobroges and 
Volturcius, all questioned and denied by Sura (Cic.Cat.3.11), a number of 
letters to the senate and people of the Allobroges, which in themselves 
seem merely to have been envoys' credentials (Cic.Cat.3-1G), and one letter 
to a declared hostis that may well have been written before that man took 
the step that resulted in that designation. The negotiations with the 
Allobroges may or may not have been treasonable, but the evidence as we 
have it makes Cicero's determination to execute the conspirators as 
quickly as possible quite understandable.
So far Cicero had succeeded in driving Catiline into outright 
rebellion, and had incriminated a number of men in the city. If as seems 
not improbable he had done these things deliberately, the question of his 
motive must be considered, Crassus' involvement with Catiline and hopes 
of an alliance with Pompey may provide the key. Between the meeting at 
which the evidence was produced on 3 December, and the debate of 5 December, 
an informer, one L.Tarquinius, claimed to have been sent by Crassus to bid
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Catiline hurry to, Rome to save his friends (Sail.Cat.48.3-9)* He was 
disbelieved, and on Cicero's motion the information was rejected and the 
informer imprisoned, . Sallust mentions a theory that Autronius was 
behind the denunciation in .the hope that Crassus' influence, once stirred 
up on his own behalf, might help all those accused, but goes on to say, 
"Alii Tarquinium a Cicerone immissum aiebant, ne Crassus more sue 
suscepto malorum patrocinio rem’ publicam conturbafet. Ipsum Crassum ego 
postea praedicantem audivi tantam illam contumeliam sibi ab Cicerone 
impositam." The generally accepted interpretation is that Sallust heard 
Crassus say that Cicero was responsible for Tarquinius' accusationl^^^
An unconvincing attempt has been made however to deny that this is 
Sallust's meaning, suggesting rather that Crassus merely complained that
(4l)Cicero had at some time accused him of defending bad men. Such an 
interpretation is strained and contrary to the impression gained from 
Plutarch that from this time onward Crassus nursed an enduring hatred for 
Cicero (Plut.Cr.13*3-4). To the objection that Cicero would have had no 
wish to antagonise so powerful a man as Crassus at such a crucial time, it 
must be pointed out that Crassus and his ambitions at this time seem to 
have been precisely the targets at which Cicero was training his fire 
throughout his consulship.
It is generally agreed that Crassus was preparing for Pompey's return 
from as early as 66/3. He was not alone in that. Cicero too had given 
careful thought to the matter and to how best he might profit from the 
likely political situation. Crassus had tried in 63 to achieve certain 
aims in cooperation with Catulus and his optimate friends. They did not 
cooperate. Crassus then considered an independent approach, hoping to 
build up his political resources to such a level that Pompey would be 
forced to accept an alliance with him. With Crassus' friends in the
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consulship and the Rullan bill made law, Pompey, faced also with 
inevitable optimate hostility, would have had no alternative, Cicero 
however had quite ^ ^other scheme of the future, which depended on 
frustrating Crassus' .plans, and on reducing to nothing his bargaining 
power and potential value as ah ally for Pompey. Instead Cicero would 
offer the prospect of cooperation with the optimates, with himself as the 
indispensable link making this possible. Pompey would return to find 
Crassus disgraced, or at least discredited, and Cicero at the head of a 
powerful and united senate. Actually to implicate Crassus may have been 
more than Cicero hoped for, but the attempt was worthwhile and must have 
raised some suspicions. That such an accusation, even if relatively 
unfruitful, formed part of Cicero's thinking may be shown by the fact that 
in his posthumously published expositio, "De Consiliis Suis",
Cicero accused both of complicity with Catiline (Plut.Cr.13.5)• It may
however have been the vociferous rejection of Tarquinius' testimony that 
led Cicero to eschew the temptation to overreach himself by allowing Caesar 
to be attacked either in court or by mob violence, Caesan, the 
Pontifex Maximus, had powerful friends and had doubly insured himself by 
his public espousal of Pompeian causes and by giving evidence to Cicero 
(Suet.lul.17.2). The elder Curio defended him from Cicero's bodyguard, 
and Cicero declined to permit a lynching (Plut.Caes.8.1-2;cf.App.BC.2.6), 
nor did Cicero follow the advice of Catulus and C.Piso, both men with cause 
to hate Caesar, to incriminate him (Sail.Cat.49.1;Plut.Caes.7.2;8.2-3)°
At the time of Tarquinius' accusation, which came between the 
senatorial meetings on 3 and 3 December, Caesar and Crassus each had one of 
the conspirators in libera custodia (Sail.Gat.47-3-4). This is unlikely 
to have been a coincidence. It has been argued that Cicero arranged this 
in order to discredit them if their charges escaped, and to compromise
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(42)them in the eyes of their friends if they did not. It is certain that 
• Cicero was anxious to involve them and indeed as many other leading men 
as possible in the•decisions to condemn and execute the conspirators, 
jVjrw'v"^ . Although Crassus was absent from the senate, on the fateful ^ e s ^ f
December (Cic.Att.12,21.2), Cicero stridently asserted that he had already 
given his support to the proceedings against the conspirators by giving 
them into custody and by voting for Cicero's supplicatio on 3 December 
(Cic.Cat. 4 . 1 0 ) Cicero protests so much that it is clear that he is 
desperate not to allow Crassus to dissociate himself from the decision.
He also tries to emphasise that Caesar's speech by implication accepted 
the guilt of the conspirators-.and the propriety of executing them. It is 
likely that Crassus' and Caesar's custody of Gabinius and Statilius may 
have suited them as much as Cicero, as it helped to demonstrate their 
complete lack of involvement with the conspiracy. Crassus will have had
little option but to vote as he did on 3 December. Anything else could
have been suicidal.
Similar motives may have inspired Crassus' decision to appear with 
Cicero and Hortensius for the defence of L,Murena at his trial de ambitu 
at some time between Catiline's departure from the city on the night of 
8 November, and the arrest of the conspirators on the night of 
2 December (Cic.Mur.10,48). It is quite possible, as has already been 
suggested, that the prosecution was, on Cato's part at least, less than 
whole hearted. He had threatened before the elections to prosecute any 
candidate involved in bribery (Plut.Cat,21.2-3)* It may be that his main 
target was Catiline (Cic.Mur,31)i but that Cato felt obliged to carry out 
his threat in order to demonstrate his opposition to bribery practised by 
anyone. Cicero makes it clear that Cato was no enemy to Murena 
(Cic.Mur.36), and Murena clearly showed no ill feelings, as he protected
103
Cato during the disturbances, of the following year (Plut.Cat.26.1-31.1). 
Crassus must how have realised that a time.could be approaching when he 
might need the help of all the political and personal ties he had built up 
over the years to keep himself from being caught up in and overwhelmed by 
the waves set in motion by Catiline and Manlius. That this was the case, 
and that these resources proved adequate is shown by the reception 
accorded Tarquinius' testimony in the senate. His defence of Murena may 
have counted in his favour on that.occasion. Crassus was in any case 
always anxious to maintain good and friendly relations with all parties, 
and, where this did not conflict with the promotion of his policies, to 
avoid giving offence. He is never found openly involved in any 
prosecution, but undertook numerous defences (Plut.Cr.3-2;cf.Cic.Cael.18,23; 
Balb.17,30;Plut.Cic.9.1-2;Schol.Bob.123 St.).
It would seem therefore that there are a number of indications that 
the whole Catilinarian affair may not be as straightforward in its essence, 
though always admitted to be complex in its details, as is often supposed.
It has been sorgued above that 63 saw a struggle for mastery between Cicero 
and Crassus, and that on this occasion Cicero may well have proved far 
more guileful, devious, and indeed ruthless than Crassus can possibly have 
expected. The executions of the Ides of December set the seal of the 
senate's authority and approval on Cicero's account of events. The state 
itself was thereafter inextricably bound up in the maintenance of Cicero's 
official myth.
— 1 o4 “
Chapter VII . The Formation of the Triumvirate
It would seem that by the end of 63 Cicero had cause indeed for ' 
satisfaction. He might seem, in his subsequent dealings with Pompey, to 
have shown some lack of tact in suggesting that the suppression of the 
Catilinarian Conspiracy was a matter fit to^be compared with Pompey's 
recent military achievements (Cic.Fam.3*7;Schol.Bob.I67 St.), but it may 
be that vanity was not the principal motive for Cicero's tone. He needed 
to make it quite clear to Pompey that he was the man to desil with. His 
aspiration to play Laelius to Pompey's Aemilianus is neither humble nor 
arrogant, but rather constitutes a. businesslike offer of a mutually 
advantageous alliance.
Over the next two years Cicero may have come close to achieving his
aim. That he was defeated, and Crassus partly successful, owes much to
the conduct of one man, M.Cato. Cato leapt to prominence in 63. After
threatening a prosecution of Catiline, he stood for the tribunate with the
express aim of frustrating the intentions of Q.Metellus Nepos, Pompey's
brother-in-law, newly come from Pompey's side to stand himself for that
office (Plut.Cat.20-1). A case has been made for the view that Nepos was
sent as Pompey's agent to prepare the way for the understanding Crassus had
(1)for some time been proposing. Certainly at the time of Nepos' 
candidacy there would seem to be no reason to suppose that Pompey had any 
intention of a move towards mending his relations with the "optimates", 
Cato's candidacy shows that, and indeed Nepos' activities in his brief 
exercise of his tribunate may have done much to harden optimate prejudice 
against Pompey. He attacked Cicero's treatment of the "Catilinarians" 
and vetoed his final oration on laying down office. He then brought in 
bills to recall Pompey to talce up the command against Catiline, and to 
permit him to stand for the consulship in absentia (MRR2.1?4). Only one
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source mentions this latter proposal,but it may well be true
’ (2 )(Schol.Bob.134 St.). That these measures indicate, any hostility
towards Catiline may be doubted in the light of Nepos' attitude towards
Cicero, and of the fact that he was supported by Caesar, praetor in 62, and
by L.Calpurnius Bestia, a tribunician colleague (MRR2.173«1?4), both men'
with strong sympathy for Catiline. Caesar's involvement has been
discussed. While he may have been the more determined to ingratiate
himself with Pompey now that his future prospects at Crassus' side were so
notably dimmed, his conduct in supporting Nepos was entirely consistent
with his actions in 63. He had supported Labienus and T.Ampius Balbus in
their bill to honour Pompey, and he had spoken, diplomatically but
unmistakably, against the death penalty for Sura and his associates.
Bestia was alleged to have been an integral part of the conspiracy
(Sall.Cat.17»3;43.1,App.BC.2.3;of.Cic.ad Brut.1.17-1), and although this has
been doubted, it is likely that his political stance, at the time must have
made such an allegation credible. He may well be the one tribune left
"ad Ingendos coniuratos" by the time of P.Sulla's trial (Cic.SulT.4l);
Nepos had left Rome by that time. Since Catiline was crushed, very soon
after Nepos made his proposals, early in January, and since this had been
militarily inevitable for some time, Nepos' measure to entrust the command
against him to Pompey could be seen in fact as a device to save him by
compelling Antonius and Celer to refrain from action until Pompey returned.
Whether or not this may have been a partial motive, the principal 
intention behind Nepos' proposals must have been to furnish Pompey with a 
legitimate excuse for returning to Italy with his army intact, stepping 
without a break from one command to another. He had done so in 77? when, 
in the face of orders to disband, he clung to his army until he obtained a 
command against Sertorius (MRR2.90), and again in 66, when he took up his
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command under the Manilian law without laying down that .under the Gabinian. 
Similarly he was disinclined to return as a private citizen, but hoped to 
repeat his success of ?1 by returning to an immediate consulship. It is
easy, with the knowledge that Pompey did in fact disband his forgoes on
arrival in Italy, to belittle the fears of his opponents, and indeed to 
accuse them of short-sightedness in their dealings with him, of pushing him 
into the arms of Crassus and Caesar when all he desired was general 
admiration and acceptance by the optimates-^^
That he did not on his return impose a virtually open dominâtio may in 
fact owe much to the intransigence of Cato at this time. By obstructing 
Nepos' proposals, Cato deprived Pompey of any legal justification for such 
an assumption of power. He called Pompey's bluff and challenged him 
either to seize power by open and illegal force, or else to submit to the 
law and to try to achieve his desires as a privatus. Pompey was shown
that he could control neither the senate nor the streets of Rome. In the
event Pompey could not bring himself to march in open defiance of legality, 
but there can be little doubt of the probable outcome had Nepos' measures 
become law^^^
That Pompey should return with an army and the prospect of a second 
consulship is unlikely to have seemed entirely desirable to Crassus. 
Certainly he was not in evidence in support of Nepos' proposals. Caesar's 
involvement may or may not indicate a break with Crassus. It is possible 
that Caesar was anxious to put on record yet again his friendliness towards 
Pompey, but was nonetheless not sorry to see the measures fail. Even 
their unsuccessful proposal will have lessened the chances of any 
accommodation between Pompey and the optimates, a possibility Caesar mu§t 
have feared,and with good cause. On the other hand Caesar may well have 
adopted a policy of "sauve qui peut", and have been keen to find some safer
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harbour than Crassus' may have seemed just then. That Crassus a year 
later stood surety for Caesar's debts does not preclude this possibility, 
as by then Pompey had himself performed an about-face, jettisoning many of 
his own previous.adherents including Caesar and Nepos in his vain quest 
for-an alliance with Cato,'
It seems likely that Crassus too made advances towards Pompeyè 
Certainly he seems to.have travelled to Asia during 62, as he used a vessel 
from the command of L,Valerius Flaccus, propraetor in Asia that year, for 
a voyage from Aenus in Thrace to Asia (Cic.Flacc.32). Plutarch also 
records a journey made by Crassus about this time, which has been generally 
supposed to refer to the same event (Plut.Pomp.43.1). In Plutarch's
account however, Crassus left Rome with his family and money out of fear of 
Pompey, or at least in order to make it seem that he feared him; no 
destination is mentioned. It has already been argued that Nepos' 
activities and proposals must have struck fear into many hearts, and it is 
not impossible that Crassus may have considered moving some of his assets 
out of Rome, and indeed may have thought it safer to be away himself until
(5)Pompey's own intentions were clearer. Plutarch's preferred account, 
that Crassus hoped by his secret departure to bring others to have doubts 
about Pompey's likely conduct, fails to ring true. Such a charade would 
be less likely to damage Pompey's reputation than his own^^^
That Crassus' journey to Asia and his flight from Rome constitute one 
excursion is not certain. The date of the former can be fixed only to 
some time in 62 during Flaccus' governorship. Plutarch's account merely 
indicates that Crassus fled while Pompey was on his v/ay back and before he 
landed in Italy. Pompey had learned of Mithridates' death during 63.
He wintered in Pontus, and, probably in early 62, spent some time on the 
Aegean coast of Asia (Plut.Pomp.42.4-3)» At all events he did not arrive
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in Rome before the very end of the year (MRR2.T?6). It is therefore ,
fairly certain that if Crassus had been keen to avoid Pompey he would not •
have chosen to go to Asi& that year, unless, very late in the year, he
somehow kept clear of Pompey's homeward route. He would be much more
likely to have headed West to Spain as he had in the 80s, or else to Gaul,
then governed by G.Pomptinus his former legate from the Servile War. If
on the other hand he wished in fact to,meet Pompey and to try to come to
an understanding with him, he could have set out at any time after
3 December 63, when he had stayed away from the senate although present at
the previous debate. No activity that certainly attests his presence in
Rome is recorded for 62, though in May or June he could have been handling
in person the negotiations for the sale to Cicero of a house on the
Palatine (Cic.Fam.3«6.2;Gell.NA,12,12.2). This could however quite easily
(7)have been carried out by an agent or by letter. It is likely that 
Plutarch, or his source, being aware that Crassus was absent from Italy for 
at least part of 62, and being ignorant of his actual destination, imputed 
without foundation the motive of real or pretended fear of Pompey,
It has been suggested that Crassus' reason for going to Asia may have 
been his interest in the farming of that province's taxes by the publican!. 
With the successful completion of the war, this contract must have become 
a much more inviting prospect. Therefore, it is argued, Crassus went out 
on a fact-finding mission^^^ New censors were elected in 6l and fresh 
contracts let out in which Crassus certainly took an interest (Dio 37*46,4; 
Cic.Att.1,17»9;cf*1 «18.8;2.1,11), It is nonetheless likely that Crassus 
may have been combining business with politics, perhaps taking a 
libera legatio on some flimsy pretext while letting it be known that he was 
interested in the Asian taxes, but hoping at the same time to meet Pompey 
and persuade him that Crassus still had much to offer as an ally^^^
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While it is uncertain at what point' Crassus made his journey, Pompey's 
reactions to events in Rome would seem quite clear. Frustrated by Cato 
and suspended from office by the senate, Nepos left Rome about the end of . 
January and went straight to Pompey (Suet.Jul.l6;Dio 37-43*3~4). Why he 
took this virtually unprecedented and indeed illegal step of le'aving Rome 
while still tribune is not explicitly stated. It may be that he hoped to 
persuade Pompey to return in force and impose his will on a senate that 
had so threatened the office of tribune. Caesar later used this pretext 
for his invasion of Italy (Suet.lul.30;Caes.BC.1.7?App.BC.2.33;
Plut.Caes.3i.2). Whatever were Nepos' intentions, the.effect of his own 
activities, and presumably of his account of Cato's conduct,was to fix in 
Pompey's mind a firm conviction that Cato was above all others a man to be 
taken very seriously. .He shaped his own policy accordingly, and resolved 
if possible to effect an alliance with Cato, whose sheer political 
effectiveness, displayed on 3 December 63 and then again when opposing 
Nepos, must have seemed just what Pompey would wish to have on his side.
It has been argued above that Pompey's earlier alliance with Crassus in 7I 
may well have seemed attractive precisely because Crassus was able to get 
things done in the senate. The events of 63 showed a powerful senate 
controlling events, and itself first controlled by Cicero, and then 
increasingly dominated by Cato. If Pompey could not bring himself to 
seize power by open force, he would certainly need help in order to realise 
his full political potential in Rome. Such help is what Cicero offered 
 ^ (Cic.Fam.3.7)? and probably what Crassus had hoped to be able to offer.
He may have gone to Pompey to assure him that, despite appearances to the 
contrary, an alliance between them would nevertheless be able to achieve 
all that Pompey could wish.
Crassus however, thoroughly outmanoeuvred by Cicero, must have seemed
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a spent force. Cicero had in his turn shown himself .remarkably devious
'in his deft ,and unobtrusive switch from support of Pompey to the ranks of 
Pompey's optimate opponents. • He was now presenting himself, as the 
essential pivot for a reconciliation between Pompey and those .optimates. 
Crassus was an older man than Pompey, of equal dignity, perhaps even 
superior in civil terms by virtue of his censorship, and certainly a rival, 
not the "collegam minorem et sui cultorem" that Pompey wanted (Sail.Hist. 
48m ; cf.Plut«Comp.Nic.et Cr.2.3)» Cicero was the same age as Pompey, 
consular, and certainly claiming not incomparable auctoritas. Cato on the 
other hand was a much younger man, of only tribunician rank, but very well 
placed by descent and marriage alliances at the heart of the nobility 
Such a man would surely be flattered by an offer of alliance from the 
greatest man of the day, Pompey certainly intended' that Cato should be 
overwhelmed by the magnitude of the compliment paid him when Pompey 
suggested a double marriage tie, whereby he,and his son should wed Cato's 
two nieces (Plut.Gat.30*2-3;Pomp.44.2-4).
Before reaching the city, Pompey divorced his wife Mucia (Plut.Pomp. 
42.7;Cic.Att.1.12.3;Dio 37*49-3;cf-Suet.lul.30*1). His haste in so doing
may have been connected with his learning of her infidelity, but is more 
likely to be a simple anticipation of Cato's acceptance of his proposals. 
That Mucia was the half-sister of Metellus Nepos may also be relevant. 
Pompey may have thought it advisable to demonstrate the sincerity of his 
offer, not only by making himself eligible for marriage, but also by 
severing his connection with Nepos, now a bitter enemy of Cato. In the 
event Pompey was shown to have miscalculated badly on every point. He 
may not have expected to alienate the Metelli, Nepos and Celer, and many 
of their associates as completely as he did, nor does the possibility of 
Cato's refusal seem to have occurred to him.
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The first fruit, of Pompey's new policy came in a letter to the 
senate, referred to by Cicero (Fam.3»-7)» In this he promised peace,
"spem oti", and it was in this, or another letter of about the same time, 
that he asked that the consular elections, be held up until his legate, 
M.Pupius Piso, could return"and stand for that office (Dio 37-44.3).
Such a request was a considerable step down from Nepos' proposals a few
(11) 'months earlier. Such a conciliatory attitude and so modest a request
may have been hard to reject, and Piso was elected consul for 6l with 
M.Valerius Messalla Niger as his colleague (Plut.Pomp.44.1). In another
account of this matter Plutarch says that Pompey asked that the elections 
be held up so that he could campaign in person for Piso, but that Cato 
ensured the rejection of his request (Plut.Cat.30.2). This request is 
said to have been made when Pompey arrived in Italy, but he probably 
arrived in December 62, well after the elections would have taken place 
(MRR2.176). Plutarch is in any case clearly muddled in this matter, as 
he telescopes the elections of Piso and Afranius. He describes as a 
closely related sequence of events Pompey's request concerning Piso's 
election, Cato's obstruction of this, Pompey's approach to Cato, Cato's 
refusal, and finally Afranius' election and Cato's disapproval of the 
bribery involved (Plut.Pomp. 4 4 .1-4^^^here is no mention in this version 
of Nepos' proposals. It may well be that Cato's opposition to proposals 
of Pompey has been transferred to the matter of Piso. Since Piso was in 
fact elected, Plutarch supposed that Cato's opposition must have concerned 
some related but subsidiary question. He therefore supposes that the 
request for a stay of the elections was to permit Pompey to be present. 
Perhaps there is in this a trace of the missing proposal of Nepos to permit 
Pompey himself to stand in absentia. Pompey's approach to Cato may then 
have followed the letter's discomfiture of Nepos rather than Pompey's
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letter to the senate.. Cato may not in fact have raised .any objection to 
Piso's candidacy.
Pompey's letter promised peace and cooperation with the optimate 
dominated senate. _ Cicero was delighted at such a prospect. He 
complained of Pompey's coolness towards him, but may not have been yet 
aware of Pompey's intention to ignore him and his proffered bridge to the 
optimates, trying instead to take a straighten route by way of a direct 
alliance' with Cato. Some were nevertheless greatly put out by the tone 
of Pompey's letter: "Sed hoc scito, tuos veteres hostes, novos amicos,
vehementer litteris perculsos atque ex magna spe deturbatos iacere"
(Cic.Fam.3.7*1)« The most common view is that these "old foes, new 
friends" are Crassus and Caesar, the former a "new friend" in the light of 
his recent proposals of alliance and perhaps a recent meeting with Pompey, 
and the latter on the strength of his association with Nepos and his 
proposal to transfer the honour of restoring the temple of Capitoline Jove 
from Q.Catulus to Pompey (Suet.lul.13-16;Dio 37*43-4). Their old enmity 
would be represented, according to Cicero at any rate, by such measures
(12)hostile to Pompey as the Rullan land bill. A second view is that
(13)Cicero is referring to the optimates, while a third suggests that he 
means the disaffected, Sullan veterans and victims, debtors and others who
(l4)hoped for a new order.
Objections can be found to all three suggestions. It could be 
observed that Caesar had in all his public actions shown himself friendly 
to Pompey, and that even Crassus is not on record as having taken any 
openly hostile stance. It should be considered however that it was very 
much in Cicero's interests to suggest that these men had indeed been 
enemies to Pompey, and to imply that, under their present show of 
friendship, they remained so.
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•The optimates led by Catulus and Cato had certainly shown themselves • 
enemies in the past, and Pompey was now keen to msike friends with them.
It could be objected however that Cicero would have had no wish to cause
Pompey to distrust the optimates, but on the contrary wished to cement - '
‘their alliance. It is perhaps not immediately clear why either of these 
two groups should have been downcast by the conciliatory tone of Pompey's 
letter. Crassus had no wish to see Pompey return with an army, nor had 
the optimates. On the other hand the prospect of Pompey reaching unaided 
an accommodation with those currently dominating the senate cannot have 
been welcome to Crassus, since it was essential that Pompey find himself 
in an impasse through optimate opposition, and would therefore need 
Crassus* help. Crassus himself may have reasoned that he too needed 
Pompey, since without the threat of Pompey*s political presence Crassus 
would have been forced to choose between cooperation with the leaders of 
the optimates and open opposition to them, the one course promising 
obscurity, the other, extinction. It would seem unlikely that Catulus or
Cato would have been shattered by Pompey*s "spem oti". It may be that
Pompey*s total disappearance from the scene would have pleased them better, 
but his return in arms, or even, in an aggressive frame of mind, without 
them, would certainly have suited them far worse. It is moreover far from 
easy to see what possible motive Cicero could have for suggesting such a 
reaction on their part.
The third identification has the advantage of using the term "hostes" 
literally. "Inimici" or "invidi" or some such could be thought better 
suited to the relationship Cicero would be describing if he meant by it 
Crassus and Caesar, or the optimates. With "hostes" one contended in 
battle, as Pompey had done in the 80s and in the 70s against the Mariani 
and Lepidani. These it is argued made up the bulk of the discontented
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elements who hoped that Pompey would return in force to redress, all-wrongs, 
and these were essentially the groups who were to be found supporting 
Catiline. The letter and his army had however been destroyed early in 
the year (Sail.,Cat.37-61;Dio 37*39)? suid there is no reason to suppose that 
at any time they had expected that Pompey would be sympathetic‘bo their 
cause. That the Rullan bill may have had as one of its aims the 
fulfilment of Pompey's future need for land with which to reward his 
veterans, can in no way be taken to demonstrate that its further aim of 
providing land for other groups has any connection with Pompey, Crassus 
intended both to increase his own power in absolute terms, partly by an 
extension of his clientele., and also to be in a position to offer Pompey 
what he wanted. It is difficult therefore to see how the designation 
"novos amicos" could apply to these discontented elements, since any signs 
of favour on Pompey*s part must go back to his consulship and to the 
restoration of the tribunicia potestas and the leges Plotiae, agraria and 
de reditu Lepidanorum. Neither Pompey nor his adherents had shown any 
more recent concern for the redress of grievances. That cause had been 
espoused the previous year by Catiline, Antonius, P.Rullus and several 
other tribunes acting in concert with them, all probably instigated by 
Crassus, and with no recorded invocation of Pompey’s name, Catiline, 
Antonius and Crassus can by no means be comprised within the proposed 
identification of "hostes" with "Mariani" and the like.
It would seem therefore that the most commonly accepted view is 
correct, and that Cicero was in this passage crowing over the 
disappointment of Crassus and Caesar, whose overtures to Pompey had 
apparently been rejected.
Pompeyfs next step seems to have been the divorce of Mucia already 
referred to. He needed to be free before making his offer to Cato. He
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may also have felt it necessary to repudiate Nepos and his tribunician 
activities, perhaps even implying that Nepos’ proposal’s were made without 
his authority or sanction. Nepos’ association with Caesar, seen by some
(15)as part of a general scheme for an alliance between Crassus and Pompey,
now had no place in Pompey’s plans. If hë were to succeed in placating 
.the optimates, those of his supporters who had on his behalf incurred the 
greatest hostility in that quarter had now to be discarded and even made 
scapegoats. The blame for any misunderstandings could be put on them, 
while Pompey could protest his own ignorance and innocence of their 
actions. Thus it was that Nepos was dropped and with him probably Caesar. 
Certainly Caesar turned again to Crassus in his financial embarrassment 
early in 6l. It has already been demonstrated that Caesar was bitterly 
hated by Q.Catulus and C.Piso, nor does the tone of Cato’s speech on 
5 December 63 reveal any great affection for him (Sail.Cab.52-53» 1î 
. Plut.Cic.22;Plut.Caes.8.1;App.BC.2.6).
A further example of this policy may be discerned in the prosecution 
in 61 of P.Clodius in the scandal of the Bona Pea. L.Lucullus cherished 
a powerful grudge against Clodius for his part in the mutiny of his troops 
earlier in the decade, and had divorced his wife, Clodius* sister, as a 
result. At some time after this he married ; one of Cato’s half-sisters 
Servilia (Plut.Luc.38.1;Cat.24.3;5^«l), and was closely associated with Cato 
at this time (Dio 37»50»1;Plut.Pomp.46.3;Duc.42.6;Cat.51.1)» Cato was in 
the van of those urging on the prosecution (Cic.Att.1.13.4), and Lucullus 
gave damaging testimony concerning Clodius’ moral character (Plut.Cic.29.2; 
Luc.38.1;Cic.Mil.73). Pompey clearly gave no help to Clodius and indeed 
his few statements on the matter gave approval to the proposals of 
Clodius’ enemies (Cic.Att.1.14.1-2). It may well be that Clodius’
activities in the East had been undertaken on Pompey’s behalf, Pompey was
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certainly the ultimate beneficiary, and may have been held to blame by 
Lucullus for those activities» It is probably no coincidence that 
Clodius was a first cousin of Nepos. and Celer, both of whom, despite not ■ 
infrequent disagreements with him, acknowledged the,duties implied by 
that relationship. Celer was moreover married to Clodius' sister.
During his consulship in 60, Celer opposed Clodius in his first attempt to 
transfer to the plebs, but this does not seem to have occasioned a break. 
Cicero says that Celer had a degree of influence over Clodius, and also 
shows that Clodius still hoped, albeit in vain, that Celer would provide 
seats at the games for his clients (Cic.Att.31 Significant and often
overlooked is the fact that Celer had himself originally proposed the 
measure on Clodius' behalf, if only "dicis causa" (Cic.Att.1,18»5).
Nepos too, in his consulship in 57» supported Clodius (Cic.Att.4.3.3-4»
Dorn.13;Sest.89;Dio 39»74). Abandonment of Clodius would then be quite
consistent with Pompey's policy at this time, both for his connection with 
Nepos and for his feud with Lucullus. Pompey was dropping all undesirable 
associations.
Pompey's role in the Bona Dea affair will repay closer examination. 
Under pressure from Clodius, the boni viri in general had been disinclined 
to push hard in the matter. Cicero himself was softening. Only Cato was
insistent (Cic.Att.1.13*3)» M.Piso, Pompey's man in the consulship, was
doing all he could to help Clodius, although he himself was officially 
required to propose the bill to set up the special court to hear the case. 
His colleague M-Messalla Niger was hostile to Clodius (ibid). At the 
instance of Piso, a tribune, Q.Fufius Calenus, summoned Pompey to a 
contio, and there asked his opinion of the senatorial proposals concerning 
the constitution of the court (Cic.Att.1.14.1-2). Pompey replied by 
endorsing the authority of the senate in all matters. He spoke
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fA^ X^  otpz-CTTOKpotTLtrycS^  > ; "in true optimate fashion” might be a good
r e n d e r i n g T h a t  such an answer was unexpected can be. seen from the 
annoyance of Piso who had prompted Calenus to ask the question 
(Cic.Att.1.14.1,6), and from the fact that Calenus had himself put forward 
an alternative proposal far more favourable to Clodius (Cic.Att.1.16.2), 
and exercised his veto against the senatorial measure (Cic.Att.1.l4.5). 
Calenus may well have been a supporter of Pompey, as Cicero describes his 
unpopularity in 59 in a context clearly labelling him an associate of 
Pompey and Caesar (Cic.Att.2.18.1), and he showed sympathy in 54 for the 
Pompeian Gabinius (Dio 46.8,1). It is highly unlikely that Piso and 
Calenus would have arranged to have Pompey publicly questioned if they had 
not had good reason to believe that his answer would support their 
position.
After the contio, Messalla Niger elicited a similar reply from Pompey 
in the senate (Cic.Att.1.l4.3)» Niger's position was very different from 
Piso's. He leaped upon this unexpected support and made Pompey repeat it. 
Pompey's accession to the ranks of the boni in this matter seems to have 
strengthened their resolve. In place of a general inclination not to 
press the matter, a new determination may be discerned. When the senate 
met to discuss the affair, they were full of zeal and energy, easily 
dominating the debate, with Cato, Favonius, Lucullus, Hortensius, C.Piso, 
Niger and Cicero all in evidence (Cic.Att.1.14.5-6). That these are the 
men with whom Pompey was keen to better his relations is perhaps shown by 
the order of speaking in the senate decided by the consul, M.Piso. First 
came his kinsman C.Piso, then Cicero, Catulus and Hortensius 
(Cic.Att.1.13.2), three of them old enemies of Pompey. Kinship may have 
dictated the choice of C.Piso, but it would in any case have been 
consistent with Pompey's new policy to honour such men. It is perhaps
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.interesting to notice that M.Lollius Palicanus, the Pompeian tribune of 71 
whose consular candidacy in 6? had been prevented by C.Piso (Val.Max.3.8.;$, 
made several attacks on L.Afranius in 60 (Cic.Att.1.l8.5). . Perhaps
Palicanus too had been discarded in Pompey's attempts to make new friends. ■
In the event the boni gave way over the matter of the jury,.
confident that Clodius' conviction was inescapable (Cic.Att.1.Î6.2).
Clodius was however acquitted, Cicéro was certain that massive bribery
was responsible, and initiated an interminable scholarly debate by
referring to Clodius' saviour as "Calvus ex Nanneianis” (Cic.Att.1.16.5)°
Much attention has been devoted to the words "ex Nanneianis”, but the
significance of the expression is so obscure that no explanation serves to
identify the individual described. Each theory of his identity stands or
falls on quite other grounds, an appropriate account of "ex Nanneianis”
(17)being then draped around the chosen figure.
The first candidate to consider must be C.Licinius Macer Calvus, the 
neoteric poet, son of C.Macer, the reforming tribune of 73 who was condemned 
de repetundis in 66 despite Crassus' help (Plut.Cic.9.1-2);Val.Max.9.12.7). 
He has the prior claim to consideration because his would at first sight 
seem to be the name given by Cicero. The text of Cicero's letter however 
runs thus: "Nosti Calvum ilium ex Nanneianis ilium, ilium laudatorem
meum, de cuius oratione erga me honorifica ad te scripseram." It has been 
shown that Calvus is highly unlikely to have been in any position at this 
date to malce a speech honouring Cicero On the other hand Crassus did
make such a speech a few months earlier which Cicero did report at length 
to Atticus (Att.1.14.3)» The fact that Cicero so labours his description,
beginning it with "Nosti", and following the supposed name with so much 
further identifying information, malces it highly likely that "Calvus" is 
not in fact a name, but is rather to be spelled with a "c" than a "C", and
j.
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and. to be taken as an epithet. The effect of the passage might, then be
rendered thus: "You know old 'Baldy'? The *ex Nanneianis' chap? The
one who made that speech in my honour? - You remember! The one I wrote
to you about? Well Cicero was keen that Atticus should know jugt
whom he meant, but was equally concerned that this should not be too
easily obvious to another reader. Indeed without the clue in the
earlier letter an identification with Crassus is unlikely to have been
made. We do however possess that clue, and to argue that some other
"oratio honorifica", mentioned in a lost letter, may be meant is surely
perverse. That Calvus was indeed a name borne by one branch of the
Gens Licinia may have been part of Cicero's enjoyment of his own wit. It
is possible that Crassus, no less than Macer and his son, may have claimed
descent from that house, the first of the gens to reach the 
(19)nobility. One attempt to cast doubt on the identification with
Crassus has been to argue that the activities attributed by Cicero to the 
man in question are not such as one would associate with a man of Crassus* 
dignitas. It should first be observed that Cicero’s account is almost 
certainly exaggerated. Secondly, Cicero, in this same letter, attributes 
an equal directness in bribery to Pompey and M.Piso the consul (Att.1.l6.12-1^1 
Thirdly, Cicero himself shows that the more sordid part of the business was 
carried out by a slave. It should lastly be noted that Cicero directed a 
stream of not dissimilar accusations at Crassus in the Sixth Stoic Paradox, 
including that of helping the guilty to escape justice (Cic.Par.St.46;cf.43), 
By the standards of Ciceronian invective, the charges in this letter are 
mild. It is also put forward as an objection that "calvus" was not 
altogether a term of great delicacy, and so would not have been used by 
Cicero. That orator was not above obscenity (cf.Cic.Att.2.1.5)*^^^
The case had considerable repercussions. Pompey had alienated yet
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.another potentially powerful figure, in pursuit of his goal of 
rapprochement with the Catonians. When these advances were finally 
rejected he may have found that he had paid a very high price for nothing.
He■had made enemies of Nepos and Celer, of the Claudii, and perhaps of■, 
many others. Clodius had been supported in his trial and in the senate 
by C.Curio, consul in 76. Curio had favoured the Lex Manilla in 66 
(Cic.Leg.Man..6’8), but in 59 he and his son were bitterly hostile to Pompey. 
It has been suggested that this resulted from outrage at Pompey's 
involvement with Caesar and his legislation. This is possible, but 
since Curio had shown himself friendly to Caesar in 63 (Plut.Caes.8.1-2), 
it is more likely that the outrage was caused by Pompey's callous betrayal 
of a common friend. It may well be that also alienated at this time were 
such as the Memmii and P.Sulla, who are later found opposing Pompey in the 
50s and working with Clodius (see above p.65f*).
Crassus can hardly have failed to be pleased with this turn of events, 
Pompey failed to ally himself with Cato, and in the process wealcened his own 
following, Crassus was not slow to take advantage of the situation. By 
securing Clodius' acquittal he gained himself a potent ally. It will be 
argued below that a consistent thread of cooperation can be discerned 
between Crassus and Clodius throughout the following years. Not all those 
who were discarded or who defected from Pompey's faction turned to Crassus, 
though he can be seen to have cooperated with some of them at different 
times.
Cato's rejection of Pompey's proposals would seem to have preceded the 
elections in 61, since Plutarch reports Cato as pointing to Pompey's 
blatant use of bribery in those elections as total vindication and 
justification of that refusal (Plut.Pomp.44.2-3;Cat»30»2-4)» It would
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appear from Pompey's attitude towards Clodius that at the time of Calenus' 
contio and Pompey's speech in the senate, some time in early February 
(Cic.Att.1.14), he had not yet lost all hope that Cato might accept, since 
he was still eager to placate him, if need be with burnt offerings. The 
final refusal seems therefore to have come between February and 2? July 6l 
(Cic.Att.1.16.13).
Pompey succeeded yet again in securing one consulship for a friend, .
this time L.Afranius. It is interesting to observe that no action seems
to have been taken during 6l on the question of land for Pompey's veterans.
This may have been because Pompey wished first to celebrate his triumph,
perhaps so that the deserts of his men might be more plainly displayed
before the people. He triumphed on 28 and 29 September 6l (MRR2.l8l).
M.Piso's attitude may be a relevant factor. It might seem that he had
recovered quickly from his displeasure with Pompey over the Bona Dea affair
(Cic.Att.1.14.7), since by June he was cooperating with Pompey over the
canvass of Afranius (Cic.Att.1.16.12-13). It is perhaps significant,
however, that Cicero felt free to attack Piso, and indeed to deprive him of
his allotted province: "dësponsam homini iam Syriam ademi",-(Cic.Att. 1.16.8)«
Although Cicero was close to the boni at this time, he was concerned, if
possible, not wholly to alienate Pompey (cf.Cic.Att.1.19*4). Piso may
well have felt obliged to support an old comrade-in-arms, and indeed to
repay the debt he owed Pompey for his own consulship, but at the same time
he may have been disinclined to assist Pompey actively in the promotion of
his desires. If this was the case, it was a heavy blow for Pompey, since
Piso, though perhaps lazy (Cic.Att.1.l4.7), was a man of far more
consequence than Afranius, He was born into a distinguished family, had
already won a triumph as proconsul in Spain after his praetorship (MRR2.133),
(21 )and had some reputation as an orator.
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Whatever the reasons, the introduction of a land bill was delayed 
until 60 when L.Flavius brought forward his proposals early in the year 
with Pompey's open backing (Cic.Att.1.I8.6). The senate was hostile,
(Cic*Att.1.19.4), and the bill was firmly opposed by Metellus Celer, the 
consul, an enemy of Pompey since the divorce of Mucia (Dio 37-49-50)•
By June the issue seemed to be dying for lack of interest (Cic.Att.2.1.6). 
It has been asserted that Crassus took no part in the opposition to
(22)Flavius' bill. The evidence cited is a passage of Cicero in which, 
after mentioning the land bill, he writes, "Crassus verbum nullum contra 
grati^" (Att.1.18.6). This is taken to mean that Crassus remained silent
Tand dared not oppose so popular a measure. There is however no mention 
here of a desire on Crassus' part to be popularis. "Gratia" could well 
refer more readily to his wish to retain his influence in the senate, with 
whom the bill had found no favour. It is clear in any case that Cicero 
had changed the subject by this point in his letter, since there intervenes 
a passage, beginning "sed interea", deploring the lack of a true 
statesman and regretting that "Pompeius togulam illam pictam silentio 
tuetur suam" (ibid). Pompey was, however, not silent on the subject of 
Flavius' bill but was its popular "auctor" (Att.1.19-4). After the 
reference to Crassus, which follows this, Cicero continues by considering 
Cato's statesmanship. There is no reference to his position on the 
agrarian bill, but Cicero expresses doubts about his attitude towards the 
Asian tax contract (Att.1.18.7)- It is clear that these comments on 
Pompey, Crassus and Cato concern Cicero's appraisal of the whole field of
l{ . \ ^  V  «Ipublic affairs at the time, his search for the 'TroAi.TLKo; cxvrtP 
It is certain that these three men were not in agreement on affairs at this 
time. Crassus' care not to offend is more likely to have led him to 
oppose the bill, if, as Cicero suggests, "Huic toti rationi agrariae
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senatus adveraabatur suspican.s Pompeio novam quandam potentiam quaeri" ' 
(Att.'1.19«4). This does not tally with the view that the optimates 
fearpd to oppose the bill. Celer certainly opposed it (Dio 37-50), as* 
did Cato and Lucullus (Plut.Lüc.42.6). Just before this passage - 
Plutarch says that Lucullus had left the championship of the senate to 
Crassus and Cato (Luc.42.4). He goes on to say that Lucullus then 
returned to the fray and worked with Cato against Flavius (Luc.42.6).
This, taken with Appian's statement that Crassus was cooperating with 
Lucullus in opposition to the ratification of Pompey's Eastern acta 
(BC.2.9), makes it highly likely that Crassus was also opposed to the land 
bill^ Z^ )
The measure was not in fact popular (Cic.Att.1.19-4), and despite 
the desperate efforts of Flavius, including the imprisonment of Celer, 
interest in it waned (Cic.Att.1.19.4;2.1.6,8;Dio 37-50). Even Cicero, 
while not opposing the bill in its entirety, tried to amend it beyond 
recognition (Cic.Att.1.19-4). Cicero does not actually mention Pompey*s 
veterans as the intended beneficiaries of Flavius' bill, preferring to 
dwell on the advantages of settling the urban plebs on the land (ibid.), 
but he describes it as being much the same as a Plotian law. IVhile the 
date and nature of this latter measure are much debated, a strong case 
exists for dating it to 70 and attributing it to a Pompeian tribune of 
that year who was also the author of the Lex Plotia de reditu Lepidanorum 
(cf.p26n25 above). The Lex Plotia agraria is likely to have been 
intended to provide land for Pompey's Spanish veterans, in accordance with 
a senatorial decree on the subject (Dio 38.5-1;cf.Plut.Luc.34.4). The 
measure seems to have been delayed in some v/ay, but some of the soldiers 
were settled (Plut.Luc.3 4 . 3 - 4 ) It is in any case clear from Dio that 
Flavius' bill did concern Pompey's troops, and he further suggests that
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the scope of the bill was subsequently widened to include others in order 
to increase its popularity (Dio 37-50-1).
Still more important for Pompey wps the ratification by the senate 
of his Eastern acta. He had expected that these would be approved as a 
whole. Any discussion of the separate dispositions would have been felt, 
and indeed intended, as’an insult. These acta were not ratified by the 
senate, and had to wait until 59 when Caesar had them approved by a single 
law _(MRP2*188). In the van of those obstructing Pompey in the
senate were Lucullus, Cato, Celer and Crassus (Dio 57.49-3-50.1iPlut.Pomp. 
45-3;Cat.31.1;App.BC.2.9;Cf.Plut.Luc.42.4-5). Pompey was now apparently
helpless. His overtures to Cato had been rejected, and every move was 
blocked by his enemies- That the senate was unwilling that he should be 
included in an embassy to Gaul has been interpreted as yet another slight
(Cic.Att.1.19.3)
Nor was Cicero's position happy. His hopes of an alliance between 
Pompey and a senatorial majority led by himself, with wide support from 
both people and équités, lay in ruins. From the first, Pompey had tried 
to ignore Cicero, paying him only what honour was necessary, and 
concentrating on the nobler optimates. In the senate in February 6l he 
gave his approval to the senate's conduct as a whole. Cicero tries to 
maintain that this was considered implicit praise of his consulship. It 
is clear, however, that explicit praise was wanted. This Pompey witheld, 
and Crassus in fact supplied. Praise of the senate's conduct in 63 may 
well have meant praise of Cato's role on 5 December rather than Cicero's 
(Cic.Att.1.14.2-4). It is likely too that Pompey had not forgotten 
Cicero's apparent treachery in joining his enemies to secure the consulship. 
Cicero had, however, made too great a reputation in 63, albeit short-lived, 
for Pompey to quarrel openly with him, Cicero was a friend of those 
whose friendship Pompey was now seeking, and it would not do for Pompey to
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upbraid him for that relationship, Pompey made.a point of seeming on 
excellentterms with Cicero, but there was little sincerity in it 
(Cic.Att.1.15.4;cf.1.12.3;1.16.11). It may be that, after Cato's 
rejection of his offers; Pompey did at last come to believe that Cicero 
might be of some use, and began publicly to praise his deeds (Att.1.19>7) ■» 
This latter passage contains the bore of Cicero's policy at this time :
"Cum hoc ego me tanta familiaritate coniunxi, ut uterque nostrum in sua 
rations munition et in re publica firmior hac coniunctione esse possit."
In another letter he justifies his attitude by arguing that it would 
benefit the state no less than himself if he could separate Pompey from 
the "improbi cives". He himself will not desert the "boni viri", for 
he has no choice despite the hostility of some of them (Att.1.20.2-3)»
He writes yet again of making an ally of Pompey, not just for his own 
benefit, but because to make him "melior", that is to say more "bonus" and 
optimate and less "popularis", would advantage the state. He has hopes 
too vt^f converting Caesar, of rendering him "melior" (Att.2.1.6) .
Crassus' dealings with Cicero at this time will repay examination.
It has been argued above that Cicero at one time hoped to incriminate, or 
at least embarrass, Crassus in the matter of the "Catilinarian Conspiracy". 
One certain outcome of that affair was a long held grudge on Crassus' 
part. It is surprising therefore to find Crassus a few months later 
involved in negotiations for selling to Cicero a house on the Palatine, and 
at what seems a bargain price (Gic.Fam,5.6,2), Cicero paid 3,500,000 
sesterces. The following year the consul Messalla Niger paid 13,400,000 
sesterces for a house in the same area, and Cicero was jubilant about the 
difference (Cic.Att.I.13.6) Cicero paid for his house with 2,000,000 
sesterces from P.Sulla, a payment for his defence (Cell.NA.2.12.2), and 
the balance from C.Antonins (Att.1.12.1-2,13.6,l4.7;Fam.5.5). It may not
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bç a coincidence that all three men involved with Cicero in these
transactions were suspected of complicity with Catiline, ‘ Cicero boasted
that his testimony was the decisive factor in all the trials and
investigations in this matter (Cic.Sull.2*1^ ,48,83)- It-has been suggested
that Crassus was deliberately'aiming to tie Cicero's hands with bonds of
(27 y ^financial obligation, but it is also possible that Cicero may have been 
taking advantage of his strong position to make, more than political 
capital. An element of extortion and blackmail may be suspected.
During a senatorial debate on the Bona Dea affair, Crassus, as has 
been observed, leaped to his feet and proceeded to speak, in remarkably 
fulsome terms, of the debt he owed to Cicero for saving the state from 
Catiline. Cicero was understandably not a little surprised and Pompey 
annoyed, but Cicero, at the time, assumed that Crassus was genuinely keen 
to be friendly (Att.1.14.3-4). Later Cicero seems to have realised that 
Crassus' aim may have been to foster Pompey's mistrust of the orator 
(Att.1.19.7,2.1.6), but such a speech can in any case have done Crassus 
no harm in his current policy of siding with the optimates against 
Pompey, while disarming suspicion concerning his own association with 
Catiline,
One consequence of Crassus' intervention to save Clodius in 6l may 
have been to lessen his credit with Cato and his allies. Although both 
Crassus and Cato were involved in blocking the ratification of Pompey's 
acta, and possibly also in fighting the Flavian bill, they were found 
clearly opposed to one another on the question of revising the censorial 
contract for the locatio of the revenues of Asia, The publicani 
involved were supported in the senate initially by Crassus, and then also 
by Cicero. Celer, the consul designate, opposed the request, but, after
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debates on 1 and 2 December .61, Cicero was confident of success
(Att.1.17-9)- Cato, however, who had been unable to speak in the earlier
meetings, then managed, by skilful, filibustering, so to hold up matters-
that by June 60 the question was still unresolved (Att.1.l8.7;2.1.8;
cf.Dio 38.7.4). The publicani did not in fact have their way until 39,
when Caesar remitted one third of the contracted figure (MRR2.I88). It
is frequently asserted that Crassus was, throughout his career, the
champion of the equestrian order, and of the publicani in particular
This is remarkably little attested in the sources save for this one
incident. Crassus must inevitably have had frequent dealings with the
équités in the course of his many financial transactions,but that is no
reason to suppose that he was generally more their patron than any other
rich noble. It is possible that he himself may have had no personal
financial interest in the matter, but may have been anxious to help his
friend, and inherited client, Cn.Plancius,who was spokesman for the
publicani concerned in the request to the senate (Cic.Plane.31-3;cf.24)■
That Caesar did help the publicani in 39 is often seen as Crassus' chief
(29)gain from his participation in the "First Triumvirate", but it is 
significant that the sources nowhere connect Crassus with Caesar's action 
then. Emphasis is placed on the goodwill gained by Caesar from the 
equestrian order as a whole (Dio 38.7.4;App.BC.2.I3), and on Pompey's wish 
to oblige the publicani (Cic.Att.2.16.2). Crassus' support of the 
request for a revision of the contract in 61 is certain- Less certain is 
that it was his frustration on this point that led him to agree to an 
alliance with Pompey and Caesar
The équités were under attack at this time on another matter. At 
the urging of Cato, the senate passed a decree authorising a law to 
remove from equestrian jurors their exemption from prosecution for receiving
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bribes (Cic.Att. 1.17-8,18.3;2.1.8;.cf>Cic.Glu. 143-8). Cicero was aware
that to alienate that order would remove an essential prop from the 
senatorial authority he was so anxious to preserve. His beloved 
"concordia ordinum" (Att.1.17.9;1.1,8.3) amounted in effect to a 
voluntary surrender of sovereignty by the people of Rome, among whom the 
équités wielded great influence, to the senate, dominated since the latter 
part of 63 by Cicero and his optimate friends. If the équités as a 
group withdrew their support, the ability of the boni to control events 
would be greatly diminished- Cicero therefore tried hard to overturn 
the senate's decision (Att.1.17.8). It is likely that the bill was never 
carried - "nulla lex perlata" (Att.l.18.3); certainly no such law was in 
force a few years later (Cic.Rab.Post.I6-18). Nevertheless the senate's
threat seems to have had the effect Cicero feared (Att.1.17-10?1 -18»3;
2.1.7-8). Crassus' position on this issue is nowhere stated. When 
Cicero first mentions the two affairs involving the équités, he describes 
first the decree concerning their immunity, and then his own role in 
reprimanding the senate for it. He then proceeds to the Asian tax 
contract and writes "Ego princeps in adiutoribus atque adeo secundus; 
nam, ut illi auderent hos postulare, Crassus eos impulit" (Att.1.17-8-9)- 
By bringing in Crassus at this point Cicero would seem to imply that he 
was not involved in the other matter. Certainty is impossible, but it is 
not unlikely that Crassus may have been pleased to see the breal-cdown of 
Cicero's concordia, and may have encouraged the demand of the publicani 
in the hope and confident expectation that Cato would oppose it-
Cato's reasons for his conduct are not immediately obvious- It is 
possible that a genuine concern for principle did in fact inspire him; 
even Cicero acknowledged that both causes were rotten (Att.1.17.8-9;2.1.8) , 
P.Clodius' acquittal in the Bona Dea trial may have been the immediate
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occasion that led Cato to propose his motion on judicial corruption.
This does not necessarily imply an attack on Crassus; the issue was an 
old one^^^^ Cato may have.overestimated the lasting strength of his 
faction in the senate, and of tl^ e senate in the state. During 6l and 
60 he carried and obstructed senatorial decrees as he willed, but when in' 
59 politics were taken out into the wider context of the popular 
assemblies, he may bitterly have rued the defection of the équités.
A'f some point in 60 or 59, Crassus, Pompey and Caesar joined 
together in that alliance called, inaccurately but conveniently,
"the First Triumvirate". The date of their agreement, its nature, and 
its effective duration have all been much discussed. Consideration has 
been given above to several of the events preceding it, and it is not 
hard to see the immediate advantages for Pompey of any arrangement that 
would help him to break out of the impotent frustration of the two years 
following his return from the East. He wished for certain specific 
things, including ratification of his acta and land for his veterans, and 
felt that if he could secure these he might then attain his rightful 
place of supreme dignity and authority in the state. Crassus' and 
Caesar's motives, however, will repay some attention.
The consulship alone is unlikely to have been a sufficient or even a 
necessary inducement for Caesar. Before the elections in 60, Cicero 
considered him a near certainty (Att.2.1.6), and, despite some doubts
(32)that have been raised, it would seem unlikely that the man who had 
defeated Q.Catulus and P.Vatia in 65 for the office of Pontifex Maximus, 
at a time when he was himself no more than aedilicius, was likely to be 
in danger of losing to both L.Lucceius and M.Bibulus. Not only Cicero 
considered Caesar's election probable. The boni seem to have feared it, 
and, according to Suetonius backed Bibulus with all their resources.
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Even then the most they hoped for was to ensure that Caesar was not aided
by a compliant colleague (Suet.lul.19.1)., When therefore, under the
terms of the lex Sempronia, the consular provinces were determined well
before the elections, the boni tried to ensure that Caesar would not
receive a province of military significance (Suet.lul.19.2). Suetonius
attributes the inception of the triumvirate to Caesar's resentment of this
action. It has been argued that Suetonius' "silvae callesque" may not
have been intended as a slight, but may have been a technical device for
allotting Italy to both consuls in view of the possible threat in the
(33)North from the Helvetian migration. It is perhaps more likely that the
words have entered the text as a gloss on names for provinces that have 
dropped out, and these provinces, whatever they were, amounted to no more 
than the policing of peaceful rural areas. If this was the case, Caesar 
may well have been motivated at least in part by a desire to secure a 
province of greater scope, especially since he was forced by the Catonians 
to forego his triumph (Plut.Caes.i3.1-2). The mere attainment of the 
consulship was in itself a sufficient end for most Roman politicians, who 
remained content to carry out their duties as servants and chief executive 
officers of the senate, perhaps securing a relative immortality by 
sponsoring some law in accordance with a senatorial decree- Caesar's 
ambitions certainly went beyond this. Already in 63 he had concerned 
himself with the ambitious agrarian bill of P.Rullus. His willingness to 
promote not dissimilar measures in 39 cannot be entirely due to his wish 
to gratify Pompey. His consulship was without question quite exceptional 
in the quantity of original legislation of various kinds put forward by 
the consul on his own initiative. Such a role had hitherto been left to 
tribunes. In 63 and 6l tribunes had, with in each case the feeble support 
of one consul, proposed land bills. Caesar now intended to use the
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consulship itself as the-dynamic force for legislation. To do this he. 
needed considerable and varied support. Pompey could provide a great 
deal of.manpower to help,dominate the streets and the assemblies,
Crassus' widespread.influence, particularly in the senate, could not 
perhaps guarantee the passage of measures through that body, since Cafo's 
obstructionism could be expected to continue, and Bibulus too relied on to 
malte matters difficult, but it could perhaps ensure that no hostile 
decrees were passed. Crassus could provide at least a senatorial 
stale-mate. Caesar needed support to enable him to enjoy an active
consulship, to be followed by an opportunity to exercise military 
imperium in an active command for a number of years. It is certain that 
in the course of 39 Caesar did achieve a position of significant political 
power far greater than that of most consuls and consulars.
Crassus' prospects of immediate gain are not as clearly discernible. 
The satisfaction of the demand of the Asian publicani does not compare 
very favourably with the benefits offered to his two "colleagues". His 
place on the commission to administer Caesar's agrarian law (Dio 38.1-7) 
will have given him scope for a valuable exercise of patronage, but this 
was an honour shared with Pompey, and perhaps with eighteen others, but it 
may be with only three. Caesar declined to benefit directly from his 
own law (ibid.), but will have gained merely from proposing the measure, 
as well as by having friends among the commissioners.
Ancient sources are remarkably clear-sighted in their analysis of 
Crassus' reasons for joining the alliance. Dio writes that Crassus, 
considering that he should by virtue of his wealth and family be 
preeminent, planned to use the friendship of both Caesar and Pompey to 
advance himself beyond both, but contrived to avoid odium for the less 
acceptable measures and achieved a nice balance between the senate and the
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people (Dio 37*36.4-3). Dio's own attribution of motives is,often wild, 
but in this case he may have been using a good source; His mention of 
Crassus' family as, by implication, '/better" than those of Pompey and 
Caesar would seem to confirm this. Later events tended to surround 
Caesar and his family with a glamour and distinction inconceivable to his 
contemporaries. Though patrician, the Caesares had decayed for 
generations, only regaining some honour in the 90s. Pompey was noble, 
but only just. His father, consul in 89, was "hominem dis ac nobilitati 
perinvisum" (Cic.in Asc.79C). The Crassi were, as has been shown, among 
the most distinguished plebeian families, producing a succession of consuls, 
censors, and Pontifices Maximi for generations. Such a nice appreciation 
of Republican attitudes may indicate a source much closer to the time , 
than Dio himself. When considering Pompey's motives, Dio describes
r / it '<Crassus as £\? o'vvcf.fAtt. ov>’rcn , again perhaps surprisingly aware of 
the political situation (37-36.3)» In 6l and 60, Crassus, a man of 
considerable power himself, was certainly in the ranks of those then in 
control of affairs, thereby frustrating Pompey's aims, Velleius too is 
perceptive; ''Crassus, ut quern principatum solus adsequi non poterat, 
auctoritate Pompei, viribus teneret Caesaris" (2.44.2). Both Velleius 
and Dio confirm the view of Crassus* strategy suggested above.
The dating of the agreement is uncertain. Some sources would put it 
before the elections in 60, others after them or even during 39- Dio's 
account is the fullest, suggesting that Caesar managed to secure the 
support of both Pompey and Crassus for his election, but that they were 
not reconciled to each other until after it (37.34.3-38-1), the alliance 
being kept secret thereafter until the time was ripe (cf.38.4,4-3)- 
Plutarch clearly opts for an open reconciliation and alliance before the 
elections (Cr.l4.1-3;Pomp.47.1-3;Caes.13-1-2;Gat.3I.2-3)- Appian
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relates that, Pompey, angered by the delay over the ratification of his 
acta, made friends with Caesar and -supported him for the consulship. 
Thereupon Caesar brought Crassus into friendly relations.with Pompey, 
•‘'vfopcûfAççri ^o'vXrj elected Bibulus (BG.2.9).
Thus Appian clearly puts the inception of the alliance and the senate's 
suspicions, either of its existence or of its intentions, before the 
elections. Suetonius' account, already mentioned, places the alliance 
after Caesar's election, but he associates it with the senatorial 
disposition of the consular provinces, which he also places after the 
elections,.clearly in ignorance of the requirements of the lex Sempronia. 
His evidence may therefore be discounted for the purpose of determining 
the order of events. The allocation of provinces took place before the 
elections, but an action of Caesar's motivated by it could have come
before or after, Suetonius' version is determined by his mistaken dating,\
of the former rather than by any independent reasoning. The Livian 
epitomator, using the word "conspiratio", suggests an alliance, presumably 
secret, before the elections (Livy Per.103), while Velleius, in a highly 
compressed account, puts the formation of the pact into Caesar's 
consulship (2.44.1).
The only contemporary evidence is provided by Cicero. On 
3 December 61 he wrote to Atticus that Lucceius had decided to stand for 
the consulship as there were only two other probable candidates, Caesar 
and Bibulus. Lucceius was undecided with which of these to ally himself. 
With Caesar he could do so through Arrius, and with Bibulus through C.Piso. 
Even Cicero acknowledged that such flexibility might seem amusing 
(Att.1.17.11). Lucceius was some years later a particular intimate of 
Pompey (Cic.Eam.13.4l;13*42) above p.6l & n.29). Arrius was a close
adherent of Crassus (Cic.Brut.242-3), had probably served under him in the
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70s, and was to, do so again in the 60s, (see above p-93 & n.3l). Although 
there is no direct evidence for a connection between Lucceius and Pompey 
so early, Lucceius* indecision may well mirror Pompey * s at this tirael^^ 
By.the end of 61 he had failed to win over Cato, but had yet to make his 
main attempt to secure his twin aims of the passage of a land bill arid 
the ratification of his acta. In 60 he tried through Flavius to achieve 
the former, and in the senate, presumably through Afranius, to secure the 
latter. In both he was frustrated. At the time of Cicero's letter 
both these disappointments lay in the future. At the end of 61 Pompey 
may have been undecided whether to continue to woo the boni, or to look 
elsewhere for help. During the first part of 60 Crassus joined with 
Pompey's enemies in delaying the approval of the acta. The offer of an 
alliance, perhaps reflected by Arrius' involvement, had not been taken up; 
a further demonstration of the desirability of such an agreement was 
therefore produced; By June 60 the decision may still not have been 
made : "Lucceius quid agat, scribam ad te, cum Caesarem videro, qui aderit
biduo" (Cic.Att.2,1.9)■ In the same letter, however, Cicero couples
Caesan with Pompey as two men he would like to see "melior", that is, 
presumably, to align with the "boni" (Att.2.1.6). This may show that 
Pompey was by this point openly backing Caesar, and that the matter 
concerning Lucceius may be something other than his actual choice of 
running-mate, and indeed subsequent to. it. In the event Caesar and 
Lucceius did cooperate in their canvass (Suet.lul.19-1)»
Yet another letter from Cicero to Atticus suggests that by the end of 
60 there was no general awareness of any alliance involving Pompey and 
Crassus, L.Cornelius Balbus had called on Cicero and assured him that 
Caesar would in all things be guided by Cicero and Pompey, and that Caesar 
would attempt to bring together Pompey and Crassus (Att.2.3-3)° Two
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things seem certain from this. The first is t.hat Pompey's association 
with Caesar was open and acknowledged; the other is that there was no 
public knowledge of any reconciliation between Crassus and Pompey. It
has been suggested that .Balbus was perfectly honest when he implied that 
such a reconciliation lay in the future, and that, had Cicero agreed to 
join in supporting the land bill Caesar was about to bring forward, he
could have had a major place in the alliance, if not indeed that later
taken by default by Crassus. Cicero's later declaration that he will not 
envy Crassus has sometimes been taken to demonstrate precisely this latter 
possibility (Att.2.4.2). It is unlikely that any mention of an attempt 
to reconcile Pompey and Crassus would have been made, were it not certain 
that such an attempt would succeed, or indeed had already succeeded.
The context of Balbus' approach was the imminence of Caesar's first 
agrarian bill. Cicero's support, or, failing that, his silence, would 
have been useful, and to that end Balbus was sent to Cicero to advise him 
that he had now lost the long struggle for Pompey's favour to Crassus, and 
that he would do better to follow Pompey in this than to remain with his 
optimate friends. It is this defeat, and his refusal to acquiesce in it, 
that concerned Cicero in 39 when he wrote, "neque mihi umquam veniet in 
mentem Crasso invidere neque paenitere, quod a me ipse non desciverim"
(Att.2.4.2). It has been suggested that Balbus was deliberately
concealing the fact of the alliance from Cicero, and indeed that it
remained secret until 56.^^^ It seems much more likely that Balbus was in 
fact gently breaking the news of it to Cicero, It will be argued below 
that the triumvirate was certainly no secret in 39-
It would thus seem clear that Dio's account fits exactly the 
indications from Cicero's letters. Caesar secured support from both 
Pompey and Crassus for his election, and then, as consul designate,
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effected a reconciliation that was kept quiet until it could be revealed 
with maximum effect, during the discussion on the agrarian bill in 
January 59* It has been objected that Caesar cannot have been 
supported publicly by both men unless they were already in agreement.
This is to ignore the complex nature of Roman political life, whereby it 
was not uncommon for two men at enmity with one another to be united in 
support of a cEindidate or defendant. Pompey recommended M.Piso in 62 both 
to his friends and to his enemies (Dio 37-44,2)„ Among the latter will 
have been C.Piso, consul 67, a bitter foe of Pompey, but a kinsman of 
M.Piso, and the consular honoured by him with first place in the senate 
(Cic.Att.1.13.2). So too Cicero and P.Clodius found themselves 
supporting the same man in 60 (Cic.Att.2.1.5), and Cicero and Crassus 
cooperated in defending Murena and P.Sestius. That Caesar should have 
received support from both men need not have excited notice in 60. He 
had excellent Pompeian credentials, but had also been associated for some 
time with Crassus. Both circumstances would have been public knowledge.
The nature of the agreement is hard to define. It must have 
comprised more than a shopping list of the measures that each wanted passed, 
Suetonius interestingly suggests a negative quality in the agreement, a 
vow to oppose any measure obnoxious to any one of the three (lul.19.2).
It is unlikely, however, that the "First Triumvirate" had any of the 
quasi-legal constitution, even privately agreed, that its title implies. 
Three men were willing to cooperate politically for an unspecified period 
for mutual benefit and the discomfiture of their common enemies.
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Chapter VIII Caesar's First Consulship '
The order and dating of events in 39 have been the subject of 
(1)considerable debate. It is likely that Caesar's- first act will have ■ 
been to bring forward the agrarian bill that Cicero had mentioned iu .
December 6o as being expected in January (Att.2.3-5)* An attempt has 
been made to deny that Caesar can have held the fasces in January, on the 
ground that Bibulus was able to postpone the elections from July, which 
was also an odd month^^^but this has been effectively refuted^^^ Apart 
from the convincing arguments for Caesar's priority, the evidence of, 
Cicero's letter cited above, and the fact that Caesar had the right to 
establish the order of senatorial speaking, shown by his giving Crassus 
first place (Suet.lul.21;Gell.NA.4.10.3), remove any uncertainty from the 
matter. By the end of April the first agrarian law had been passed, 
Ptolemy Auletes recognised as King of Egypt, the Asian publicani 
satisfied, Pompey's acta ratified, P.Clodius adopted into a plebeian 
family, and probably Caesar given Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum by the 
lex Vatinia (Cic.Att.2.16.2;cf.2.9-1 ;2.6.2;2.7-2-3). All save the
lex Vatinia and the curiate law legalising Clodius* adoption must have been 
passed by the end of March, since Bibulus held the fasces in April, and 
there were in any case insufficient comitial days in that month to permit
(4)of legislation. Caesar presided over the curiate law as
Pontifex Maximus. Vatinius, as a tribune, was naturally unaffected by
the question of the fasces.
As must have been expected, there was considerable opposition to the
first agrarian bill when Caesar brought it to the senate for approval.
It seems likely that the bill was not rejected by the senate, but that its
(5)opponents managed to prevent the passage of the decree authorising it.
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Caesar thereupon took the,matter to the people, where, despite a varietyI
of obstructive tactics by Bibulus, Cato, and others, the measure was 
passed. At the first public contio on the matter, the "triumvirate*" was 
made manifest as-Caesar stood with Crassus -bn. one side of him-and Pompey 
on the other, and both gave their full approval to the proposals 
(Plut.Caes.l4;Dio 38.4.4-3-3;App.BC.2.10). Despite Bibulus* continued
opposition, helped by three of the tribunes, the bill became law. It is 
uncertain whether it was at this stage, or later in the context of 
Caesar's second agrarian measure, the lex Campana, that Bibulus took to 
his house for the remaining part of the year. Cicero learned for the 
first time of this latter bill at the end of April (Att.2.16.1). This 
would suggest that Caesar published it at the beginning of Kay, By this 
time the commissioners to administer the first law had been elected 
(Cic,Att.2.6.2;2.7.3)- It is probable therefore that the bills were 
separated by a period of some three months. The sources however tend not 
to distinguish between them. Dio does append a mention of the 
distribution of the ager Campanus to his discussion of the circumstances 
of the first law (38.7-3)- That his account is compressed, and may indeed 
be corrupt, is further shown by his twice indicating that he has finished 
with the matter. He describes Bibulus' failure to intervene in the 
assembly and concludes, kal o fACy hn'VpcjBrj *'
(38.6.4). He then recounts Bibulus' attempt to persuade the senate to 
annul the law, his subsequent retirement, arid the taking of the oath by
' r  c /  'y  /  ( /the senate to obey the law. He then writes, o T£ ovv>
eKVpu?(:7ri  ^ KCAL 'rrp o crc -T L  KdiL. q X W V  y q ___ c o p t /q
(38.7-3)- It could be that the mention of Bibulus' withdrawal from the 
scene properly belongs after the second closing statement. Suetonius too 
is aware of both laws, and has Bibulus withdraw after the first, but his
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account of the legislation is schematic and chronologically unreliable 
(Suet.lul.20). The confusion created by the failure of several sources 
to make the necessary distinction can be seen in Plutarch. In one 
account he puts Pompey's marriage to Julia into the context of the 
first, and only, law, and, after referring to this union and to the 
consular elections, relates Bibulus’ self-incarceration (Plut.Caes.l4).
So tod, elsewhere, he mentions only one agrarian bill, which-had not yet been 
passed when Pompey married Julia, and Caesar Calpurnia, and Caesar received 
both Gauls and Illyricum, Meanwhile Bibulus shut himself up for the 
ramaining eight months of the year (Plut.Pomp.48). Such a period would 
tie in precisely with the Campanian law, which came in May, and was indeed 
accompanied by the marriage alliance between Caesar and^  Pompey 
(Cic.Att.2.17.1). This would seem confirmed by Cicero’s attribution to
Pompey of a denial of responsibility for what had happened to Bibulus in 
the Forum when the partial remission of the Asian tax contract was being 
dealt with (Att.2.16.2).
This passage has sometimes been interpreted to mean, "what would have 
happened if Bibulus had come down", but this is farfetched, and fails to 
explain why Cicero should select just this one occasion, out of many, to 
discuss what might have happened but did not. The natural inference is 
that Bibulus did leave his house on that occasion, and so had not by then,
(7)probably in March, entered upon his self-imposed seclusion. It is likely
therefore that incidents connected with one bill may have been transposed 
in the sources to the other. In the same way, Caesar's attempt to silence 
Cato by imprisoning him is shifted from the context of the first land bill 
to other matters (Dio 38.3*1-3>cf-Pl"t.Cat.33*1~2;Val.Max.2.1Q.7).
In view of the blocking tactics developed in the senate by Cato and his 
friends during the previous two years, it is unlikely that Caesar will have
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expected to gain senatorial approval for his legislation. It may be,
however, that the triumvirate could have mustered sufficient support to win
a vote, if one .had been taken, since, when resistance ceased from Bibulus
and Cato,.the senate was willing to give Caesar Transalpine Gaul ^
addition'to the command bestowed under the lex Vatinia. Indeed, after the
first agrarian bill was passed, Bibulus could find none in the senate to
propose any hostile motion (Buet.Iul.2Q). Presumably he could not do so
(8)himself, as he did not hold the fasces.
As has been shown, Caesar had satisfied the legislative requirements 
of his colleagues with all possible despatch. That Pompey's acta had been 
ratified by the end of April has been questioned, but seems established by 
"qui régna quasi praedia tetrarchis ,., dederunt" (Cic.Att,2,9°l), and by 
"vectigal te nobis in monte Antelibano constituisse, agri Campani 
abstulisse" (Att.2,l6*2). The date of the lex Vatinia, conferring upon 
Caesar the provinces of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum has been much 
discussed. At the beginning of May Cicero put into Pompey's mouth the 
words, "Oppressos vos tenèbo exercltu Caesaris" (Att.2.l6,2). The only 
reason for doubting the most obvious interpretation of this is the 
association with the granting of his provinces of his new kinsmen by 
marriage (Suet.lul.21-2;cf,Plut.Pomp.48;Caes,l4), Suetonius does
distinguish between the grant by the people of Cisalpine Gaul and 
Illyricum, and that by the senate of Transalpine Gaul, but does so after 
mentioning the marriages, Plutarch fails to make the distinction. There 
is in fact even in Suetonius* account nothing inconsistent with the view 
that Piso, at least, was only involved in the second, senatorial, 
disposition, and it would therefore seem reasonable to assume from Cicero's 
"exercitu Caesaris" that the lex Vatinia, which did in any case give 
Caesar three-quarters of his initial army (Dio ^^.8.9), had been passed by
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the end of April. .
It has been suggested that the existence of the alliance did not 
become publicly known before 56, when it was reaffirmed at Luca.
This would seem refuted by .«the public support and cooperation given' by 
Porapey and Crassus to Caesar's first land bill, including the presence of 
both men on the commission (Dio 38.1.7), by Balbus' earlier conversation 
with Cicero, by Caesar's calling'on Crassus first in the senate, and by 
the existence of a rumour, in April 59, that Pompey and Crassus were to be 
the next consuls (Cic.Att.2.5«2). Indicative too is Cicero's 
acknowledgement of Crassus' success and his own failure (Att.2.4.2).
Most conclusive is a reference by Cicero to "très homines immoderatos" with 
whom all power then lay (Att.2.9.2). That these three men do not include 
Vatinius, Clodius, Gabinius or Piso is shown by the words that follow, 
"Proinde isti licet faciant, quos volent, consules, tribunes pl., denique 
etiam Vatini strumam sacerdotii vestiant" (ibid), Vatinius and
the others are clearly recipients of the favours of the three. It is
(11)clear that Cicero does refer to Crassus, Pompey, and Caesar.
That he always does so when complaining of the state of affairs is 
less certain. In a series of letters written to Atticus in April, Cicero 
shows an awareness of some changes and dissensions within the alliance. 
Early in the month it seems secure, since Cicero is resolved to keep away 
from politics, devoting himself rather to the muses; he will not envy 
Crassus his success. He asks Atticus who are likely to be the next 
consuls (2.4.2-3)« In the next letter Cicero returns to the subject of 
the consuls for 38, and asks how Arrius likes being abandoned by Caesar.
He mentions two rumours, one that Pompey and Crassus will stand, the other 
that Gabinius and Ser.Sulpicius Rufus will be chosen. He himself could
be bought by "isti" with the vacant augurate (2.3.2). Later he delights
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in a report that P.Clodius is in disagreement with Caesar .and Pbmpey, who 
had helped his transitio, and who now wish him to go on a lègat'io to 
Armenia, rather than on another he preferred (2.7.2). Clodius has been 
; denied .a place among, the vigintiviri, and. "isti" are not yet. sure that *' 
they want him to become tribune (2.7-3)• "Isti" here clearly includes 
neither Clodius nor Vatinius. The latter is spoken of as a possible 
candidate for Clodius' preferred legation. Cicero continues, "Una spes 
est salutis istorum inter ipsos dissensio; cuius ego quaedam initia sensi 
ex Curione." Arrius is furious about his consulship. One Megabocchus 
and other young men are "inimicissimi"- Atticus has himself hinted that 
some of the quinque viri themselves are speaking out. It this is so, 
things are better than Cicero had feared (2.7-4), A few days later he 
spoke to the younger Curio, who announced, to Cicero's surprise, that he 
hated those now in power, described by Cicero, quoting Lucilius, as 
"reges superbos"-(2.8.1). In the next letter in the series comes the 
passage about "tres homines immoderatos", also referred to as "isti" 
(2.9-2). Earlier in the same letter he discusses Clodius' relations 
with "his dynastis", and mentions an unlikely possibility that Clodius may 
quarrel with them (2.9.1). On 19 April he asks, "Negent illi Publium 
plebeiura factum esse?" Porapey himself had talten the auspices (2.12.1).
He continues with news from Curio that Clodius has announced his intention 
of standing for the tribunate as an enemy of Caesar, and rescinding all 
Caesar's legislation. Caesar is denying that he had proposed Clodius' 
adoption. Curio, Memmius, and Metellus Nepos were all enraged (2.12.2). 
Other letters written in the second part of April reflect on Pompey's 
unpopularity (2.13-2;2.l4.1), and in later letters he discusses Caesar's 
and Pompey's actions and motives, but there are no similar uses of "isti" 
or of "dynasti" (cf.2.15.1f'2.l6.1-2;2.17.1-2). Eventually Cicero
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writes, after 25 July, that where before the "dominâtio" had been 
generally popular, and, while unwelcome to the boni,'not entirely hateful, 
it was now universally detested (2.21.1). Pompey was wholly■bemused by 
the decline iu his popularity, "0 spectaculum uni Crasso.iucundum" (2.21.3).
It is possible to discern a pattern in the progressions shown by 
these letters. That Arrius was a dutiful partisan of Crassus is 
generally agreed. • His part in the negotiations between Caesar and 
Lucceius in 61/6O could well have involved some agreement that Caesar 
should in turn help him to the consulship of 58. Clearly by April 59 
Caesar had changed his mind. Cicero learned of Pompey's marriage to Julia 
in early May (2.17-1). Caesar's marriage to Calpurnia, daughter of 
L.Piso Caesoninus, and his support for his new father-in-law's consular 
candidacy, took place at much the same time (Suet.lul.21;cf.Plut.Caes.l4.4; 
Pomp.47.6;Dio 38-9-1). Caesar now called on Pompey to speak first in 
senatorial debate rather than Crassus (Suet-lul.21;Gell.NA.4.IQ.5). On 
its own such a change would seem quite reasonable, but, taken with other 
pointers, would seem to reflect a real shift in the balance of the 
alliance. Not content with withdrawing his support for Arrius, Caesar 
attacked him through the agency of Vatinius, who ostentatiously 
dishonoured a public banquet given by Arrius as part of his consular 
campaign. The occasion of the banquet was a supplicatio voted by the 
senate to honour the victory in Transalpine Gaul of C.Pomptinus 
(Cic.Vat.30-2;Schol.Bob.149-50 St.). Pomptinus had served as a legate 
under Crassus in the Servile War (MRR2.176), and his present association 
with Arrius would suggest that his allegiance was unchanged. It has been 
suggested that Vatinius was protesting at the loss of comitial days for 
his legislation, necessitated by the supplicatio, rather than attacking
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Arrius and Pomptinus. The argument runs that if the latter had been the
case, Caesar would have opposed the granting of the supplicatio in the
first place. He did not do so out of consideration for Crassus,
(12)Pomptinus' friend. Vatinius' action did not, however, show^  this
consideration. An alternative view is that Caesar was concerned that
Pomptinus' success, if acknowledged, would lessen his own case for
(1"5)adding Transalpine Gaul to the command already given by Vatinius. It 
is unlikely that Caesar objected initially to Pomptinus' supplication, 
just as he originally supported Arrius' candidacy. Clearly something has 
changed. There is disagreement about the reasons for the addition of 
Transalpine Gaul, In March 60 the senate had instructed the consuls to 
draw lots for the two Gallic provinces in view of the disturbances in and 
beyond the Transalpine province (Cic.Att.1.19-2). Metellus Celer had 
dravm the Transalpina, but had not gone there by the time of his death.
He died some time between taking the oath to obey Caesar's first land law, 
probably in February, and the middle of April, when his death, had 
occasioned a vacancy in the augurate (Dio 38.7.1-2;Cic.Att.2.5-2;2.9-2; ' 
cf.MRR2.192). In 60 the Pompeian tribune Flavius had threatened to 
prevent his going out to his province, and it would seem that Celer was 
in fact quite happy to stay (Dio 37-50.4). Pomptinus had been governing 
the province since 62, and presumably continued to do so when Celer failed 
to talce up his command. It may be that Pomptinus, who was conspicuously 
successful in Gaul, had his command prorogued after Flavius did in fact 
carry out his threat (MRR2. 1 8 5 ) Celer's presence in the city in 
early 39 suggests that no curiate law had been passed conferring 
proconsular imperium upon him. It has been shown above that the 
lex Vatinia was probably passed before May, and that the sources should 
therefore be talcen to show that it was the addition by the senate of
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Transalpine Gaul that was proposed and supported by Pompey and L.Piso in 
May or after (of.Cic.Att.8,3»3)■> It is generally asserted that it was 
Celer*6 death that occasioned the grant of that province. It is more 
likely that ^  increasing coolness between Crassus, and his colleagues, 
shown in other matters,' may have overcome any scruple Caesar had 
previously felt about replacing and attacking Crassus' friend. Caesar 
had already been given the province of Pompey's friend Afranius (MRR2.I76).
He would not have hesitated to replace Celer, an enemy, but Crassus may 
have protected Pomptinus' position, until his own relations with Caesar 
and Pompey reduced his power to influence them.
Cicero had written, "Una spes est salutis istorum inter ipsos dissensio" 
(Att.2.7-3), citing Clodius' discontent, Arrius' rage over his disappointed 
hopes, and the hostility of Megabocchus and his friends (2.7-2-3). This 
latter figure is likely to be a friend of Crassus' son Publius, and later 
a legate of Crassus in Parthia (Plut.Cr.23.3,l4). If to these be added 
Caesar's closer relations with Pompey, his unprecedented action in 
changing the senatorial order of speaking, and his dishonouring and 
supplanting of Pomptinus, the conclusion seems inevitable that Crassus was 
in real danger of being discarded as of no further use to the alliance.
It is possible indeed that the quinquevirs who were "speaking out" may be 
a reference to open dissension even among the principals of the alliance.
It is generally thought that the quinque viri were a judicial subcommittee 
of the viginti viri elected to administer Caesar's land law (cf.MRR2.192). 
Both Pompey and Crassus seem to have been elected, and it is highly 
probable that they would have sat on both boards, the better to control the
patronage available. Atticus' hint might then indicate some public clash
(15)between Crassus and Pompey.
An essential but ambiguous part in the pattern of the political scene,
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from the formation of the -triumvirate down to its renewal in 36» was played 
by P.Clodius. He has been variously regarded as a puppet of the 
triumvirate as a whole, or, else specifically of Caesar or Crassus, or as 
a major figure in his. own right, independent of the triumvirate and largely 
hostile to it^^^^ The likely truth lies between these poles. Clodius' 
was certainly no puppet or tool. There is nevertheless good reason to 
suppose him generally inclined to cooperate with Crassus. It is almost 
certain that Clodius had been saved in 61 by Crassus' intervention to 
bribe the jurors in the Bona Pea trial. In early 36 Clodius and his 
gangs were engaged in demonstrations violently hostile to Porapey, and, 
apparently, explicitly favourable to Crassus (Cic.QF.2.3-2). Pompey 
spoke in the senate and privately to Cicero of his belief that Crassus was 
indeed behind Clodius' actions, .and was furnishing him with money 
(Cic.QF.2.3-3-4). After Luca, Clodius left off his attacks on Pompey 
(Cic.Har.Resp.30-2;Dio 39.29.1;Schol.Bob,I70 St;cf.Cic.Mil.21,79), and 
even abated his feud with Cicero. A most revealing incident took place 
in early 35- Cicero visited Pompey to request his help in a matter 
concerning his brother Quintus. Pompey advised him to consult Crassus. 
.Cicero did so and was told that if he refrained from interfering in 
another matter dear to Clodius’ heart, Cicero could have what he wanted 
for Quintus (Cic.QF.2.9.2). That Pompey referred Cicero to Crassus shows
that he Icnew that Crassus wished to make his proposal on behalf of 
Clodius. Pompey did not feel it his place to malce the proposal himself, 
despite his new-found friendship with Clodius. It would seem clear that 
this was left to Crassus because matters that concerned Clodius were 
accepted to be his concern.
The timing of two shifts in policy would seem to reinforce the view 
that Crassus and Clodius were closely associated. The first v;as that
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abrupt announcement in April 39 that Clodius was to stand as Caesar’s
enemy and to rescind his-legislation (Cic.Att.2^12.2). Caesar and Pompey
•were denying that they had, only a few weeks before, effected his adoption
into a plebeian family (Att.2.12.«1-2). As has been seen, this coincided'
precisely with a number of quite separate indications of a growing rift
between Crassus and his colleagues. The second can be seen in Clodius'
abandonment of his hostility towards Pompey. In early 36 he was attacking
Pompey,' but after Luca he stopped. If he had been essentially hostile to
the triumvirate all along, regardless of relationships obtaining among its
(17) 'members, as is maintained, there would seem to be no reason for its 
reaffirmation at Luca to change his policy. If on the other hand he was 
close to one member of that alliance, then the reconciliation of Luca 
could have induced him too to make his peace.
This is not to argue that every action of Clodius must necessarily 
reflect Crassus' policies. On the other hand it does seem reasonable to 
suggest that Crassus did have the power, if he wished, to restrain 
Clodius. Here for once it may be legitimate to infer the power of 
Crassus' money. When Pompey made his outburst against Crassus in 36, he 
made it clear that he saw Crassus as Clodius' paymaster (Cic.QF.2.3-4). 
Clodius will have needed regular access to large sums of money to maintain 
his street bands. His family was far from wealthy (Varro RR.3-l6.1f.).
The fact that someone else had to bribe the Bona Pea jurors in 6l seems 
to confirm this. The possibility of a threat to his money supply may 
have served as an adequate bridle. In general it is unlikely that Crassus 
was able to determine Clodius' movements in a positive way, Clodius' 
value lay, however, in the fact that his hostility was already aimed in 
directions convenient for Crassus. He hated Cicero for his dajnaging 
testimony at the Bona Pea trial, and he nursed a grudge against Pompey for
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his failure to help at that time, _ .
Pompey had been opposed to Clodius' attempted transitio in 60 
(Cic.Har,Resp.43), l?ut in 39 Pompey and Caesar were instrumental in 
effecting his adoption, the one as augur and the other as Pontifex Maximus 
(Cic.Att.2.12.1-2;Suet.Iul.20.4;cf.Dio 38.12.2). Their immediate reason 
for helping him in this is explicitly stated to have been annoyance with 
Cicero for remarks hostile to them, made while defending C.Antonius 
(Cic.Dom.4l;Suet.lul.2 0 . 4 ) This must have taken-place before early 
April (Cic.Att.2.7«2;cf.2.4.2). The political significance of the case 
itself may have been s l i g h t P o m p e y  had been keen to have Antonius 
recalled to stand trial in 6l (Cic.Att.1.12.1). Caesar's attitude may be
reflected in that of Vatinius who was hostile (Cic.Vat.27-8;Schol.Bob.l49 8b.). 
Antonius had been supported by Crassus in his campaign for the consulship 
in 64, but came to an understanding with Cicero, whereby, in return for 
Antonius' complaisance in the matter of Catiline, and perhaps in several 
other, tribunician, affairs, Cicero arranged that he should have the 
potentially lucrative province of Macedonia^^^^ Antonius was in fact the 
conqueror of Catiline, although he managed to avoid having to lead his 
forces against his former associate in the final battle. His treachery 
can hardly have endeared him to Crassus and Caesar, and it would seem 
likely that the triumvirs were united in their wish to see him condemned.
He received little support from any quarter, Cicero defended him, as he 
was honour-bound to do. Antonius had provided a large part of the money 
with which Cicero had bought his new house on the Palatine, but even so 
Cicero was reluctant to honour the bargain (Cic.Att.1.12.1-2;13-6;T4.7; 
Fam.3.3)- It is most probable that part of their agreement required 
Cicero to defend Antonius, when, as was always likely, he should be 
prosecuted. Antonius' cause, however, commended itself neither to the
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boni, nor to their opponents (Cic.Att.1.12.1). The prosecution was 
instituted by M.Caelius Rufus, Q.Fabius Maximus, and one Caninius Gallus 
(Cic.Cael.7^;Va-t.28;Val.Max.4«2.6;Quint.Inst.0r.4.2.123-4;9-3«58;
r 21 )Schol.30b.94,l49 St.), all with possible associations with the triumvirs. 
Although Cicero claimed that Antonius was being attacked for defeating 
Catiline (Flacc.3,95) , it would seem that he was accused' of complicity 
with him (Dio 38-10.3jcf.Cic.Cael.13?7^}78). Antonius seems to have had 
many enemies and few friends. The occasion would seem important only 
because the triumvirs were exerting their,full influence to have him 
condemned, and Cicero therefore chose this moment to make a general 
attack on their activities. Despite his words to Atticus in December 60, 
Cicero does not in fact seem to have been prominent in opposing the first 
land bill in January 59 (Cic.Att.2.3-3-4)» The reaction was swift, and,
perhaps as far as Pompey and Caesar were concerned, hastily conceived.
Crassus may have been urging the move for some time, but .succeeded in gaining 
the assent of his partners only when Cicero spoke out. Their intention 
seems to have been to frighten Cicero, since Clodius' intention to attack 
him if he could was common knowledge. As tribune he would be strongly 
placed to do so. The transitio made his tribunate a legal possibility, 
but was clearly a matter about which there were reservations (Cic.Att.2.7-2). 
Cicero wrote several times in April that he intended to keep well away 
from politics (Cic.Att.2.4.2;2.5-2;2.6.2), and indeed stayed away from 
Rome all that month, and-at least part of May (Att.2.4-2.17)- It would 
seem that he had taken the hint that his opposition would not be tolerated. 
Having effected Clodius' adoption, and perhaps thereby its desired effect, 
it was another matter to prevent Clodius from carrying out his threats.
It is not easy to distinguish cause and effect in the political 
shifts at this time. It may be that Pompey and Caesar were so emboldened
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by the ease with which they had secured .what they wanted, that they felt
confident of their ability to manage without Crassus. Caesar had
contrived to by-pass the senate in which Crçissus' strength had seemed to
promise advantage, ' Pompey will have been willing to cooperate with
Crassus only if this seemed essential, and now it may not have seemed so.
Another, less likely, possibility is that Crassus himself showed at this
time an inclination to withdraw from the alliance to some.extent. The
moves of his partners could then be seen as compensating for this.
Pompey and Caesar would have felt it necessary to reaffirm and strengthen
their own association. Crassus could have been motivated by a desire to
avoid the invidia that had been aroused by the first deeds of the
alliance. That he did apparently attract less hostility than the others
seems likely, but this may have been rather a question of style than of
lack of commitment, Pompey's whole career had been controversial, and
had made him the focus for the hatred of a great many important men. In
59 Caesar was the consul seen to be using unconventional, if not illegal,
means to pass legislation of which much clearly favoured Pompey. Crassus
was a private citizen in 59, simply a princeps civitatis who showed
support for Caesar's early measures. He may have been content to avoid
the limelight, and to let Pompey take the leading role in their public
support of Caesar (Dio 58.4.4-5.6;cf.Plut.Pomp.47,4;Caes.l4.2-5). His
ovm support was given, but probably in a less provocative manner than
Pompey's, Attacks on Crassus were in any case generally considered
ill-advised; Sicinius avoided them in 76, and Tarquinius did not benefit
from his attempt in 65. It is likely too that Crassus took care to
maintain such relations as he could with the boni. Thus he was found
( 2? )cooperating with Bibulus in 56 (Cic.QF.2.3-5îcf«Ps-m.l.1.5)-
That Crassus was keen to avoid unpopularity, and maintained relations
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with opponehts of the triumvirate, need not indicate that it was he who 
initiated the changes that can be detected from April onwards. Caesar's 
abandonment of Arrius, and his .attack, through Vatinius, on Pomptinus, are 
both better seen as the first strokes of a new policy- The hostility of 
Megabocchus, and perhaps that of Clodius, Curio, Memmius, and Nepos, were 
the reaction. It is not clear from Cicero's account whether Clodius 
announced his opposition to Caesar before or after Caesar’ and Pompey had 
tried to deny his adoption (Cic.Att.2.12.2). It is certain, however, 
that they had already shown their reservations about his hopes for the 
tribunate. . Earlier there had been talk of his being sent on an embassy 
to Armenia (Att.2.4.2). This was presumably a device to prevent him from 
standing for the tribunate, and so to protect the now compliant Cicero.
An alternative was for Cicero himself to go off on a libera legatio (ibid.). 
Soon, however, it appeared that Clodius was likely to refuse the embassy 
(Att.2.7.2). His tribunate was therefore to be held back ..«."ad istorum 
tempora reservatur" (2.7.5)» All this of Clodius is tied in with 
Cicero's hopes of dissension among "isti", with Arrius' and Megabocchus' 
anger, and with the outspokenness even among the quinquevirs (2.7.5-4).
It would thus seem clear that it was the growing opposition by Pompey 
and Caesar to the idea of Clodius' tribunate and to that of Arrius* 
consulship that was the immediate occasion of the split in the triumvirate. 
As well as confidence in their ability to manage without Crassus, there 
may have been some apprehension at the prospect of Arrius as consul, with 
Clodius as tribune, while Pomptinus continued to hold Transalpine Gaul. 
Crassus could have been very strongly placed in 58. Caesar and Pompey 
therefore moved to prevent this. Arrius, too close to Crassus, was 
abandoned by Caesar, and presumably also by Porapey. It must be supposed 
that, unaided, Crassus lacked the weight in the comitia to secure the
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consulship for so. relatively undistinguished a candidate. Caesar allied
himself to the noble L.Piso Caesoninus, helped him to the consulship, and
was helped by him to talce over Transalpine Gaul from Pomptinus. Pompey .
too helped in this (Cic.Att.8.5.5;8uet.Iul.22.l).
The sources for the rest of 59 after May are far from clear
chronologically. The elections were put off by Bibulus until l8 October
(Cic.Att.2.20.6). The elections presided over by the consul, however,
concerned only the magistratus populi. The plebeian aediles and tribunes
were created by a tribune. A tribune could obstruct the election of
consuls, as C.Cato did in 5^ (Cic.Att.4.15-4;4.16.5-6;Dio 39-27-31»
cf.Att.4.17-4), but it is not certain whether any agency could delay the
elections of tribunes. On this question hangs the dating of the affair
knom by the name of its principal actor, Vettius. The letter in which
Cicero tells of the affair (Att.2.24) is agreed to have been written
shortly after another, which in its turn is agreed to have been written
before the tribunician elections (Att.2.23.3)- It has been suggested
that since all other dateable tribunician elections were held in July,
and since there is no evidence, other than the published order of seven
of Cicero's letters (Att.2.18-24), to suppose them postponed in 59» the
(2"5)Vettius affair must have been enacted in June or early July. That no
elections are known to have been held except in July has been challenged^^^^
and the suggested reordering of the letters challenged on internal 
(25)grounds. Most decisive however are indications that the tribunician 
elections may indeed have been postponed in 59- Writing to his brother 
at some point between 25 October and 10 December, Cicero told him that 
there was some hope as the consuls would be friendly in 58, as would some 
of the praetors and tribunes (QF.1.2,16). It would seem that he was here 
giving his brother news of the elections of all these office-holders.
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The way in which the praetors and tribunes are joined in this context fits 
•badly with any suggestion that the tribunes had in fact been elected 
several months before.
In the passage cited above as showing that Att.2.23 and 2.-24 precede
the tribunician elections, Cicero first writes of Clodius' threats, and
then demands that Atticus return at once to help him. He continues,.
"Permagni nostra interest te, si comitiis non potueris, at declarato illo
esse Romae" (Att.2.23.3)- That the elections referred to are tribunician
is shown by the context.’ Cicero actually uses the word "comitiis"
inaccurately, as the tribunes were elected by the concilium plebis, but
this usually took place on the same day as, and just after, the election
of the patrician magistrates by the comitia centuriata. This inaccuracy
would seem to strengthen the view that, on this occasion too, both sets of
elections took place on the same day. In this passage Cicero is
concerned that if Atticus cannot reach Rome in time for Clodius' election
as tribune, he must at least do so "declarato illo". This has been
translated "when he is returned", but this makes Cicero's point virtually
meaningless, as the "renuntiatio" by the presiding magistrate, to which
this clearly refers (cf.Cic.Mur.1,2). took place on the same day as the
(27)election, or on the following day. Cicero must mean that Atticus must
return, if not before Clodius is elected, then at least while he is still 
designate, returned but not yet entered into office. That this is the 
sense of the passage is clearly shown by the preceding letter: "Sed totum
est in eo, si ante, quam ille ineat magistratum" (2.22.3). It has been 
argued that in view of Cicero's frenzied exhortations to Atticus to make 
haste (2.23.3524.5), that he should seem to allow Atticus a margin of 
nearly five months, from mid July to early December, is hard to accept.
If the tribunician elections had been put off until October, the
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alternatives suggested to Atticus,.and a gap of less than two months, are
perhaps more c r e d i b l e I t  is perhaps also significant that in neither
of the letters that certainly come after,25 July (2.21 & 22), is there any
reference to the fact that Clodius has been, elected, or indeed to any of
the other tribunes who might counter him. In two letters written almost
exactly at the time when the tribunician elections are claimed to have
talcen place (2.19 & 20) the mentions of Clodius.are still of general
threats, nor are their any urgent pleas to Atticus to return, as there are
in the letters certainly written shortly before the election (2.25.5;
2.24.5), and indeed in the letter written not long before Clodius was due
to talce office (2,25.2). Cicero was anxious to have Atticus with him to
face Clodius when he commenc.ed his tribunate, and, if possible, when he was
elected. He evinced no such anxiety in July. It is almost certain that
Clodius was not elected in July^^^^
The Vettius affair is itself the subject of a considerable controversy.
The most commonly held view is that Cicero was correct, when first
describing the events to Atticus, in seeing in them a plot by Caesar to
incriminate the younger Curio (Att. 2 . 2 4 . 2 ) Others, while agreeing that
Caesar was behind the affair, believe that its object was to ensure that
(51 )Pompey kept his distance from the optimales. It has also been suggested
that Clodius arranged the affair for much the same reason, and specifically
(32)to deter Pompey from protecting Cicero. Pompey himself has been seen
behind Vettius, in an attempt to recoup his own fading popularity, and to
(33)cast mud on his most prominent enemies.
The ancient sources are themselves divided. Suetonius bluntly states 
that Caesar bribed Vettius to incriminate some of his opponents 
(Suet.lul.20.5). Plutarch writes that Pompey was widely believed to have 
arranged the affair himself (Plut.Luc.42.7). Appian does not venture an
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opinion about the instigator of the plot, but observes that Caesar tried 
to capitalise on it (App.BC.2.12). Dio alone suggests that the plot may 
have been a genuine attempt by Ciçero‘and Lucullus to kill Pompey 
(Dio 58.9.2-4).
Cicero's account of the sequence of Vettius' several revelations is 
likely to be accurate. After his arrest, Vettius named the younger Curio, 
L.Aemilius Paullus, Q.. Caepio Brutus, and'L.Lentulus Niger filius as 
active participants in the plot to murder Pompey, with Niger's father and 
Bibulus giving their support and approval (Att.2.24.2). That Vettius*. 
subsequent revelations are likely to have been tampered with by Caesar is 
generally accepted. Vettius added the names of L.Lucullus, C.Fannius, 
L.Domitius, C.Piso, M.Iuventius Laterensis, and, without naming him,seems 
to have indicated Cicero's involvement.
Paullus and Brutus both had cause to hate Pompey. Paullus was the 
son of M.Lepidus, consul in 78, whom Pompey had first supported, and then 
helped to crush. Brutus' father had been Lepidus' legate, and had been 
put to death by Pompey after surrendering on conditions. The elder Niger 
was a consular candidate in 59, clearly opposed to Gabinius and Piso, the 
men supported by Pompey and Caesar (Cic.Vat.25)° The son unsuccessfully 
prosecuted Gabinius in 54 (Cic.Att.4.18.1;QF.5.^.15;3»4.1). Curio 
filius had been an outspoken critic of Caesar and Pompey, certainly since 
April, Cicero reported his hostility to Caesar and the popularity he 
derived from this (Att.2.8.1;2.12.2;2.18.1;2.19.3)° Curio was a close 
friend of Clodius, having stood by him in the Bona Pea affair, as had his 
father (Cic.Att.1.l4.5f;1.l6.11;Schol.Bob.85 St.). He was closely 
associated with Clodius in 56 (Cic.^.2.3.2ff) and indeed married his 
widow, Fulvia, after his murder (Cic.Phil.2.11). Curio's hostility to 
Caesar seems to have been manifested just at the time when Caesar and
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Pompey were alienating Clodius, which in turn seems to be related to the • 
rift appearing within the triumvirate at this time. In 66 the elder 
Curio had supported the. lex Manilia (Cic.Leg.Man.68), and in 63 he had 
protected Caesar (.Plut .Caes.8.2), but in 39 he made several speeches 
fiercely hostile to Caesar (Cic.Brut.2l8f.), and both he and his son'virere 
critical of the marriage in May 39 between Pompey and Julia (Suet.lul.30.1 
It may well be that the friendship between Clodius and the Guriones was 
sufficiently strong to influence the political attitudes of the latter. 
Cicero associates the stance of young Curio with those of Memmius and of 
Nepos (Att.2.12.1). It need not be assumed that any of these were 
necessarily associated with Crassus. They were friends of Clodius, who 
for his own reasons seems to have been in alliance with Crassus, None of
the other names on Vettius' first list shows any detectable ties with
Crassus or Clodius. L.Niger, the father or the son, had indeed been 
subscriptor in Clodius' prosecution in 6l (Schol.Bob.89 St;Val.Max.4,2.3)- 
L.Paullus had indicted Catiline de vi in 63 (Sail.Cat.3I.4;of.Schol.Bob.
149 St ;Cic.Vat.23), and although in 36 he testified against Sestius, he 
threatened at that time to prosecute Vatinius, who was then giving help to 
Clodius (Cic.QF.2.4.1), and indeed Paullus had been unfriendly to Clodius 
in 57 (Cic.Fam.15.13.2). He may have favoured Cicero's recall, and
probably appeared against Sestius out of enmity for Pompey (of.Cic.Vat.25).
During his consulship in 50 he favoured Caesar, though this seems to have 
been a change of stance (Plut.Caes.29.2-3;Pomp.58.1;App.BC.2.26; 
cf.Cic.Att.6.3-4), and helped Curio whose kinsman he appears to have been 
(Dio 40.63.5)-
That Caesar made use of the affair for his ov/n ends is certain. He 
was not obliged to produce Vettius in a contio, but chose to do so. It 
would seem that the first list of names suited him well enough, with the
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exception of Brutus. He was content that the Lentuli, PaulIps, Curio and 
Bibulus should be accused. All, except possibly Paullus, were currently 
opposing him. Paullus may already have begun his feud with Vatinius, 
unless indeed it was Vatinius' part in the affair that occasioned Paul^lus' 
dislike for him. The new names included: C.Fannius, like Niger a
subscriptor of Clodius' prosecution in 6l, and now a hostile tribune 
(MRH2.189); Lucullus, an old opponent of Pompey, who had continued his 
opposition into 59 (Suet.Iul.20); L.Domitius, another man with a kinsman, 
here a brother, killed by Pompey, and currently a candidate for the 
praetorship of 58 in which he was to attack Caesar's acta (Suet.lul.23»
Nero 2.2;cf.Cic.Sest.li3); M.Laterensis, an opponent of the lex Campana, 
and a friend of Cicero (Att.2.18.2); and C.Piso, Cicero's son-in-law.
Some have felt that the whole affair was devised with the intention of 
creating in Pompey such fear and distrust of Cicero that he would no longer
(35)seek to protect him from Clodius, This motive has been variously 
attributed to Caesar and to Clodius. Ceasar seems to have been keen to 
prevent the clash between Cicero and Clodius, but at the same time 
determined to remove Cicçro from the political scene. Once it was clear 
that Clodius would not accept a legation and would stand for the tribunate, 
Caesar urged Cicero to seek protection on his staff, or else to go abroad 
on a libera legatio (Cic.Att.2.18.3)° When the matter came to a head, 
Caesar could not or would not prevent Clodius from acting. That he was 
concerned to win Cicero's support or his silence is shown by the approach 
made through Balbus in December 60, and by Caesar's immediate response to 
Cicero's hostile speech at the trial of Antonius. Cicero would not avail 
himself of Caesar's offer of refuge, nor could his support be bought by a 
place on the agrarian commission (Cic.Att.2.19-4). Caesar had good cause 
to rate Cicero a dangerous enemy after the events of 63 and 62. Cicero's
158
grand plan for an alliance between Pompey and the boni had lost ground in 
59} but was not wholly abandoned. After his recall he had high hopes of 
resurrecting it. Pompey was clearly not happy with the state of affairs 
from about the middle of July onwards (Cic.Att.2.21.5;2.22.6;2.25.2), and 
may have shoim signs of wishing to dissociate himself from Caesar’s acts 
and methods which had won him the increased hatred of the boni, while his 
breach with Crassus exposed him to additional attacks from Clodius, Curio 
and others. "Taedet ipsum Pompeium vehementerque paenitet" (Cic.Att. 
2.22.6). He certainly hinted to Cicero that he would welcome a 
rapprochement with the boni (Att.2.25.2). Cicero thought this impossible, 
but Caesar may have been sufficiently alarmed by the prospect, however 
remote, of Pompey’s defection, to be glad of the chance presented to him of 
ensuring that relations between Pompey, on the one side, and Cicero and the 
boni, on the other, remained strained and suspicious. This could apply 
whether Caesar inspired the original disclosures, or only the second 
instalment. One argument raised against the former possibility is that, 
if Caesar had been involved from the start, Brutus’ name, omitted from the 
second list, would not have been mentioned at all. It is interesting to 
note, however, that Cicero states both that Caesar was behind Vettius from 
the start, and also that Caesar dropped Brutus’ name. He suggests that 
Brutus' mother Servilia, reputedly Caesar's mistress, had intervened.
Cicero himself saw no incompatibility between the two views (Att.2.24.2-5). 
He admits that his suggestion that Caesar had set up the affair is a guess 
...."ut perspicimus." Later he attributed the subsequent revelations to 
Vatinius (Vat.24-6), though it is clear from his earlier account that 
Caesar was prominent at the contio.
Speaicing in 56, Cicero accused Clodius and other enemies of 
deliberately having caused Pompey to believe that Cicero was a physical
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threat to him (Cic.Best.15,41,67,135îd » Pis»76ff). 3ome at least of
these references concern the beginning of the following year, but they do 
indicate that Pompey’s abandonment of Cicero may well have been caused in 
part by the success of such a .campaign. The Vettius affair may have been 
one element in this. Cicero's accusation, taken together with Pompey's 
quite genuine fear of assassination, makes it less than likely that Pompey 
himself instigated the affair. In 58 the discovery of a would-be 
assassin led Pompey to stay within his own house for four months (Cic.Pis. 
28;As c . 3 7 } 4 6 - 7 C ) Pompey's decision not to protect Cicero from 
Clodius seems to have been an abrupt reversal of his previous attitude. 
Something caused the "subita defectio Pompei" . (Cic.QF.1.4.4)
It may be therefore that Caesar was prepared at this stage to give a 
helping hand, perhaps unsolicited, to any. circumstances that may have 
seemed likely to alienate Pompey from Cicero. Both Clodius and Crassus 
had reasons for desiring this end, and could have suggested to Caesar that 
they would be in a position to damage his interests when he was in Gaul. 
Caesar, fearing this, and not wholly trusting Porapey, may have been willing 
to go along with the scheme.
On the other hand, it is possible that there may have been some truth 
in Vettius' allegations, an idea that has found .little favour with modern 
scholars. It is, however, far from unlikely that the hostility and 
resentment towards Pompey felt by his opponents should have found 
expression in at least talk of tyrannicide (cf.Cic.Att.2.8.1). He held 
no office, and yet seemed a king. Cicero uses such words as "rex"
(Att.2.8,1), "dynastes" (2.9.1), "regnum" (2.15.2), "oppressio" (2.18.2), 
sy-r'vpcx.VV&Lcr9ctk (2.14.1), all in private letters rather than
conventionally hyperbolic public speeches. He may indeed, as Vettius
claimed have spoken of L.Brutus and Ahala. Despite himself, Cicero did
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care for Pompey (Att.2.21,J>), and h^d sunk a considerable portion of hisi -
political capital into his connection with him (2.21.4). If Cicero then 
used such words, such men as Paullus and Brutus, one of them at least 
certainly capable of tyrannicide, may have considered whether the current 
situation may not have merited such action. At some date cloSe to this, 
Brutus issued coins with the inscription "libertas", commemorating 
L.Brutus and Servilius Ahala (MRR2.442). The circumstances of 59 would
seem very apt for this, It would be a remarkable' coincidence if Cicero's 
reputed invocation of their names and Brutus' apparent involvement in the 
conspiracy were entirely unconnected with the coin issue. Bibulus' 
hatred of Caesar led him to attack Pompey in scathing edicts (Cic.Att.
2.19.5), and the fact that he had earlier warned Pompey to be on his 
guard (Att.2.24.2) need.not show'that he would not have encouraged such a 
plot. Such warnings are sometimes not far removed from threats. C.Piso, 
consul 67, had not been friendly to Pompey when he warned him that he 
might meet with the fate of Romulus (Plut.Pomp.25).
The younger Curio was notoriously intemperate in his outspoken 
enmity for Pompey, and could have seemed eminently suited to an invitation 
to join a plot to murder the "tyrant". He may however have recoiled from 
the prospect of realising his own threats, and have therefore consulted 
his father, who in turn disclosed the matter to Pompey and the senate.
There may have been no more than wild talk, but there may have been a 
genuine plot. Vettius' apparent muddle over Paullus' movements may 
reveal a badly devised conspiracy to incriminate the "manus iuventutis", 
but it could show that Vettius had picked up scraps of intelligence 
concerning a real plot, but have muddled them in his account either through 
fear or ignorance. He could have known that Paullus v/as involved in the 
plot, and also that at one time it had been planned to strike during
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Gabinius' games, Vettius mistakenly put the two together. Paullus 
could have been in touch with the others by letter, or else might in fact 
have been recruited only on his return. Cicero seems a little too keen 
to apply the principle, "falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus." .«He was
himself included in Vettius' second list, and therefore had a strong 
motive for denying all truth to the allegations. Caesar certainly 
exercised editorial discretion over Vettius' disclosures before the people, 
but that does not prove that those disclosures were entirely of Caesar's 
composition. If there had in fact been a plot, some at least of those 
named could well have been in it.
Certainty is impossible. There may have been no plot. Caesar may 
have devised the whole thing. If so, he did it very badly. Pompey seems 
an unlikely candidate. If Crassus or Clodius, or indeed both, had 
planned it, it would have to be assumed that they did so with the 
connivance of Curio, a close friend then and susequently of Clodius.
Vettius would then have to be seen to have acted in ignorance of his own 
true role in the affair. He was indicted de vi, and then, shortly 
afterwards, murdered (Cic.Vat.26;Suet.Iul.20.5). It is unlikely that
either prospect was part of his original expectations. Between the 
indictment and the murder, however, Cicero wrote that prosecutions of those 
denounced by Vettius were expected, Clodius is unlikely to have wished 
to expose Curio to such a danger. The only reconstruction of events 
that might permit the conclusion that Clodius was behind the affair is that 
Vettius acted on his own initiative in trying to bring Curio into a plot 
in which he himself was a very minor and ill-informed conspirator.
Caesar then used the circumstances for his own ends. It may well be that 
something violent was planned, but that, after Vettius' death, there was a 
general willingness to ignore it. There could have been uncomfortable
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memories and doubts about what had or had not happened in 63-
If the identity and motives of those responsible for the Vettius 
affair must remain mysterious, the sequence of events that followed seems 
rather clearer. The most striking change would seem to be in Pompey’s 
attitude towards Cicero. Before the affair he had been assuring Cicero 
that he would restrain Clodius (Cic.Att.2.19.4;2.20.2;2.21.6;2.22.2;2.24.5). 
Although the latest assurance is reported in the letter that describes 
the Vettius affair it may well have preceded it. The letter v;as clearly 
written almost immediately after the contio, as no mention is made of 
Vettius’ murder in prison very soon after, perhaps the same night 
(App.BC.2.12;Suet■Iul.20.5;Dio 38.9»4;cf.Cic.Att,2.24.4;Vat.26). Pompey’s 
assurances may then have come some time before both the affair and the 
writing of the letter, and Cicero might not have realised that Pompey’s 
attitude had been influenced by the affair.
At the elections L.Niger was unsuccessful, while L.Piso and Gabinius 
secured the consulship. It is not certain whether or hot Arrius did in 
the event stand, nor is there any evidence to suggest that Piso and 
Gabinius had at any time looked like l o s i n g C i c e r o ,  earlier in the 
year, seems to imply that whoever the triumvirs choose will win 
...."Proinde isti licet faciant, quos volent, consules...."
(Att.2.9«2;cf.2.3.2;2.7>3)-■- After the elections, an attempt was made to 
prosecute Gabinius de ambitu. The would-be prosecutor was C.Porcius Cato. 
The praetor in charge of the court managed to avoid Cato, with the result 
that he was unable formally to initiate the actioA^^^^At a later contio 
Cato denounced Pompey, calling him a dictator, but was driven from' the 
rostra (Cic.QF.I.2.15). During his tribunate in 56, Cato allied himself 
with Clodius, helping his election as aedile (Cic.Fam.1.4.1;cf.QF.2.1.2), 
and working to ensure Milo's trial (QF.2.3.4). He opposed the Egyptian
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pretensions of Porapey, and also proposed to abrogate Spinther's command 
(Dio 39"15;Cic.QFy2.3.l). After Luca he helped to delay the elections in 
the interests of Porapey and Crassus (Dio 39-27-3;Att.4.13»4;4.l6.3-6;
Livy Per.103). His position would thus seem inconsistent with that of a 
Pompeian or an optimale, but seems to coincide very neatly with that of a 
friend of Clodius or supporter of Crassus, very likely both, Pompey 
clearly thought so (Cic.QF.2.3«1-4).
The Vettius affair shortly before the elections, and Cato's attempt 
to prosecute Gabinius after them, together with Clodius' success in 
securing the tribunate, may have led to a reconciliation between Crassus 
and. his tv/o somewhat errant partners. It has already been suggested that 
Caesar may have been less than confident of Pompey's reliability, and also 
apprehensive of what Clodius might do with regard to his command and his 
legislation. Caesar may therefore have been more easily convinced than 
Pompey that good relations with Crassus and Clodius were desirable.
Vettius and C.Cato may have helped to bring Pompey round to this view.
At the end of the year, Clodius acted towards Bibulus as Nepos had towards 
Cicero in 63, forbidding him to malce the usual speech on laying down 
office (Dio 38-12.3). He also helped Vatinius to escape prosecution 
(Cic.Vat.33). When he moved against Cicero, he encountered no opposition
from Pompey or Caesar, or from either of the consuls. Cicero certainly 
claimed that the consuls' attitudes were the result of outright bribery 
by Clodius, in the shape of his legislation giving them desirable 
provinces, but it is more likely that they would not in any case have 
opposed Clodius on their own accounts. Soon after their election, Cicero 
had been confident of their friendliness (QF.1.2.16), but, as has been 
seen, at some point between the elections and the end of the year, 
attitudes changed considerably. Gabinius consistently mirrored Pompey's
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policy. When Clodius broke with Pompey, the latter began to work for 
Cicero's return, as did Gabinius who thereafter opposed Clodius (Cic.Domj60). 
Piso, who seems to have had little love for Pompey in any case^^^^ 
encouraged Clodius (Cic.Dom.60,66-7), as later did Caesar's man, Vatinius 
(Cic.Sest.155;Vat.40).
It would thus seem that the consuls of $8 to some extent represented 
the views of Pompey and Caesar respectively. Despite prevarication, 
both dynasts clearly assented to Cicero's exile, Cicero himself 
analysed the reasons for his dovmfall thus: "subita defectio Pompei,
alienatio consulum, etiam praetorum, timor publicanorum, arma" (QF.1.4.4). 
He gave first place to Pompey's defection. That Porapey and Gabinius 
changed their attitude later shows that they had earlier acquiesced in the 
exile (Cic.Att.5.8.5;Sest.67;Pis.27-8;Dio 58.50.2-5;cf.App.BC.2.l6).
Caesar too would do nothing to help (Cic.Red.in.Sen.52)« Later sources
confirm the attitudes of Pompey and Caesar. Pompey deliberately avoided 
meeting Cicero, while Caesar prevaricated and did nothing (Dio 58.17.1-3; 
Plut.Cic.30-1;cf.Dio 38.13)- The consuls'attitudes too are shown 
(Dio 38.l6.3-6;Plut.Cic.31;Pomp.49.2). That when Pompey changed his mind, 
and was keen that Cicero should be recalled, he felt it necessary to 
obtain Caesar's consent, shows that the exile had, in the first place, been 
a policy agreed upon by both men- (Cic.Att«3-18.1).
It has been argued above that .Crassus is. likely to have been, from 
the start, eager that Cicero should be dealt with. Attempts have been
(4o)made to deny this. The later sources have no doubts about the matter.
Dio and Plutarch both state that Crassus favoured Cicero's exile, although 
both are well aware that P.Crassus, his elder son, was friendly to Cicero 
(Dio 38,17-5;Plut.Cin.30.1;33-5;cf-Cr,13,5). Cicero himself was aware 
of Crassus* importance in the matter. Discussing the possibility of his
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recall, he wrote to his wife in October ^8, "Id erit firmum, si Pompei 
voluntas erit; sed tamen Crassum metuo" (Fam.14.2.2). He later denied 
that Clodius had been truthful in claiming Crassus' support for his exile 
(Sest.39-41), but, since in the same passage he is concerned to claim 
that Pompey had spoken out in his defence, this denial does not carry any
great weight. As has been seen, Pompey, despite his soft words, was
clearly willing that Clodius should have his way.
A crucial passage comes in a letter to Atticus: "Puto Pompeium Crasso
urgente, si tu aderis, qui per jSowfrLV ex ipso intellegere possis, qua
fide ab illis agatur, nos aut sine molestia aut certe sine errore futuros" 
(Att.2.22.3)« It is clear that all is not well with the text at 
"Pompeium Crasso urgente". Two possible restorations have been put 
forward. One suggests that some words such as "vacillare, sed" may have 
dropped out after "urgente". The other would emend the text to read, 
"Pompeio eum et C r a s s o " The first would make the passage mean, "1 
thinlc that, at Crassus* instance, Pompey is wavering, but if you were here 
and could learn from Clodius, through his sister, how far those men are to 
be trusted, then 1 should either escape harm, or else at least know where 
1 stand." in the previous letter Cicero had expressed doubts about 
trusting Pompey's professions (2.21.6), Earlier in the letter presently 
considered he qualifies an account of an interview between Pompey and 
Clodius with the consideration that he only has Pompey*s word for what was 
said. He is clearly not prepared to place complete faith in the account 
(2.22.2). He is keen for Atticus to come home, as Atticus can check 
Pompey‘s account from the other side, through his friendship with 
Clodius* sister- The men whose good faith he misdoubts may be Pompey and 
his friend Varro. The latter is mentioned a few lines earlier as a 
•possible but uncertain helper (2422.4), and had been coupled with Pompey in
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this same context in the previous letter (2.21,6;cf.2.25-1)•
The second emendation would require a further change, in that "urgente" 
would have to become "urgentibus". The passage might then be rendered,
"I think that, with Pompey and Crassus working on Clodius, if you came and 
found out from Clodia how far we can trust them, I should,.,." Such a 
reading seems to ignore the central point of the passage, which is Cicero's 
need to Icnow whether he can trust Pompey. If he had knovm that both 
Pompey and Crassus were indeed working to restrain Clodius, Cicero would 
not have written so uncertainly of the future. He wants to know how far 
he can trust "them", who in this reading must be Pompey and Crassus, and 
yet he states that they are working for him, not that they say they are, 
nor that he thinks they are. They are restraining Clodius, and therefore 
he thinlcs what he thinks. Such a reading may be thought "palaeographically 
more reasonable", but it does not make sense, irrespective of any 
preconceived ideas concerning Crassus' likely stance.
One other passage might seem to suggest friendly relations between 
Crassus and Cicero, In June 58 Cicero wrote from exile to his brother, 
advising him, if in trouble, to seek help from Crassus and M.Calidius 
(^F.1.5.7). Various suggestions have been made as to the identity of the 
Crassus meant. M.Crassus' son Publius, P.Crassus Dives, an unknown 
Crassus, or else M.Crassus himself have all been considered^^^^
P.Crassus M.f. was away from Rome at the time, serving with Caesar in Gaul 
(Caes.BG.1.52.7)- An unknown is highly unlikely to have been mentioned 
with no other identification, P.Dives, however, seems highly probable,, 
since he was associated with M.Calidius the following year, when they were 
colleagues in the praetorship, both working for Cicero's restoration 
(Cic.Red.in.Sen.25). In June 58 they were presumably candidates for the 
praetorship, their friendliness towards Cicero known to his brother.
" 167 ~
Cicero did distinguish Dives from M,Crassus when necessary 
(cf.Att.2.24.4)f^^^but here it may not have been necessary, the context 
and the association with Calidius being sufficient. It is noteworthy that 
in the same letter Cicero accuses Q.Arrius, Crassus’ friend, of treachery 
(gF.1.5.8).
It therefore seems that all the evidence points to Crassus’ hostility 
towards Cicero, nor in the light of their earlier differences and rivalry 
does such a conclusion seem in any way surprising.
It has been argued in this chapter that relations between Crassus and 
his two associates deteriorated sharply in April 59» after their early 
cooperation and success in passing the bulk of Caesar's controversial 
legislation. Pompey and Caesar grew closer from April onwards to the 
exclusion of Crassus and his friends. Crassus counterattacked, largely 
through Clodius and his friends, until by the end of the year, perhaps 
partly as a result of the Vettius affair, some improvement in their 
relations is apparent. This improvement was not to last, but when the 
next strain was placed" on the alliance, it may well have been Pompey who 
found himself one against two. The events of 59 seem to have caused 
Caesar to revise his estimation of Crassus' power, and to resolve to keep 
on good terms with him.
- 168 -
Chapter IX To Luca
Having weathered a stormy patch in his relations with his associates 
during much of 59, Crassus began 58 with bright prospects. Clodius was 
in office as tribune, Pompey and Caesar had agreed to the exile of Cicero, 
a man potentially helpful to Pompey and dangerous to Crassus, and, perhaps 
most important of all, Caesar seems to have been persuaded that Crassus’ 
power was far from negligible. When, after Cicero had fled, Caesar left 
for his province, he was accompanied by Crassus’ son, Publius, Whatever 
the latter's official position (MRP2.199,204;cf.Appendix A), Caesar gave 
him considerable responsibility, including a virtually separate command 
with large forces (Caes.BG.1,52,7;2.34;3»7-9;cf.Dio 39-31«2). Caesar’s 
father-in-law, L.Piso, continued to cooperate with Clodius even after 
Clodius and Pompey quarrelled (Cic.Dom.66-7)- Vatinius too, when he 
returned.from Gaul, repaid Clodius for his help in protecting him in 58 
(Cic.Vat.33), by witnessing against Milo and Sestius (Cic.Vat.1,40-1;
Sest.135;Schol.Bob.125,139,151-2 One of Clodius’ brothers, probably 
Caius, served on Caesar's staff in 58 (Cic.Sest.4l).
As well as his action against Cicero, Clodius secured the removal too 
of M.Cato. Too influential to be attacked, Cato was honoured with a 
commission to annexe Cyprus and restore exiles in Byzantium (MRR2,198).
He was absent for some two years, and therefore unable to offer his 
familiar brand of obstruction to Clodius' subsequent legislation.
Clodius' move was a clever one, Cato was no friend of his, as he had 
shown in 73»,when he threatened Clodius with a counter-prosecution for his 
attack on Catiline, arid in 61, when he was resolute in demanding Clodius' 
prosecution over the Bona Dea affair. By his authorship*of the law 
conferring Cato's command, Clodius ensured that Cato was bound to uphold 
the validity of Clodius' own tribunate (MRR2.211), In the same way, by
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his laws concerning the provinces for the consuls of 58, he made himself
safe from any attack from them on the legality of his actions. Gabinius
opposed him but does not seem to have dared to question the validity of
his office (Dio 38.30.2-3;Cic.Pis.27-8).
These dispositions effected, Clodius seems to have engineered a clash
with Pompey. The ground he chose was Pompey's dominance in Eastern
affairs. In 39 Caesar had carried a law ratifying Pompey's Eastern acta
en bloc. Clodius interfered with his arrangements by bringing in a law
to give Brogitarus of Galatia the title of King and control of Pessinus
(MRR2.I96), at the expense of DeÜotarus whom Pompey had recognised,
Cato's despatch to Cyprus may also have been designed to upset Pompey's
influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, The immediate occasion for their
breach, however, was Clodius' action in engineering the escape from Pompey's
custody of the son of Tigranes of Armenia. Pompey had been holding the
son as a hostage for the father's continued loyalty to him (Dio 38.30.1-2;
As c.37,47C)o That Clodius had his own family traditions and ambitions
(1)with regard to the East seems clear, but that does not mean that such 
interests alone dictated his hostility towards Pompey. The readiness with 
which he turned on Pompey and Gabinius, when they complained about the 
release of Tigranes, would seem to indicate that he was more than willing
(2)for a confrontation. , -
Pompey's immediate response was to start working for Cicero's recall 
(Cic.Att.3.8.3;Sest,67-8;Dio 58.30.2-3)- It has been suggested that
(3)Clodius in retaliation began threatening Caesar's legislation, but this
seems unlikely. Examination of the evidence (Cic.Dorn.40;Har.Pesp.48-9) 
shows that what Clodius was probably doing was insisting that objections 
to the legality of his adoption applied in equal measure to all the 
leges luliae, ' His enemies argued that Bibulus had been watching the
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heavens when the relevant curiate law was passed. Clodius therefore drev/ 
from Bibulus a statement to the effect that he had indeed been doing so 
constantly throughout the year. Cicero, in the later passage, describes 
the matter simply as an attack on the Julian laws, and suggests that 
Clodius had actually failed to notice that he was undermining his own 
tribunate by his arguments (Har.Resp.48). It is clear from Cicero's 
earlier account, however, that Clodius was more than aware of the 
implications of Bibulus' statement. Indeed his brother Appius 
deliberately elicited from Bibulus a subsequent opinion that Clodius' 
tribunate was invalid, as he had been adopted contra auspicia (Pom.40). 
Clodius had earlier passed a law modifying the leges Aelia et Fufia, which 
governed the uses of obnuntiatio and of the collegial veto (MRR2.196). 
Clodius was by no means as wild and inconsistent as is sometimes asserted. 
He was generally opposed to the abuse of obnuntiatio, and was here simply 
concerned to point out that to attack him on these grounds was to attack 
Caesar too. Cicero blusteringly tried to deny the connection, and indeed 
later to obscure the issue, but the move to invalidate Clodius' tribunate 
failed. Those laws of his that were subsequently reversed were 
rescinded individually (Dio 38,13-2;4o.37-1-3!Asc.8C;Bchol.Bob.132 St.)l^^ 
There would therefore seem to be little reason to credit Cicero's claim
(3)that Clodius in 38 had attacked Caesar's legislation.
From his breach with Pompey over the. Tigranes affair until they were 
reconciled after Luca, Clodius showed himself unremittingly hostile to 
Pompey and to Pompey's friends. At no time, with the possible exceptions 
of the trials of Sestius .and of Caelius, which will be discussed below, 
does he seem to have acted against the interests of Crassus, or indeed of 
Caesar. He was helped by L.Piso and Vatinius, and invoked Crassus' name 
against Pompey. It must be considered how far his actions will have
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suited Crassus' own. policy. It has been argued above that, when it 
suited him, Crassus was able to induce Clodius to make his peace with 
Pompey, It would seem reasonable to assume, therefore, that Crassus did
not try to restrain him earlier. It is indeed possible that he may have
encouraged Clodius, in an attempt to achieve Pompey's total ruin. It 
could be argued that the events of 59 had in fact left Pompey weaker than
before. That he had been unable earlier to provide land for his veterans
had been damaging to his prestige, but the hostility aroused by the manner 
of that eventual provision may, in the long run, have been more serious.
His Eastern acta had been ratified, but were now being questioned and his 
authority assailed. Caesar, the agent he had used to achieve these ends, 
seemed perhaps rather less subservient than Pompey was accustomed to 
expect, Afranius, and even M.Piso, despite a possible brief 
embarrassment over the Bona Pea affair, had been firmly his men. After an 
attempt to break with Crassus, Pompey had been persuaded, perhaps partly 
by Caesar, that such a move was dangerous, and that Clodius must be 
allowed to have his way with Cicero. More unpopular than ever with the 
boni, who blamed him for all of Caesar's acts, Pompey was now attacked by 
Clodius, and reduced to total impotence for the rest of the year. He
became eager to secure Cicero's recall, both for the symbolic value of such 
a move as a blow to Clodius, and also perhaps because Cicero may have 
represented what he felt to be his only hope at this point, some kind of 
reconciliation with the boni.
This latter consideration is likely to have been a strong inducement 
for crassus to try to keep Cicero away. Whether he ever.expected to'be 
able indefinitely to prevent Cicero's return must be uncertain. ' Cicero's 
absence.and Clodius' ascendency must together have promised as good a 
chance to crush Pompey completely as he was likely to find. With Pompey
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eclipsed, Cato out of the way, and Caesar friendly but occupied in Gaul, 
Crassus alone would remain, unquestionably the strongest political figure 
in Rome.
The bulk of Clodius' legislation seems aimed at securing his own 
power base. He sought popular support by distributing free grain, and 
organised it by restoring the collegia. He provided against obstruction 
by his modification of the leges Aelia et Fufia. His limitation of a 
censor's powers to distribute notae may have had the same motive. He 
disarmed, at least for a while, any possible opposition from the consuls, 
Piso and Gabinius, by laws giving them provinces. He got rid of both 
Cato and Cicero (MRR2.196). Nothing in this programme is likely to have 
been displeasing to Crassus, nor as has been shown, does he seem to have 
needed to worry that Clodius, having achieved power, might turn on him.
Clodius and Crassus miscalculated if they did hope to crush Pompey.
He seems to have been caught unprepared by Clodius* volte face, unable to 
meet the challenge, and driven to seek ignominious'refuge in his own 
house (Cic.Pis.28;Asc.46-7G)- The optimates were delighted by Clodius' 
assault on Pompey (Cic.Har.Resp.50), and seem to have cooperated with 
Clodius (Cic.QF.2.2.2-3;cf-Faim.1.9»10). It may be at this time that 
approaches were made to Caesar by the optimates, offering to have all the 
legislation of 59 resubmitted to the comitia, this time with due 
observance of the niceties of the laws (Cic.Prov.Cons.46). This could 
seem to constitute an invitation formally to abandon his alliance with 
Pompey,.and. to be received into the optimate fold. It was not accepted. 
Caesar was careful not to make any move himself that could be ' construed as 
"hostile to Pompey. L.Piso and Vatinius may have sided with Clodius 
.against Pompey at various times, but Caesar maintained correct relations 
with his son-in-law. Thus Pompey continued to honour the alliance by
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consulting Caesar on the subject of Cicero's recall (Cic.Att.5.l8.1).
It would be interesting to know whether Crassus was also consulted. It 
is possible, Cicero was particularly concerned to know what was Pompey's 
attitude in the matter. In September 58 Cicero was delighted with the 
news that, if Caesar agreed, Pompey would take up the case (Att.5-18.1).
Some two months later, Atticus had written to him analysing the various 
political factors involved, "de Crasso, de Pompeio, de ceteris" (Att.5-25-5)- 
Crassus may have tried to delay matters, but nevertheless have accepted 
that Cicero's return was inevitable. He greeted Cicero when he reached 
Rome (Plut.Cic.55-5), and indeed later agreed to defend Sestius, who had 
been prominent in procuring the recall (Schol.Bob.125 St.). He had no 
wish for an open breach with Pompey, but was scrupulous in fulfilling his 
duties as an ally. Even Metellus Nepos, Clodius' kinsman and at this time 
regular supporter in other matters (Cic.Att.4.5-5;Dio 49-7-4-8.1), 
eventually cooperated in promoting Cicero's return (Cic.Att.5-22.2;5-25-1; 
5.24.2;Red.in Sen.25;cf-Att.5-12.1).
Pompey engaged force to counter that of Clodius. T.Annius Milo and 
P.Sestius, tribunes in 57, gathered their own street gangs, but, despite 
the support of six other tribunes, were prevented for some time from 
securing Cicero's recall by Clodius, who, although no longer tribune, still 
had his own popular following and the aid of the remaining two tribunes 
(MRR2.201-2). Eventually, however, on 4 August 57, tbe bill recalling 
Cicero was passed, and he returned to Rome a month later (Cic.Dorn.90;
Att.4.1.4-5)- This, and the fact that Cicero at once successfully 
proposed in the senate that Pompey should be invested with special imperium 
to supervise the city's grain supply (Cic.Att.4.1.6), have been taken to 
show that Pompey had at last succeeded in overcoming optimate suspicions. 
.This may not be thè case, A bill to put into effect Cicero'.s proposal '
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was presented the next day by the consuls, P.Lentulus Spinther and 
Metellus Nepos (Att.4.1.7). At the same time, a tribune, C.Messius,
proposed a measure, similar in application, but vastly greater in the 
power to be conferred, Messius' bill included control over all the state's 
finances, an army, a fleet, and maius imperium throughout the empire (ibid.). 
It could be that Messius was deliberately making his proposals unreasonable, 
with the intention that the more modest consular proposal would be 
gratefully accepted as the lesser evil. On the other hand, it is not 
impossible that Pompey did hope that, in his rediscovered auctoritas, he 
might indeed secure the vast power offered by Messius. Cicero clearly 
suspected Pompey's true wishes, but he did not wish to compromise himself 
too far with the optimates by supporting Messius, since he was still 
awaiting the judgement of the pontifices about his house, of which the site 
had been consecrated as a temple, in his absence, by Clodius (ibid.).
Cicero had felt free to make his original proposal, and indeed claimed that 
all the consulars were willing to grant Pompey anything at all (ibid.).
In the same passage, however, he records the fury of the consulars at 
Messius' proposals. Clearly their willingness was not infinite.
In view of the hostility shown towards Pompey by the boni, earlier in 
58, and later in 56, when, for example, Sex.Cloelius is said to have been 
acquitted by the senatorial votes out of enmity for Pompey (Cic.QF.2.4.6), 
their apparent .friendliness in this matter of the corn command might seem 
surprising. It could be that Clodius^ had gone too far in the violence of 
his opposition to Pompey and to Cicero's recall, and that the boni were 
prepared to recall Cicero, and to honour Pompey, in order to impose a 
curb on Clodius. Another factor may have been the matter of 
Ptolemy Auletes, who arrived in Rome in the summer of 57, having been 
driven from Egypt by his subjects. There-ensued a lengthy debate whether
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he should be restored, and, if so, how and by whom. At first it was 
agreed that he should be restored by the governor of Cilicia, the province 
assigned to Spinther for 56 (Dio 59.12.1-5;Cic.Fam.1.1.5). Auletes had 
been recognised as King in 59, in return for a considerable sum of money 
promised to Caesar and Pompey (Dio 39-12.'1;Suet.Iul.54.2), which had not 
been paid in full by 57-^^ Besides this financial motive, Pompey was 
unwilling that anyone else should have the opportunity to gain influence 
in the East. Since Spinther was a friend and adherent of his 
(Cic.Att.2.22.2), Pompey did not canvass openly for the post, but arranged 
for others to maice proposals on his behalf. Three tribunes worked to 
that end in 58, L.Caninius Callus, A.Plautius, and P.Rutilius Lupus 
(MRR.2.209). It is specifically stated in one source that Spinther 
cooperated in proposing Pompey's grain commission, in order to remove 
Pompey from the running for Auletes' restoration (Plut.Pomp.4-9-5)«
Messius' proposal could then be seen as an attempt to win back the
(7)initiative over Egypt for Pompey, Egypt was a vital supplier of grain 
to the Roman market, and, with an army and maius imperium, Pompey could 
have had the physical capability and the legal right to supplant Spinther, 
without the need for any further legislation. By ensuring that his corn 
commission was essentially unmilitary, Pompey's opponents made such a 
step much more difficult. By giving him the commission at all, they were 
able to argue that Pompey was occupied, and surely too busy to be 
burdened with any further responsibility. From his arrival, Ptolemy, who 
stayed in Pompey's house, had made plain his preference for Pompey as the 
.man to restore him (Dio 59*14.3;16.2;cf^QF.2.2.5)« Pompey's aspirations
being thus plain, the corn commission may have been a deliberate 
concession of the lesser evil, to prevent.the greater.
The struggle for the Egyptian mission continued'into 56,.as did the
1?6 -
contention between Clodius and Pompey. In 57, no longer immune from
prosecution, Clodius was twice indicted by Milo, In the first instance
he was protected by the consul Nepos, his cousin, by his brother Appius,
then praetor, and by one of the two tribunes who supported him in that
year (Cic,Sest.89). It was Milo's failure in this that led him to
resort to the use of armed bands (Cic.Red.in Sen.19), which helped to
effect Cicero's recall. He then renewed the prosecution, Clodius was
seeking the aedileship for 56, which would confer fresh immunity. Milo
blocked the elections with the backing of the consul designate,
Cn.Lentulus Marcellinus. Nepos, Appius Claudius, and Hortensius all in
various ways helped Clodius to secure election unprosecuted (Cic.Att.
4.3-3-5), which he did early in 58 (Dio 39-18.1).
Crassus may have been disappointed by Clodius* relative failure in 57
to subdue Pompey. By the end of that year, however, Pompey had been, to
some extent, contained. Cicero had returned, and Pompey had gained a
prestigious command. .The command could, however, have been more
dangerous, and Cicero was behaving cautiously as he awaited the various
verdicts concerning his house. This could be the reason that Cicero
proposed a supplicatio of unprecedented length for Caesar's successes in
Gaul (Cic.Prov.Cons.26;cf.Caes.BG.2.35-4;Dio 39-9-1;Plut.Caes.21.1).
Caesar as Pontifex Maximus, though absent, may have been able to retain
considerable influence in the deliberations of the pontifices. It is
(8)perhaps also significant that Crassus was almost certainly a pontiff. ^ 
It is possible however that Caesar's supplicatio was intended as a- 
subtle first move.in Pompey's assault on Caesar's position- A supplicatio
* /Q \could be seen as implying the successful conclusion of a campaign.
Caesar's command in Transalpine Gaul had been conferred by the senate, and 
had no fixed term, unlike his five year tenure of the Cisalpina under the
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lex Vatinia. What the senate had given, it could also take away
(cf.Cic.Fam.1. 7 » L.Domitius Ahenobarbus was to stand for the
consulship in 58, with the express intention of succeeding Caesar in
Gallia Comata (Suet.lul.24.1 ;cf.Nero 2). Cicero could have been preparing'
the way for such a step. In December 97 two new tribunes attacked Caesar.
P.Rutilius Lupus suggested that the lex Campana be reconsidered
(Cic.QF.2.1.1), and L.Antistius tried to have Caesar recalled to stand
trial for the irregularities of his consulship (Suet.Iul.23). This latter
move is usually attributed to an otherwise unknovm tribune of 38. A
convincing case has been put forward for identifying Suetonius* man with
a known tribune of 38, Antistius Vetus; who supported the movement to have
f 11 )Clodius* trial held before he could secure the aedileship (Cic.QF.2.1.3). 
Lupus subsequently supported Pompey*s Egyptian pretensions (Cic.Fam.1.1.3;
(12)1.2.2).. Antistius* allegiance is less certain, but it is possible that 
he was connected with Pompey through the letter's first wife, Antistia 
(Plut.Pomp.4.1-3-1)- Neither attempt proved fruitful at the time.
Lupus' motion was received with suspicion by the senate, who wished to know 
where Pompey stood in the matter (Cic.QF.2.1.1). An attack on Caesar 
could only succeed if Pompey helped. Antistius too failed, since the 
other tribunes confirmed Caesar's immunity while "rei publicae causa 
absens". In both cases Pompey may have been gauging the likely reception 
such proposals would meet if firmly advanced. That Pompey was indeed 
behind the assault on Caesar can be seen from his attitude towards Cicero 
after the latter had raised the issue of the Campanian Land on 3 April 38.
At the time Cicero expected Pompey to approve (Farn.1.9-9), and two days 
later Pompey behaved towards Cicero with great friendlinèss (QF.2.3-3-4).'
.Only after the meeting at Luca was Cicero compelled by Pompey to desist.
Earlier in the year, during the trial of P.Sestius, Cicero delivered
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a ringing denunciation of Caesar's man P.Vatinius, who had acted with 
Clodius at the trial of Milo, and was nov/ again testifying against Sestius. 
Despite Cicero's unconvincing protestations, it is clear that his attack 
on Vatinius reflected, and was intended to reflect, on Caesar's 
consulship. Cicero himself malces this clear (Fam.1.9-7)■ The published 
version of the speech may have softened the direct references to Caesar, 
but, even as it stands, the implied criticism must have been obvious
(cf.Cic.Vat.3,13-18,22,24)(13)
There are, therefore, strong indications that Pompey was at least 
willing to see Caesar attacked, and indeed that he encouraged some of the 
attackers. Dio asserts that Pompey was encouraging the movement to 
recall Caesar (39-25-2-3)- Dio's usually reliable account of events is 
here regarded with suspicion, as he seems ignorant of a number of vital 
events at this time. He asserts that Pompey and Crassus were in collusion 
against Caesar, and that they sought the consulship in 38 in order to 
subdue him (Dio 39-23-7)- It would seem that Dio was aware of one half 
of the situation. He knew that Pompey was attacking Caesar's position.
He loiew that Pompey and Crassus did stand together for the consulship.
He seems ignorant, however, of the outspoken hostility between Pompey and 
Crassus that emerged in February 38, and of the conference of Luca.
Because of this, he overlooks the significance of the fact, known to him, 
that P.Crassus brought troops from Gaul to help in the election of his 
father and of Pompey (39-31-2). This could not have been done without 
Caesar's express sanction. Dio's evidence is therefore to be treated 
with caution. He is unlikely,’'however, to have constructed his whole 
account from nothing, and can therefore probably be taken to confirm 
Pompey's hostility, at least for a while, towards Caesar.
Doubts have been expressed on the subject of Pompey's involvement with
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the move to reexamine Caesar's lex Campana. On the one hand, it has been 
objected that, as Pompey's own veterans were the principal beneficiaries 
of the law, any move to interfere with it must be seen as a move against 
Pompey's interests. On the other hand, sometimes associated with the 
previous point', and sometimes not, doubt is expressed about the truth of 
Cicero's claim to have been as deeply involved in the matter as he later 
maintained to Spinther (Fam.1.9.8)
It is highly likely that Pompey's men had all been settled by 56.
After the Civil War there was still land available for Caesar's troops.
In 51 Pompey renewed the agitation about the law with the express purpose
(13)of depriving Caesar of the means to reward his troops (Cic.Pam.8.10.4).
If Pompey did not feel his own men or his own dignity involved when he 
attacked the law in 51, it seems reasonable to suppose that he would have 
felt free to attack it in 56. As has been seen. Lupus, who first raised 
the matter in 57, proposed very soon after that Pompey should restore 
Auletes (Cic.Fam.1.1.5,1*2.2). A month before Cicero, in his turn, 
proposed that a debate be held on the Campanian land, he had, at the trial 
of Sestius, both glorified Pompey's name and attacked Caesar's consulship 
(Cic.Sest.67,69,74,109,129;cf.Vat.passim). In the same senatorial meeting
that Cicero booked 15 May for the Campanian debate, the senate showed that 
the move was not hostile to Pompey by voting him a large sura of money 
(Cic.QF.2.5-1)- It has already been noted that Cicero did not expect 
Pompey to object to his proposal (Fam .1.9.9;cf.QF.2.5.5-4), and, in the 
event, a word from Pompey sufficed to stop him (Fam.1.9»10;cf«QF.2.6.2). 
Caesar, on the other hand, was angry (Fam.1.9-9)»
The view that Cicero lied in the account he gave later to P.Spinther 
(Fam.1-9-7-9) is based largely on his silence in his letters written at 
the time to his brother (QF.2.5-1;2.6.2), and on the fact that the meeting
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at which the debate was to take place had, as its first business, another
matter, that of a supplicatio for Gabinius (QF.2.6.1). This second point
is no problem. It depends simply on an invalid inference from Cicero’s
proposal to discuss the matter at a frequens senatus, that his proposal
included the calling of that meeting. An acceptable interpretation of
his words would run, "at the (i.e. already arranged) full meeting",
rather than, "at a (i.e. now proposed) full meeting". The first point,
that of Cicero’s silence to his brother, becomes less impressive when it is
realised that a letter is certainly missing between QF.2.4 and 2.5, in which
Cicero could have described his intentions more fully(^^^and that Cicero
not only does, in his letter referring to the events of the Ides of May,
say that he has been embarrassed by his involvement in the issue of the
Campanian land, "in hac causa mihi aqua haeret", but also that in saying
even this he has been unwise, "Sed plura quam constituera#; coram enim"
(QF.2.8.2)o That Cicero was involved in activities, which, after Luca,
proved embarrassing for him, is clearly shown by his having to provide a
written recantation to serve as a personal guarantee (Att.4.5-1). It has
also been suggested that Cicero may have been less than candid in these
letters, as Quintus had been obliged to give some kind of pledge for his 
(17)brother’s conduct. Since, however, the pledge seems to have been given 
to Pompey, and Pompey was clearly encouraging Cicero in his course of 
action, it would seem unlikely that this would have been a motive to keep 
quiet. A final and decisive argument against the view that Cicero lied 
to Spinther is that he could not have hoped to get away with so specific 
a falsehood. He refers three times, to "mea sententia" (Fam.1.9-8),
This was a technical term indicating that-he proposed the motion
(cf;Att.4.1.6). Spinther would undoubtedly have received copies of the
acta diurna,•which gave details of senatorial meetings’, and included the
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names of those who proposed motions (of.Att.6.2.6;Suet.Iul.20.1).
It may thus be seen that in March and April, Cicero was engaged in 
attacks on Caesar, that Pompey seems to have encouraged them, and may too 
have been behind Lupus* and Antistius* earlier attacks.
After 57, in which Clodius was to some extent on the defensive, 
resisting attempts to prosecute him, and trying to prevent both Cicero's 
return and Pompey's corn commission (Cic.Att.4.1.6), Clodius resumed the 
attack in 56. He instigated prosecutions of Milo and Sestius, who had 
both helped Cicero and Pompey in 57, and with the help of the tribune, 
C.Cato, sought to prevent Pompey from obtaining the commission to restore 
Auletes. Crassus involved himself in all these matters, but his position 
seems to have been deliberately ambiguous.
Cato produced a verse from the Sibylline books that forbade the 
restoration of Auletes with an army (Dio 59»15-1-’3îGic.Fam.1.1.5;1.4.2; 
1.7.4). The senate voted to accept the prohibition, which seemed likely 
to ensure that Pompey would not gain command of an army, even if he 
managed to obtain the commission (Cic.QP.2.2.5)- Pompey believed that 
Cato was prompted by Crassus (QF.2.5.4), and Cato's conduct generally, 
from his hostility to Pompey in late 59 to his part in delaying the 
elections in 56 in the interests of Pompey and Crassus, has already been 
argued to be most consistent with that of a friend of Crassus. Crassus 
proposed that three men be chosen from those currently holding imperium 
(Fam.1.1.5), thus excluding himself, but not Pompey. He seems however to 
have put up little fight for his proposal, and withdrew it in favour of a
motion by Bibulus that three men should indeed be chosen, but from those 
not holding imperium (Fam.1.2.1-5,1.4.1-2;QF.2 . 2 . 5 ) Crassus' 
proposal would seem to have been nicely judged. It enabled him to claim 
to have tried to act in Pompey's favour,but even if it had won acceptance.
- 182 -
such a commission, without an army, and with two equal colleagues, cannot 
have been what Pompey wanted. Cato later brought in a bill formally to 
deprive Spinther of the task, and indeed to recall him from his province 
(QF.2.5.1). That this was not designed to help Pompey is clear from 
Cato's hostility towards him. It is more likely that Cato aimed to ensure 
that the Sibylline oracle was obeyed. It could also be significant that 
Spinther had been the chief agent of Cicero's return. Milo and Sestius, 
who had provided the force to malce this possible, were now being 
prosecuted at Clodius' instance, Cato, who was working closely with
Clodius, may well have intended to punish Spinther for his part in the
matter.
Crassus was present at both the trial of Milo and that of Sestius,
His role at the former in unclear. Cicero writes, "Is aderat turn Miloni 
animo non amico" (QF.2.5.2)■ The translation of this sentence depends on
how it is to be punctuated. If a comma is placed before "Miloni", the
meaning would be that Crassus was then present, but was hostile. ' If the 
comma is placed after, this would suggest that Crassus was officially
speaking for Milo, but in fact wished him ill^^^^ The latter reading has
found more favour, and does seem more natural Latin; to end a clause thus
with "turn" does not feel very Ciceronian. Either would suit the
situation admirably, since it was while this trial was being conducted that 
Clodiup attacked Pompey, and urged that Crassus be sent to Egypt (QF.2.5.2)' 
Pompey then declared that Crassus was conspiring against him (QF.2.5.5-4). 
That, despite this, Crassus may have been ostensibly supporting Milo is 
suggested bÿ" the fact that his support is attested a little later for 
Sestius (Schol’.Bob,125 St ; cf.Cic. Sest .48) . just as Crassus *. motion 
concerning the restoration of Auletes was ostentatiously not exclusive of
Pompey, so too he fulfilled the letter of his alliance with Pompey by •
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speaking for Sestius, and probably for Milo. When the time came for a 
reconciliation, Crassus could show that he himself had behaved entirely 
correctly. He could not be expected to talce responsibility for the 
actions of Clodius or Cato. If, as seems likely, the cases of Milo and 
Sestius were in many respects similar (cf.Cic.Vat.41), there is good 
reason to suppose that Crassus' presence among Sestius' defenders may have 
been quite as insincere as his earlier appearance for Milo. Crassus also 
spoke for M.Caelius Rufus (Cic.Cael.18,23)» Despite assertions to the 
contrary, however^^^^this case cannot be seen in the same light as those 
of Milo and Sestius, Caelius, although here attacked by Clodiani, had 
himself earlier prosecuted L.Calpurnius Bestia (Cael.76), yet another of 
those who had been involved in violence on Cicero's behalf in 57 
(QF.2.3-6). Caelius had ties with Crassus (Cael.9), and, although the 
Claudii, whose hostility towards him may stem from his broken-off affair 
with Clodia, used the occasion to attack Pompey, there are many factors in 
the case which prevent it from fitting the pattern of other contemporary
(21 )prosecutions.
It must again be considered how far these attacks on Pompey and his 
followers will have suited Crassus, and also what connection can be found 
between these and Pompey's attacks on Caesar. It has been suggested 
above that Pompey's corn commission may not in fact represent an outright 
triumph for him. . The rejection of Messius’ bill, and the blocking of 
Pompey's aspirations to restore Auletes, may have caused him considerable 
frustration. Any attempt he may have made to improve his relations with 
the optimates would seem to have been anticipated by Crassus. Crassus 
cooperated with Bibulus over his Egyptian motion, and Pompey believed that 
Crassus and the optimates were joined in support for C.Cato and Clodius 
(Cic.QF.2.3.4). Certainly both Hortensius (Att.4:3.3) and M.Cato, newly
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returned from Cyprus (MRR2.211), defended Clodius against attacks from 
Pompey*s quarter. Pompey’s unpopularity in the senate can be seen in the 
verdict at the trial of Clodius* adherent, Sex.Cloelius. He was acquitted 
on the strength of the senatorial votes, hostility towards Pompey being
(22)cited as the reason (Cic.QF.2.4.6). Pompey had, therefore, little room
for manoeuvre. Although he could not win acceptance from the boni, he 
could join them in attacking Caesar, He had tried to assail Clodius, and 
had failed. Crassus himself was probably far too well defended for any 
direct attack to succeed, but Caesar was perhaps the weakest link in those 
defences. That Caesar seems to have moved closer to Crassus since 59 may 
be shovyn by the presence of his staff of P.Crassus and C.Claudius, by the 
help given to Clodius in 58 by L.Piso, and in 56 by Vatinius. Caesar was 
vulnerable to attacks both on his legislation and also on his command- 
Crassus could not afford to let Caesar fall. He was a valuable ally 
against Pompey, and while he commanded in Gaul, his army was a useful 
threat.
It is unlikely that Pompey was himself keen to see Caesar's downfall, 
but he needed to provoke a reaction, and to show that he was strong enough 
to do damage. Crassus may have hoped at least after it became apparent 
that Pompey could not be crushed, that Pompey would approachIhlmwith 
suggestions for a revival of their alliance. Such was not, and never had. 
been, Pompey's style, but, by the desperation of his move against Caesar, 
he showed a state of mind that would be receptive to any such suggestions. 
It was essential to Pompey's self-image that he be able to convince himself 
that he was in command of the situation. Others could approach him with 
invitations. ■ It would have been too dangerous to'call Pompey's bluff.
His vanity might have caused him to go on. Crassus never minded being the 
first to maJce an approach. He had perhaps more confidence in his own. and
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his family's dignity, and did not need to insist on it. He had 
approached Pompey in 71, had taken the lead in their public reconciliation 
in 70,-and had probably proposed an alliance in 62, He now hurried to 
Ravenna to see Caesar, and the two men then invited Pompey to join them at 
Luca (Cic.Fam.1.9,9 -Plut.Cr.l4.5;Pomp.51«5;Gae£.21,3;Suet.Iul.24;
App.BC.2.17)(^ 3)
Caesar's v/as the weakest position. Without Crassus' help he would 
almost certainly fall to a combined attack by Pompey and the optimates.
His legislation reversed and his command diminished, he would undoubtedly 
succumb to prosecution. He needed security in Gaul and his laws left 
unmolested- To be sure of these he would give his support to any demands 
by his allies. Pompey had met obstruction and abuse at almost every turn 
for two years. He sought relief from that. Crassus wanted more. Just 
. as he had received least in 59, now he asked for most.
Precisely what was decided at Luca is not clear. The ultimate 
consequences of the conference included the second consulship of Crassus 
and Pompey, their provincial commands, and the extension by a law, rather 
than a senatus consultum, of Caesar's command in the Gauls, It has been 
asserted that none of this was decided at Luca, but only the abandonment 
of Cicero's attack on the lex Campana and the blocking of any move to 
. replace Caesar.- Certainly these two matters must have been decided.
They were urgent, and were speedily implemented. Cicero was silenced over 
the lex Campana (Cic.Fam.1.9-9-10), and then employed to help, defeat the 
proposal to declare Gaul consular for 55 (Cic.Prov.Cons.passim). Another
immediate consequence was probably Clodius' reconciliation with Pompey . 
(Cic.Har.Resp.51-2;cf.Dio 59-29-1-3). .
That a second joint consulship for Crassus and Pompey was agreed upon 
at Luca is.a more hotly disputed point, despite the explicit statements of
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Appian, Suetonius, and Plutarch (loc.cit.). The reason for this doubt is 
that Pompey and Crassus seem not to have made their "professio" by the 
appointed day, but to have decided to stand only belatedly. Dio writes 
that when they began to canvass, 'ro)v -T«v> é-V
A X Ç /■ ’*"Toy yop-oL^  the consuls, particularly Marcellinus, made
it plain that they would not permit it (39.27.3). This must mean that 
they had failed to enter their names in time, and that Marcellinus 
exercised his prerogative and declined to reopen the lists, just as . 
Volcacius had done in 66 with Catiline (Asc,89C;Sall.Cat.l8), They 
therefore had C.Cato and others put off the elections until they might be 
held at the beginning of 53 by an interrex, who would of necessity open 
fresh lists.
The meeting at Luca took place around the middle of April. The 
elections would normally have been held in July. If the candidacy of 
Crassus and Pompey had been decided upon at Luca, there was certainly 
plenty of time for them to enter their names legitimately. IVhy did they 
not do so? Dio, whose account does not include any mention of Luca, says 
that they had been supporting other candidates (39.27.2). This is 
possible, and would be consistent with other evidence. Cicero writes, 
later in the year, that L.Domitius Ahenobarbus is being deprived of his 
consulship, destined from his birth, by the same people who had caused 
Cicero's exile, presumably the triumvirs. He goes on to say that Domitius 
has no competitors, or at any-^ate only one (Att.4.8a.2). This could tie
in with Plutarch's statement that most of the other candidates withdrew 
when Crassus eind Pompey decided to stand (Cr.15.4). Cicero seems to 
suggest that Domitius' deprivation.was unexpected, but the unexpected 
factor could be the tactic of delaying the elections for the whole of the
(24)remaining part of the year.
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It could be that the triumvirs' plans at Luca included the provincial 
dispositions later effected, but not the consulship. It is perhaps worthy 
of note that none of Pompey's previous commands, of which six may be 
counted including the corn commission, had come to him out of a regular 
magistracy. He had of course only held the consulship, after which he 
did not talce a province. The same was true of Crassus, whose imperium 
against Spartacus was invested in him as a privatus. In view of the 
hostility aroused by the idea of their second consulship, even perhaps 
among their oivn allies, as the queue of praetorians lengthened, it would 
seem unlikely that it formed part of their original plans (Livy.Per.105;
Plut,Cr.15.4;Dio 59.28.1-31*1). Plutarch's account of their prevarication
when questioned by Marcellinus about their intentions contains no 
indication of whether this took place at a time when they could legally have 
given in their names (Plut.Cr.15.2-3;Pomp.51.4-5), but Dio associates the 
questioning with the senatorial reaction to C.Cato*s repeated obstruction 
of the elections (Dio 39-30.1-2). This would seem to confirm the 
impression that, until shortly before the elections were originally due, 
Pompey and Crassus had no intention of standing. The reason for Cato's 
obstruction may only later have become apparent to their enemies. It may 
be that they had come to realise that no candidate they could put up stood 
any chance against Ahenobarbus. IVho these candidates may have been is 
uncertain. The following year Pompey was hoping to -secure the 
consulship of 54 for T.Ampins Balbus (Schol.Bob.i56 St ;cf.Cic.Plane.25), 
who was certainly eligible a year earlier (MRR2.188,197)- Q.Arrius may 
still have been considered, or L.Lucceius, C.Pomptinus, or 
Cn.Tremellius Scrofa, Crassus* quaestor in 71 and probably praetor by 58 
(MRR2.195)- The possibilities are numerous, but it is unlikely that any 
candidate could have been found strong enough to beat Ahenobarbus, It
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has been suggested that it was this fear of Ahenobarbus' strength that 
led Pompey and Crassus to have the elections delayed so that they might be 
free of the influence of a hostile president in Marcellinus, and so that 
Caesar's troops could be brought to help. It is, however, more likely 
that they decided too late that they wished to stand, and so were obliged 
to resort to the tactic of delay in order that they might legally stand 
at all.
It is thus possible that the plan at.Luca was to have supporters of 
the triumvirate elected to the consulship, and by their aid to obtain the 
agreed provinces. It is sometimes argued that the precise details of 
these provincial dispositions cannot have beeza-finalised at Luca, or indeed 
for some time after, Cicero writes, on 2? April 55, of Pompey, who is 
"sibi displicens ut loquebatur....Syriam spernens, Hispaniam iactans, hie 
quoque ut loquebatur" (Att.4.9*1)» The inference sometimes dram is that 
the question of the provinces was still undecided. It is suggested that 
"iactans" either be translated as "boasting", or else emended to "lae'tans", 
Since this would not fit a picture of Pompey "sibi displicens", it is then 
argued that, at the time of the letter, Pompey was due to get Syria and 
Crassus Spain, and that Pompey wanted to change. It is hard to see 
however what Crassus could want with Spain, It was an' unlikely place from 
which to establish a military reputation and a power base. It had not 
been a consular province since the Sertorian War, and indeed Cn.Piso a 
quaestor had been sent to govern Nearer Spain in 6 5 Crassus' 
invasion of Parthia shows that he wanted an active command. Pompey was 
content to govern Spain in absentia through legates. His army in Spain 
was there to provide a degree of security to balance the forces of Caesar ' 
and Crassus, He .had no interest in using it to achieve further glory.
It is much more likely that Pompey was, in his conversation with Cicero,
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simply grumbling in his usual fashion about the responsibilities the state 
insisted on heaping onto his unwilling shoulders. Perhaps out of force 
of habit he was grumbling on Crassus' account too.
Each of the members of the triumvirate has been credited with having 
emerged from Luca with the lion's share of the spoils^^^^ As ever the 
question is bedevilled with hindsight. Crassus' failure and death are 
treated as though they were icnozvn to be probable in 56, and his command 
accordingly treated as a potentially fatal sop thrown to the least 
significant one of the three, a bauble to keep the old man quiet. Crassus 
was much more formidable than that. Despite the fact that he had not 
commanded an army for many years, his military reputation will have stood 
■probably higher than Caesar's had when he left for Gaul in 58. His 
success in the East must have seemed likely, Crassus returning, backed 
by a powerful and successful army, would have been doubly formidable. 
Without it he had more than held his own in Rome. In agreeing to Crassus' 
command, Pompey must have been sacrificing at least some of his ov/n
(27)influence with his Eastern clients.
In view of the fact that Caesar had shown himself before Luca more 
friendly to Crassus than to Pompey, the latter's command in Spain can be 
seen as only a partial balance to the power of his colleagues. Later 
Caesar's army of Gaul proved able to take on both Pompey's Spanish legions 
and the army he gathered in the East. After Luca Pompey was certainly 
wealcer militarily than a possible combination of Caesar and a returning 
Crassus. He was left alone in Rome, but it would seem, paradoxically, 
that in the past his influence there had always been stronger when he was 
away. He had nevertheless a measure of security. Caesar was free to 
continue unimpeded in Gaul. When civil war broke out his strength was 
greatly underestimated, and the efficiency of the fighting machine he had
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forged in Gaul, unappreciated. In 56, with only two seasons* 
campaigning behind him, this must have been still more the case, despite 
the spectacular successes of those years.
That Pompey may have been uneasy at the concessions he had made, can 
perhaps be seen in Gabinius* restoration of Auletes in 55 (Cic.AttA.10.1; 
Dio 59.56.5-58.5)" It is possible that Pompey encouraged Gabinius to 
talce this action, in order to forestall any attempt on Crassus' part to 
gain influence in that corner of the Mediterranearu^ Crassus was angry 
and attacked Gabinius (Cic.Fam.1.9.20), but was probably persuaded by 
Pompey that Parthia still remained, a much more worthwhile target for his 
military operations. Crassus therefore left off his attacks .on Gabinius, 
and indeed abused Cicero who had also denounced Gabinius (Cic.Fam.1.9*20; 
Dio 59.60.1). Nevertheless ill feeling persisted, and Gabinius proved 
uncooperative in giving up his- province to Crassus’ legate. Although it 
is sometimes asserted that an interest in the Syrian publicani, ill used 
by Gabinius (Cic.Prov.Cons.9-17), may have been a factor in Crassus’ 
quarrel with him, Egypt seems a much more likely cause. Crassus had shown 
a consistent interest in Egypt, in 65 when censor, in 65 through Rullus, 
and possibly in 56 when Clodius had noisily suggested Crassus as the man 
to restore Auletes (Cic.QF.2.5.2). It is indeed possible that Crassus’ 
original reason for choosing Syria v/as to enable him to deal at last with 
Egypt. One source actually includes Egypt in his command (Plut.Cat.45.1 ; 
of.Dio 59.55.2;App.EC.2.18). PompeyJ^s and Crassus' meeting in 55 to
discuss the affairs of the publicani (Cic.Att.4.11.1) need not have been 
of peculiar concern to Crassus. As has been shown, the supposed link 
between Crassus and the publicani depends entirely on his support for those 
farming the Asian taxes in
It would seem, therefore, that Crassus may well have deliberately
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engineered the crisis in the triumvirate that led to Luca, by leaving 
Pompey no alternative but to attack Caesar. Crassus certainly came out 
of the conference potentially much stronger than before.
-, 192 -
Chapter X After Luca
In view of the transitory nature of their several previous 
reconciliations, it is perhaps surprising to find that Pompey and Crassus 
seem genuinely., to have cooperated throughout their second consulship 
(cf.Cic.Att.4.11.1). Even Crassus' quarrel with Gabinius (Cic.Fam.1.9.20) 
does not seem to have disturbed his good relations with Pompey, and though 
it led to a violent, clash with Cicero, Pompey smoothed over this too.
Just before Crassus left for Parthia, late in 55, he was a guest in 
Cicero’s house. He left ’’paene a mais laribus” (ibid;cf.Plut.Cic.25-4). 
Cicero's private feelings were, however, unchanged ...,"0 hominem nequam” 
(Att.4.15.2).
Once they had entered office, Pompey and Crassus contrived to secure,
with some difficulty, the elections of their own adherents to the other
f 1 )magistracies (MRP2.2l4;Dio 59«>52.2-3)- A quantity of legislation was
enacted during the yeeir, little of it with any obvious political motivation. 
Pompey carried a law ensuring that all jurors had a high census rating, and 
Crassus the lex Licinia de sodaliciis, which concerned itself with 
electoral corruption (KRR2.214-5). There has been a deal of debate 
concerning Crassus' motives for the special feature of this law, which 
provided that jurors judging offences under it were selected from only fiveAtribes, chosen by the prosecutor, while the defendant could challenge one
of these but no individual jurors (Cic.Fam.8.2.1;Schol.Bob.152,l60 St.).
It has been argued that Crassus* purpose was to render judicial bribery
(2)easier, as only five tribes would have to be bribed. This is to confuse 
the bribery in elections, which was the offence with which the law was 
concerned, with the bribery in the trials resulting from the elections.
If an election were limited to five tribes, bribery in that election would 
indeed be easier, but one did not bribe whole tribes before a trial.
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The law was simply designed to achieve a more impersonal and random 
selection of juries^^^
Crassus and Pompey also proposed a sumptuary law hut were persuaded 
to drop it by Hortensius (Dio 39 «>57»2-4). There is no reason to suppose 
that this, any more than their other measures, was designed with a view to
(4)securing any political advantage.
A tribune, C.Trebonius, was charged with the responsibility for
effecting the provincial dispositions, which, it has been argued above,
were probably agreed at Luca (MHR2.217)» He did not, however, carry out
the agreed policy of extending Caesar’s command in Gaul and confirming his
tenure of the Transalpina by a law. This was done by Pompey and Crassus
themselves in a lex Pompeia-Licinia (Dio 39*55jCaes.BG.8.53)» Various
explanations have been advanced for the separation of Caesar’s command from
(5)those of the consuls, but it is most likely that Pompey and Crassus wished 
publicly to put their full authority behind Caesar’s command. They could 
not, however, confer commands on themselves, and so this had to be left to 
a tribune.
Opposition to the triumvirate in 55 was vigorous but ultimately 
ineffectual. Doraitius stood against them with Cato’s support (Plut.Cr. 
15»2-5;Cat.4l.2-5iFofflP»52.1-2;App.BC.2.17). and Cato himself stood for the 
praetorship (Plut.Cat.42.3), but both were unsuccessful. The tribunes 
had presumably been elected in 56, when affairs were far less completely 
within the control of the triumvirs, and they included two opponents, 
P.Aquillius Gallus and C.Ateius Capito, who both opposed the passage of 
the lex Trebonia.
It would seem that Crassus, having secured at Luca the potential for 
acquiring the position he had long been seeking, may at last have 
encountered some of the odium he had before been so careful to avoid. In
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59 Pompey and Caesar had been the targets for the attacks of the boni.
In 55 Crassus seems to have borne the brunt of the struggle. This may 
show that there was a general recognition that he was in fact now the 
strongest member of the alliance. He certainly showed a more whole­
hearted commitment than in 59, even exchanging blows with an opponent in 
the forum (Plut.Comp.Cr.at Nic.2.2), and threatening violence to the two 
hostile tribunes, who tried to interfere with the arrangements for his 
Eastern command (Dio 59»39»2-5)- He nevertheless continued to 
cultivate his other political connections. It was probably in 55 that 
his elder son, Publius, married the daughter of Metellus Scipio, who was 
almost certainly one of the successful triumviral candidates for the 
praetorship of this year (MRR2.215;see Appendix A). Publius Crassus is 
likely to have been elected to the augurate in this year, replacing 
L.Lucullus who died about the end of 57- Such elections usually came 
just after the regular consular cornitia. There had not been any in 56, 
and so the elections early in 55 at which his father was elected consul 
and at which he himself was certainly present (Dio 59-51.2), probably saw 
P.Crassus’ election as augur
The hostility of two of the tribunes has been mentioned. It is hard 
to gauge the degree of general unpopularity incurred by Crassus in 
connection with the levy of his troops and with his departure for the East, 
The later sources have been shown to be not a little suspect in their
(7)account of the circumstances surrounding Crassus’ last day in Rome. It 
is certain that Ateius did try to stop Crassus leaving by announcing bad 
omens (Cic.Div.1.29-50)- That he cursed him, or tried to arrest him is
rather less certain. Cicero mentions that Crassus’ departure was not 
especially dignified, but certainly gives no indication that anything 
untoward had happened (Cic.Att.4.15.2), Indeed he would not have boasted
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that Crassus had left “paene a mels laribus", if the departure had been 
associated with any disgrace (Fam.1.9*20). That Pompey did accompany 
Crassus to the city gates is likely, but is more likely to be a gesture 
of courtesy and friendship, than a revelation of Crassus’ weakness and 
unpopularity. As often happens, hindsight makes it impossible for some 
writers to avoid bringing in the colouration of the outcome of an event 
when describing its beginning. Thucydides avoided this when he described 
the departure of the Athenian fleet to Syracuse. Lesser v/riters could 
not.
The triumvirs must, at least after Luca, have taken thought to the 
preservation of their influence after 55» Cicero wrote in 56 that Pompey 
was suspected of having long lists of future consuls (Att.4.8a.2).
Pompey seems to have supported T,Ampins Balbus for the consulship of 54 
(Cic.Plane.25;Schol.Bob.156 St.), but Ahenobarbus and Ap.Claudius were 
elected. One at least of these men must have been unwelcome to the 
triumvirs. There is no reason to suppose that they had changed their 
minds, about the undesirability of Ahenobarbus’ consulship, but, as was 
observed above, it would seem that in 56 they had realised that he could 
only be stopped by their “first team". They must have been resigned to 
the prospect of his success in 55» Ap.Claudius' position is'different.
He seems to have been actually present at Luca (Cic.Q.F,2,4»6;cf,2.15a,3)< 
and it has been asserted that he was a triumviral candidate in 55, and 
that he cooperated with the coalition during his consulship^^^ One piece 
of evidence cited for this view is the marriage alliance, whereby 
Appius’ daughter married Pompey*s son, which some would place in 54^^^
" nDio describes Appius in that year as to Pompey. (39*60,3), but
Cicero makes no reference to the alliance until 51 (Fam,3»7»5)* Early in 
54 he was on sufficiently friendly terms with Caesar and Pompey to arrange
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a post on Caesar’s staff for the Pompeian C.Messius (Cic.Att.4.15*9; 
of .QF.2.15a»3), and in February he helped Gabinius to avoid censure by 
filling up the comitial days, while Domitius was hostile (Cic.QF.2.13.2). 
Later in the year, however, he organised the prosecution of M.Scaurus, 
then Pompey’s consular candidate (Cic.8caur.51-6;Att.4.15*7;Asc.19,28c), 
and then turned and attacked Gabinius (QF.3»2.5îPio 39-60.3)«
These two instances of a change of attitude would seem to concern the 
consular elections for 53, which will be discussed below. More 
puzzling is the account, in his letter to Crassus, of Cicero’s defence of 
Crassus against the attack of the consuls and many consulars (Cic.Fam.5-8.1)< 
The date of this letter is uncertain, though it is generally assumed to 
have come early in 54. The only clue seems to be the implication that 
both of Crassus’ sons were at that time in Rome (Fam.5-8.2,4). Publius 
joined his father in Syria in the winter of 54/3 with a body of Gallic 
cavalry (Plut.Cr. 17«4,6). Marcus served under Caesar in Gaul in 54 as
quaestor (Caes.BG.5-24.3;46.1;47.l). These considerations malce it likely 
that the letter was written well before the summer of 54, since the early 
months of that year would best suit the movements of the young Crassi^^^^
On the other hand such a date does not seem to fit with the indications 
that Appius started the year friendly to the triumvirate, but changed his 
attitude later. It would be surprising if, before breaking with Pompey, 
Appius should have attacked Crassus, the triumvir with.whom he may well 
have had the better relations. It is interesting to note that, as censor 
in 50, Appius gave a nota to C.Ateius Capito for falsifying omens in his 
attack on Crassus in 55 (Cic.Div.1.29)- It has been suggested that 
Appius did this because Ateius’ curses were thought to have produced the 
national disaster of Carrhae, rather than out of any feeling for Crassus,
It has been pointed out above, however, that Cicero’s account refers
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merely to Ateius’ pronouncement of dirae, and says that Appius censured 
him for their falsity, Ateius, therefore, was not held responsible for 
the disaster in 53, but rather punished for having been a nuisance to 
Crassus in 55*
In the famous letter to Spinther, Cicero mentions his good relations 
with Caesar and with Appius in such a way as to imply that there was a 
close connection between the two friendships,,,,"me cum Caesare et cum 
Appio esse in gratia" (Fam,1,9.4), Later in the letter, after an apology 
for his eulogy of Vatinius, Cicero tries to explain why he has defended 
Crassus in the senate (Fam.1.9.20), There is a'definite impression that, 
in all these apologies, there is the common theme of subservience to the 
post Luca coalition, Appius is part of this pattern, and there is no 
suggestion of any break between him and Crassus, or between Crassus and 
his partners. A further indication of good relations between Crassus and 
Appius may be the latter’s support of Pomptinus, still awaiting his triumph 
and opposed by the Catonians (Cic.Att.4.l8.4;QF,3»4.6;cf,Dio 39*65;
Cic.Pis,58),
It would therefore seem surprising, in the face of all these 
indications to the contrary, to find Appius apparently engaged in an attack 
on Crassus, early in 54, and in association with his colleague. It is 
possible that the text of Cicero’s letter referring to the attack is not 
above, suspicion. Appius is not named, and his involvement is indicated 
by the use of the plural "consulibus" in the phrase "Mam et cum consulibus 
et cum multis consularibus". "Consulibus". could have been corrupted from 
"consule" by the parallel with ’’consularibus'’, On the other hand Appius 
was notorious for his pride, his Appietas, and may have taken offence, 
perhaps temporary, at Crassus’ attitude towards the King of Comraagene
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(QF 2 o11»2)o The Claudii had a considerable interest in the East, as 
P.Clodius had shown in It is possible, but unlikely, for the
reasons given above, that Appius was already considering an alliance with 
Pompey.
The prosecution of Scaurus is usually accepted as being a move on 
Appius* part to further the consular aspirations of his brother Caius, 
since there could not be two patrician consuls (Cic.8caur.31-7;8chol.Amb. 
275 St.). By the time the trial came off Caius* candidacy had apparently 
been dropped (Cic.Scaur.33), but the prosecution went ahead, presumably 
now in the interests of Appius* new coitio with his colleague and the two 
plebeian candidates. Inevitably such a prosecution involved a clash with 
Pompey, who, to start with at least, was backing the candidacy of Scaurus , 
his adfinis and former quaestor. The list of those who spoke for Scaurus 
is long and distinguished, and defies all attempts to include this case 
with those that manifest a confrontation between the triumvirs and their
(11 )enemies, or to detect in it dissension within the triumvirate) Among 
those ranged on Scaurus* side were Pompey, Cicero, C.Cato, PvClodius, 
L-Piso, representing among them all three triumvirs. Also speaking for 
him were Hortensius and L.Philippus from among their enemies. There 
were many others of great distinction, including the interesting figure of 
C-Memmius, son of the consular candidate and of his recently divorced wife 
Fausta, Scaurus * half-sister (Asc,.28c). This accords with the support, 
attested by Cicero, of Caesar and Pompey for Scaurus and Meramius. If, 
by the time of the trial, the compact had been made between Memmius, 
Calvinus, and the consuls, it would be hard to see why Meramius* son should 
be defending his father’s rival against an attack instigated by his 
father’s ally. Although Cicero learned of the pact by late July 
(Cic.Att.4.13.7)1 it was not officially revealed until later. It may be
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that in the interval Memmius was obliged to be seen to conform to his 
earlier association with his adfinis, Scaurus, From the mention of 
P.Triarius as a possibility for a subsequent prosecution of Scaurus, 
after the revelation of the pact and its ensuing break-up (Cic.Att,
4,17,5), it can be seen that opposition to Scaurus was not confined to 
those who wished to further the interests of Meramius and Calvinus.
Triarius was a close associate of Cato, and unremittingly hostile to 
Scaurus (Asc,19-20,28-290).
Of the other candidates in 54, M.Messalla Rufus needs least attention. 
A nephew of Hortensius (Val.MaXo5*9»2;Cic.QF.3»9»5), his consulship was 
an unwelcome prospect for Pompey in 55, and was no more attractive in 54
( 12)(Cic.Att.4.9.1,4.15*7)- That Cicero needed to reassure Caesar about 
Messalla when his consulship seemed inevitable (QF.3.3»2;3»8«5) suggests 
that Caesar'shared Pompey*s doubts, C.Memmius, like Scaurus, looked to 
Pompey for support (Cic.Att.4.I6.6)» This might seem a reversion to an 
old loyalty. Memmius is thought to have supported Pompey in the 60s, the 
evidence cited being his attacks on the Luculli (Plut.Cat.29»2-4;Luc.57»1-2; 
Cic.Att.1.18.3). Memmius’ cousin was a close friend of Pompey, and 
married his sister. Memmius himself however v/as clearly hostile to 
Pompey and Caesar in 58, as was Pompey’s nephev/, tribune in 54, who showed 
himself hostile to Gabinius, It has been argued above that ties between 
the Meramii and the Curiones, and between the latter and the 
Claudii Pulchrl, inay well have been of great importance in determining 
political attitudes throughout the years considered in this study 
(see pp. 65-6). The pattern shown by their attitudes has been''seen as 
best explained by the association of P.Clodius with Crassus. It is 
possible therefore that C.Memmius, the consular • candidate, may also have 
come back to his original friendship with Pompey after the conference of
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Luca. Calvinus' position is the most ambiguous. As tribune in 59 he 
had helped Bibulus in his sky-watching (HRR2.189), but it is not clear at 
what point he had helped the opposition to Caesar's legislation, and 
whether this was at the time of Caesar's first land bill,which Crassus 
supported, or possibly later, at the time of the lex Campana, when Crassus 
was at odds with his colleagues. It has been suggested that in his 
praetorship in 56 Calvinus was a "firm conservative"^"^^^but the evidence 
cited all refers to his tribunate in 59, and there is in fact no 
indication of his views at that time. It would seem certain that he was 
not in 54 supported by Pompey, at least initially, since Pompey was 
clearly backing both Memmius (Cic.Att.4.16.6) and Scaurus (Att.4*15-7)» 
Cicero carefully distinguishes between Memmius' support, and that of 
Calvinus, who "valeat amicis" (Att.4.16.6). Caesar certainly supported
Memmius (ibid;cf.Suet.Iul.73)- His attitude to Scaurus is unattested. 
Equally unknown, but highly relevant, is the attitude of Crassus to 
the election. It is often supposed, albeit tacitly, that Crassus, who 
left Rome in November 55, and met with disaster and death in June 53, was, 
to all intents and purposes, dead from the moment he left. To those 
alive in Rome in 54 Crassus must still have been a figure of great 
political significance. He did not begin his serious invasion of Parthia 
until 53- In 54 he could have kept in touch with events in Rome,
Pompey in the 60s had, through supporters in.office and other agents, 
maintained to a remarkable degree his influence on the political scene. 
Indeed Pompey himself must have been constantly aware of the possibility 
of Crassus* triumphant return, and of the close relations between Crâssus 
and 'Caesar. It was therefore in his interests to see that the alliance 
held and that his allies were not offended.
•Just as Pompey had, while in the East, taken a close interest in the
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elections, so Crassus will have been concerned in 54. One cause of the 
earlier friction in 59 had been the throwing over of Arrius, Crassus* man, 
in favour of L.Piso auid Gabinius, men close to Caesar and Pompey 
respectively. In 54 Pompey supported Scaurus and Memmius, the former 
certainly his own man, the latter not obviously so, but, as has been seen, 
possibly closer to Crassus. At all events Caesar too supported him.
The infamous pact was made between the consuls, on the one hand, and 
Meramius and Calvinus, on the other. The first mention is a cautious and 
undetailed reference by Cicero, writing about 27 July 54. It is 
interesting to observe that despite the fact that news of the agreement had 
lesdced out, it seems to have been still in force. Cicero writes that 
Messalla "languet" because of the "coitio consulum" and because of Pompey. 
Before this he writes, "Memmium Caesaris omnes opes confirmant. Cum eo 
Doraitium consules iunxerunt, qua pactione. epistulae comraittere non audeo. 
Pompeius fremit, queritur, Scauro studet, sed utrura fronte an mente, 
dubitatur" (Att.4.15.7). The natural inference is that Pompey is angry 
because of the pact, has turned against Memmius, and at least appears to 
be backing Scaurus. Caesar's support for Memmius is confirmed but it is 
not clear whether Caesar has any knowledge of the pact.
Pompey*s anger and abandonment of Memmius become' less certain when 
it is seen that two months later Memmius read out the text of the pact to 
the senate "auctore Pompeio" (Att.4.17.2). If Pompey was estranged from 
Memmius, how could he persuade him to make his revelation? If he was 
close to- him, why should he do so? The revelation seems to have 
delivered a death blow to Memmius* chances but not to those of Calvinus.
If Pompey is to be supposed in earnest about his support for Scaurus, the
creation of the pact must have been against his interests, unless he
■
always meant that it should be revealed to the discredit of the
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signatories. Ahenobarbus and Memmius were the casualties, but it is not 
certain that they were the expected casualties. No conclusions can be 
definitely asserted, Ahenobarbus was a serious enemy of the triumvirate, 
particularly in view of his hereditary feud with Pompey, As Cato's close 
ally and brother-in-law, he can have had little love for any of the 
triumvirs, and yet he joined in this pact. His motive seems to have been 
his desire for a province. When, proposing to stand for the consulship 
of 55» he announced his intention of replacing Caesar in Gaul, he did so 
not only out of hostility towards Caesar, but also in furtherance of his 
own a m b i t i o n s M o s t  candidates sought the consulship, less for the 
power.it brought, than for the dignity of having held it, and for the 
provincial command which might follow it and which usually brought great 
profit both financially and in terms of influence. It may be that the 
triumvirs, after failing to prevent Ahenobarbus' election at the second 
attempt, could have contrived to prevent his going to a province, or at 
least to one he wanted, perhaps Macedonia. Something of the sort seems 
to be the case with Appius, to whom Cilicia had been allotted, but who had 
failed to secure the appropriate ornatio and curiate law. Spinther v/as 
proconsul in Cilicia in 54, and it may well be his friends that were 
blocking Appius (Cic.QF.5«2.5;Fam.1.9,25»Att«4.l8.4). It has been shov/n 
that it is of Ahenobarbus that Cicero wrote to Spinther as "ille perennis 
inimicus amicorum suorum" (Fam.1.9*2), who had turned on Spinther all his 
malice, and was now, by the disclosure of his deeds, bereft of all 
reputation and independence. The treachery referred to is presumably
Ahenobarbus' support, promised in the pact, for Appius' attempts to secure
( 15)the province and replace Spinther.
Appius had already joined the pact and attacked Scaurus, but v/hen he 
attacked Gabinius all were surprised by what eimounted to en attack on
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Pompey himself (Cic.gF.3.2.3). It is possible that he was angry at 
Scaurus* acquittal, but it is more likely that Pompey*s responsibility for 
the publication of the pact was the principal spur for his hostility.
Ahenobarbus* and Appius* desire to secure their provinces may 
provide a partial explanation for their participation in the agreement, 
but there are other, more specifically political, explanations that must 
be considered. It has been suggested that Pompey engineered the whole 
thing with a view to discrediting his enemy, Ahenobarbus, and so 
disturbing affairs that there would be a demand for a dictatorshipl^^^
Other than the actual outcome over a year later, when there was still an 
electoral impasse, and when, moreover, news of Crassus* death must have 
had an effect, there is little evidence for this view. One small hint 
may be contained in Cicero's cryptic allusion to a friendship between 
Ahenobarbus and Lucilius Hirrus (Att.4.16.3)- Hirrus was Pompey*s cousin, 
and a staunch enough supporter for the notion of independent action on 
his part to be incredible (QF.3.8.4). Pompey*s involvement in Memmius* 
disclosure does not, however, prove that he knew or approved of the pact 
at its inception. His displeasure, referred to by Cicero in his first 
mention of the affair, could have been occasioned either by the existence 
of the pact or by its becoming public knowledge, but the former seems 
more likely.
That the ultimate outcome of Meramius* disclosure was not predictable 
is shown by the fact that Memmius made it, and that, even after making it, 
he continued to hope, vainly, for Caesar's support and for the consulship 
(Cic»QF.3*2.3»cf■3*8.3). Caesar was in fact angry at the "enuntiatio**, 
and Memmius had lost all chance (Att.4.1?.3)* Memmius then proposed to 
prosecute Calvinus (Att.4.17»5îQF*3*2»3), who seems to have lost no favour 
through the disclosures (Att.4-17*3)» It has been suggested that it was
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in fact C.Meramius, the tribune of 54, who was to prosecute Calvinus.
Cicero is however generally careful to make it clear to which man he is 
referring. The context of Att.4,17-5 malces an unannounced shift to the 
tribune very difficult to accept. In QF.2.5-2 it is inconceivable that 
two Meramii are meant...."a Meminio Domitius, a Q.Acutio,...Meramius 
(postulati sunt)". It is perhaps significant that Calvinus later voted 
openly for Gabinius* acquittal (QF.3-4.1). Pompey had quite abandoned 
Scaurus by November 54 (QF.3-8.3), and it seems that Pompey may well have 
come to some agreement with Calvinus.
The inception of the agreement between the consuls and the two 
plebeian candidates is still obscure, but various.clues may permit a 
tentative conclusion. It has been seen that Memmius* candidacy may have 
been acceptable to all three triumvirs. Caesar and Pompey backed him, and 
there are reasons for supposing him at least as close to Crassus.
Scaurus, on the other hand, may have been less welcome to Crassus and 
Caesar. He may perhaps be considered Pompeian rather than triumviral. 
Appius launched an attack on him, initially in the interests of his brother 
Caius, and when Caius* candidacy was no longer possible, Appius may have 
looked elsewhere. Calvinus seems to have been a man with powerful 
connections, but not perhaps closely involved with the boni» Cicero 
contrasts Calvinus, who was strong in friends, with Messalla and his known 
strength, presumably that of Hortensius, his uncle, and the Catonians 
(Att.4.16,6). Appius will have had close ties with Meramius, for reasons
already given, and also because the younger Curio, who was Memmius* 
nephew, i/as currently serving under C.Claudius in Asia (MRR2.224).
Memmius himself had been a colleague of Ahenobarbus in his praetorship in 
58, and had been associated with him in attacks on Caesar (MRR2.194).
With the added lure of a province, it should not have been hard to •
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persuade Ahenobarbus to support his former ally. Calvinus too may have 
been acceptable to Anenobarbus after his anti-Caesarian tribunate. Both 
Memmius and Calvinus may have shoivn their hostility to Caesar because of 
his then over-close association with Pompey. Once Caesar reestablished 
closer ties with Crassus, this may have ceased, Ahenobarbus too may, at 
this date, have still considered Pompey the principal enemy. Seen thus, 
it is possible that the affair was from the start designed to stop 
Scaurus, not just for the sake of C,Claudius, but because of Scaurus* 
attachment to Pompey. Failing C,Claudius, the flexible Calvinus would 
do.
The affair became known. Pompey was angry and reiterated his support 
for Scaurus. When Scaurus* hopes looked faint, Pompey put pressure on 
Meramius to read out the text of the compact. This may have been a fairly 
desperate attempt to shipwreck Calvinus, and, incidentally, the trouble- 
making consuls. Pompey may have thought that Meoimius would recover some 
credit, or at least may have told Meramius so. When the results of the 
revelations were clear, Meramius was nowhere, and Calvinus and Messalla 
seemed all but home, since Scaurus* prosecution, even though he was 
acquitted, did sufficiently delay his canvass to give the others a start, 
Pompey, never one to harbour loyalty to any man whose usefulness seemed 
over, dropped Scaurus, and wooed Calvinus, who could accept his offers 
without betraying his eeirlier supporters. He could be friendly to 
Pompey, but not perhaps as dependent as Scaurus would have been.
It has here been suggested that the chief mover in the formation of 
the .compact was Appius, It must remain uncertain whether he was working 
entirely for himself, or else perhaps partly as an ally furthering the 
interests of Crassus, P,Clodius actually spoke for Scaurus, but this 
need not betoken a breach between the brothers. Since Scaurus* hopes
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could be effectively sabotaged without his actual condemnation and loss 
of caput, the prosecution does not seem to have been conducted with the 
heavyweight resources possible. Indeed P,Clodius* presence for the 
defence may have been designed to show that no risk to Scaurus was 
intended. He was simply not to have the consulship. Links with Crassus 
other than with the Claudii, and through them perhaps with Memmius,are not 
easy to discern. If Crassus was indirectly involved, he would seem to 
have been concerned that Pompey should not have in the consulship a man 
too closely tied to him. After Luca there is no evidence of any hostility 
between Pompey and Crassus, but Crassus may have been keen to preserve the 
status quo established then, and which inclined, as has been argued, 
rather in his own favour.
Caesar*s attitude is shown only by his anger with Meramius and 
withdrawal of support from him, but it is interesting to observe that in 
48 Calvinus was prominent on Caesar's side against Pompey (MRR2.277)*
It is possible therefore that Caesar, who had shown himself before Luca 
rather closer to Crassus than Pompey, and who certainly supported Memmius, 
but probably not Scaurus, may well also have been concerned with the pact. 
His relations with Appius seem to have been good.
The elections were held up for the remainder of 54 by the tribune 
Q.Mucius Scaevola (Cic.Att,4,17«4;QF.3-3«2)« He went on to serve in the 
following year with Ap.Claudius in Cilicia, This might suggest that the 
delay was contrived to serve Appius* interests. It may have had some 
connection with his desire to make sure of going to his province,
Scaevola could have held up the elections until Appius should obtain his 
ornatio and curiate law. A stalemate ensued, ‘ Appius received neither, 
and no elections were held. They were held up for at least half of the 
following year too. One possible reason is that Pompey may have hoped
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for a dictatorship (Cic,QF»5«»8»4;3-9«3îAtt.4.19<»l)- This was resisted by
the boni. At last, after a long interregnum, in the summer of 53,
Messalla and Calvinus were elected. What broke the deadlock is unclear
as Cicero's letters do not cover this period. The date of the elections
is not certain. Dio puts them in July 53, and suggests that Pompey
refused the dictatorship and took steps to have the elections held
(40.45.1-46.1). Appian, however, implies that they were held in August
or September and that Pompey was responsible for the delay (BC.2.’19)»
It is surprising to find no mention in the sources of the arrival in Rome
of the news of the disaster at Carrhae, but it is not impossible that it
was in fact this that put an end to the petty political manoeuvrings.
It was no moment for the state to be without consuls. Although nothing
came of them, there were for several years fears of a Parthian invasion.
There is in fact one indication that the elections did follow the arrival
of the news from the East, and this is Cicero's election to the augurate
in succession to P.Crassus. Such elections usually followed directly
upon the consular cornitia (Cic.Fam.15.4.13;6*6»7;cf.Att.10.8a,1;Plut.Cic.
36.1). He was elected before the younger Curio returned from Asia
(Cic.Phil.2.4) and before M.Antonius left for Gaul (Fam»8.3.1Î2.15.1)■
Antonius did not leave until after Milo's trial in April 52 (Asc.4lC),
which would permit Cicero to have been elected in early 52 when Pompey
became consul. Curio's date of return is unclear but was probably late
in 53 or early 52. The general opinion is that Ciaero was elected in 
(17)53. If this was so, it would confirm that the cornitia followed the
news of P.Crassus' death. To fit in with Dio's date, the news would need 
to have travelled fast as Crassus died on 9 June (Ovid Fasti 6.465).
Even Appian *B more elastic indication would make the elections come hard 
on the heels of the news. It may well have been the shock of the news
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that permitted the elections to talce place. The favourites were elected. 
It may have been only after this that the political implications of 
Crassus' death were fully realised. With his removal from the scene 
the factional balances were disturbed, both within the triumvirate, and 
between it and its opponents, as many men must have had to consider fresh 
political ties. It could be for example that both Ap.Claudius and 
Q.Metellus Scipio now gravitated towards Pompey, and formed marriage 
alliances with him, precisely because Crassus with whom both had been 
associated was now dead. The break-up and dispersal of Crassus' faction 
may well be the cause of the imbalance that ultimately led Pompey to 
challenge Caesar. He had gained most from the auction of the political 
effects of his late p a r tneirThe boni too, now that Crassus was no 
longer there as a possible if questionable ally against his triumviral 
colleagues were forced sooner or later to choose between Pompey and 
Caesar, Crassus' death caused many ripples.
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Some Conclusions
As was observed at the beginning of this study, there is a marked 
discrepancy in the ancient sources between various statements and 
assessments of Crassus' power and significance on the one hand, and on the 
other his apparent lack of involvement in and influence upon much of the 
recorded history of his time. In view of such statements as those of 
Velleius, Dio, and Plutarch, cited in Chapter I, his powers of invisibility 
are remarkable. Between his first consulship and his censorship he drops 
from the record almost completely. From 69 to 67 he is not mentioned at 
all. In 66 he is mentioned in passing as the man whom Manilius vainly 
claimed was behind his measure on the freedraen, as a supporter of C.Macer 
at his trial, and at the end of the year is said by Suetonius to have been 
involved in some kind of plotting that came to nothing. These were, however, 
the years of Pompey's accession to almost unprecedented powers, and of 
great political upheavals associated with his rise. It is inconceivable 
that a man, "mox rei publicae omnium consensu principem" (Vell.2,30,4), a 
man described by Cicero as "praepotens" (Fin.2.57), whose ambition was 
"in re publica princeps ... esse" (Off.1.25), should have taken no part in 
the events of these years. Again, from his appearance in support of 
Caesar's first land bill in 59 until his consular candidacy after Luca, 
his recorded public actions are very few: nothing in 58; in 57 he
welcomed Cicero back to Rome; in early 56 he proposed a motion concerning 
the restoration of Auletes which was quickly dropped in favour of another, 
and he is briefly mentioned as speaking for Sestius, Caelius, and possibly 
Milo. Apart from these, all that can be found is that Clodius' gangs 
chanted his name, and that.Pompey accused him of conspiring against him.
These last two items show clearly that Crassus must have been doing far 
more than is on record.
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In the opening discussion various reasons for the discrepancy were 
put forward. The subsequent chapters have consisted of an attempt to 
flesh out the dismembered skeleton that is all that tradition has given us 
to create a picture of Crassus, The existing accounts have been examined 
at a number of points along Crassus® life, and the case for his involvement 
in various affairs and issues considered. No gleaming new theory has been 
constructed, to be imposed upon the picture of the late republic, but an 
adjustment of the focus has been attempted, and to tidy up a number of 
incoherences and inconsistencies. In some cases the results have been 
negative, and Crassus* involvement not proven,
A brief summary of the major areas subjected to examination may be 
appropriate ;
1. An attempt has been made to put Crassus® assumption of the command 
against Spartacus into the political context of the seventies. Earlier 
considerations of the matter have tended to concentrate exclusively on the 
legal and constitutional issues,
2, The same has been attempted with the quarrel in 70 between Crassus and 
Pompey, This is customarily attributed to mutual dislike®
3* Crassus® involvement in the various stages of the dismantling of 
Lucullus* Mithridatic command has been examined and found not-proven,
4. The disturbances at the trials of Manilius and the violent plans 
attributed to Cn.Piso have been considered, and associated with Crassus* 
part in the so called "First Catilinarian Conspiracy".
5® Crassus® activities as censor have been shown to have constituted a 
serious attempt to acquire great personal influence,
6. Evidence of Crassus® association with Rullus and Antonius led to the 
conclusion that another very serious bid for power was contemplated in 63, 
and that Rullus* bill was much more than an agrarian measure.
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7» Consideration of the "Second Catilinarian Conspiracy" produced the 
conclusion that Cicero was involved in an attempt to enhance his own power, 
particularly at Crassus® expense, and to that end deliberately goaded 
Catiline into desperate measures, hoping in this way and also by 
manufacturing evidence to compromise Crassus and his friends®
8® Crassus® activities from 65 to 60 have been considered and have been 
found wholly consistent with a long-term aim of a mutually advantageous 
alliance with Pompey®
9» An attempt has been made to bring some sense into the muddled accounts 
of Caesar's first consulship by considering the shifting relationships 
between the triumvirs.
10. The same has been done for 58-56. Much detailed work has previously 
been done on these years, but few accounts deal convincingly with the 
motives behind the sequence of events® A tentative analysis has been 
constructed.
Such have been the areas upon which greatest attention has been 
concentrated® If only some of the conclusions reached are accepted, 
enough will remain to guarantee Crassus a far more active political career 
and far greater personal ambitions than are to be found in the ancient 
narratives.
Leaving aside the strong statements concerning his ambitions already 
cited, consideration of the dimensions of the few events and plans with 
which his name is linked shows Crassus to have had vastly greater personal 
ambitions than the great majority of his contemporaries.
The restoration of the tribunicia potestas was, if not revolutionaryj 
at least a step of considerable constitutional importance and of great 
significance for the following years® The attempt to enfranchise the
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)adani cannot be compared with the enfranchisement of the Italians
after the Socieil War* Then the allies had fought long and bitterly and
the citizenship was granted only reluctantly by the senate and people of
Rome, for whom the consuls and tribunes whose names were given to the laws
were merely the executives (MRR2«25^32,34). Crassus seems to have tried
almost single-handed to confer this favour on the bulk of the population
of a whole province* By this one move he could have increased his own
power beyond recognition, He seems to have been playing an equally bold
game in foreign affairs with his Egyptian policy. In the audacity of
these attempts his policy is not unlike that of Ti-Gracchus and his allies
(1)in 133» The parallel also springs to mind when the apparent scope of 
the Rullan land bill is considered* It'may be that, while Cicero did 
distort the intentions and likely applications of the bill, he may not 
have greatly exaggerated the magnitude and far-reaching nature of the 
power that was sought- Crassus* differences with his triumviral colleagues 
in 39 were certainly not occasioned by any reservations about the measures 
carried or methods used by Caesar, His second consulship was an honour 
with few precedents, the only examples in living memory being the 
consulships of Marius during the German troubles and then those in the 80s 
of Marius, Sulla, Cinna and Carbo- Q,Metellus Pius did not seek a
second consulship, nor did Q.Catulus. It was not. the step of a quiet
(2)conservative, nor was his desire for a great military command, fifteen 
years after his consulship, in any way orthodox. The conventions permitted 
ambition and even intrigue in order to secure a worthwhile consular 
province, but the nature of the constitution made it clear that, after 
consulship and'province, a consular was expected to submit gracefully to 
his future as an elder statesman, a princeps civitatis- For Crassus the 
consulship was only the beginning of a struggle to be much more than that-
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Much of this study, and the conclusions concerning Crassus® political 
strategy, rest on the estimate formed of the scope of his ambitions.
There would seem to have been a distinct discrepancy between Crassus® 
political aims and his style. The latter v/as not far removed from the 
well established norms of political behaviour, clientelae, amicitiae, 
necessitudines, and in his case minimal inimicitiae v/henever possible.
It is the conclusion of this study, however, that his ambitions may well 
have been far larger and that he aimed for some form of supreme power.
That the idea of monarchy would have been within his conceptual armoury 
seems likely. Pompey, throughout his career, v/as feared and suspected of 
seeking such a position. Caesar's imposition of autocracy was resented 
by many but did not come as a surprise. After his death the Republic 
stood little chance. After the Civil Wars of the 80s, the Republican 
constitution had resumed. No would-be successors of Sulla sprang up, 
perhaps because all the leading men in the state had grown up before that
bloody decade. The epigoni of Caesar were all brought up in the
aftermath of Sulla, Cinna, and Marius, and many of them may well have 
regarded military dictatorship with a lack of horror, inconceivable to an 
earlier generation. Pompey, Crassus, and Caesar were all young men in the
80s and may well have been among the first to develop this new political
philosophy. Crassus, the oldest of the three, and born into a family 
much more part of the old establishment, may have found it hardest to 
abandon original preconceptions of the rules of the game, and been less 
clear in his conception of what he.wanted than the others, but he will 
have learn'ed quickly from Pompey*s example. He may not have formulated 
his thought so, but it would seem that he would have been glad to exchange 
"M,Crassus; triumvir", for "M.Crassus, princeps".
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It has sometimes been objected to studies of Crassus* career that too
(3)much emphasis is laid on his rivalry with Pompey, but even were there no 
statements in the sources attesting this rivalry, it would be necessary to 
infer it from Crassus* ov/n manifest ambitions. Pompey was, in the 
generation after Sulla, quite simply the most important fact of political 
life, and awareness of this must inevitably have affected attitudes on
(4)almost all public matters. His career had been so extraordinary, and 
his ambition so undisguised, that every politician must have considered 
where he stood with regard to Pompey. The faction of Catulus and others 
seems to have had, as its principal policy, a resolve to resist Pompey*s 
increasing dominance. This may indeed have been essentially its nature, 
a group united by this resolve. Others of the nobility saw advantage to 
be gained by association with the rising star. Initially they helped him 
and encouraged his extraordinary commands against Lepidus and Sertorius. 
Later they accepted patronage at his hands. It was impossible to be 
indifferent to Pompey. Any other man who himself sought, as Crassus 
seems to have done, to achieve the highest place in the state,’ was obliged 
to consider Pompey at all times. He v/as the single most powerful figure 
in Rome, but the united power of those who opposed him was also great.
If Crassus had stayed with the optimates all his life and opposed Pompey, 
he would never have achieved the preeminence he sought, but would have been 
submerged, one among many. On the other hand, as this study has shov/n, 
Pompey*s way with his own adherents could be ruthless, and he was
reluctant to accept associations on equal terms. Crassus moved in a
political environment that contained two strong forces, Pompey and his 
enemies. To get too close to either, save on his own terms, could have
risked absorption of his own political identity.
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One reason for this may have lain in the nature of Crassus* ovm 
strength» Porapey could have maintained a reserve of strength even if 
opposed by the entire nobility and the senate, since the foundations of his 
power lay outside these, and in the votes and manpower of Italy, particularly 
of Picenum^^^ Crassus* power however lay precisely in his ability to pull 
strings in the senate and to cooperate at different times with a number of 
different groups of nobles» If Crassus wholly alienated too many powerful 
elements in the senate, he would be nothing. It would seem that he was 
quite conscious of his ov/n strengths and weaknesses. In 71 he was able 
to offer Pompey his considerable influence in the senate, in return for 
Pompey's voting strength (cf.Plut.Pomp.22.5;Zonar.10.2). He was keen to 
overcome this limitation of his power, however, as is to be seen in his 
interest in the Transpadane Franchise, and in Rullus» land bill, both 
measures that could help him make up his deficit in popular support. It 
may also be significant that he seems to have been prepared to put at risk 
his carefully acquired and widespread senatorial connections only when, 
after Luca, he felt that at last he had some other base to stand on.
Crassus» influence in the senate is generally acknowledged^^^but its 
composition is a matter of some doubt. It has been asserted that Crassus 
deliberately eschewed alliances with the nobility, preferring to 
concentrate on the lower ranks and less well born in the s e n a t e T h e  
reason for such a view is that no list of nobles who served under Crassus 
or who enjoyed his patronage in elections can be compiled, as it can for 
Pompey. Porapey»s staffs for his two great commands in the 60s included 
two censorial consulars, Gellius and Clodianus, and a glittering array of " 
noble future consuls, Celer, Nepos, Torquatus, Marcellinus, Pupius Piso, 
in addition to such men as Faustus Sulla, Scaurus, and Plantius Hypsaeus 
of noble stock who failed to reach the consulship. Crassus* following
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in his Eastern campaign included no consulars or future consuls. Only
three men of noble family seem to have been with him, his quaestor
G.Cassius Longinus, a probable Marcius Censorinus, and his own son. In
the Servile War there was an obscure Mumraius. The argument is however
not very convincing, since it might induce one to draw the same conclusion
about the policy of L.Lucullus or Metellus Pius. In Lucullus* first
three years in the East, the only noble found with him is Appius Claudius
his brother-in-law. L.Murena later achieved the consulship. Pius was
in Spain for nine years, and yet there is no record of a single noble on
his staff. Indeed in Caesar*s first three years in Gaul only
(8)Ser.Sulpicius Galba and P.Crassus were noble. All that can be inferred
from Pompey*s remarkable array of noble names is that Pompey*s was an
exceptional case, while Crassus* seems quite normal. There is no record of
Crassus backing distinguished nobles for the consulship, but it is not
clear that Pompey derived much benefit from his noble legates when they
reached high office. Celer, Nepos, and Marcellinus were all hostile;
Torquatus* legateship may have been only a legal device connected with his
governorship of Asia; only M.Piso remains. It would seem that the only
consuls Pompey could rely on were the relatively undistinguished men such
(9)as Afranius and Gabinius whom he managed to push into the consulship.
There are no consuls undoubtedly Crassan, with the treacherous exception 
of C.Antonius, and only two certain Crassans defeated at the polls,
Catiline and Arriusô One conclusion could be that Crassus was not 
interested in the consulship and did not try to push or buy his adherents 
into it. Another is that in all these matters it is a mistake to assume 
that the pattern set by Pompey was one that others even tried to follow.
His faction was his own and he seems to have treated it'as such. There, 
are few relationships in which Pompey was concerned that would be fairly
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termed alliances. He seems to have brought with him from Picenum an 
arrogant and autocratic manner. The only relationship that interested 
him was that of patron and client, and if he could treat men from noble 
families like clients, so much the better. That his father, the founder 
of his own nobility, had been hated by the older established nobles 
(Asc«79C), could partly explain this.
Such was clearly not Crassus* attitude. No noble could be a client. 
Nobles cooperated with one another for various reasons and for various 
lengths of time. They might owe one another favours, or they might share 
a common objective, or a common enemy. It is suggested that because 
Q.Metellus Creticus and Q.Metellus Scipio, Crassus* adfines, cannot be 
seen to have behaved like clients towards him, he was not politically 
associated with them. Creticus* election to the consulship in 70 when 
Crassus was consul, and Scipio*s to the praetorship in 55 when Crassus was 
again consul, are unlikely to be coincidences (cf.Appendix A). That 
examples of their cooperation with Crassus are not in evidence, other than 
that Scipio accompanied Crassus when delivering his letters in 63, means 
little, as records of Crassus* activities are in any case so scanty. 
Crassus wielded great influence in the senate, as was shown when 
Tarquinius denounced him. It is highly likely that such men as Creticus 
and Scipio supported him on many occasions. He will have been a friend 
rather than a leader.. ‘ Other nobles with whom he may possibly have 
cooperated include P.Sura, 1.Cotta, L.Caesar, Cn.Aufidius Orestes, 
P.Clodius, Ap.Claudius, C.Curio, C.Caesar, C.Memmius, Cn.Calvinus, 
M.Marcellus, and even L.Lucullus and M.Bibulus.
Certainly he had many followers from undistinguished families, but, 
except for Q.Arrius, he does not seem to have tried to push these into the 
consulship. Pompey was not loved by the nobility for procuring Afranius*
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consulship. Crassus* humbler followers are as hard to identify positively 
as his noble friends, perhaps because they were not encouraged to devote 
themselves to measures ostentatiously in his interests. Pompey*s 
tribunes for example are easy to identify, chiefly because they were 
openly his men. Even where Crassus* hand can be detected behind a 
tribune, it is almost certain that that tribune was not trumpeting Crassus* 
name to the heavens. It has already been suggested that Crassus may have 
been involved with Sicinius, Quinctius, and Macer in the 70s. Tribunes 
may have been used as Suetonius suggests in the Egyptian question in 65, 
and perhaps also in the attempted enfranchisement of the Transpadanes.
A possible connection exists with L.Roscius Otho. His legate of 71j
Q.Marcius Rufus, may have held a tribunate in 68. P.Servilius Rullus
was almost certainly Crassus* man, but Crassus* name was not mentioned.
In the fifties Clodius himself, and the tribunes who helped him, may all 
have received discreet support from Crassus. It would seem surprising 
if, after being at least partially responsible for the restoration of the 
full powers of the tribunate, Crassus had not subsequently availed himself 
of its help.
It has therefore been shown that because Crassus was not as blatant 
in his use of political influence as Pompey frequently was, it must not be 
assumed that he did not use it and use it very effectively. Until the 
lex Trebonia Crassus was never the obvious beneficiary of the measures put 
forward by himself or his friends. He did not thrive, as Pompey did, on 
confrontation. Again this difference of style may reflect the difference 
in the nature of their various political relationships. Crassus* 
connections with his noble friends may not have been as rigid as Pompey*s 
with his,, but they may have lasted better where Pompey*s tended to snap.
He could not dictate his friends* behaviour, but" could presumably rely on
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a great deal of varied support for much of the time. Pompey may have 
controlled a block of his o w  followers in the senate, but this seems in 
fact only to have served to unite the remaining majority against him 
(cf.Cic.Atte1.19=4)o
It would seem that Crassus was tireless in his efforts to widen his 
circle of influence. Many men owed him money (Plut.Cr.3*1 ;cf.Sail.Cat. 
48.3), and many too were indebted to him for other forms of help. He was 
an assiduous pleader in the courts, no case being too much trouble or 
beneath him (cf.Plut.Cr.3.2;7.4;Comp.Cr.et Nic.1»2;Cic.Brut.233;Parad.St. 
46). His presence is attested for only a few cases, Macer, Murena, Milo, 
Sestius, Caelius, and Balbus, but there will have been many more. His 
help for Clodius in 6l may not have been an isolated instance. It is 
interesting to note that there is no record of his appearance as a 
prosecutor, or even as a hostile witness...."Crassus verbum nullum contra 
gratiam** (Cic.Att.1.l8.6) .
The nature and sources of Crassus* power have been considered. He 
had of necessity to walk very carefully, eschewing Porapey*s attitude that 
all who were not for him were against him. His political and financial 
assets made him very powerful, but they were not ideally suited to the 
realisation of his ambitions. He was obliged to pursue what might be 
seen as a post-Sullan goal of personal dominatio with weapons of pre-Sullan 
vintage. Sulla had shown that to control the government in Rome was not 
enough,*and that armed support was also needed. Nevertheless, as has 
been seen, even without an army, or even notably great strenght in the 
comitia, Crassus was able to rival Pompey.
It has been suggested that Crassus* solution to the post-Sullan 
dilemma was to try to have important commands held for him by lesser men,
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while he remained in his senatorial power-base. This connects with the 
theory, already discussed, and discounted, of Crassus* search during the 
60s for points d *appui against Porapey. To secure a prestigious post for 
a friend built up credit with that friend and impressed others, but it is 
hard to see what Piso could have done from Spain or Caesar from Egypt to 
help Crassus. Caesar*s Gallic command owed more to Pompey than to Crassus, 
unless Caesar and Crassus were being almost unbelievably devious in 39»
Poraptinus in Gaul seems to be almost the only example of a former Crassan
associate holding a strategically vital command, though Cilicia may have 
been intended for L.Metellus in 68, an adfinis; hardly enough to support 
the theory. Crassus* failure to take a province after his first 
consulship proves nothing, as Pompey did the same. All the apparently
interesting provinces were at the time occupied by Lucullus, who will have
then seemed well entrenched.
Crassus simply did not try to compete with Pompey on Porapey*s own 
ground. He could have lost the power he had achieved. Lacking 
Porapey*s assets, Crassus tried to profit from Pompey*s possession of them.
If Pompey had not existed, Crassus could never have risen 
as high as he did. He needed Porapey, sometimes as an ally to 
help him achieve specific ends, and sometimes as a decoy to 
attract the hostility of.the optiraates. Without Porapey, Crassus 
himself would have been speedily crushed by the more conservative 
nobles. Crassus hoped to play on their obsessive fear of Porapey, 
so that he himself might remain relatively untouched by their 
opposition. As time went on however, he found in 65 for example, that
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his ovm schemes were being blocked by the optimates, and he hoped to be 
able to use Pompey*s strength to overcome these obstacles. These hopes 
were dashed in 63 by Cicero, who had formed the only slightly less 
ambitious plan of uniting Pompey with the optimates, with himself as the 
catalyst. Crassus in his turn managed, by virtue of his closer ties 
with many of the nobility, to frustrate Cicero’s plans. After Pompey 
returned from the East, Crassus faced a very delicate task. He had to 
demonstrate to Pompey that he stood no chance of an alliance with the 
optimates, and that he could achieve nothing in opposition to them without 
Crassus’ aid, Crassus' own power had proved ultimately inadequate to 
enable him to expand his field of influence. He needed Pompey’s help to 
permit him to move beyond the senate house. He could only get that help 
by using the strength he had in the senate to frustrate Pompey who was 
weak there, Pompey would then be forced to seek an alliance. To have 
destroyed Pompey at any time in the 60s would therefore have been 
disastrous for Crassus. The coveted alliance fell into his lap but 
proved less helpful than he had hoped, Pompey must have been well aware 
of Crassus' ambition to use and then supplant him, and attempted to avoid 
the implications of the alliance as soon as he had gained his own immediate 
ends. Once the deadlock was broken, he concentrated on trying to detach 
Caesar from Crassus, and leaving Crassus helpless. Crassus contrived to 
win back Caesar, and also to induce Pompey to agree to the exile of Cicero, 
Crassus now encouraged Clodius to make an all out attack on Porapey, but 
failed to bring him low. That such an attempt was made could suggest that 
Crassus now considered that Caesar was strong enough to take Pbmpey’s place 
as a supplier of force and votes, but was .at the same time more vulnerable 
and likely to serve Crassus’ own ends. Although Pompey proved too strong 
to be crushed completely, he was forced to agree to a renewal of the
-  222 -
alliance on terms distinctly favourable to Crassus. Crassus now took up 
a major overseas command for the first time. He seems to have given up 
his old quest for an extended popular base for his power, in favour of 
military glory, and presumably the loyal support, on his return, of a 
successful army. It is possible that he felt that time was running out 
for his dreams of supremacy. He was about sixty, and indeed looked older 
(Plut.Cr.17.5)o His career had been outstandingly successful. He had
managed to equal, though not to surpass, the greatest man of the day, 
against whom all who aspired to preeminence had to measure themselves 
(cf«Plut.Comp.Cr.et Nie.2.3).
His disappearance from the political scene left a yawning void.
Where before there had always been a potential coalition of Crassus and 
the boni, that had on several occasions shown itself strong enough to check 
Pompey, this balance was now severely upset. A number of powerful men had 
before been happy generally to align themselves with Crassus. They may 
not have found Cato's political company congenial, and at the same time 
been reluctant to form part of Porapey's following. Both Metellus Scipio 
and Ap.Claudius seem to fit this pattern. Scipio was an enemy of M.Cato, 
but had on the other hand certainly been close to a number of Pompey's 
opponents. In 70 he sided with Creticus and Hortensius in support of 
Verres. When Pius died in 63» he adopted Scipio in his will. In that 
same year Scipio was associated with Crassus, and later married his 
daughter to Crassus* son. The Claudii too were, after 61, essentially 
unfriendly to both Pompey and Cato, and P.Clodius certainly cooperated 
with Crassus. After the death of Crassus and his son Publius, Pompey 
married the latter*s widow, daughter of Scipio (Plut.Pomp.33.1). The
date of the msirriage alliance between Appius and Porapey is uncertain.
Dio implies that’it already existed in 34 (39*60.4), but Cicero makes no
mention of the relationship before 31 (Fam.3«7*3)» It would certainly 
fit the likely circumstances if both Appius and Scipio felt it necessary 
to form new ties with one of the surviving major powers in the state. As 
the republic drew to its close the gravitational attraction of the great 
dynasts became so strong that they proved eventually irresistible.
Catulus and Cato after him had provided the possibility of a loose 
association for those who resented the power of Porapey and were not strong 
enough to stand alone. Cato's own ambitions seem to have been limited by 
a notion of what he felt was right (cf.Dio 40,38). Crassus too had 
provided a relatively comfortable political fold, in which it was possible 
still to feel Independent. When Crassus was gone, Cato's faction 
ultimately proved too weak to stand alone and was forced to choose between 
Pompey and Caesar. In the disturbances that followed Clodius* murder, the 
boni had to turn to Porapey to restore order. They themselves had no 
authority. Cato and Bibulus were responsible for Porapey*s sole consulship 
(A8C.35f»C). One reason for this may well be that few of Crassus' former 
associates moved into the Catonian camp. The majority seem to have 
gravitated either to Caesar or to Porapey. Pompey's acquisition of Appius 
and Scipio has been noted. The anti Caesarian stance of L.Metellus, 
tribune in 49, may also be significant. He was probably a nephew of 
Creticus, Crassus* adfinis. On the other hand, M.Crassus, the younger son 
of the triumvir, stayed with Caesar in Gaul and sided with him in the 
Civil War, probably taking with him a deal of inherited support in the
lower ranks of the senate. The friends and allies of P.Clodius did not all
......................................................  • • ' • f10).follow Appius into Pompey»s camp. C.Cu'rio, no friend to Appius, joined
Caesar and led many of his own friends to <io the same, M.Caelius Rufus and
the Antonii among them, Q.Fufius Calenus, an ally of Clodius in 6l, was
with Caesar in 49» It has been suggested that L.Caesar may have been in
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fact originally close to Crassus, and have come to cooperate with Caesar 
because of this, rather than because they were distantly related.
Calvinus too may have been a friend of Crassus who later sided with Caesar, 
as did P.Sulla, Pompey’s brother-in-law. Caesar deliberately set out to 
renew Crassus* policy of encouraging those in trouble to look to him for 
help, and indeed it may have been Crassus* death that led him to engage 
in a vast programme to help build up his own support in all areas 
(Suet.Iul.26o2-28.l). Even the ranks of the boni were split.
Hortensius* son joined Caesar.
It may thus be that Crassus* death and the dispersal of his faction
created a considerable reshaping of the political scene. Before his
death there were essentially four major powers in the state, those of each
of the trumvirs, of whom Caesar was probably in political terms the wealcest,
and that of the boni led by Cato. After Crassus* death both Pompey and
Caesar increased considerably their strength, and the Catonians went into
a decline. It is often asserted that the oligarchy won over Pompey.
It would be fairer to say that many of them were at last forced to
acknowledge him as master, something Crassus had, for his own reasons,
helped to prevent for a long time. Slogans may have been used concerning
liberty and the republic, but the only question at issue was the name,
(11 )and perhaps style, of the future ruler. To assert that civil war 
followed because of Crassus* death might seem unreasonable, but that it was 
fought when it was, and by the two sides that fought it, inust be seen to 
be direct consequences of Crassus* death. Had he still been in the East, 
the political situation could never have developed as it did. . What would 
have ensued upon his successful return'is impossible to say, but it would 
seem unlikely that he could have continued to coexist peacefully with 
Pompey. If Porapey felt unable to accept Caesar as an equal in dignity, 
how much less tolerable would he have found Crassus? > ■
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It is interesting to observe, as something of an epilogue to
Crassus* career, the events of the year 27BC. M.Crassus, grandson of the
triumvir, had been consul in 50? and then governed Macedonia with
conspicuous military success for two years (Dio 31»25.2ff), returning to
claim both a triumph and the spolia opima, the latter a matter of almost
unprecedented glory and honour. The prospect of military honour going to
others did not at this time usually worry Octavian. Several triumphs
(12)are attested for the years after Actium. Nevertheless Crassus* claims 
clearly worried Octavian considerably. He contrived by a quibble, or 
even by forgery, to deny the spolia opima. He deprived Crassus of the 
title of imperator and added it to his own total (Dio 31,23.2), despite 
the fact that others of similar rank had been allowed the honour. Lastly 
he delayed Crassus* triumph until July 27BC. Meanwhile Octavian undertook 
a revision of his own constitutional standing, taking the title 
"Augustus" and other powers to mark himself off more distinctly from 
possible rivals (cf.Dio 33*11.3,33»17.1). He produced what was in effect
a new constitution in January 27» Crassus* triumph was held back until 
some time had elapsed after this. Why Octavian should have been 
galvanised into such a drastic reaction is unclear, but it is highly likely 
that the triumvir's grandson was heir to more than a name, and had
(13)inherited enough influence to malce him feared, even by Caesar Augustus,
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Appendix À Marriage and Children
Plutarch states that when one of Crassus* brothers died, he promptly 
married the widow. She was the mother of his children (Plut,Cr.1,l), 
and it would seem from Suetonius that her name was Tertulla (Suet.Iul.gO).
No gentilicium is given, and although it has been asserted that she came
(1)from the municipal aristocracy, there is no evidence to support this view*
Even Tertulla, simply a diminutive of Tertia, is only given by Suetonius
in a list of possible mistresses of Caesar, That he found her name thus
in whatever source he used could suggest either that to the source her
family was so well known that she required no further identification, or
(2)else so obscure that it did not matter. Cicero mentions, but does not 
name her, in his letter to Crassus, calling her "praestantissima omnium 
feminarum" (Fam.3»6,2)» That he does not, in the course of his effusive 
flattery, describe her as noble could suggest that she was not* Certainty 
is impossible.
It has sometimes been assumed that she was originally married to that 
brother of Crassus who died with his father in Sy^^^but it will be seen 
from the probable birth dates of Crassus* sons that this is unlikely, and 
that Tertulla*s first husband died earlier than 87. Plutarch certainly 
seems to imply that in 87 Crassus had only one brother (Cr.4.1)* Cicero 
may have been unsure on this point. He asked Atticus whether P.Crassus, 
the son of Venuleia, died before his father or after (12.2^ 2)* It has been 
suggested that Cicero was concerned here to find cases of paternal 
bereavement that he could use as parallels in, his Consolatio on the death 
of Tullia, If so, it is argued, P.Crassus cannot be the son who died 
with his father, as the father would hardly have had time to grieve* If 
however P.Crassus v/as the son who died earlier, then, as will be seen, he 
must have been the first husband of Tertulla; Cicero certainly knev/ the
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ages of Crassus* sons, and will therefore have been aware that the eldest 
was born before 87. He would not have needed to ask the question. It 
is possible that Cicero was concerned to use the deaths of P,Crassus and 
his father as an example of a father who did not in fact have to grieve. 
The exact details of their deaths are not clear in the sources, Cicero 
himself says twice that the father died by his own hand (Sest.48;De Or, 
3,10), Livy confirms this and adds that the son was killed first, by 
Fimbria*B cavalry (Per.80), Later sources who mention both deaths 
include Florus and Augustine who simply say that they were killed before 
one another's eyes (Floru8,2,9.l4;Aug.C,D.5.27)» Appian however does say 
that the father first killed his son, but was himself killed by their 
pursuers (BC,1*72), Livy *s account is probably correct, Cicero 
however may have been asking Atticus to confirm the precise order of 
events. There may already have been conflicting accounts.
It has often been asserted that of Crassus* two sons, Marcus was the 
e l d e r H e  was quaestor in 34 (Caes,BQ,3.24;MRR2.223), Publius has
(5)been thought to have been quaestor in 33- This would in any case cause 
one to doubt their relative ages. The only reason for thinking Marcus 
the elder is that he bore his father's praenomen» There are, however, 
other cases of such an apparent discrepancy, M.Cotta M.f., consul in 74, 
was clearly younger than his brother 0.Cotta, consul in 73, and 
Ap,Claudius Ap.f,, consul in 79 was younger than C.Claudius, consul in 92, 
It is assumed that in such cases an earlier child has died between the 
births of the apparently wrongly named pair.
If Crassus had .married Tertulla in 87, it would seem unlikely that 
three sons could have been born by 83, the latest date consistent with 
Marcus* quaestorship in 34, Publius certainly cannot have been born 
after 83, as at least from then until late 82, his father was away, in
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hiding or fighting for Sulla* Publius served under Caesar in Gaul from 
58 to 36, in 57 iu command of considerable forces, A birthdate in 81 or 
later would make him far too young for such responsibilities* If however 
it is assumed that Crassus could have married Tertulla well before 87, 
Publius could have been born early enough for his quaestorship to precede 
his post on Caesar*s staff, as it must have done if Dio is right in 
calling him a legate in 57 (39-31*2), It has been argued that he cannot 
have been a legate, as he was not quaestor until 55»^^ It might be better 
to argue that his quaestorship must be earlier, as he was legate* Caesar 
does not give him any title. In 38 Crassus was "adulescens, qui 
equitatui praeerat" in the battle against Ariovistus (^-1-33)» while in 37 
he commanded a legion in independent action (BG.2.34). In 36 Caesar 
entrusted him with a considerable force and a commission to subdue the 
bulk of one of Gaul's three parts, Aquitania (BG.3*20-7;Dio 39*46). It is 
clear that he was a trusted and senior commander, and must have been of 
senatorial rank to have held such a command. He was therefore quaestor 
by 38, just possibly in 38 itself, and therefore born by 89- He would 
thus seem to be the elder brother by anything up to four years. That 
interval would allow for the death of his ovm elder brother, Marcus, after 
which the next born son received that name- With Publius born by 89, and 
the first Marcus therefore by 90* it would seem probable that Tertulla's 
bereavement and second marriage took place in or before 91/90- The 
triumvir will have been twenty-four or five by that time, a perfectly
(7)possible age.
In view of these conclusions, it would perhaps appear surprising to 
find that the yodnger son, Marcus, seems to have married much earlier than 
his brother, Publius' wife, Cornelia, was the daughter of 
Q.Metellus Scipio- (Plut.Pomp.33-1-2;74.3)- Scipio's career is unlikely
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to have been delayed, and his consulship in 32 suggests a birthdate not 
long before 93- His daughter was probably born after 75* A reasonable 
date for the marriage might well be 33» the year of Crassus* second 
consulship, and probably that of Scipio*s praetorship, P,Crassus wintered 
in Gaul in 37/6, The winter of 38/7 remains possible, as does a date 
before 3^» Crassus had certainly been associated with Scipio as early as 
63 (Plut,Cic,13).
Marcus married the daughter of Q.Metellus Creticus (CIL.6,1274/lLS,881) 
Both Creticus and Scipio were involved in helping Verres in 70, the year of 
Crassus * first consulship. In that year Creticus stood successfully for 
the consulship, a circumstance that might suggest it as a suitable year for 
the marriage. In much this way Caesar married Calpurnia in 59» when he 
was consul, and her father L-Piso a consular candidate (Pint.Caes.14-5)«
So too Pompey himself married Scipio*s daughter at the same time as he 
elevated him to the consulship in 32 (Plut,Pomp,33)- If» however, Marcus 
was quaestor in 54 suo anno, he would have been only fifteen in 70, rather 
too young to marry, though a betrothal is possible* It has therefore 
been suggested that the marriage alliance took place later, perhaps near the 
time of Creticus* long delayed triumph, which Crassus may have helped him 
at last to celebrate in May 62 (MRR2.176) Crassus would then be seen
at work strengthening his ties with the nobility-after the damage done to 
his reputation in 63. This date, however, seems less likely when 
consideration is given to the probable birthdates of the son of this 
marriage and of his son. The triumvir's grandson was consul in 30, It
.has been suggested that since Augustus, had not by that date fixed the 
minimum age at thirty-three, the consul of 30 may have been yoxmgerl^^ In
fixing that minimum, Augustus was, however, lowering not raising it, in an 
attempt to reduce the importance of the office. Although there were
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exemptions, there seems no reason to doubt that the legal minimum in 30 
was still forty-three. Furthermore, while under-aged consuls were not 
unioaovm, it would seem unlikely that an excessively young man would have 
been entrusted with an important military command such as that of 
M.Crassus in Macedonia, He is thought to have governed Crete and Cyrene 
at some time between 37 and 35 (HRR2.397) » and to have served under 
Sex.Pompeius before 39 (Vell.2.77»3»App.BC.5»72;Dio 48.36.4). These 
considerations would make it likely that he had reached at least the 
quaestorship by about 37? and this in its turn would make it hard to place 
his birth much-later than 67* His own son, consul in 14, was probably 
born by 47, if Augustus' rule, then in force, was applied. In view of 
these considerations, it must be concluded that the marriage of the 
triumvir's son, Marcus, cannot be placed much later than 67» and probably 
came earlier. Creticus was absent from Rome from 68 to about 63. The 
only obstacle to a dating in 70 or 69 is the presumption that Marcus was 
quaestor suo anno in 34 and so born in 85, Since it has been demonstrated 
that Publius was probably born by 89, there is ample time for Marcus to 
have been born in 88 or 87. This would incidentally increase the 
probability that Crassus was in fact away from Rome from 87 onwards, as one 
of the arguments for his leaving only in 83 is the supposed birth of his 
son, or even sons, between those dates. 70 or 69 therefore seems 
finally the most probable date.
That the elder son seems to have married so much earlier than the 
younger need not cause doubt or concern. It is only by the chance of a • 
discovered inscription that we are aware of Marcus' marriage'"at all.
Indeed Publius * marriage is referred to by the sources only because his 
iiddow married Pompey. It is highly likely that Publius was married 
before his union with Cornelia, and that his first marriage ended in death
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or divorce. It is possible that an inscription found in the sepulchre 
of the Crassi may commemorate a daughter of such a marriage;
"Licinia P.f. Galli (uxor)" (GIL.6.21308).
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Appendix B Wealth and Areas of Influence
Crassus was proverbial for his riches. Pliny called him
"Quiritium post Sullam diyitissimus", and cited a figure of 200,000,000
sesterces for Crassus' possessions "in agrls" (NH.33*134)» This would
seem to mean that this was the estimated value of his holdings in land*
Another figure is given by Plutarch, who says that Crassus inherited
300 talents, but that, on the eve of his departure for Parthia, found that
(1)he was worth 7,100 talents* These figures are approximately
7,200,000 and 170,400,000 HS« That his inherited fortune was not vast
is shown by the probability that the minimum census requirement for a
(2)senator seems to have been 1,000,000 H8 in the late Republic, and by some 
of the sums paid for houses at this time. P.Clodius spent l4,800,000 HS 
(Pliny,m.36.103), and M.Messalla Niger, 13,400,000 Eg (Cic.Att.1.13»6)
A generation earlier, P.Crassus* propinquus, L*Crassus had a house that 
cost 6,000,000 HS, almost as much as P.Crassus® entire fortune (Pliny,NH. 
17-2.3?Val.Max*9»1-4)* Despite the great increase shown by Plutarch's 
two figures, however, it is highly probable that at least his second’is far 
too low* It is appreciably lower than Pliny's figure, which does not 
even purport to relate to more than one part of Crassus' total wealth. 
According to Plutarch, Crassus owned countless silver mines, the greater 
part of the housing in Rome, and, surpassing all his other possessions, 
great numbers of valuable slaves (Cr*2.3)« .
An interesting indication of the dimensions of Crassus* fortune may 
be found in his often quoted assertion that no man might consider himself , 
rich unless he could support some body of soldiers from his.income. This 
force is described variously, as one legion (Pliny,NH.33-134), an army 
(Plut.Cr.2*7), an array (Cic.Off.1.23), and an array of six legions 
(Cic.Parad.8t.43). It has been asserted that the most precise and accurate
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version is Pliny's, but this is clearly not so. Cicero had actually 
heard Crassus* boast, and clearly relates it to an army considerably
(4)larger than Pliny's one legion. It might be worthwhile considering
if Crassus could have fulfilled his boast. It has been estimated that a
legionary received then about 480 HS a year, and that a legion therefore
(5)cost about 3,000,000 a year. Allowing for additional expenses such 
as food and equipment this is not incompatible with the 24,000,000 sesterces 
a year received by Pompey to support six legions in Spain (Plut.Caes.28.3; 
Pomp.33.7)- Ibis would bring the annual cost of a legion to 
4,000,000 HS. If the largest army quoted is considered, it will be seen 
that an income of at least 24,000,000 HS would be needed to support six 
legions. The capital needed to produce such an income is not easy to 
assess. One estimate, based on the likely return from investments in 
land, suggests that each legion would need property worth 70,000,000 
sestercesl^^ On the other hand, other kinds of investment brought in 
much greater profits. At 10^, less than the legal maximum interest, a 
legion would need capital of 40,000,000 HS. Six legions would therefore 
need property worth somewhere between 420,000,000 HS and 240,000,000 HS.
The lower figure is appreciably greater than Plutarch's statement of 
Crassus* total wealth. Even Pliny's figure would suggest that Crassus* 
assets "in agris" must indeed have been greatly supplemented in other 
ways.
The reference by Cicero to six legions is not clear. ' He says that 
Crassus has been- heard to assert that no one is rich unless he can support 
an''army on his income (Parad.St.43) * Cicero goes on to say that it 
therefore follows that Crassus will -never be rich until his ihcome is 
great enough to support six legions with all their auxiliaries and cavalry. 
Therefore, he concludes,. Crassus admits that he is not rich as he falls
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short of his own aspirations. Six legions was in no way a standard army;
a consular command was traditionally two legions. It is unlikely that
Cicero can be making any reference to the troops Crassus commanded in
Parthia, The Paradox, even though perhaps written after Carrhae, has a
dramatic date clearly at some point when Crassus was in Rome, as it
purports to address him (See Appendix C). It has been suggested that the
reference may be to Crassus* command against Spartacus, when he took over
the armies of the defeated consuls and added to them six new legions
(App.BC.1.118). In 72 the state's finances must have been sorely
depleted, with wars being waged in Spain, Macedonia, and Asia, and with the
reduction of revenue particularly from Asia. In such a situation Crassus
could have offered to recruit and pay for the legions himself, with a view 
(7)to later repayment. Cicero's argument could seem to imply that Crassus 
had not been able to perform this feat. On the other hand his point 
might be that Crassus, who was wont to make such a boast, had not, when 
the opportunity offered itself, tried to prove his point. At any rate 
the fact that such a feat was spoken of does show that, even in 72,
Crassus* fortune had grown vastly since he received his inheritance.
Such growth does not tend to stop, but rather accelerates, making Plutarch's 
figure for Crassus' total assets in 55 dwindle into meaningless 
insignificance. It is possible that, this figure may represent something 
else, such as the sum Crassus reckoned he could at that moment realise in 
immediate cash. He could indeed have already done something of the kind 
to provide a "float" for his forthcoming.campaigns.
As has been observed, Pliny states that Crassus was the richest Roman 
"post Sullam", presumably meahing in the generation after Sulla, and then 
goes on to say that Claudius*, freedmen were richer (NH.33*154)» This claim
has been doubted, and some have suggested that Porapey, after his Eastern
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campaigns, was as rich. It has even been asserted that Pompey could have
(8)bought out Crassus without noticing. Indications of Pompey *s wealth are 
ambiguous. In 44 the senate voted to return his fortune to his son 
Sextus (Cic.Phil.13«10-12;App.BC.3*4;Dio 43.10.6). Appian gives a figure 
of 200,000,000 HS. Cicero says 700,000,000 HS, but this figure is thought 
to have been corrupted, from one corresponding to Appian's, by Cicero's 
frequent assertions elsewhere in these speeches that Antony has 
embezzled a sum of 700,000,000 HS. This larger figure may refer to the 
total reparations offered to Pompeians (cf.Cic.Phil.1.17;2.93)« In 39
Sextus was only offered 70,000,000 HS (Dio 43-36.3). It would seem 
however that the offer in 44 was 200,000,000 HS, but this may represent 
what the remains of Pompey's estate were worth in 44, rather than an attempt 
to match his fortune in, say, 30.
Another attempt, not to put a figure on Pompey's.whole fortune, but
merely to indicate its vast dimensions, has been to consider just one
financial transaction in which he was engaged. He was supposed to receive
9,600,000 HS a year in interest from Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia (Att.6.1.3)»
IVhat interest rate obtained is not clear, but the capital involved must
have been considerable. 12% was the legal maximum, and if that was the
rate here, the capital debt would be 80,000,000 HS. This certainly shows
(9)that Pompey's investments were made on a vast scale. Since it has been 
shown that Crassus' .fortune almost certainly came to something considerably 
in excess of 200,000,000 HS, it becomes absurd to speak of either man 
buying out the other without noticing it. They were both fabulously rich.
. It would seem from the very scanty data'’-that Crassus* money was 
invested rather differently. About his lands' we know little, though it is 
possible to speculate that he.may have had holdings in the South of Italy, 
especially in Lucania. His father held command there in the Social War,
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fighting with little success against Laraponius (App.BC.1»41), who at one 
point suggested settling the matter by single combat (Diodorus 37-23)*
This could suggest that P.Crassus was sent to Lucania because he had 
influence in the region, just as Ch.Porapeius Strabo operated in his own 
region of Picenum, and that this led to Lamponius' proposal to resolve the 
affair on a personal basis. P,Crassus enfranchised one,
Heracliensis Alexas (Cic.Balb.30), probably in connection with his 
operations in Lucania at this time^^^^ This impression might seem a little 
strengthened by the fact that Crassus took many of his soldiers for his 
Eastern campaigns from Lucania (Pliny MH.2.147)- Connections with the 
South of Italy and local knowledge could have helped Crassus secure his 
command against Spartacus, since almost all his fighting took place there.
No other area in Italy can be connected with Crassus, even so 
tenuously as this. Horace writes of Marsian and Apulian prisoners in 
Parthia after Carrhae (Odes 3*5-9)* Crassus had earlier been sent by 
Sulla to raise troops amongst the Marsi (Plut.Cr.6.2). Sulla's refusal
of a living escort, and his reference to Crassus' father, brother and kin 
(Plut.Cr.6,3), may be, as is usually assumed, an attempt to shame and 
inspire Crassus, On the other hand, Sulla could have been suggesting the 
slogan and arguments Crassus should use. If the family was well known 
and liked in the area, reference to the wrongs done them could have proved . 
a rallying call against the Cinnani. In the course of Sulla's conquest 
of Italy, Crassus seems to have operated with Pompey, mainly in the North, 
in Umbria and Picenum (App.BC.1.90;Plut.Cr.6.3), but there is nothing to 
indicate that he had any prior connections with those regions. Although 
he is said to have embezzled the spoils of Tuder, in Umbria (Plut.Cr.6.3), 
the only place where he is reported to have acquired property is again in 
the South, in Bruttium (Plut.Cr.6.7)- It can be seen, however, that there
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is little evidence for the location of Crassus* Italian estates and 
influence, except for the possibility that he had connections with the
(11 )extreme South, particularly Lucania,
Of provinces where Crassus may have had interests, Spain must be 
considered first. Until his father exercised proconsular imperium in 
Further Spain, the family's only connection with the province would seem 
to be the refusal of Crassus' great-grandfather to take up his command 
there in I76 (Livy 41.15,9-10;42,32,1-3)* His father, consul in 97» 
governed the province for some four years, at the end of which he 
celebrated a triumph de Lusitaneis (MRR2.13), During that time, he must 
have established a considerable personal following, since his son, who 
served with him, was later able to raise a private force to oppose the 
Cinnan authorities (Plut.Cr.6,1), The location of his hiding place,
. before he emerged on the news of Cinna's death, is unknown, but is likely 
to have been in the more Romanised part of the country. The only place 
mentioned in connection with M,Crassus' Spanish campaign in the 80s is 
Malaca, which he is said to have denied sacking (Plut.Cr.6.I). These two
considerations make it likely that P.Crassus may have acquired influence 
over a greater part of Spain than his actual province. During his 
command, Nearer Spain was governed by T.Didius, consul in 98. The two 
men celebrated their triumphs within two days of one another in 93 
(MRR2.15)» which could suggest that their campaigns were considered 
essentially one war, and that a good deal of cooperation may have talcen 
place. Similarly it would seem that in the 70s Metellus Pius governed. 
Further Spain, and Pompey, when he arrived, Nearer Spain, but they 
certainly did not restrict their activities to their own provinces.
M.Crassus showed an interest in Spain later when he was involved in the
' (12)move to send Cn.Piso to Nearer Spain (Sail« Cat.19■1).
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Consideration of Spain leads one to think of the countless silver 
mines Crassus is said to have owned (Plut.Cr.2.6). Spain was famous for 
its metals, and in particular for its silver, A much disputed passage of 
Strabo tells of P.Crassus who sailed to the Cassiterides, ten islands 
productive of lead and tin, reached from the port of the Artabri across a
greater width of sea than that separating Britain from Gaul, and that he
sent back a report to the senate which included details of mining methods 
and instructions concerning the journey (3*5.11)- Some have tried to 
identify this P.Crassus with the triumvir's son who served under Caesar in 
Gaul, but there is no mention by Caesar of such an exploit, and he v/as 
generous in his praise of his legate, Strabo's man seems to have reported 
to Rome; Caesar's legate would have reported to Caesar, In any case, 
Strabo specifically says that the journey v/as made from North-West Spain,
It is interesting to note that Poseidonius, v/ho travelled in Spain early 
in the first century BG, is reported by Strabo to have described the
country of the Artabri as productive of silver (Strabo 3*2,9).
It would seem therefore that Crassus' father operated in North-West
Spain and took an interest in the mining of metals, and that that area v/as
stated by a contemporary to be rich in silver. There may well be some
connection between these facts and Plutarch's statement that Crassus owned
TrdjUTroAAot (Cr.2,6). It seems, likely that the
mines in Macedonia, the other great source of silver, were largely ■
(13)exhausted well before this time. On the other hand the mines at 
New Carthage were still flourishing. . In-Polybius* time they had yielded
100,000 H£ a day for the state (34.9)» but by Strabo's time of writing 
they were no longer state owned but were in private hands (3*2,10). The 
gold mines alone still belonged to the state. It has been suggested that 
Sulla may have sold the silver mines'off to Crassus^^^^ One hitherto
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overlooked, and anyv/ay tenuous, link with Crassus may be seen in an 
inscription on a lead ingot, foünd near the mines, which reads,
"M, P. RQSCIËIS, M.F. MAiq?' (CIL.2.3439)» and is thought to date from the 
first half of the first century BC. This shows the involvement in the 
mining of two brothers named Roscius, Tifo brothers of that name served 
under Crassus in Parthia, and were employed by him as envoys to Surenas 
(Plut.Cr.31»2). Perhaps they had earlier helped to manage the 
New Carthage mines for him.
Crassus' other principal sources of income included housing and slaves. 
Plutarch's well known story of how Crassus bought up property that was on 
fire or near the scene of a fire does not in fact say that he had a
private fire brigade, as is sometimes supposed, but rather that he had a
force of over five hundred skilled architects and builders, whom he used 
to rebuild the burnt down property (Plut.Cr.2,4). No doubt in some cases 
they would be able to use their skills to prevent the spread of the fire, 
by demolishing buildings in its path. It has been suggested that a ban 
on the destruction and rebuilding of dilapidated property, unless bought 
in that poor condition, may have made it difficult to find sites for
(15)development, and that this may have necessitated Crassus* practice;
Crassus was a great builder and repairer, but is said to have built only 
one house for himself, and to have stated that those who were fond of 
building needed no other enemies than themselves (Plut.Cr.2 . 3 ) .
Clearly he meant by this building for show and personal use rather than
for profit. He was certainly a prolific builder (cf.Plut.Cat.19-8)- 
It is interesting to observe the'lack of evidence for Crassus* possession 
of any country villas, particularly in the Bay of Naples where so many
(17)other and poorer Romans of his day took their leisure. Cicero ovmed 
seven villas in addition to his town house (Cic.Phil.2,40).
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Plutarch claims that Crassus came to own the greater part of Rome 
(Cr.2,4)= In other words he did not buy or build in order to sell, but 
presumably in order to rent out his property. The income from this 
cannot be known but must have been vast, Sulla, in his youth a poor 
man for a noble, had paid 3,000 H£ a year for his apartment, while a 
freedman on the floor above paid 2,000 HS (Plut, Sulla 1.2), Later 
M.Caelius Rufus paid his friend Clodius 10,000 HS for his apartment on 
the Palatine (Cic,Cael.17)« At the lower end of the scale, it has been 
estimated that in the first century BC an unskilled labourer could not 
have afforded more than 3^0 H S ^ I n  view of the vast increase in the 
urban, population during the second and first centuries BG, any landlord 
controlling most, or even a great part, of the city's housing accommodation 
would have received an immense income, probably far outweighing that from 
his agricultural land.
Both Crassus' mining activities and his building will have been to 
some extent connected with what Plutarch describes as the most valuable of 
all his assets, his slaves (Cr.2.3)» Plutarch in fact only refers here 
to his skilled slaves, distinguishing them from the labourers on his 
estates, which he implies were slave^worked, and also from the slaves in 
the mines. Polybius is quoted by Strabo to the effect that the 
New Carthage mines were worked by 40,000 miners (Strabo 3*2.10), Crassus
owned highly trained readers, secretaries, silver-smiths, table- servants 
and stewards. He himself supervised,their training (Plut.Cr.2.6).
Whether this was done for his ovm benefit, or rather as a commercial 
exercise, producing highly trained slaves for the market, in unclear. 
Perhaps both motives were involved.
Crassus is reported away from Italy only once between the Civil Wars 
of the 80s and his Parthian venture, and that is when he sailed from Aenus
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in Thrace to Asia in 62 (CiCoFlacc.32)° It has been thought likely that 
this journey was concerned with his hopes of establishing an understanding 
with Pompey, but it has also been suggested that he may have gone on a 
fact-finding mission in connection with the Asian tax contract that was 
likely to be up for auction the following year (Dio 37*46.4;Cic.Att.1.17*9; 
18.8;2.1.11)^^^^ This may indeed have been the ostensible reason for his 
journey* That this was Crassus* only venture outside Italy is unlikely.
He probably took a personal interest in his Spanish concerns, and other 
overseas investments.
Other, less reputable, sources of income are mentioned by Cicero in 
the Stoic Paradoxes (See below. Appendix C). Crassus is accused of 
robbing the treasury, defrauding socii (either allies of the state or 
business partners could be meant), lying in wait for friends' wills, or 
even slipping in forged ones, taking money for helping clients in court, 
bleeding the provinces dry through his freedmen, evicting his neighbours by 
force, land grabbings, and general corruption, selling his influence in the 
senate and elsewhere. The foundation of his fortune is said by both 
Cicero (Parad.St.43) and Plutarch (Cr.2.3) to have been the Sullan 
proscriptions, in which he bought up all the confiscated property he could, 
and is said to have added at least one name to the list himself. The 
accusation of forged wills occurs twice in the Paradox, and again once in 
the De Officiis (3*75,75)» where Crassus does not actually forge them, but 
does not object to being a beneficiary of the forgeriep of others.
Income from housing rents, agricultural land, mining, and the sale of 
slaves, would thus seem to represent the bulk of Crassus' wealth, though 
he will no doubt have had numerous other interests and investments, 
particularly in public contracts of various sorts. In these latter he 
would, as a senator, have had to act through agents. Even the most
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general guess at the total wealth represented is impossible, but it has 
been shoi-m that no hasty assumptions should be made on the basis of one 
figure in Plutarch, and that Crassus may well have been indeed 
"Quiritium post Sullam divitissimus".
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Appendix C Cicero's "In Crassum*'
Reference has been made, on more than one occasion in this study, to 
Cicero's sixth Stoic Paradox, which seems to consist of an attack on 
Crassus, just as the second and fourth clearly concern P.Clodius. Crassus 
is not named, but it is clear from Cicero's reference to the famous boast, 
that no man is rich unless he can pay for an army (Parad.St.43), that 
Crassus is meant, Cicero himself attributes this boast to Crassus elsewhere 
(Off.1.23).
The paradoxes are preceded by a dedicatory preface in which Cicero
explains to M.Brutus that the work was undertaken for his own amusement,
"ludens" (Parad.St,3), as an experiment in which he will try to deal in
rhetorical fashion with subjects that might be considered more suitable for
philosophical treatment, which usually implied the dialogue form he employed
for his other philosophical works. Although Cicero does not mention it,
he owes much of this idea to the Cynic diatribe, which was itself a fusion
of the philosophical dialogue and the rhetorical monologue. It was in
outward form a rhetorical monologue, but was philosophical in content, and
preserved traces of the dialogue in an imaginary interlocutor and his
(l )supposed objections.
Cicero's Paradoxes have this form, and appear to be speeches, in some 
cases speeches attacking an individual, whose reactions and objections are 
apparently noted. This resemblance to speeches, and the attacks in the 
second and fourth paradoxes on Clodius, and in the sixth on Crassus, have 
.led some scholars to assume that they were written when their targets were 
alive. Others think that these targets; and probably Hortensius and 
Lucullus in the fifth, were simply chosen sis exemplars of the false beliefs 
attacked.*
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One writer who may have thought the paradoxes actual speeches is 
Plutarch. He quotes the boast mentioned above (Plut.Cr.2.?), and while 
it is possible that he could have found this elsewhere, in Cicero's 
de Officiis, in Pliny, or some other unknown source, there are several 
reasons to suppose that he was familiar with the Paradox. He describes an 
exchange between Crassus and Cicero, in which Crassus expressed his approval 
of the Stoic doctrine that the good man is always rich. Cicero suggested 
that perhaps he was thinking of the doctrine that all things belong to the 
wise (Plut.Cic.23.4)» Such an exchange not only suimnarises the whole of
the apparent debate in the Paradox, but contains two Stoic doctrines that
n c /  t  c \combined make up the title of the Paradox 0~TL ju,o\?oj 0 craéoK
'TTAOVO'LO^  .This passage from Plutarch's biography of Cicero is only one of 
a series of quips and exchanges that he attributes to Cicero, and it could 
be that all of them came from Tiro's collection of such material.
A third passage, however, does clearly suggest that Plutarch had either 
read the Paradox, or had had it "digested" for him by a helper, and had 
assumed it to be a speech.
In his Comparison of Crassus and Nicias, Plutarch refers to certain 
practices that Crassus denied when on trial. These include: (i) taking 
bribes for his support in the senate; (ii) wronging the allies;
(iii) Circumventing weak women with flattery; (iv).aiding base men to cloak 
their iniquities (Comp.Gr.et Nic.1.2). Of these, (i), (ii) and (iv) are 
among the charges in the Paradox (43,46). It is interesting to note that
II / ""socios" in the Paradox is rendered, perhaps wrongly, crn/fAfAcLj^ ov^  
in Plutarch; Cicero may have been referring rather to business partners.
The absence of the third charge from the Paradox, and its presence in 
Plutarch, are easily explained, as the only trial of Crassus of which 
Plutarch shows any knowledge is his indictment for incest in 73» He says
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that Crassus had been trying to induce the Vestal Licinia to sell him a 
villa at a low price, and that he had been hovering about her and paying 
court to her for this reason. It is clear therefore that for Plutarch the 
chief accusation in Crassus’ trial was this charge of flattering weak 
women. It would seem that when Plutarch came across the Paradox, which 
bears a close resemblance to a criminal accusation, he assumed it to be 
precisely that. He knew of only one occasion on which Crassus had to 
answer charges of any kind, and therefore inferred that this must have been 
the occasion on which the speech was delivered. Such reasoning and its 
probable causes may throw some light on Plutarch’s knowledge of Latin, and 
his methods of working.
How wrong Plutarch was is not certain. The date of the composition of 
the preface to the Paradoxes is easily established: the Spring of 46,
between the publication of the Brutus and the arrival in Rome of the news 
of Cato’s death, and at a time when the nights were growing shorter- It 
does not, however, follow that the six pieces themselves were all composed 
then. Cicero may have had at least some of them by him, -and have 
decided to work them into a publishable whole. Plutarch’s assumptions 
could have been partly justified by the prior existence of the sixth 
Paradox as a polemic against Crassus. It may even have survived 
separately as such. Some of the more personal sections of the second, 
fourth, and sixth Paradoxes-are surprisingly irrelevant if composed in their 
existing context in 46. It is not impossible that Cicero made use of 
older material, published or unpublished, and merely increased the 
abstract and philosophical elements to serve his later purpose.
■ It is interesting to note that Plutarch mistook another work by Cicero 
for a speech. He says that Cicero • ' Ti-VU Xoyu , openly
accused Crassus and Caesar of being involved in the Catilinarian Conspiracy,
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This speech he says was not published until after both were dead 
(Plut-Cr.13*3)» This would seem to be a reference to Cicero’s
posthumous expositio, de consiliis suis, which was certainly not a speech 
(cf.Asc.83c).
The Paradox as we have it does not contain any specific details that 
would permit the establishment of a dramatic date. As it stands, even 
without the philosophic form possibly added in 46, it could not have been 
delivered at Crassus* trial, as that took place in 73» and his use of the 
six legions mentioned was not until late 72- It would be intriguing to 
speculate on the possibility, however, that this too was an addition, and 
that Plutarch could have been right. Cicero as prosecutor of Crassus in 
73 would indeed be an interesting notion, but, alas, unlikely.
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Ch. I
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9. On official attitudes under Augustus towards the chief actors of the late Republic see Syme, RR 53-5 and 317-21.
10. Besides his own writings, Cicero was the subject of at least twobiographies after his death, one by Tiro, the other byCornelius Nepos. The latter also added to the numerous biographies of Cato.
11. See the strange reasoning of C.E.Stevens, Latomus 1955, 14-21, who argues that Crassus planned to conquer Britain from Spain in order to get his hands on British gold,
12. Although the quotation concerning the maintenance of an army isfound in tlib De Officiis (1.25), it is repeated in theStoic Paradoxes in almost identical words (Parad.St.6.45).
13. As already noted, a fairly lengthy anecdote is taken from Fenestella.He was regarded as a special authority for the Ciceronian periodand is cited as such by.Asconius. He y/rote a history down to about 57 B.C., dhd probably also antiquities after the manner of . Varro. It is not certain whether the anecdotes attributed to him were taken from his history or from other writings. If the former it must have been a strange work.
14. So Gabba, RSI 1957, 317ff.
. 15. So Miller, Cassius Dio 84-5; cf. Strasburger, Caesars Eintritt 27.• ' • 'It is not certain however» that Cordus* work went back far enough. '. . . . He dealt.with, the civil wars and praised Brutus and Cassius.
- 251
Notes to pages 1 1 - 2 0
Ch. I
l6e So Strasburger concerning Sallust: Caesars Eintritt 24f. Polliois first noted as a participant in public affairs in 4-9 (MRR 2,266).
17- Although it is often asserted that Cordus was prosecuted for hispraise of Brutus and Cassius, it seems far more likely that a more serious offence was involved,.cf. R.S.Rogers, TAPA I965, 551-9»
Ch. II
1. Cf. G.V. Sumner, Orators in Cicero*s Brutus, 3-10, I5I-6O; 
A.E.Douglas, ^  ïÿéé", 576-95»
2. A.E.Douglas, AJP 1966, 295»
3» Sumner, Orators in Brutus, 122-3» The present argument owes muchto that work, though Sumner is not responsible for the conclusions here drawn about the possible significance of aequalitas.
4. Cf. Mommsen, StR I 3^d ed. 506-7»
5» For Cinna's death see App.BC 1.78»
6. It has been suggested that Q.Catulus who had also lost a fatherremained quietly in Rome during the dominatio Cinnae, neither hiding nor joining Sulla in the East: Badian, JRS 1962, 52-3» It hasbeen shown however that Catulus was almost certainly to be found in the East at this time: B.L.Twyman, A & N , 1.1, 836 n.106 on aninscription published by B.D.Merrit in Hesp 1954, 254-5» Badian, op.cit. 54, admits that Crassus was away from Rome. It has been doubted by Garzetti, Ath 1941.l4; Ward, Crassus 54-7»
7» In favour of direct promotion by Sulla: Hill, PCA, 1951,64;CQ 1952, 170-7» Of. Gabba, Ath 1956, 124. In favour of a quaestorship: Deloiatel, Vita 10; Gelzer, RE I3.I, 302,
8, T.A.Dorey believes that the pro Roscio Amerino was aimed indirectlyat Crassus: Ciceroniana 2, 196Q, 147-8 contra: W.V.Harris,Rome In Etruria and Umbria, 274 n.2.
9. Contra: Ward, Crassus 67-8; Garzetti, Ath 1941,17»
10, First suggested by T.J.Cadoux, G & R 1956, 154 n.5, who favoured an aedileship.
11, Certain for curule aedile: Mommsen StR I 3^ ’d ed. 528. Probablefor plebeian aedile.' Mommsen StR I 3rd ed, 552-3®
12, There are indeed several examples of this. The closest in dateand nature to- this case is perhaps that of M.Antonius Creticus, praetor 74, whose imperium against the pirates was almost certainly proconsular: MRR 2.101, I08; cf. Livy Per. 96,97»
15- Appian *s three year.s require that the war should have broken out in74. The indications in all other sources are that it did not do so until 75» Appian laiew that Crassus defeated Spartacus in 7I• < » * • • r $ * * * # ' ^ . * ' ' * * ' ' • • * *and probably assumed that he commenced his command then.
l4. Cfo Mommsen, StR II 3rd ed. I69»
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15» For Plutarch»s debt to Sallust see: H.Peter, Die Quellen Plutarchsin den Biographien Romer, 6l-5, 108j B.Maurenbrecher,C.Sallusti Crispi Historiarum Reliquiae I, 27-31, 48; G.Rathke,De Romanis Beilis ServilibusV 49-62,
l6. So Broughton, MRR 2.110,121; Ward, Crassus 82, 85 n«7, advancingno reasons for preferring 73 to 74; of. Shatzman, Ath I968, 349; Badian, Ath 1970, 6-7; Marshall, Ath 1973, 109-21 adds nothing.
17® So by implication Broughton, MRR 2.121, since he does not suggestthat Crassus was privatus before assuming the command.
18. Cf. Balsdon, 1939, 61.
19» E.g. Ward, Crassus 67-8, 82 and n.84, 85-6 n.7o
20. Mommsen, StR J 3rd ed. 705f«; cf. Greenidge, RPL I81.
21. Hardy, The Catilinarian Conspiracy 22-3-
22. They sponsored a measure to give Pompey the right to confer the citizenship (Cic.Balb.19,32-3)» They showed themselves hostile to |C.Verres (Cic.Verr.2.2.94-8). They both served as Pompeian legates iunder the lex Gabinia (MRR2. l48 ). Clodianus was one of the fourconsulars who supported the lex Manilla (Cic.Leg.Man.68). Of. Syme, 44,66; Badian, EC 280-1; Gruen, Hist 1969, 85. Gellius hadchanged his mind by the 50s, but so had many of Pompey *s adherents(Plut.Cic.26.3;Cic.QF 2.1.1).
23* Cf. Wiseman, C^ 1967, 164-7»
24. Cf. C.Henderson,Jnr. CJ 1957/8, 195ff*
25» Cf. .MRR 2.128, 130 n.4. This bill was clearly concerned withclearing up the debris of the civil wars of the 70s, and may wellbe part of Pompey*s new-found attitude of clemency (cf.Plut.Pomp. 20.4). This impression is strengthened by the likelihood that this same man proposed an agrarian measure to help settle Pompey*s Spanish troops. Almost all loiown-Plotii or Plantii show Pompeian connections. Cf. P»27, and n.gy below.
26. For Catiline*s connections with Catulus see MÜnzer, RE 13-2083,
2087.
27. The A.Plautius who was a Pompeian tribune in 56«and then praetor in 51 is usually identified with the legate of 67. It is objected that a second tribunate is unlikely: Ward, Crassus 75 n.6l. Theman’s career.seems in any case to have progressed slowly. In 67 he was at least quaestorius. In 56 Pompey urgently needed friendly tribunes and to that end may have helped to resurrect Plotius* cursus; cf. R.E.Smith, ^  1957, 85 u.67.
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28. One other Plotius should be noted for completeness: C.Plotius,legate, perhaps under L.Valerius Flaccus, in Asia (MRR2.177)®
29* For a development of the idea of a Claudio-Metellan factionincluding such men as Pompey, the Luculli, the Claudii, Pius,Celer, and Nepos, see: B.L.Twyman, A & N 1.1, 816-874, esp.
853-62; cf. Gruen, ^  1971, 1-16.
30. Cf. Astin, Aemilianus 93-4; Earl, Ti.Gracchus 69-78, 96.
31 » Contra; Z. Rubinsohn, Hist 1970, 624-7, who believes that theconsuls were in no way disgraced and must have connived at their replacement; cf. Marshall, Ath 1973, 115-21.
32. Ward, Crassus 78, suggests that Plutarch here missed a word play onfaenum-hay, and faenerator-money-lender, and that Sicinius may have been financially indebted to Crassus.
33* Cf. Badian, Hist 1963, 137-8; Wiseman, New Men in the Roman Senate 
237-8.
Ch. Ill
1. B.Rawson shows that this acknowledged achievement is likely to have been arranged in direct competition with Pompey*s triumph:Antichthon 1970, 30-37, contra; Badian, Roman Imperialism 8l, who would place Crassus* celebration in 55.
2. W.C.McDermott, CP 1977, 49-52, argues that the law bore Pompey*sname alone. Cf. Ward, Latomus 1970, 66; Crassus 4l.
3. Cf. M.Gelzer, Pompeius l68 ff and n.70.
4. The second interpretation of the linguistic point is rightly takenby M.I.Henderson, JRS 1952, 115, and R.Seager, JRS 1972, 53-8., Mommsen, HR 4, 86, clearly favours the first approach.
5. Cf. Badian, FC 249-51 ; Gruen, RPCC 254, 277-8; LGRR 6-46.
6. . Cf. Ward, Crassus .8-45. The kind of reasoning here attackedpermeates throughout Ward’s otherwise admirable book. Serviceunder Sulla or a conservative attitude are for him enough to consider any man a card-carrying optimate.
7. Contra: R.Seager, Hommages Renard, 2.680-6, who believes that the Cottae suffered for their espousal of popular causes.
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8. Cf. LoS.Taylor, PPAC 103-6, 2l8 n.24, in an otherwise eccentric account of the Verres case.
9. This conclusion is convincingly argued by J.Linderski,Melanges Michalowski, 523-6.
10. Rubinsohn, Hist 1970, 624-7, and Marshall, ^  1973, 115-21, argue that the censorship for Gellius and Clodianus was part of a bargain struck with Crassus in 72, whereby they acquiesced in his taking the command. Crassus can however hardly have been in a position to promise such a thing in 72.
11. The exact relationship is uncertain. Valeria, Sulla’s last wife, was daughter of a Messalla and Hortensius' " "(Plut.Sulla 33*4). It has been suggested that Plutarch is wronghere because Val.Max.5.9*2 makes Messalla Rufus, cos. 53, Hortensius’ nephew. The matter is discussed by B.L.Twyman, A & N1.834 and n.80. Gruen, LGRR 335 n.1l6, states that Niger v/as Valeria's brother and therefore presumably half-brother or cousin . to Hortensius. He also states that Rufus was Hortensius’ nephew, p.268. While the precise relationship between the two Messallae is uncertain, it is likely to be sufficiently close for both Plutarch and Valerius Maximus to be right. Cf. Broughton MRR Supp, 65-6; Münzer, Gent.Val. 52, nos.55-7 and n.3*
.12. On this censorship see; Willems, Le Sénat 1,417-20; Suohlahti,The Roman Censors 457-64.
13. Wiseman, ^  1969, 59-75.
14. L.R.Taylor, PPAC 101-10; of. Gruen, AJP 1971, 10.
15® E.g. Badian, FC 282ff; Ward, Crassus 42-5*
16. Contra; Gruen, AJP 1971, 10-12.
17- L.R.Taylor, PPAC IO3-6; cf. Holmes, RR I, 165 who also seesCrassus behind the compromise. Ward, Crassus 107-8,on the other hand believes that Pompey was for moderate reform and Crassus for the extreme measure.
18. Gruen, conversely, uses this supposed homogeneity to try todemonstrate that Pompey was not involved in the Verres case;AJP 1971, 12 : ’’Pompeius Magnus had no quarrel with the Metellanclan,”
19. Garzetti, Ath 1942, 17-19; L.R. Taylor, PPAC 219, n-44, seems to have reached the .right probable conclusion, but by a most devious route. Contra; Ward, Crassus 107-8, who is influenced by notions of Crassus' equestrian constituency.
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1, Cf. Holmes, RR 1.166.
la. See Broughton’s discussion in MRR 2.131 n.6. He implies that theconsuls of 70 would be less liltely to favour Lucullus than their successors. This is of course to prejudge the present issue.Cf. Gelzer, RE 13»1, 595; contra; B.L.Twyman, A & N 1.1.868-9®
2. Niccolini, FTP 254.
3* E.g. Mommsen, HR 4.64, 95®
4. Cf. P.A.Brunt, 2nd Int. Conf. Econ. Hist. 1.l49.
5® The Valerian Legions had been enrolled for the Mithridaticcampaigns of L.Valerius Flaccus, consul of 86, whom they murdered. They then followed C,Flavius Fimbria until they went over to Sulla, thereafter continuing to serve in Asia until Lucullus took them over. They were prominent in the mutiny against him, complaining that they should be discharged. In fact when Pompey took over thecommand, despite the discharge granted by the Lex Gabinia, theyre-enlisted (MRR2.55;Dio 36.l4-l6).
6, Cf. Münzer, ^  2A.2, l8l5®43-53®
7» Cf. w.c.McDermott, Phoenix 1970, 39-47®
8. Cf, Holmes, RR 1,166. Badian, Philologue 1959, 94ff,, suggeststhat Gabinius was an old friend of Catiline, and that both had extensive Pompeian backgrounds,
9® Cf, MRR 2.101, 108 n.2 for the precedent of M.Antonius’ imperiuminfinitum in 74. He was then a praetor.
10. She was the daughter of Q.Scaevola, the Augur, consul 117: Münzer,RE 16,1,448-9® Pompey’s wife, Hucia, was daughter of the consulof 95, P.Scaevola: D.-G. 4,560-1.
11. Cf. L.Hayne, CP 1974, 280-2. Gruen, LGRR 131, astonishinglythinks that Glabrio’s wife Aemilia was a sister of Pompey's wife, despite Plutarch's specific evidence that they were the same (Bull,33®5)® Klebs, RE 1.1.257.28-30, suggests that Glabrio maybe the Acilius who had L.Lucullus' curule chair smashed(Dio 36.41.2), but Holzl's amendment to Lucceius is clearly preferable:FP 29® This would be the consular candidate for 59,. certainly later a friend of Pompey.
12. Deknatel, Vita 24; cf, L.R.Taylor PPAC 121, 2l8 n.24,222 n.10; Gruen, LGRR 187, suggests a connection with the Roscii who accompanied Crassus to Parthia. On these brothers see above: Appendix Bp. 239#
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13® Gelzer, RE 13-1, 308, believes that Crassus did not involve himselfin the debate on the Lex Gabinia. Garzetti, Ath 194-2, 23, arguesthat he must have opposed it. So too does Ward, Crassus 112-4.
l4. On Cornelius* tribunate, especially the chronological considerations,see M,Griffin, JRS 1973, 196-203- On other aspects, cf. alsoR.Seager, Hommages Renard, 2, 68O-6.
15- It has been suggested that this was rather a consular law of 58: Mommsen, R.Strafrecht, 885; Niccolini, FTP 258. 67 seems abetter context for the law. Cornelius may have passed it on toGabinius, as he did the measure concerning the freedmen to Manillas (As c.64C); cf. MRR 2,145-
16. Ward, Crassus 137 n-32, takes Manillas* claim of Crassus*involvement as actual evidence that Pompey was behind the measure, sic!
17- Ward, TAPA 1970, 54-5-56. W.McDonald, Cg I929, 199, goes further and argues that Cornelius was in his tribunate acting for Crassus.
18. Cf. E.J.Phillips,. Latomus 1970, 595-8.
19- Gruen, CP 1969, 20-34; contra; Phillips, Rh. Mus. 1973, 353-7-
20. Cf. Q.Cic-Comm.Pet. 51 for insistence on the appearance of beingPompeian and popularis. The implication of this passage is surely that the reality is very different. Cf. J.S.Richardson,Hist 1971 436-42, and above p.76-7-
21. Phillips, Latomus 1970, 595-8; Ward, Crassus.;.l4l.
22. Gruen, CP 1969, 20-34.
23. Cf. Cichorius, Romische Studien 172-3»
24. These arguments are advanced by Stockton, Cicero 77-8. He attemptsto show that Catiline, Clodius, Torquatus and Cicero may haveformed, at least in 65, a Pompeian "cell”; cf. Seager, Hist 1964,344-5.
25. Gruen, ^  1971, 59-62.
26. MRR 2.151 n.l6; Syme, Sallust l4g, 151 n.l6.
27. His consulship was gained at the expense of P.Sulla, Pompey*s brother-in-law. His lifelong friendship with Atticus might, indicate a lack of fervent support for Pompey (Nep.Att.1.4)»Atticus needed constant reassurance of Cicero's motives in his dealings with Pompey (Cic.Att.1.17-10;1»l8;1-19-7;1-20.2;2.1.6;etc.).
28. Cf. Sumner,.JRS 1964, 42; contra; Seager, Hommages Renard 2.685.
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29» Contra: McDermott, Hermes I969, 233, who,observing that there were two men of this name, argues that Catiline's prosecutor cannot be Pompey's friend. This opinion is however based on the supposed a priori improbability in such a situation. Indeed his whole argument about the two men stems from this belief.
30. Cf. Gruen, CSCA I968, I60-I.
31. Munzer, ^  14.1.1134,1140, s.v. Manilius 10, 23.
32. Gruen, CSCA I968, I60-I.
33. Cf. Ciaceri, Cicerone 1.153-6.
34. Cf. Hardy, Cat.Consp. 15,18,21,33; Some Problems 95; Holmes, RR 1.227, 234, 242; Scullard, Gracchi to Nero, 109-10; M.Cary, CAH 9.478-9.
33. Balsdon, JRS 1962, 134f., has shown that the command, while extraordinary, was not unusually so.
36® Cato was his brother-in-law, Catulus probably his cousin. Catulus' mother was a Doraitia: Gelzer, RE 12,2073» Badian, JRS I962, 53» Münzer, RA 346, is confused by the two marriages of Catulus* father, to a Domitia and then to Servilia; cf, B.L.Twyman, A & N 1.1.857»
37. A fragment of a speech Pro Manilio exists; Nonius, 235M,
38. Such as, and especially. Ward, Crassus 136-41 and TAPA 1970,545-56.
Ch. V
'
1. H.Frisch, C & M 19^ +8, lOff., argues that the whole affair is fictitious; P.A.Brunt, CR 1957» 193-5» shows that the myth had not developed far by 64; cf. R.Seager, Hist 1964, 338-47» Gruen,CP 1969.20-24; and Syme, Sallust 88ff,, all analyse the growth of the nytE".' For the now heterodox view that there was such a conspiracy see Stevens, Latomus 1963» 397-435; Hardy, Cat.Consp, 12-20; . Garzetti, Ath 1942,30.
2. Cf. Wiseman, CQ 1967, 167; Syme, Sallust 102 n.88.
3. Syme guesses that Autronius may have been an adherent of Crassus; Sallust 103 n.2.
4. ' Ward, Crassus 145»
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5» The classic example is that of Ti.Claudius Nero and M.LiviusSalinator in 204, Suohlahti, The Roman Censors 558, 575-7» shows that there would seem to have been little competition for the censorship in its earlier days, but that between the second Punic War and about 150 a strong competitive element can be seen as in 185 (MRR1.374). After 130, he argues, there is again little sign of such striving.
6. Cfo Greenidge, RPL 217» Suohlahti, The Roman Censors 80-6.
7. Suohlahti, op.cit., passim.
8. Gelzer, Cicero 66 n.63» cf. Mommsen, H^.156 n.1,
9» Cfo Hardy, Some Problems 54-67.
10. Brunt, CR 1957» 195, has shown that there is no reason to accept theoften stated view that Asconius (92C) mentions either Caesar or Crassus in connection with Piso.
11. The primary sources among these would seem to be Curio and Bibulus.Suetonius cites the former's Orations and the latter»s edicts. Inboth cases these will date from 59 and the succeeding years when copious propaganda hostile to Caesar and to Pompey flowed from these sources (cf. Cic.Att.2.19*5{2.20.6;2.21.3-4;Brut.210-220; Suet.Iul.49)« It is not certain that either man implicated Crassus in the supposed plotting of 66/5. This may have been derived by Tanusius Geminus from Cicero's de consiliis suis.
12. On the status of the two parts of Cisalpine Gaul see Hardy,Some Problems 44-54.
13. Wiseman, JRS 1969» 59-75»
14. Mommsen, StR II 3i'd ed. 352.
"^ 5» Contra ; Mommsen, HR 4.149*
16. Cf. Greenidge, RPL 229-32.
17. When Egypt was finally taken over after"Actium, the "taxes” were ’mostly in the form of grain, collected locally by the Egyptians: Frank, ESAR 2.490. Egypt was then however not fully incorporated into the regular provincial framework of the empire, but rather kept by Augustus as a private domain. Therefore what was in fact done over thirty years later need not be what Crassus was proposingin 65. '
18. Cf. Chapter IV n.34 above.
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19- This notion of commands to "balance” those of Pompey has beensupposed to be the reason for the senate's creation in the 70s ofthe great commands of L.Lucullus and M.Antonius. They are said tohave been designed as insurance for the "Sullan" party againstPompey in Spain: Badian, FC 280-1. It has been shown however thatLucullus and Antonins probably belonged to groups with little love for one another, and that Pompey and Lucullus may well have been on good terms. Perhaps it is Antonius' command that should be seenas a counterweight to Lucullus'.
20. Mommsen, St R 2,3rd ed. 352; cf, Greenidge, RPL 188.
21. Greenidge, RPL 220.
22. Cf. Suohlahti, The Roman Censors 648-9» 4-72-5•
Ch. VI
1. . L.R.Taylor, CP 1942 , 21ff,, has shown that this did not directlyaffect Caesar's election as Pontifex Maximus, since the people had never lost that right. Dio however makes it plain that Caesar was involved in Labienus* proposal, and that the proposal preceded and was connected with Caesar's election. Presumably the intention was to gain popularity and support for Caesar's election by giving him an opportunity to show himself popularis in priestly matters; cf. Gelzer, Caesar, trans. Needham, 46. For Labienus* relations with Pompey and Caesar, see Syme, JRS 1958, 113-25*
2. L.R,Taylor, TAPA 1942, 1-24; Gruen, LGRR 80-1,f Caesar alsosupported the lex Plotia de reditu Lepidanorum in 70, a measure probably inspired by Pompey, but that support could be argued to have been due to his brother-in-law, L.Cinna, who was one of those enabled to return (Suet.Iul,5îGell.N.A.13.3»5îPio 44,47*4).Cf. Chapter II n.25 above,
3. , Cf- Hardy, Cat.Consp. 5» 108; Gelzer, Caesar 33-4.
4. Ward,Trist 1972, 250, argues that Asconius was right. Contra:P.A.Brunt CR 1957, 195; Marshall, Latomus 1974-8o4-9-
5. That Caesar was iudex rather than a private prosecutor has beendoubted: Strasburger, Caesars Eintritt 117-9; Gruen, LGRR 76-7n.124. The chief reason for doubt is that Schol.Gron.293 St. says that Caesar "multos accusavit et damnavit Sullanos", which is held to contradict Suetonius' assertion that Caesar was iudex (Iul.1l). Suetonius himself however speaks of Caesar almost as though he had been prosecutor and clearly sees no contradiction in this, Dio simply says that Caesar was.largely instrumental in bringing about
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the convictions (37*10.1-2). It would seem most likely therefore that Caesar was iudex, but that in that office he was notably partial perhaps even arranging for prosecutions to be brought to his court. In the case of Sabirius the following year a rather similar arrangement can be seen. The prosecutor was Labienus, but Caesar contrived that he and his kinsman, L.Caesar, should be the judges. Gelzer, Caesar 42 accepts Suetonius' account-, as does Hardy, Cat.Consp. 32.
6. Cf. Munzer, RE 16.423-4, s.v. Mucius, 12® No other Mucii seem known in public life under the Republic. It is just possible that Cicero may in fact refer to Crassus' involvement with Catiline in a passage of the In Toga Candida; _ "Hunc vos scitote Licinium gladiatorem iam immisisse capillum Catilinaet iudic. qua Q. ve Curium hominem' quaestorium" (Asc.95C)» Ihat Sie" ÜLïcinius gladiator” had helped Catiline in' his trial in 63 seems clear.It is possible that Cicero is referring to Crassus, the epithet "gladiator” being an allusion to Crassus* Servile command, while Licinius is of course Crassus' own gentilicium. In much the same way Cicero referred to Pompey as "Sampsiceramus” or "Arabarches” or "Hierosolymarius" (Att.2.14.1;2.17»3î2.9.1), all deriving from associations with Pompey*s Eastern campaigns.
7. Hardy, Cat.Consp. 25-6, 31-2; John, ^  Supp.8, 1876, 763-777.
8. Sumner, TAPA I966, 58O, Munzer, RE 2A.2.1761. Servilius:5,thinks that this man must be either the Servilius Caepio mentioned by FI crus as serving Pompey in 67 (1.4.10), or else the young P.Isauricus, pr, 54, son of P.Vatia who had supported the Lex Manilia in 66. Caepio is probably Cato's half-brother who died in 67 (Plut.Cat.11.1-3;15*4). Sumner thinks young Isauricus would have been too young in 65 for such a post, but Ward, Crassus 155»shows that he could easily, and with good precedents, have beenpraefectus classis in 65.
9. Afzellius, CSM 3rd ed. 1940.224-6, argues strongly for the view that the bill was hostile in intent towards Pompey; contra; Sumner,TAPA 1966, 578-82, who argues that Caesar was promoting the bill in Pompey»s-favour. Hardy, ^  1912/3, 228-60 and Cat.Consp. 34-6,•though more judicious in expression, generally accepts Cicero's points; E.T.Sage, CJ 1920/21, 230-6, has Caesar ^ehind the bill in order to discredit Cicero's popularis pretensions, Cf. also Cary, CAH 9. 485-6; Ward, Crassus 157-61.
10. So, with a different political interpretation, Gruen, LGRR 389-96,
11. Holmes, ^  1.457-8. Allen, TAPA 1'952, 233-41, puts the exchangeof provinces in late 64, and Cicero's relinquishment of Gaul inJune 63. Hardy, Cat.Consp. 47, argues from Antonius* support ofCatiline in 63 that the agreement was not made, until after the elections in that year.
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12. Gruen, LGRR 138-40.
13» JoS.Richardson, Hist 1971» 436-42. Cf. M.I.Headerson, JRS 1950,8-21; Nisbet, JRS I96I, 84-97» Balsdon, 1963, 242-30. For a summary of the controversy see E.Deniaux, A & N 1.3*248-36.
l4. For Caesar's position, cf. n.5 above. W.C.McDermott, Hermes I969»235-46, argues that,of the two men named L.Lucceius, this man was not Pompey»s intimate. Briefly but effectively refuted by Gruen, LGRR 141 n.88.
15- Hardy, Cat.Consp. 38, but he associates Labienus* bill directlywith Caesar's election; of. n.1 above.
16. Gruen, LGRR 80-I, argues for Caesar as a Pompeian candidate, butignores Vatla's involvement; contra: Ward, Crassus 169-70.
17- Contra: Harc^, Some Problems 112-3-
18. Of. Gruen, LGRR 279 n.69» W.B.Tyrrell, Latomus 1975» 288-92.
19. Cf. Munzer, ^  10.1, 892, Iulius:l43- Taylor, PPAC 224, suggests that he was C.Caesar's man.
20. Cf. Syme, Sallust 98-9; JRS 1938, II8; Cary, CAH 9-490; M.Grant, Julius Caesar 52; contra; Ward, Crassus 166,
21. Cf. Ward, Crassus 164; contra; Stockton, Cicero IO8, who argues that Cicero's involvement with Pompey's enemies would not have affected his standing with Pompey and his friends.
22. So; Cary, CAH 9-491; Syme, Sallust 70 n.46; Pareti, La Congiuradi Catilina 55» Contra; Mommsen, HR4.170“1» Holmes, RR 1.256; 'Gelzer, Caesar 47» Garzetti, Ath 1942, 34-5» Hardy, Cat.Consp.37; Ward, Crassus.172, all accept that the support continued at least to the elections of 63.
23. For Murena; Pareti, La Congiura 63; for Sulpicius; Syme, Sallust 70 n.46; for Silanus; Ward, Crassus 171-2.
24. Shackleton Bailey, Phoenix 1970, l64.
25- Ward, Crassus l4l-2. , . •
26* R.Seager, Hist 1973, 240~8. Some sihilar doubts about Manlius' position are expressed by K.H.Waters, Hist 197C, 195ff * » esp, 201, For the conventional view, following Cicero, of Manlius as "audaclae satellitem atque administrum tuae" (Cat.1.7), see Hardy, Cat.Consp. 51-2, 54; Gruen, LGRR 423-5» Mommsen, HR 4.162.
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27® Mommsen, HR 4.162-5; contra; Hardy, Cat.Consp. 45-5; John, JCP Supp.8, 1B76, 762. Mommsen may have been led to his opinion precisely because the gap between elections in July and the rising in late October was so long as to strain the credibility of the rest of his account.
28. Hardy, Cat.Consp. 64. Contra: Seager, Hist 1973, 240-1.
29. It is clear from Plutarch (Cic. 13*3-4) that he derived this information from Cicero's treatise on his consulship. The date is that computed by Hardy, Cat.Consp. 55-7* John, Philologus 1888, 650-65, and Holmes, RR I.259-oO, believe that the tumultus was decreed on 21 October and the S.C.ÏÏ. on 22 October. The date of the S.C.U. depends on that of the delivery of Cicero'sFirst Catilinarian, since Asconius declares that the latter was delivered on the eighteenth day after the S.C.U. (Asc.6C). The speech followed the meeting at Laeca's house, which was certainly on 6 November (Cic.Sail.52), but whether it came the next day or the next but one is a matter of debate. Hardy believes the former, the 6th; John and Holmes opt for the 7th. Hardy also uses the reference in Cic.Cat.1.4 to a period of twenty days to date the decree of the tumultus.
30. Cf. Waters, Hist 1970.209ff., suggesting that Cicero was manufacturing a crisis to give him an opportunity to discredit Crassus. Others believe that Crassus intended to make capital out of the conspiracy by first encouraging it, then unmasking it, and finally obtaining the command to crush it as he had Spartacus.He would thus have an army in Italy, just as he had in 71, with which he could face the returning Pompey; Salmon, AJP 1935, 310-5» Deloiatel, Vita 35-7# Ward, Crassus I83, follows these and suggests that Crassus himself either solicited or forged the letters thathe produced. Gelzer, ^  13*1, 313, and Garzetti, Ath 1942, 37-40, think that Crassus was not really involved in the conspiracy but hoped to be able to take advantage of any uprising.
3OA. The separation of the tumultus and the S.C.U. shows both that the senate was not wholly convinced by the letters, and perhaps also that the prosecution of Rabirius had indeed produced some doubts about the use of the ultimate decree without compelling justification,
31# For the singularity of Q.Arrius see: Syme, CP 1955, 133; Wiseman,New Men 2l4; Marshall and Baker, Hist 1975, 220-31* For his duality; iCLebs, RE 2.1.1252-4, Arrius:7 & 8; .MRR 2.109,I6I;Douglas, Brutus 179*
32. Cf. .Gruen, RPCC 216-20 and Hist 1966, 40ff. See also Cicero's account in De Or 3*1-11*
33* The MSS. are divided on the name of the man who accepted Catiline. Three MSS. have "M.Metellum”, the rest "M.Marcellum". Quintilian (Inst.Or.9.2.45) quotes this passage, w^th "M.Metellura". He does * ■ 8^0 because of the irony of the epithet ?optimum virum".' If
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••M.Marcellura” were correct, there would seem to be a contradiction with a mention of M.Marcellus a few lines lower, where he is genuinely complimented with the epithet "fortissimo viro" (1.21). Indeed the corruption could stem from this mention. The epithets are verbally similar and occur within a few lines of one another. That Metellus is the correct name is shown by Dio, who says that, when indicted for violence after the passage of the S.C.U., Catiline, after a refusal by Cicero, took up his residence at the house of Metellus the praetor (Dio 37*31•3~32.2)« Despite his confusion of Metelli, the praetor being Celer who had already refused, this passage does suggest that some M.Metellus is to be sought. Perhaps he is to be identified with the M.Metellus who gave games in 60 (Cic.Att.2.1.1), perhaps a kinsman of Creticus.His brother, M.Metellus, praetor 69, would be a tempting identification, but his failure to reappear after 69 for his due consulship might suggest that he had died.. Cf. Munzer, RE 3*1*206, Caecilius;78 & 79*
34. Cf. Syme, Sallust 71-2.
35* Of. Caesar's arrangement with I.lucceius over the financing oftheir joint campaign in 60 (Suet.Iul.i9), despite Crassus* almost certain support. Crassus had helped Caesar with his creditors in 61 (Plut,Caes.11.1), but Caesar clearly still needed Lucceius' help.
36. R. Seager, Hist 1973, 241-2.
37* Cf. Hardy, Cat.Consp. 79»
38. Seager, Hist 1973» 245» cf. Hardy, CatConsp. 99»
39® Syme, Sallust 82, Ward, Crassus l84, suggests that as Volturciuswas known to Pomptinus, one of the praetors sent to arrest the Allobroges, and Pomptinus was a former legate of Crassus, the latter was involved in planning the trap (Cic.Cat.3.5»l4;Flacc.102; Prov.Cons.32;Sail«Cat.45)* If there is anything in these connections, it is more likely that Cicero chose Pomptinus for the same reasons that he later gave two of the conspirators into the custody of Crassus and Caesar. See above p.101-2.
40. Holmes, RR 1.473» Syme, Sallust 103-4, n.3» Stockton, Cicero 132.Garzetti, Ath 1942, 38-9» believes that Crassus was probably right in blaming Cicero.
41. Ward, Crassus 179-80.
42. Mommsen, HR4.171» contra; Ward, Crassus I89.
43. That Crassus is here meant is almost certain in view of Crassus* absence from the list in Att. 12.21,2, Cf. Garzetti, Ath 1942,39*
264 _
Notes to pages 104 - 118
Ch. VII
1. Hardy, Cat.Consp. 107; Salmon, AJP 1935» 316; Adcock, Crassus 41-2.
2. Cfo Gelzer, Caesar 56; Chr.Meier, Ath 1962, 103-23.
3. Cf. Holmes, HR I.290-1; Scullard, Gracchi to Nero 1l6.
4. Cf. Mommsen, HR4.178-81.
3- Garzetti, Ath 1944, 1; cf. Holmes, RR 1.467; Ed.Meyer,Caesars Monarchie 38; Salmon, AJP 1935, 316.
6. Contra; Gelzer, 13*1, 313; Grnen, LGRR 84.
7. Garzetti, Ath 1974, 2, believes that Crassus stayed away from Romeuntil Pompey had disbanded his arny.
8. E.Ciaceri, Cicerone 2, l8-9*
9. Ward, Crassus 195, of. Parrish, Phoenix 1973, 357-80; Adcock, Crassus^ 4l.
10. Münzer, M  342-7»
11. Pompey*s letter was probably written not long after Nepos reached him, in the spring of 62. Cf. L.A.Constans, Cic.Corr. 1.109, who dates Cicero's letter to May, and Shacldeton Bailey, Cic.Earn.1.279, who dates Cicero's letter in May and the arrival of Pompey's to late March.11A. Plutarch does give a clearer account elsewhere (Cat.30.1-3).12. Thus inter alios: Ward, Crassus 199-201; Hardy%^ a t  « Consp .110;Holmes, RR 1.28F ; Gelzer, Cicero IO8 n.47.
. 13. Taylor, TAPA 1942, 19-
14. Gruen, Phoenix 1970, 237-43; cf. T.N.Mitchell, Hist 1975, 6l8-22.
15- Hardy, Cat.Consp. 107-9; Salmon, AJP 1935, 316.
16. To say, as does Ward, Crassus 206, that Pompey avoided a specificstand, felt kindly towards Clodius, and did not wish to alienate him, clearly misses the points both of the question and of the answer.
17. A derivation from the name "Nannius"-and a connection with Crassus» activities during the Sullan proscriptions is seen by: Deknatel,Vita 50-1 ; Tyrrell and Purser, Corr.Cic. 1.212-3; Garzetti,Ath 1944, 3 n.4; Shackleton Bailey, Cic.Att. 1*316-7; Stockton, Cicero I60 n.36; Ward, Crassus 227-30; Gelzer, Caesar 60.T.Franlc, ^  1919, 396-8, and R.Y.Hathorn, CJ 1954, 33-4, provide different explanations of how the phrase refers to the
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Novi Poetae of whom Calvus was one. Wiseman, 19&8, 229,
similarly chooses Calvus but explains the phrase as a corruptionof " which would have been written in Roman letters. Crassus is chosen by Trencsenyi-Waldapfel, Ath 19^5» ^9-91, with a very obscure reference to a play by the Attic comic poet,Eubulus. There were Nanneii in Africa at Thugga(lLA f r « 9 6 l ; c f .
18. Trencsenyi-Waldapfel, Ath 19&5, 42-7.
19. Cf. Wiseman, Cg^  1968, 297-8. On all this question seeP.W.Fulford-Jones, C^ 1971, 103-5? Ward, Crassus, 227-30*Against the conclusions reached above see also Gruen, Phoenix 1966, 121-2, and LGRR, 275 n.58, where he simply declines to discuss the matter.
20. On Macer's pretensions see R.M.Ogilvie, A Commentary on Divy 1-5 7- 12.
21. Cf. Badian, Acta 5th Epig.Cong, 209-l4; Gruen, CSCA I968, 167-9*Any breach with Pompey is denied by Shaclcleton Bailey, Cic.Att.1, 312; Ward, Crassus 206 n„4l,
22. Ward, Crassus 212 n.54; cf. Grant, Caesar 72,
23. Plutarch (Pomp.45*3) also says that Lucullus had virtually retired,but that he reentered the fray with Cato, In this version,however, the issue of his come-back is the question of the acta.
24. See R.E. Smith, Gg 1957, 82-5; Gabba, PP 1950, 66-8.
25. Gruen, !LGRR 86,
26. It has been objected that the figure for Messalla*s house is somuch larger, that it must be corrupt, and that Messalla must havepaid 3,400,000 ES; both L.A.Constans and W.B.Tyrrell ad. loc.On the other hand P.Clodius paid l4,800,000 ES for his house i (Pliny M  36.103). Cf. Shackleton Bailey, Cic.Att. I.306,
27. Ward, Crassus 202,
28. Gelzer, Æ' 13.1*350.1; Taylor, PPAC 121, 2l8 n.24, 222 n.10;cf. Badian, Publicans and Sinners 101-12; contra: Cadoux, G & R1956, 157 n.1. But cf. Crassus» interest in Egypt in 65 (above p75, •
29. Adcock sees this and a share of the bribe from Ptolemy Auletes as Crassus* chief inducements: Crassus, 44. Cf. Cary, GAH 9.515? Scullard, Gracchi to- Hero 119? and slightly more cautiously:Ward, Crassus 210-2;. Gruen, LGRR 90.
30, Ward, Crassus 219; of. the involved but unconvincing reconstruction of the affair by E.J.Parrish, Phoenix 1973, 357-80.
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31. Cf. Gruen, LGRR 241-2.
32. Stanton and Marshall, Hist 1973, 203-19.
33. Balsdon, JRS 1939, l67ff. Contra: Holmes, RR 1.474, who suggeststhat silvae callesque may be a copyist's gloss, and that Italy was not meant, but other, unwarlike, provinces; cf. Gelzer, Caesar63 n.2.
34. Cf. Shackleton Bailey, Cic.Att. I.328.
35. Sanders, MAAR 1932, 55-68.
Ch. VIII
1. Among others: Taylor, AgP 1951, 254-68; C^ 1954, 187-8; Hist 195045-51; Hist 1968, 173-93; Taylor and Broughton, Hist I968, 166-172;S.I.Oost, AJP 1956, 25-6; Gelzer, Caesar 7I-IOI; Hermes 1928,113-37; Shackleton Bailey, Cic.Att. I.4o8; Meier, Hist I96I, 69-88; 
Linderski. Hist 1965, 423-33*
2. Linderski. Hist I965, 423-33»
3. Taylor and Broughton, Hist I968, 166-72; cf. Ward, Crassus 217n.66.
4. Taylor, ^  1951, 257.
5. Gruen, LGRR 397, believes that the senate did reject the bill,citing Plut.Caes.l4,1-2;App.BC 2.10;Schol.Bob.l46 St. Dio's account, however, is the fullest and most explicit-
6. Cf, Meier, Hist 196I, 77ff.
7. Cf. Shackleton Bailey, Cic.Att. I.4o8. Contra; Lintott, Vm 145
8. Cf. Taylor, ^  1951, 26o.
9. Shackleton Bailey, Cic.Att.1.4o8; contra: Taylor, Hist I968,182-7; cf. Gelzer, Hermes 1928, 116, Lintott, VRR 74-5*
10. . Sanders, MAAR 1932, 55-68,
11. Varro's pamphlet . "Tpk-Kapavov ' (App.BC 2.9) probably belongs to .59 and further indicates that the triumvirate was common knowledge.
12. Taylor, Hist I968, 186-7*
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13. Gelzer, Caesar 86; Ward, Crassus 224.
14. Cf. Broughton, TAPA 1948, 73-6.
15. Two other quinquevirs are known, M.Messalla Niger, cos, 61, and C.Cosconius, pr. 63. It is not possible to guess the likely political connections of either man (MRR 2,192),
16. Clodius a puppet of the triumvirate: Garzetti, Ath 1944, l4;of Caesar: Cadoux, G & R 1956, 158; Pocock, ^  1924, 59-65;Cary, CAH 9-522; of Crassus: Deknatel, Vita 7o-9; Marsh, Cg^1927, 30-6; Rowland, Hist I966, 217-23; Marshall, Crassus115-30; Wholly Independent: Gruen, Phoenix 1966, 120-30;Lintott, G & R 1967» 157-60; VRR'193-200."
17. Gruen, Phoenix I966, 120-30,
18. Cf. Gelzer, RE 8a. 90?f.
19. Cf. Gruen, Latomus 1973, 301ff.
20. Cf. Allen, TAPA 1952, 233-5-
21. Crassus was a patron of Caelius (Cic.Cael.9). Q.Fabius served as a Caesarian legate in 46-5 and was suffect consul in 45. He may have been a lover of-Clodius* sister (Cic.Att.2.1.5)îcf. Shackleton Bailey, Cic.Att. 1.348. Caninius is probably L.Gallus the Pompeian tribune of 56 (MRR 2.209),
22. Stockton, Cicero 201 n.l4, suggests that Crassus withdrew his motion proposing that, for Auletes* restoration, three men be selected from those holding imperium, in favour of a motion by Bibulus thatthey be dra^m from those not holding it. This latter proposalwill have suited Crassus much better, since it excluded Pompey,Cf. Garzetti, Ath 1944, 17f.j Gruen, Phoenix 1966, 129 n.49.
23. Taylor, AJP 1951» 45-51» accepted by McDermott, TAPA 1949, 358-9» Allen, TAPA 1950, 153; Gelzer, Caesar 90 n.2.
24. Meier, Hist I96I, 89-93-
25. Shackleton Bailey, Cic.Att. 1.395» cf. Brunt, C^ 1953» 62ff,, not entirely refuted by Taylor, Cg^  1954, l8lf.
26. - (deleted)
27. Cf. Mommsen, St R 3*409.
28. 8.1. Cost, AJP 1956, 25-6; of. Seager, Latomus I965» 519-31*
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29- There are two further indications that the Vettius affair, andtherefore Clodius* election, took place later in the year. In hisaccount of the affair, Cicero refers to Gabinius* games. It is clear that these had taken place some time before, as Paullus would seem, from the tenses used, to have returned from Macedonia in the interim (Att.2.24«5)« These games are probably those referred to by Cicero in mid July (Att.2.19-5)» cf. Shackleton Bailey,Cic.Att. I,389-90* The other point concerns Cicero's referencein his speech pro Flacco to his ovm recent denunciation by informers (Flacc.96). This could be a reference to the Vettius affair (cf.Att.2.24.3;Dio 38*9*2). The trial of Flaccus is usually dated in September or October 59, and so would fit well withthe period just before the elections on I8 October, the context ofthe Vettius affair,
30. Taylor, Hist 1950, 48-51» Rowland, Hist I966, 223; Gelzer, Caesar91.
31. McDermott, TAPA 1949» 366, who even believes,that Caesar hadarranged for Vettius to denounce him in 62 in order to demonstrate his innocence, p.362; Allen, TAPA 1950, 153-62.
32. Seager, Latomus I965» 525-31•
33* Ward, Crassus 238-42; Gruen, LGRR 96.
34. Gelzer, Caesar 91 n2, is of the opinion that these criticisms comenot from speeches of the elder Curio in 59, but from a dialoguethat he wrote later, Cf, Malcovati, ORF 301-3*
35* Seager, Latomus 1965» 525-31 » Allen, TAPA 1950, 153-62.
36. For Pompey's fear of assassination cf, McDermott, TAPA 1949, 364n.29.
37» Vettius* possible Picene origins are not enough to prove himPompeian, His background must have been far better known to his contemporaries, Cicero certainly did not see an inevitableconnection with Pompey: cf. Ward, Crassus 238 n.26. In 62Vettius had denounced Caesar at a time when Caesar was very openly supporting Pompey*s interests.37A. Hoard evidence, however, suggests a date later than 58, possibly 54.38;' Contra: Ward, Crassus 235-42, who thinks that Bibulus* delay andCurio's opposition, encouraged by Crassus, had in fact endangered •their prospects. The Vettius affair, he argues, was designed to restore them, and indeed clearly succeeded*-............... '38A. Theie seem in fact to have been insufficient days for the prosecution.39. Cf, Gruen, CSCA I968, I63-7. '
40. Cf, Ward, Crassus 243-5*
■ 41. Cf. Shackleton Bailey, Cic.Att. 1.397»- who suggests the first, andcites the second, .which belongs to Watt, and is favoured by Ward, 
i • • Ci^assus 243 n,40.........................................
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42. Deknatel, Vita 79“80, mentions the first three possibilities. Ward, Crassus 244, favours M.Crassus,
43, Although when listing the friendly praetors of 37 he does give Dives* praenomen, it should be noted that he gives the praenomina of all of them, as was presumably fitting in a formal speech 
(Red.in Sen.23)«
Ch. IX
1. Cf, E.Rawson, Hist 1973, 233-8.
2. Clodius seems to have prosecuted a number of Pompey*s friends, butwhom and when is not clear (Plut.Pomp.48.6).
3. Ward, Crassus 246-7; Gruen, LGRR 99,294.
4. See Weinstock, JRS 1937, 215-22, on the fate of Clodius*modification of the leges Aelia et Fufia. Cf. Balsdon, JRS 1957,15-16; Astin, Latomus 1964, 421-45.
5. Thus; Pocock, C^ 1924, 59-65; contra: Marsh, 1927, 30-6.
6. Cf. Shatzman, Latomus 1971, 363-9»
7. Thus: Balsdon, JRS 1951, I6-I8.
8. Although Taylor, AJP 1942, 393-4, suggests that the M,Crassus, listed as a pontiff in Cic.Ear.Resp.12, must have been the triumvir'sson, because of his relatively late entry to the college, shown byhis place on the list, it is more likely that the triumvir himself held this priesthood. Marcus was his younger son (see Appendix A), and Publius the elder became an augur in 55. It is unlikely that the younger son would be honoured before the elder, and it is' therefore probable that the father was the pontiff. He was in any case listed above C.Curio, consul 76, an older man of considerable dignity, for all that his family was not noble.
9. Cf. Gelzer, Caesar 86, on Pomptinus' supplicatio, and Vatinius' objections to it.
10. Cf. Balsdon, JRS 1939, l67ff.
11. Thus; Badian, ^  1969, 200-4.' Contra: Gruen, Ath 1971, 62-5.
12. Cf. Cary, 0^ 1923, 103-7.
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13- Cf. Pocock, Gomm.Cic.in Vat. 1-9; contra; U.Albini, PP 1959, 172-84.
14. Th.N.Mitchell, TAPA I969, 295-320, argues that the issue was not animportant one, that Cicero was neither deeply involved in it nor atthis time hostile to Caesar, and that Lupus may not have been acting for Pompey. Balsdon, JRS 1957, 15-20, tries to show that Cicero was lying when he claimed to have been a prime mover in the affair. Marsh, C^ 1927, 30-36, argues that Pompey was the chief target of the attack, and that Caesar was not affected by it.Pocock, CP 1927, 3OI-6, shows that Caesar was in fact annoyed by the attack, and that Pompey supported it® Carey, Cg^  1923, 103-7,and JT 1920, 174-90, also shows that it was Caesar who stood to behurt by the attack. Stockton, TAPA 1962, 72-7 and T.A.Dorey,CP 1959, 13, both refute Balsdon*s arguments.
15. Cf. the arguments of Cary in the articles cited in n.l4 above.
16. Cf. Stockton, TAPA I962, 476.
17» Dorey, CE 1959, 13* Cf. Wiseman, JRS 1966, 108-15, who doubts thetriumvirs'power to coerce Cicero after Luca, and concludes thatthey must have bribed him. He .ignores Cicero*s own testimony, and also the fact that Cicero was by now well aware that without Pompey he was nothing.
18. Cf. Stockton, Cicero 201 n.l4.
19- The first view is that of Ward, Crassus 252 n.66. The second is favoured by Shackleton Bailey, Cicero 8o, and Meier, RFA 20.
20. E.g. Gruen, LGRR 308.
21. Cf. Gruen, LGRR 305-9, for the details of the case, although he does try to bend it to fit the pattern.
22. On the name Cloelius, rather than Clodius, see Shackleton Bailey,C^ 1960, 4l-2.
23. The actions and motives of the members of the triumvirate in theperiod leading up to Luca have given rise to much speculation.Cf. C.Luibheid, CP 1970, 88-94; Pocock? CP 1927, 301-6; Marsh,CQ 1927, 30-6; Gruen, Hist I969, 71-96. An interestingly eccentric account is.that of J.F.Lazenby, Latomus 1959, 67-76, who, accepting Dio's account, suggests'that’ Pompey sought the consulship of 55 so that he might himself replace Caesar in Gaul.
24. One possible explanation of Domitius' one competitor could be thatCrassus. had in fact been able to submit his name properly, but that Pompey had encountered some difficulty, perhaps failing to obtain a dispensation allowing- him to malte his professio in absentia. It is unclear whether Pompey's imperium prevented him
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from doing so in person. At one point the senate met outside the pomerium specifically so that he could attend (Cic.^ 2.3.3), but on the other hand he seems to have entered the city to speak for Milo and Sestius 2.3.2;Fam.1.9.7).
23. Pace C.E.Stevens, Latomus .1953, 14-21, who believes that Crassusplanned to conquer Ireland from Spain. It is not clear whether the lot was nominally involved (Plut> Pomp ^ 2 .^  c£. Cr. 13 .7^Cat.43 .1;Dio 39 .3^ 2)26. Cary, CAH 9, 334-5, and Gelzer, Caesar 123, opt for Caesar. Syme,RR 37 and Stockton, Cicero 208»9, credit Pompey. Meier, RPA 287 and Ward, Crassus 264, favour Crassus.
27. Thus: Meier, RPA 287.
28. Thus: Stevens, Latomus 1953, l4-21.
29. It is not certain that this meeting was connected with the Syrianpublicani. Marshall, Crassus I3I, thinks it may concern Pompey'sproposal to make equestrian jurors liable to prosecution for extortion (cf. Cic.Rab.Post.12-13); contra; Shackleton Bailey, 
Cic.Att.2.197*
Cf. Taylor, ^  1964, 12-28; Gruen, LGRR 313-22; Hist I969, 101-3. 
Marshall, Crassus 101.
The measure did, in any case, merely put into effect a senatorial decree passed in early 56 (Cic.^F 2.3*5)»
4. Cf. Gruen, LGRR 230-33; contra; Ward, Crassus 269-72.
5. Dio, in his already noted ignorance of the meeting at Luca, suggests that Pompey and Crassus initially did not intend to extend .Caesar's command, but were compelled to do so by Caesar'ssupporters who threatened to oppose the lex Trebonia (Dio 39*33)j cf. Gelzer, Caesar 128 n.2. V/ard, Crassus 277, suggests , unconvincingly that Pompey and Crassus hoped, by not including Caesar's extension in the lex Trebonia, that the measure might encounter less resistance. . •
6. Ward, Crassus 283-4, sees in these moves a conspiracy between Crassus and the ^'optimates" to the disadvantage of Pompey and Caesar. He ignores the fact that Crassus' ties with Metellus Scipio almost certainly go back at least to 63, ;V/hen they made’ their joint nocturnal visit to* Cicero, and possibly, to 70, when
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Scipio was associated with Crassus* adfinis, Metellus Creticus, in the defence of Verres. Ward's use of the term "optimate" is in any case elastic. Scipio was a hitter enemy of M.Cato (Plut.Cat.7*1-2), and, as has been shown, almost certainly a triumviral candidate for the praetorship. That P.Crassus succeeded Lucullus is more likely to be due to his gens than to any political associations.
7. See the convincing arguments of A.D. Simpson, TAPA 1938, 532-41, who shows that confusion with a similar set of events and names in 131/130 recorded by the Livian epitomator may have led the later writers astray.
8. Meyer, Caesars Monarchie I6I; Heitland, RR 3*229* Contra; Gruen, Hist 1969,’"100-3.
9* Münzer, RE 3*2850; Syme, RR 45; contra; Gruen, Hist 19&9, 101-3»
10. Cf. Tyrrell and Purser, Corr.Cic. 2 ad loc.IpA. Cf. E.Rawson, Hist 1973, 219-39*11. Ciaceri, Cicerone 2.112-127, tries to represent the trial as a triumviral attack on Scaurus. E.Courtney, Philologue 1961,151-6, sees the trial as a resurgence of the Marian-Sullan struggle, with family loyalties from that time determining present positions. There are, however, as many exceptions detectable to this rule as observances, if not indeed more. Meier, RPA I8, takes .the case as evidence for the essential unanimity of the Roman nobility,but this example would seem exceptional rather than typical.Cf. Gruen, LGRR 332-7*
12. If Messalla did stand in 55, he must have been opposed toAp.Claudius, since they were both patricians. This would confirm the impression that Appius was not aligned with Ahenobarbus until well into 54. The latter and Messalla, both connected with the boni, may have been opposed to the triumvirs, and Appius and Ampius Balbus friendly.
13* Gruen, Hommages Renard 2.315»
l4. Ahenobarbus had an hereditary interest in Gaul. His grandfatherhad helped to organise Gallia Narbonensis in the first place(MRR 1.524), and his father had been a co-founder of Narbo Martius in 118 (MRR 2.644).
15. The credit for the identification belongs to Shackleton Bailey 
Cic .Earn, ad loc ■ ^ Ciw)
16. Meyer, Caesars Monarchie, 191-7; 207-11 ; D.-G. 2.4-8; cf, Mommsen, HR 4 297, 302.
17* Cf. MRR 2.233; Taylor, PPAC 23O-I.
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Ch. X
18. It could be interesting to speculate whether Pompey might not infact have had a hand, indirectly, in Crassus* downfall in the East. The motive was certainly there; so tod the means, in his immense influence and clientela. Ariamnes, who appears to have been achief agent of the disaster, was a client of Pompey (Plut,Cr,21.1-2;22.l).
Ch. XI
Cf. Earl, Ti.Gracchus 91-3; Gruen, PPCC 56-8; Stockton,The Gracchi 81-4»
2. Cf* Syme, Sallust 19; JRS 1944, 96-7; Adcock, Crassus 13®
3. Cf. Gruen, AJAH 1977, 119-21®
4® Cf® Syme, RR 28-46; R.Seager, Pompey l88.
5® Cf® Syme, ^  28-31; Badian, FC 228-9; Seager, Pompey 2.
6. Syme, RR 22,40; Holmes, RR 1*309®
7® Gruen, LGRR 71—4®
8. C.Claudius Pulcher had command of some of Caesar's troops in Italyin early 58 but there is no record of his presence in Gaul (Cic.Sest.4l).
9. Even M.Piso may have needed Pompey's help more than most nobles. His praetorship had been at least ten years earlier.
10. ^  2A, 870ff.; 3.12691.
11. Cf. Syme, RR 51-2.
12. E.g. C.Calvisius Sabinus, Sex.Appuleius, L.Autronius Paetus, C.Carrinas, M.Messalla.
13. Cf. Groag, ^  13.283ff«; Syme, RR 303, 308-IÔ® One other incident that may.have served to trigger•Octavian's "restoration of the republic" is the obscure, affair, of Q.Cornelius Gallus, Prefect of Egypt. He was 'prosecuted for treason, disowned by Octavian, and committed suicide (Jerome, Chron.l64H; Dio 53.23*7)• It is just possible that there may have been some link between Crassus and Gallus. The tomb of the Crassi contained one "Licinia P«f~. Galli (uxor)" (CIL.6.21308). Certainty is impossible. M.Crassus disappears from history after his triumph, and indeed is tactfully never mentioned at all by so loyal a historian as Velleius.
— 2y4 —
Notes to pages 226 - 235 
Appendix A
1. Ward, Crassus 81.
2® Cf® lunia Tertia or Tertulla, daughter of D.Silanus, cos® 62® Vespasian's paternal grandmother was a Tertulla, wife of T. Flavius Petro, a Pompeian centurion from Reiti (Suet.Vesp.1.2). Attempts to see Tertulla as a contraction of Terentilla are unlikely, though such diminutives are found; cf® "Mucilla" (Catullus 113.2).
3® Cf. Adcock, Crassus 2.
4. Munzer, ^  13*1, 291; Gelzer, Caesar 132; Syme, RR 22 n.1;36 n.3®
5. MRR 2.217; Supp.34; Mattingly, Num.Chr* 1956, 20f«
6. Willems, Le Sénat 1.536.
7. Cf. Sumner, Orators in Brutus 149-50; Ward, Crassus 55-7,esp® n.39, which shows that the coin issued by P.Crassus need not mean that he was quaestor in 55#
8. Ward, Crassus 203-4®
9. Ward, Crassus 203 n®35; cf. Syme, RR 369#
Appendix B
1® It seems best to give all figures in one currency and denomination.All subsequent suras will be given in sesterces. It is assumedthat the denarius, which was four sesterces, was equivalent to thedrachma, and that there were approximately 24,000 HS to the talent.
2. Wiseman, New Men 66-7*
3. Cf. T.Frank, ESAR 393-4, on the sizes of private fortunes in theRepublic•
4® It is amusing to note that Badian, Roman Imperialism, who insiststhat Pliny's is the version to take here (109 n.201, studiously ignores, for the purposes of his argument, Pliny's assessment of Crassus* wealth which comes in the same passage, and quotes only Plutarch's (8l-3). In each case the lower "figure is preferred, Pliny refuting Plutarch in the one, and vice versa in the other.
5® Watson, Hist 1958, 113®
6. T.Frank, ESAR 1.393-
7® Adcock, Crassus 22-3» Ward, Crassus 86.
8. Badian, Roman Imperialism 82. Cadoux, G & R 195.6, I61, more reasonably suggests that there was probably little in it.
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Appendix B
9» Suetonius asserts that Caesar and Pompey shared a bribe of150,000,000 HS from Ptolemy Auletes (Suet*Iul.54.2). It is notcertain however that Crassus may not have received a share.
10. An alternative reading is Heracleensem legionem. The same point would apply-
11. A reference by Tacitus to the lands, clients, and "nominis favor" of the Crassi in Istria may not have any bearing on the Republic (Hist 2.72),
12. It has been suggested that Pompey*s debts about provinces in 55» "Syriam spernens, Hispaniam iactans" (Cic.Att.4.9.1), mayreflect an interest on Crassus* part in having Spain for himself.The suggestion that he was inspired, by Caesar's exploits and byfaulty notions of geography, with a desire to use Spain as a stepping stone to the conquest of Ireland seems unlilcely;C.E.Stevens, Latomus 1955, l4~21.
15. Casson, Macedonia, Thrace and Illyria 76.
14. T.Frank, ESAR 1.257»
15. E.J.Phillips, Latomus 1973, 86-95»
16. Since Crassus* father was not a rich man, it is likely that thehouse on the Palatine that Crassus sold to Cicero was the only house he had inherited (Gell.NA.12.12.2;Cic.Fam.5.6.2). If Plutarch is right, it must be assumed that his one piece of personal building was at least an adequate replacement for that house and must have been built by 62.
17» Cf. J.H.D'Arms, Romans on the Bay of Naples.
18, Frank, ESAR I.385.
19» Cf. Yavetz, Latomus' 1958, 500-17»
20, Ciaceri, Cicerone 2.18-19; Parrish, Phoenix 1973, 357-80.
Appendix C
1. Cf. A.G.Lee, Introduction to his edition of Cicero's Stoic Paradoxes. Cf. A.Oltramare, Les origines de la diatribe Romaine.
2. Plutarch gives the maxim Crassus admired as ' ovl > irAouirkdv' 6LV*L vov , ' and Cicero's counter­
quotation as “ oTL 'TT^ V'ra • 'to'O (ToSo'V . , . eivaL • • (Cici25.44.' ■ ' . ■, -   . ! . .  . : 7 . . .
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